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Note
The following work is based on a variety of texts. The intent, in quoting them, has 
never been to fully reconstruct their content, but rather to extract key arguments for the 
discussion. I apologise if some authos may appear to have been mutilate.
Quotations, if not otherwise indicated in the bibliography, were taken from their 
English translations. When these latter were not available, I translated them myself and 
indicated it in the text. In a few cases, when to translate was, for various reasons, 
inopportune, I left the quotations in their original language.
References to ancient classical texts are made unsing the system “title plus 
reference”. For example,
{Poetics, 1447a 20) indicates passage 1447a 20 of Aristotle’s Poetics.
(Resp. 519c.ff) indicates passage 519c and following of Plato’s Republics
More recent texts, instead, are quoted using the system “author plus year of the first 
edition plus chapter (when preceded by a comma) or page number (when preceded by a 
colon)”. For instance,
(Nietzsche 1887,1, 6) indicates Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morals, part I, section 6
(Flood 1996:147) indicates instead page 147 of Flood’s Political Myth.
Finally, the text is most often feminised, a part from the few cases when this might 
have distorted an author’s thinking or attitude.
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After reading John Rawls’ Theory o f Justice or Habermas’ Faktizität und 
Geltung, perhaps the two major books in political philosophy of the last fifty years, one 
could emerge with the impression that politics is an activity always potentially involving 
rational individuals meeting other rational individuals. In whatever ways rationality is 
conceived, as either rationality in respect to ends and values or as communicative 
rationality, the image of politics resulting from these works is that of an activity which 
can and should be guided by rational procedures.
When one looks at the everyday activity that goes under the heading o f '‘politics”, 
one is confronted with quite a different picture. People involved in this activity are not so 
easily persuaded to adopt rational procedures of communication and decision. Quite 
often people seem rather to act on the basis of a-rational elements, some other kinds of 
powerful symbols and images of the world, which are not taken into account by a purely 
rationalist approach to politics.
On the other hand, there are some events, for instance when people show a 
willingness to sacrifice their own lives that openly clashes with a rationalist image. The 
twentieth century, with the rise of totalitarianism and its two world wars contains 
countless examples. All the same, while the grandiose parades of totalitarian regimes 
exhibited the power of a-rational elements such as myths and symbols in a patent way, 
there seems to be some reasons to suspect that they still operate. Despite the fact that 
their presence is not always as conspicuous, they could still be there exercising their 
power in a more subtle way.
Scholars of different proveniences have long since recognised the important 
political role played by a-rational elements. Sociologists, historians and anthropologists, 
each in their own way, have devoted an important part of their work to the analysis of 
these kinds of phenomena. Anthropologists have always been dealing with such issues. 
As external observers catapulted into remote regions of the world they were perhaps in
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the best position to do so: their foreignness to the “primitives” made the myths and 
symbols of these peoples conspicuous to their eyes. Furthermore, in the study of archaic 
and traditional societies, the presence of such phenomena seemed to be the obvious 
consequence of the fact that politics could hardly be separated from religion in these 
societies.1
Historians also have long since dealt with such phenomena, at least from M. 
Bloch’s Le rois thaumaturges (Bloch 1924) and E. Kantorowicz’ s seminal work on the 
medieval political theology (Kantorowicz 1957). In particular these two works, by 
starting from the very observation that rulers share some properties with gods, opened 
the path for a new series of study on the mythical and symbolic dimension of power.
But all these studies were still confined to traditional or archaic societies where 
the influence of myths and symbols could still be attributed to the proximity between 
politics and religion that characterises these societies. Sociology has also been dealing 
with these topics for a long time: one just has to think o f Durkheim’s sociology or 
Weber’s works on charisma. However, whilst Weber was aware of the possibility of 
new prophets,3 by moving from his prediction of an iron cage, one could assume that 
modem politics, with its increasing rationalisation and bureaucratisation, had become 
immune to their influence: in a bureaucratic iron cage there seems to be prima facie  little 
space for myths and symbols. As far as politics is seen as prey of “specialists without 
spirits” (Weber 1905), one could well suspect that there is no more need for myth and 
symbols.
However, relatively recently, a new series of studies focusing on the mobilising 
power of myth and symbols in modem politics has emerged. The rise of identity politics 
and the revival of nationalism o f the last decades have perhaps rendered manifest that, to 
paraphrase Geertz, the extraordinary has not gone out of modem politics, however much 
of the banal may have entered it. On the other hand, the emphasis on constructivism and 
the linguistic turn has given rise to a new interest in the symbolic dimension of social 
phenomena. As a consequence, titles such as ‘The invention of x” or ‘The symbolic *
1 See for instance the classical Malinowski 1948 or, more recently, Geertz 1983. Both Geertz and 
Malinowski deal however with myths under the general category of political symbolism rather than on 
political myth specifically.
* On this point, see in particular Eisenstadt’s collection of Weber’s works on charisma and institution 
building (Weber 1969). However, as we will see, all these works were not dealing with the specific notion of 
political myth.
* Most famously see the end of Die Protestantishe Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (Weber 1905).
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construction of y  and z” are quite common today.4 The result of this new emphasis is 
indeed a striking number of publications containing the word “myth” and “symbols”.
The exponential number of publications on this topic would suggest the existence 
of a refined and consolidated theoretical framework for their use. On the contrary, it 
seems as if there is not yet one. In particular, whereas there is a vast theoretical literature 
generally dealing with the symbolic dimension of power, the different forms of political 
symbolism are rarely dealt with separately. To deal with these phenomana under the 
common headings such as “the extraordinary” or “the symbolism of power” (Geertz 
1983) can be misleading, because it can come to suggest that all that is not rational is 
symbolic or extraordinary.
Indeed, headings such as ‘The Symbolic Uses of Politics” (Edelman 1976) or 
‘The Construction o f Society” (Cohen 1985) quite often end up unifying very different 
phenomena - in particular, symbolism, generally understood, and myth. The problem, 
however, is that myths and symbols do not coincide. Despite the fact that myth operates 
with symbols, the two concepts of myth and symbol must be kept and treated separated: 
to conflate the two would mean to lose the specificity o f myth. Indeed if myths operate 
through symbols, not all symbols are myths: the sequence of letters of a mathematical 
equation is also a symbol, but nobody -  or only very few - would argue that it is a myth. 
To put it in Cassirer’s words, symbols, in this sense, are the transcendental conditions of 
the human mind: myth, science, language itself, are all “symbolic functions” , i.e. 
functions of the human mind through which only the multiplicity of experience can be 
grasped and communicated (Cassirer 1925).
It is precisely the conflation between these concepts that has generated most of 
the confusion surrounding this topic. In turn, this has also generated a great reluctance to 
use the concept o f myth at all - particularly as related to the realm of politics. Why make 
recourse to such a concept as cumbersome such as myth, and not recur instead to other 
concepts such as “tales”, “narratives” or “legends”?
Much of this work will be devoted to showing that to make recourse to such 
substitutes is neither possible nor necessary. It is not possible, because all of these 
alternatives are inadequate for conveying the semantic complexities of the concept of 
myth. Indeed, the word myth has been used - and abused -  in so many different and
4 See in particular “The Invention o f Tradition" by the historians Hobsbawm and Ranger (Hobsbawm and 




various ways. In front of the varieties of the conceptions o f myth, more that fifty years 
ago E. Cassirer recalled the scene of the witch’s kitchen in Goethe’s Faust: Faust, 
waiting for the drink by virtue of which he shall regain his youth, stands in front of an 
enchanted glass and has the wonderful vision of a woman of supernatural beauty. Faust is 
enraptured and spellbound, but Mephisto, standing at his side, scoffs at his enthusiasm 
because he knows that what Faust has seen is not a real woman but only a creature of his 
mind (Cassirer 1946:5). Myth, Cassirer suggests, is a sort of enchanted glass in which 
each scholar has found the objects with which he is more familiar: the linguist found in it 
a world of signs and names, the psychologists a product of the unconscious, the 
philosophers both the opposite of philosophy and a form of primitive philosophy and so 
on. Hence the varieties of conceptions o f myth and therefore also the complexity o f the 
semantic area covered by the term. Yet, when faced with this complexity, one cannot 
simply disregard it.
Indeed, it is precisely because of this complexity that none of the above 
mentioned alternative candidates is suitable. A myth is not a simple tale, because there 
are plenty of tales that are not mythical. The Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer are 
not myths -  they might have referred to myths, they might have worked as myth in the 
past but, they do not seem to operate as myths any longer. On the other hand, myth is not 
coextensive with the concept of narrative either: it suffices to think of all the failed 
myths, that is of all the narratives that did not succeed in acquiring the status ¿ t myth. 
But a myth is not a legend either, because there are myths that are not legends, and vice 
versa. We can talk of the “myth of the French Revolution”, but nobody would talk o f the 
“legend of the French Revolution”. At least, one can argue, that those who use the 
expression “the legend of the French revolution” mean something different from what is 
understood by “the myth of the French revolution”. In particular, the former seems to 
imply some mystifying impact that is not necessary implied by the latter.
Finding a substitute for myth is not only impossible: it is also unnecessary. As for 
political myth, there is indeed today a vast literature that, from different perspectives, 
looks at the role that myths play in politics. Still there is a striking asymmetry in the state 
o f the art on this topic. On the one hand, there is an ever growing literature dealing with 
specific case studies -  beginning with the pioneering studies of the 1960s by Norman 
Cohn and Eric Hobsbawm on the role o f eschatological myths in peasant rebellion (Cohn
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and Hobsbawm 1963) and the long series of studies on nationalism.5 On the other hand, 
there are very few theoretical studies clarifying the way in which we use the concept of 
political myth and, even less so, dealing with the question o f why this concept should be 
used at all.
In particular, whereas there is today an overwhelming number of historical and 
sociological works dealing with specific case studies, political philosophy seems to be 
reluctant to take the concept of political myth as an object o f specific inquiry. Moreover, 
most o f the few contemporary works that have undertaken this task, they have done so by 
treating political myth under headings such as “political symbolism” or, recently, “veil 
politics” . Ajume H. Wingo, criticising Rawls’s liberalism, had recourse to the metaphor 
of “veil politics” in order to vindicate the importance and legitimacy of elements such as 
monuments, flags, national heroes, political myths and rituals (Wingo 2003). According 
to Wingo, not only “veils” do operate in liberal democratic societies, but it could not be 
otherwise: they are a crucial means of political persuasion and propaganda and are not 
incompatible with the principle of individual autonomy, if they meet the criterion of 
consensus from all sectors of a nation. The problem, though, with this view is that by 
unifying under the heading of “veil politics” such different phenomena as flags, rituals, 
national heroes and political myths, not only does one lose the specificity of political 
myth, but one also risks ending up in a generalised defence o f all sorts o f “veils”, and 
thus also of normatively problematic practices such as the cult o f national heroes.
The reluctance of political philosophy to specifically focus on the concept of 
political myth is particularly striking in light of the tradition o f philosophical studies on 
the concept of myth. Indeed, if the philosophical literature on political myth is very 
limited, the literature on myth without further qualification is endless.6 Myth has been the 
object of much of Western speculation: the other side of philosophy, the side against 
which philosophy as an intellectual enterprise has defined itself, but also that 
cumbersome other side that has continually recurred through the centuries, despite all 
attempts to rationalise it. Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of myth, both enlightened 
thinkers arguing for the dismissal of mythical thinking and the nostalgic romantics
5 On myth and nationalism, there is now an explosive literature. Among those who have paid particular 
attention to the role of myths in national identities, see in particular A.D. Smith (Smith 1986; 1991; 1999). 
Among the historians, see for instance Strith 2000.
6 As a first approximation, see Bohrer 1983, Fuhrmann 1971, Poser 1979 or Jamme 1991.
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advocating for its renovation,7 have rarely deal with political myth expressly, i.e. with 
the specific role that myth plays in politics.
Indeed there is no vast tradition of philosophies of political myth. This can be due 
in part to the fact that it is only under the conditions of modernity that the specifically 
political role played by myth emerges as a topic: whereas in archaic societies political 
myths are hardly distinguishable from religious myths, it is only in modem societies, 
with the separation of politics from its religious anchorage, on the one hand, and with its 
démocratisation on the other, that the role of specifically political myths becomes 
conspicuous. To put it in Sorel’s words, when it comes to explaining typically modem 
phenomena such as big social movements, the fact that the people participating in them 
represent their action in the form of grand narratives assuring their success is so evident 
that there seems to be little need to insist on it (Sorel 1980: Introduction, 3).
In spite of this conspicuousness, there seems to be something in the concept of 
political myth that renders it recalcitrant to a philosophical treatment. Indeed, if one 
looks for the classical theories of political myths, one discovers that philosophers 
themselves have dealt more with singular political myths that with political myth in 
general: the theory of political myth that can be derived from Sorel’s Réflections sur la 
violence or from Cassirer’s The Myth o f the State are indeed generated by a reflection on 
specific political myths: the proletarian general strike and the myth of the Aryan race 
respectively (Sorel 1908, Cassirer 1946). Indeed, it seems as if political myths have an 
intrinsically particularistic nature, which has not favoured the proliferation o f a 
philosophical reflection on this topic.
On the other hand, there is nothing which would a priori hinder a philosophical 
treatment of political myth. In particular there are today different philosophical 
conceptions of myth that have stressed this particularistic nature of myth. Among them, 
Hans Blumenberg’s concept of Arbeit am Mythos is perhaps the theory better suited to 
capturing this particularistic nature and that can thus better serve in seeking to understand 
political myth (Blumenberg 1979). A myth, Blumenberg sustained, is not a product that 
is given once and for all, but rather a process, a process of continual reworking on a basic 
mythologem, which takes place in time and reflects the changing of circumstances. If 
myth consists in the working on myth (Arbeit am Mythos), not only are there no single
7 I am here obviously referring to the concepts of Enlightenment and Romanticism as general categories of 
the spirit, rather than as historical movements.
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myths, given once for all, but the same mythologem also changes over time because on 
each occasion it is re-appropriated by different needs and exigencies: a myth must 
always answer a need for significance (Bedeutsamkeit) in order to work as a myth so 
that, if it cannot do so, it simply ceases to be a myth (Blumenberg 1979).
Blumenberg, however, puts forward his theory more through a phenomenological 
analysis of single myths rather than through the development of a systematic theory of 
myth. In particular he focuses mainly on literary myths and does not specifically deal 
with political myth. Furthermore, the debate that followed the publication of his Arbeit 
am Mythos did not provide a theory of political myth either. The overall German 
Mythosdebatte, the philosophical debate that took place in Germany from the 1970s 
onwards, rich as it is in theoretical insights and stimulations, does not, however, 
specifically focus on political myth.8 9 Thus even if Blumenberg’s Arbeit am Mythos can 
be used as a basis for a theory of political myth, the political scope of his theory remains 
generally on the background and is not explicitly problematised.
The aim of this work is to contribute filling up the gap between philosophical 
theories of myth on the one hand and the social sciences’ literature on political myth on 
the other. Among the latter, together with the huge body o f literature devoted to single 
case studies there are also some works specifically devoted to political myth. Tudor’s 
Political Myth is however conceived more as an introduction than as an attempt to 
provide a theory of political myth (Tudor 1972). As a political scientist, Tudor discusses 
the various theories of myth and the few classical theories o f political myth, with the 
explicit intent o f an introductory work, i.e. to simply draw attention to a common, but 
often neglected type of political argument (Tudor 1972).
More recent attempts to develop a theory of political myth can be found in 
Lincoln’s Discourse and the Construction o f Society and Flood’s Political Myth, 
However, both Lincoln and Flood tend to define political myth in terms of their claims to 
truth -  and this, even if they do not claim that myth is necessary false, is problematic 
from different points of view. Lincoln looks rather at myth in general, but also focuses on 
the specific “politics of myth”. However he defines myths as those kinds o f narratives 
that possess credibility and authority, where a narrative possessing authority is “one for
8 On Blumenberg’s concept of re-appropriation (Umbesetzung) see Blumenberg 1971 andLeghissa 2002.
9 The only exception is perhaps Odo Marquard: in his article on the Lob der Polytheismus he uses
Blumenberg’s insights over the pluralistic character of myth for a defence of each form of Polymythie against
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which successful claims are made not only to the status of truth, but, what is more, to the 
status of paradigmatic truth” (Lincoln 1989:24). Similarly Flood, who specifically 
focuses on political myth understood as synthesis between political ideology and 
religious myths, defines political myth as “an ideologically marked narrative which 
purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and 
which is accepted as valid in its essential by a social group” (Flood 1996:44; emphasis 
mine).
However, to define myth in general and political myth in particular in terms o f its 
“truth” means to bring it to a terrain that is not its own. As Ludwig Wittgenstein has 
pointed out, a myth is not a scientific hypothesis over the constitution of the world. To 
put it in Wittgenstein’s terms, they do not aim at putting forward a theory and cannot 
therefore be approached from the standpoint of their truth or falsity (Wittgenstein 
1967b). Following the second Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language it may be said that 
to interrogate myths from the standpoint of their true or false account means to assume 
too limited a view o f what human language and meanings are about: human beings are 
ceremonious animals that with their language perform innumerable actions that are not 
based on any opinion about the constitution of the world and that do not therefore 
advance any claim to truth (Wittgenstein 1967b).
With regards to Flood’ and Lincoln’s theories of political myth one could thus 
simply reject them and have recourse to Wittgenstein’s criticism of Fraser (Wittgenstein 
1967b). Readers wishing to follow this route may skip the first part of this work and start 
by reading Chapter 4. This Chapter reconstructs Wittgenstein’s critique of Fraser’s 
Golden Bough and thus shows the shortcomings of an approach to myth in terms of truth, 
and by discussing the second Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language points to the an 
alternative view o f language and meaning better suited a theory o f political myth.
The problem however remains that Flood’ and Lincoln’s reflect quite a common 
attitude in the social sciences and contains important remarks as to the way in which 
political myths work within a society: a philosophy of political myth would therefore 
result enormously impoverished if it refused to engage with them. Moreover, these views 
also seem to reflect quite a common attitude towards myth. Indeed, what characterises 
the social sciences is the fact that that they tend to take their objects as given, i.e. to move
any forms of Monomythie (Marquard 1979). Marquard’s article seems to be however more devoted to make 
an argument against the regime of the DDR than to develop a general theory of political myth.
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from the term “myth” as it is commonly employed. Thus, even if Flood and Lincoln 
claim to take distance from from the common view o f myth, they remain in fact 
entrapped in the definition of myth in terms of its claim to truth.
If we open the Oxford English Dictionary at the entry on “myth” we read: “7A. A 
purely fictitious narrative usually involving supernatural persons, actions, or events, and 
embodying some popular idea concerning natural and historical phenomena; LB . in 
generalized use, also an untrue or popular tale, a rumour. 2. A fictitious or imaginary 
person or object” (Simpson & Weiner 1989, X, 177). In both 1 and 2, myth is 
characterised in terms of “fictitiousness” and “untruth”, where “fictitious” -  always 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary -  does not simply means “artificial” , but also 
“counterfeit”, “arbitrarily devised”, “feigned to exist”, “imaginary”, “not real” (Simpson 
& Weiner 1985, V, 873). Three features seem therefore to characterise the common use 
of the term: fictitiousness, unreality, untruth.
Faced with the common usage of the term one cannot therefore simply refer to 
Wittgenstein and Blumenberg. A philosophy of political myth situates itself between 
social sciences and philosophy: if it cannot simply ignore the former which tend to take 
their objects as given, it can on the other hand have recourse to philosophy, which 
typically questions its objects. With regards to the definition of myth in terms of its 
untruth and unreality, the approach here adopted is philosophical and consists in 
reconstructing the genealogy of this view of myth (Part I) and showing why 
contemporary thinking, at least from Wittgenstein and Blumenberg, has the means for 
going beyond its presuppositions (Part II).
The genealogical method, as it has been defined by F. Nietzsche in his 
Genealogie der Moral, consists precisely in facing the problem of the meaning of a 
certain formation by looking at the circumstances in which it has been created and thus at 
the values that were at stake in this process (Nietzsche 1887: preface, 3). In this sense, a 
genealogy of myth is not a reconstruction of the history of myth, but rather a critique of 
myth aimed at discovering what the presuppositions are of the view of myth as untruth 
and unreality.
To this end, Chapter 1 moves from the recognition that in the Homeric culture 
mythos simply meant word and was thus used as a synonym of logos. In contrast to the 
narrative o f the birth of philosophy as exit from myth, this chapter argues that until the 
fourth century no opposition between mythos and logos is attested. Even if by the time of
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the sophistry the two terms began to be separated -  the former specialising in the 
meaning of “tale” and the latter in that of “discourse, calculation” they were not yet 
counterpoised from the point of view of their relationship to truth. Philosophers 
themselves, at least up to Plato, did not disdain to have recourse to myth. Even if the 
professionalisation of philosophy brought with it a critical stance on the part of certain 
philosophers towards the old mythological tradition, not even in Aristotle is there an 
identification of myth with untruth and unreality. Rather, mythoi are for Aristotle the 
constitutive elements of poetry whose essence is the mimesis of reality.
Clearly, it is a particular conception of truth and reality that is here at stake: the 
ancient Greeks conceived of truth as aletheia, literally “unhiddeness”, and it is only 
against this conception of the truth that we only can understand the plurality of Greek 
myths: whereas this plurality is a scandal to us and we keep asking ourselves “Did they 
really believe in their myths?”, their view of the truth allowed a plurality o f myths and of 
variants within a mythologem to simply coexist with each other. And it is because this 
plurality has been lost that the view of myth as untruth and unreal could have emerged.
Chapter 2 reconstructs one of the crucial moments for the development o f  the 
attitude to treating myths from the point of view of their claim to truth. When the logos 
became the revealed Word of a Unique God, the plurality of truth of ancient myths began 
to be condemned as deceitful. Indeed, in the monotheistic religion of the Book there 
seems to be something that is fundamentally hostile to the plurality of myth: this chapter 
argues that this consists in an absolute pretension to truth and uniqueness that leaves no 
space for the recognition of the polytheistic world of myth. The sacred logos thus finds 
itself caught in a dialectic, where, by condemning the plurality of myths, it presents itself 
as Holy History, i.e. as History in the singular, and thereby denies its own possible 
mythical nature. But once the principle of the free interpretation of the sacred logos is 
fully developed, it cannot but lead to the recognition of the mythical nature of the sacred 
logos itself and thus to the recognition o f a plurality of histories.
Another crucial moment is represented by the dialectic of the Enlightenment that 
is analysed in Chapter 3. Following the thesis exposed by Horkheimer and Adomo in the 
Dialetik der Aufklarung this chapter explores the dialectic in which any absolutisation of 
scientific logos, here analysed in the form of an ideal-typical Enlightenment, risks to fall 
(Adomo Horkheimer 1944). In particular it argues that the Enlightenment, by 
condemning myth for its subjectivity, hides the fact that myth is already “enlightenment”
15
inasfar as it concerns telling and finding out the origins o f things and, at the same time, it 
reinforces that separation between the knowing subject and the known object upon which 
scientific logos itself rests. It is from the point of view of the Enlightenment that myths 
are condemned not just as untruth, but also as imaginary and thus unreal. On the other 
hand, romantic theories of myth, with their call for a rehabilitation of myth understood as 
totality and as the vehicle for a divine revelation, rather than radically questioning 
Enlightenment simply inverts the axiological value of the dichotomy o f myth versus 
reason upon which Enlightenment itself rests.
However, reflections on the nature of language and meaning post linguistic-turn 
have gone beyond the presuppositions o f the dialectic of Enlightenment and also of the 
very opposition between an enlightened and a romantic view of myth (Chapter 4). In 
particular, the second Wittgenstein, which is a central author of the linguistic turn, has 
definitely shown that any distinction between an expressivist and a designative view of 
language is essentially flawed because meanings are only possible through language- 
games where no distinction between the two can be drawn.
Chapter 5, moving from both the genealogy of myth and the discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, tries to delineate a possible approach to myth which escapes 
both the dialectic of the sacred logos and that of the Enlightenment. In contrast to the 
criticism raised by the logos against the plurality of myth, the Chapter argues firstly in 
favour of an inter-relational approach to myth, i.e. of an approach that, following 
Blumenberg, focuses on the Arbeit am Mythos\ secondly, in contrast to the 
Enlightenment’s discourse about the unreality of myth it proposes to adopt a 
phenomenological approach which leaves the problem of reality between parentheses. 
Chapter 5 continues thus by pointing to four fundamental features of the working on 
myth: 1. it operates with figurative means, 2. it is not limited to a particular set of 
contents; 3. it coagulates around a narrative; 4.it answers and provides what Blumenberg 
has called Bedeutsamkeit, i.e. significance.
Blumenberg’s concept o f significance is discussed in Chapter 6. Myths provide 
names through which the unknown becomes first masterable, but they also provide 
narratives which, by inserting events into a plot, can produce and reproduce significance. 
This leads back to Gehlen’s characterisation of human beings as noch nicht festgestellte 
Tiere (Nietzsche): human beings in contrast to other animals, are not adapted to a 
specific environment. As a consequence they are not only weltoffen, and thus exposed to
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all sorts of stimulations from which they must seek relief through the creation of 
meaning, but they also interrogate themselves over the conditions of their own existence 
and must therefore make significance of them. As Kerenyi has also pointed out, the 
function of myth is begründen.
Chapter 7 serves as a passage from the preparatory parts dealing with myth in 
general to the parts specifically devoted to analysing the role that myth thus conceived 
plays in politics. In particular, to assume that, since political modernity has liberated 
politics from its religious anchorage, it must also have liberated it from myth means to 
take the point of view of Enlightenment, which assimilates myth and religions under the 
heading o f superstition. Myths however are not religion, and therefore they can be a 
possible means o f critique. By exploring the working of one of the most powerful myths 
of modem political theory, i.e. the myth of the state of nature, and the way in which the 
working on this myth changes in different authors and contexts, the chapter concludes 
that myth is not in principle incompatible with the idea of autonomy and that, as 
Rousseau’s uses of this myth shows, it can rather be an important means for critique.
This view of political myth clashes with the view emerging from Cassirer’s 
treatment of myth. His view is discussed in Chapter 8, which is devoted to reconstructing 
the classical theories of political myth. After rejecting Cassirer’s definition of political 
myth as collective desire personified because it is too dependent on the totalitarian 
model, on the one hand, and to the premises of Enlightenment on the other, the chapter 
focuses on Sorel’s theory of political myth as it emerges in his discussion of the general 
strike. With his emphasis on the pouvoir moteur of myth that makes sense -  but we 
would say significance - of the present by providing a vision of a future catastrophe, 
Sorel points to the fact that myth is not a description of things, but rather a determination 
to act. However he does so from the point of view of a problematic theory of two selves.
Looking within modem political theory one may find another author who has 
dealt with political myth and whose remarks on this regard seem to provide crucial 
insights for a philosophy of political myth that goes beyond any form of dichotomy of 
“mythos versus logos”. Baruch Spinoza is perhaps also from this point of view an 
anomaly of modernity. In his analysis o f the role played by prophecy in the constitution 
of the ancient state o f Israel, Spinoza points out that prophecy is a product of imagination 
understood as an idea produced on the basis of present o r past bodily impressions. 
Prophecy is thus valid because the prophet is morally certain of his knowledge and this
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moral certainty derives from the fact that he belongs to a community whose rules and 
laws he embodies. Thus, whereas for Cassirer myth is a form of regression into a 
primitive form of consciousness and social organisation, and for Sorel it is a means for 
progress, Spinoza seems to sustain that if myths operates in all societies, what they differ 
in is the degree to which these mythical beliefs are subject to open and free discussion.
To sum up, Chapter 9 concludes that a political myth can be defined as the 
working on a common narrative by which the members of a social group (or society) 
make significance of their political experience and deeds. Thus what makes out of a 
simple narrative a political myth is not its content or its claim to truth, but rather the fact 
that this narrative creates significance, it is shared by a group and can come to address 
the specifically political conditions in which this group operates. As a consequence the 
chapter argues that political myth must be kept distinguished at the analytical level from 
ideology, on the one hand, and from utopia on the other.
Chapter 10 looks instead at the consequences that this definition of political myth 
implies for the relationship between political myth and historical narratives. Even if both 
are constitutive of what Castoriadis has called the social imaginary and even if quite 
often they are intermingled, this chapter argues that the two categories must be kept 
separated: when we say that a certain historical narrative is a political myth we mean that 
this narrative has come to work in a particular way, i.e. as a narrative the makes 
significance o f certain political experiences and deeds.
Finally, Chapter 11 looks at the role that myth plays in the constitution of 
common identity. By critiquing Schmitt’s view of political myth as a symptom of the 
national energy, this chapter maintains that myth is not only the product but also the 
producer of common identities. Against Schmitt’s holistic treatment of identity, the 
chapter argues for a distinction between different forms of identity - identity with an 
adjective: personal, social, cultural and political identity, etc - without nevertheless 
ignoring the possible interactions between them. In particular, it is precisely the working 
on political myth, which plays a crucial role in the construction of common identities, 
that stresses how problematic it can be in reality to separate cultural from political 
identity.
This argument emerges again in the last chapter with the analysis o f some 
possible sites for the working of political myths today. There are narratives that do not 
contain anything political per se, but by working within certain contexts they can come to
18
create significance and to contribute to the shaping of common political identities. More 
than a definitive conclusion, this chapter puts forward some hypotheses as to the forms 
that the working on political myth could assume under the contemporary conditions of a 
globalised society of spectacle. There are reasons to suspect that it is precisely in our 
epoch, which has aspired to get rid o f the grand political narratives, that the working of 
political myth has become much more insidious than it has ever been in the past.
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I A GENEALOGY OF MYTH
According to a common view, myth is defined in terms of its untruth and 
unreality.10 The task of a genealogy of myth is to reconstruct the presuppositions of 
such a view. Following Nietzsche’s definition of the genealogical method (Nietzsche 
1887), a genealogy must address the question “what is x?” by, at the same time, asking 
“why we conceive of it in this way”. As Nietzsche pointed out, a genealogy faces the 
problem of meaning by looking at the circumstances in which it has been created and 
thus at the values that were at stake in its creation (Nietzsche 1887: preface, 3).11
In this sense, genealogy is a form of critique (Nietzsche 1887: preface, 7). In 
contrast to the type of critique developed by Kant, however it does not aim at providing 
a transcendental fundament. A transcendental critique, according to Nietzsche, can 
easily turn into the opposite of the critique, i.e. into the hypostatisation of a 
particularistic view and of the values that it presupposes (Nietzsche 1885, V). As 
Nietzsche puts it in the letter to Overbeck of the 4th of January 1888, the genealogical 
method aims to set up a critique of a given formation through the “artificial isolation” 
of some of its different hearths {verschiedenen Entstehungsheerde) (Nieztsche 1984: 
224).
Therefore, the following genealogy of myth must not be understood either as 
a history o f myth or as a simple reconstruction of the origin of myth. In particular, 
inasfar as it aims at isolating some o f the different hearths that generated the view of
10 See for instance myth in the Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson & Weiner 1989, X, 177). For a wider 
discussion, see Introduction.
11 On the relationship between meaning and values in Nietzsche’s genealogical method, see Deleuze 1962,
1,1.
myth as untruth and unreality from which we started, the genelogy proposed will not 
focus on the continuity of the history of myth, but rather on its discontinuities.
In their Dialektik der Aufklärung, Horkheimer and Adorno put forward the 
thesis of a mutually dialectic constitution of myth and logos (Adomo & Horkheimer 
1944). As has been observed, the approach they have developed in this book is an 
example of a Nietzschean genealogy (Habermas 1985, 5). However, whereas they 
applied the genealogical method to the Aufklärung in order to show how it constitutes 
itself by rejecting the myth, a genealogy of myth rather starts from myth and looks at 
the different hearths that produced such a view.
As a consequence, the foilwing genealogy of myth focuses on the way in 
which myth is related to the logos understood in different ways -  first as logos without 
further specification (Chapter 1), then as sacred logos (Chapter 2) and, finally, as 
scientific logos (Chapter 3). This has many important consequences that will become 
clear later on. Now, suffice is to say that whereas Horkheimer and Adomo move from 
Aufklärung, i.e. modem rationality, and then project it back to the Greek logos, in order 
to show the continuity between the two, a genealogy of myth, rather, moves from the 
Greek mythos and then tries to reconstruct the discontinuities o f its genealogy
Starting from the Greek mythos may appear arbitrary from the point of view 
of its spatial temporal limitation (Jamme 1999). A reply to this objection is implicit in 
the concept of genealogy sketched above. A genealogy does not aim at any kind of 
exhaustiveness -  in either space or time, nor at setting up a comparison between the 
ways in which different cultures across the globe have conceived of myth. It merely 
seeks to interrogate a certain view of myth, namely a view that identifies it with 
“unreality and untruth”, and then, by looking for its discontinuities, tries to reconstruct 
its presuppositions.
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1. MYTHOS AND LOGOS
Mythos is a Greek word and it originally meant “word, speech”. According to 
certain etymologists, it derives from a popular expression constituted by the 
onomatopoeic sound ma- (the sound that we produce with a closed mouth), and the 
common suffix -thos. In the Homeric poems, mython eeipe is, for instance, the 
standard expression used to mean “he said”, without adding any further connotations 
(Tebben 1994, 902; 1998, 1155).12 3 In these poems, the primary meaning of the term is 
that o f “word, speech”, even though, as secondary meanings, the term is used in the 
sense o f “public speech”, and also “dialogue, conversation” or “tale, narration” (Liddell 
& Scott 1968, 1151).
Thus, by the time o f the composition of the Homeric poems -  a time that most 
interpreters collocate around the eighth century BC, the semantic area of the Homeric 
“mythos” corresponded then to the area that would later be covered by the term 
“logos”.14 Indeed, whereas in the Homeric poems, the term logos is almost absent -  
there are only only two occurrences, one in the Iliad (XV, 393) and one in the Odyssey 
(I, 56), the term logos entered progressively into common usage up to a point when it 
took the semantic space once occupied by mythos. This latter began at the same time to
12 For a discussion of this etymology, see entries “mu-” and “mythos” in Chanteraine’s Dictionnaire 
Etymologique de la Langue Grecque (Chanteraine 1984:717 -718).
13 In the 153 occurrences mytho* of the Odyssey, we have mytho* eeipe 20 times and mytheomai, to tell, to 
speak, 37 times(Tebben 1994: 902); in the llias, there are 146 occurrences for the entry mytho*: the 
expression mytho* eeipe recurs 33 times and the verb mytheomai, “to tell appears 20 times (Tebben 1998: 
1155).
14 According to some interpreters, mythos in Homer would designate a specific kind of speech, namely an 
authoritative speech act -  the prototypes being the public declamation of the poet (Martin 1989). Despite 
these divergences, scholars agree on the basic meaning “word, speech” and therefore on semantic proximity 
between the two areas mythos, mytheomai and logos, legein -  as it is attested by the expressions that combine
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express the additional meaning of fanciful tales. According to Chanteraine, this passage 
is fully attested in the works of the tragedians and Plato: it is here that the term mythos 
tends to specialise in the sense of “fiction, mythe, sujet d ’une tragédie” (Chantraine 
1984: 718).
Thus, a genealogy of myth starts with “mythos” meaning simply “word, 
speech” and being thus almost a synonym of “logos”, while by Plato’s time a new 
meaning, together with the old one, has emerged. What happened in between? Which 
forces determined such a passage? According to a common view, it is the “birth of 
philosophy” that, by giving rise to a fundamentally new approach towards the world, 
determined the eclipse of the old mythological tradition and relegated the semantic 
ambit of mythos to that of pure “fiction”. In this view, the activity initiated in the Ionia 
of the seventh century BC by the first “naturalist philosophers”15 16represents the exit 
from the world o f myth. For the first time, these thinkers searched for a rational 
underlying principle of the world (arché) -  identifying it first with water (Thales), then 
with apeiron /<s(Anaximander) or finally with air (Anaximenes). In so doing, according 
to W, Nestlé, they rejected any mythological explanations and opened the Western road 
from “mythos to logos” (Nestlé 1942).
Thus, the argument about the “birth of philosophy” was linked with the idea 
of a Western development from “mythos to logos”. “Vom Mythos zum Logos” was the 
title of Nestlé’s very influential book and it well captures ideas that were widespread at 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Nestlé 1942; Burnet 1920). These views, 
elaborated in an epoch of crisis, served not only to provide an identity for the so-called 
European or Western civilisation, but also to supply an ideological covering for its 
political expansionism. That is to say, the argument concerning Europe as the 
birthplace of philosophy was used to justify the superiority of Western civilisation: 
even when the argument did not take the explicit form of a panegyric upon “the 
extraordinary intelligence of the Greek men” fathers to the European civilisation
the two areas, such as the above mentioned mythos eeipe or the verb mythologeuo, which simply meant “to 
tell words” (Liddell & Scott 1968:1150).
15 As we will see later on, this is Aristotle’s definition. Indeed, it was Aristotle who attributed to these figures 
both the status of first philosophers together with that of “naturalists” philosophers.
16 The term “m apeiron" is often translated with “the indefinite” (see for instance Kirk, Raven, Schonfield 
1983). Others more accurately translates with “Non -limited” (Freeman 1966). It literally means without 
boundaries, so that a good translation could be “boundless”.
23
(Burnet 1920:10), it lent itself openly to providing an ideological justification for 
European colonialism.17
The idea of a “Western road from mythos to logos” is still widespread. Kirk 
adds a question mark to the tile o f his essay “From myth to philosophy?” and thus 
vindicates his perplexities about the narrative of the “birth of philosophy” as a linear 
development from mythos to logos. These perplexities stem from his critical stance 
towards the idea of there being a sharp dichotomy between “mythos” and “logos” (Kirk 
1970, 1974: 277ff). All the same, he still maintains that the birth of philosophy does 
imply the dismissal of myth. As he radically concludes in his essay: “the organic use of 
myths has to disappear before philosophy becomes even a remote possibility” (Kirk 
1974: 279).
Jean-Pierre Vemant who also problématisés the idea of a linear ‘W estern exit 
from myth”, still argues that the “birth of philosophy” represents the “beginning of 
rational and positive thought” (Vemant 1965). His essay on La formation de la pensée 
positive dans la Grèce archaïque thus begins with the following words: “Rational 
thinking has a civil status {état civil); we know its date and place of birth: it is in the 
sixth century BC, in the Greek cities of Asia Minor that a completely positive, new 
form of reflection on nature emerged (Vemant 1965: 374; trans.mine).
In the following pages, Vemant continues by criticising the argument of 
those, like Burnet, who presented this passage as a sort of miracle that is explicable 
only in terms of the extraordinary intelligence of the “Greek man” (Vemant 1965: 374; 
Burnet 1920: 10). It was not a miracle, Vemant replies. Coming from the ranges of 
structuralist and Marxist historiography, he could not believe in miracles. Nevertheless, 
in his view, this event still represents “such a deep change in mentality” {changement 
de mentalité) that we should nevertheless see in it the “act o f baptism of Western man, 
the emergence of the true spirit, with the values that we” -  read Marxist structuralists -  
“can recognise in this term” (Vemant 1965, 11; transi, mine).
Such a change consisted, according to Vemant, in the fact that, with the so- 
called “naturalist philosophers” the explanans assumed for the first time, instead of
n It would seem that the term “civilization”, which implied from its very origins an opposition between 
“civilized” and “barbarian”, has never completely freed itself from this original connotation of the 
“superiority'’ of the “civilized” (Fisch 1992:688,785). Recent theories about the multiplicity of civilizations 
can thus be read as the (later) recognition that there is a plurality o f “civilized peoples”, but the concept of 
“civilization” still involves a fundamental judgement about superior and inferior forms of cultures. For a
""‘" " in f
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personified agents, the form of an abstract quality - as it is underlined by the new use of 
the article “ to* “ in expressions such as “the humid” or “the hot”. In other words, these 
thinkers were looking for “the hot”, a reality defined by the positive action of warming 
up, and not by some mythical power such as Hephaestus or any other mythical figure. 
Therefore, their theorising, according to Vemant, represents the moment when 
positivity invaded the being and led to the consequent dismissal of myth: “Among the 
physicians, positivity had at once invaded the totality of being, Gods and human beings 
included. Nothing real that is not nature” (Vemant 1965: 381; trans. mine).
Surprisingly this argument followed the recognition of some kind of 
continuity the between mythical tradition and the theories of the Ionians. For instance, 
Vemant recognises that there are some similarities between the conceptual structure 
employed by the Ionic physicians and by Hesiod’s cosmogony. In the first place, 
Hesiod had already presented the creation of the world by recurring to characters such 
as “chaos, the “earth”, the “sky”, which, as their names point out, can be interpreted in 
purely “naturalistic” terms. Even more: the conceptual apparatus of Hesiod’s 
cosmogony and the view of the world put forward by the Ionic philosophers seem to 
correspond in details. In both cases, the origin of the world is seen in terms of 1) chaos 
at the beginning; 2) the separation of pairs of opposites such as hot and cold, dry and 
humid, and so on, out of the primordial unity, and 3) the reunification and interaction 
between the opposites (Vemant 1965: 378; Comford 1952). Where, then, does the 
difference lie?
In other words: if, as Vemant maintains, the first philosophers were, by 
looking for the arche, searching for a deeper level of reality, something “beyond nature 
itself’ (Vemant 1965, 383), in what sense can these theories be said to be “positivist”? 
Otherwise stated, how could these philosophers have been so positivist if they 
recognised the existence of something real that is not “nature” itself? Vemant seems to 
recognise this impasse later on in his text and tries to escape from it by saying that even 
if these philosophers used the same conceptual apparatus of the old mythical tradition, 
they were doing so in a revolutionary way. According to Vemant, whereas in myth the 
separation between different levels o f reality generates confusion, in philosophy it 
brings clarity (Vemant 1965: 383),
critique of this concept, as it has been recently recovered in the so-called “axial age debate”, see Wagner 
2004.
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The argument at this stage cannot but give the impression o f circularity: the 
same conceptual system generates confusion in myth because it is a myth, whereas it 
leads to clarity in philosophy because it is philosophy. No other explanation of the 
difference between the two is yet available at this level o f the argument. To understand 
in what this difference consists, we have to wait for the pages where Vemant describes 
the emergence of cities. Here, the separation between the different levels o f reality 
operated by philosophy in contrast to myth acquires a new sense: the revolution is said 
to consist in the fact that with these theories ‘‘thinking” is completely separated from 
“physical reality” as if they had been separated by an axe (comme a la hache) (Vemant 
1965: 400) and that this separation at the level o f mental forms corresponds to the 
separation between society and nature that the emergence of the city realized at the 
level of the social forms (Vemant 1965 : 392).
Thus, according to Vemant, there is a strong connection between the birth of 
philosophy and the emergence of the “citizen”, because the city operates according to 
Vemant a separation between nature and society which the “presupposition o f rational 
thinking” (Vemant 1965: 392). Here therefore lies the greatest break with the world of 
myth: whereas this latter, according to Vemant, distinguished, but confused different 
levels of reality, philosophy clearly jusxtaposes physical reality to thinking itself, much 
as the polis, at the level of social forms, contrasts nature with society.
In Vemant’s view, then, it is not the presumed “superiority” of the “Greek 
man’s intelligence” that produced philosophy, but that of an entire political, economic 
and mental world -  a world that resulted from the changes which took place in the 
Ionia o f the seventh century BC. According to this view, whereas human beings were 
unable to distinguish between different levels of reality until the rise of philosophy, or 
at least they did so in a confused way, after this change of mentality, “thinking” 
became separated comme a la hache from physical reality (Vemant 1965, 400). 
Reason, on the one side, and physical reality, on the other: here were the beginnings of 
positive thinking, the act of “baptism o f Western man” (Vemant 1965).
It is very difficult to evaluate the different accounts of the “birth of 
philosophy”. The sources upon which they rest are very few and precarious in the sense 
that they are highly dependent on what later interpreters estimated as worth 
transmitting. We do not even possess fragments of their own texts: the so-called 
“fragments of the presocratics” are either ^testimonial, i.e. comments made by later
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authors on their theories, or “direct quotations”, i.e. quotations made by subsequent 
ancient authors. Doubts over a linear account of the “birth of philosophy” thus seem to 
be legitimate.
In the first place, one can observe that it is very difficult to see how the 
alleged separation “comme a la hache” between thinking and reality could ever be 
attributed to the so-called first naturalist philosophers. For instance, we have many 
signs that the separation of the logos, understood as “thinking”, and what Vemant calls 
“physical reality”, was unknown even to later philosophers. Indeed, such a separation, 
with which we are now so familiar, seems to be alien to ancient thought, since the term 
logos indicates a being and a thought at the same time (Abbagnano 1971:547). I will 
come back later to this point. If we look at the other side of Vemant*s presumed 
separation between “thinking** and “physical reality**, the problematic character of such 
a separation is even more manifest. The Greeks did not even have a word to designate 
what Vemant called “physical reality”, their corresponding terms being ousia and 
physis. Physis, however, indicates nature in the most general sense: the term derives 
from the verb phyein “to rise”, whish is in its turn etymologically linked to phainesthai 
“to show itself*. Physis is therefore literally “what shows itself*, “what comes to light** 
and thus indicates a much broader reality than a “physical positive reality”. The term 
ousia designates instead what we call “reality” but in the sense of the “immutable or 
true reality” i.e. reality understood as substance (Liddell & Scott 1968: 1274).18
On the other hand, it is not difficult to recognise in Vemant*s separation 
comme a la hache of the “logos** from “physical reality’* the modem separation of the 
knowing subject from the known object, which is at the basis of the modem 
gnosiological approach and which accompanied the birth of the modem science. 
Indeed, what seems to be at work here is a strategy of re-appropriation of the past in 
order to provide an identity for a much later cultural enterprise. By going back to 
Vemant’s words, one can say that what is at stake in the debate over “birth of 
philosophy” and in the narrative of a “Western road from myth to logos” is primarily 
the search for the civil status of Western rationality (Vemant 1965,373).
The emphasis given to the “birth of philosophy” as the greatest rupture in the 
passage from mythos to logos is linked to the fact that this moment worked over the
18 To bypass this difficulty, Vemant has to postulate a presumed split within the concept of physis (Vemant 
1965,381-382), a split that is not, however, supported by the sources and seems, on the contrary, to 
contradict the documented uses of the term physis.
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centuries as a powerful means for the self-identification of Western rationality. The 
idea o f “the birth” of philosophy has been used in order to provide Western rationality 
with an identity. This is clear in Husserl’s The Crises o f  the European Sciences: it it 
when faced with the European crisis that he moves back to the Greek nation of the 
seventh and sixth centuries BC, presenting it as the birthplace of the “spiritual shape o f 
Europe” (Husserl 1935). In Husserl’s view, the new “theoretical” attitude, to which the 
earliest Greek philosophy gave rise, not only helps to identify the “distinctive European 
spiritual shape”, but is also aimed at finding a possible cure for the crisis that this 
spiritual shape is facing. Thus, this re-appropriation of the past not only provides an 
identity to the “European sciences”, but also gives orientations for acting in the present.
In this way, Husserl followed a long-lasting strategy of self-definition through 
a reappropriation of the past. But what are the bases for saying that it is with the Ionian 
physicians that philosophy began? As we have seen, the sources that we possess for the 
reconstruction o f the thinking of the so-called presocratic philosophers depend on later 
testimonies. Among these latter, Plato and Aristotle played a primary role. Plato is, 
however, very vague in his quotations: he is much more interested in the dialectic 
confutation of the arguments exposed and, consequently, he often does not even quote 
the author. Instead, Aristotle indubitably paid greater attention to his predecessors, but 
the price we pay for this is that his reconstruction is strongly shaped by his own view 
of these philosophers as first steps towards the truth contained in his own philosophy.19
Standing behind the whole narrative of the “birth of philosophy” there is thus 
primarily the authority of Aristotle (Colli 1975,1977,1978a,b). Indeed, it was Aristotle 
himself who first spoke of Thales and the Ionians as the “first philosophers” and as the 
“naturalist philosophers”. This interpretation is developed at the beginning of his 
Metaphysics, where he puts forward his own view of that specific activity which would 
be called “philosophy” thereafter. After having described philosophy as the search for 
the first principle and causes (Met. 982a-b), he presents the conceptions o f Thales, 
Anaximenes and Anaximander as first steps in this search and therefore as the “first 
natural philosophers”..
Aristotle’s reconstruction o f the “birth of philosophy” has therefore the clear 
function of preparing the presentation of his own doctrine of the four causes. These
19 On this point, see for instance Adorno 1961a and Colli 1977,1978 a, b. In his philological work on the 
Presocratics, Colli sharply questions any naive reliance on Aristotle’s testimony.
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latter are presented as the final result of the previous speculation, and in particular of 
that of the first naturalist philosophers, so that it becomes, o f course, very difficult to 
judge where their alleged theories end and Aristotle’s begins. The influence of 
Aristotle’s authority on this point can hardly be overestimated. He played a major role 
not only in the interpretation of the work of the first “natural philosophers” but also in 
the presentation of the whole cultural enterprise that goes under the heading of 
“Western philosophy”. For centuries Aristotle’s words represented the act of baptism 
of the specific discipline designated as “philosophy” and for many also a crucial, if not 
the crucial, moment for the self-identification of the West itself.20
Some doubts can, however, be raised over this narrative as a whole. First, 
some scepticism seems legitimate because, as we have seen, the sources upon which 
this narrative rests are narratives whose authority is highly dependent on those, 
particularly Aristotle, who first formulated them and who were most often more 
interested in putting forward their own view of philosophy than in reconstructing the 
thinking of the Ionians. Second, since we know nothing about the silence surrounding 
those very few sources upon which this narrative rests, it might well be that some 
“philosophers” that did not fit into Aristotle’s reconstruction and in Aristotle’s 
definition of what it means “to be a philosopher” existed, but were simply neglected. In 
particular, if one assumes that philosophy means critique and is thus an attempt at 
providing a rational explanation of the world, then it is very unlikely that nobody else 
had already “philosophised” about the world apart from Aristotle’s “first naturalist 
philosophers”. To take Vemant’s example, it is very unlikely that human beings were 
all making recourse to Hephaestus in order to explain the phenomenon of “the hot” .
On the other hand, even in the case of the “philosophers” presented by 
Aristotle, there are good reasons for questioning his reconstruction. For instance, in the 
case of Thales’ thinking, there is a fragment that suggests an alternative interpretation 
to Aristotle’s. According to this fragment, Thales would have said that “all things are 
full of gods” (panta plera theon einai) (Diels & Kranz 1938, Fragm. 22; Kirk, Raven & 
Schofield 1983, 95). This fragment seems indeed to refer to a view that comes close to 
what Vemant called a “mythical conception of reality”, i.e. one where different levels
20 Husserl’s approach, as we have seen, is paradigmatic from this point of view (Husserl 1935). More 
recently, for instance the narrative of the “birth of philosophy” has entered the debate about the European 
identity. According to some interpreters, “the birth of philosophy” is precisely what characterizes the specific 
“spiritual shape” of Europe. For a general reconstruction of this debate, see Friese and Wagner 2002.
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of reality are fused together. Despite the obscurity of the formulation and the 
consequent difficulty in providing any univocal interpretation of this fragment, it seems 
clear, however, that we are a long way away from the image of the “positivist natural 
philosopher”.
Finally, as has been recently pointed out, the idea of the “birth of philosophy” 
as an exit from myth, contrasts with the fact that even in later sources “mythos” can 
never be said to be totally “irrational”, and no “philosophy” is totally deprived o f 
mythical elements (Morgan 2000). Not only, thus, as we have seen, were the 
conceptual tools of the so-called first philosophers not very dissimilar from, let us say, 
those of Hesiod’s, but -  furthermore - the very fact that later “philosophers” often 
recurred to myths in their writings is a sign that the boundaries between “mythos” and 
“philosophy” were far from clearly delineated (Morgan 2000).
The fact that philosophers themselves make recourse to mythical narratives 
when dealing with philosophical issues should not come as a surprise. The presocratics 
were considered sophoi. The sophos was a figure in between poet and shaman, more 
precisely someone who excelled in knowldge (see Colli 1975, 1977, 1978a, 1978b). 
Both their contemporaries and Plato called the presocratic philosophers sophoU so that 
instead of speaking of “presocratic philosophy” we should probably better speak of 
“Greek wisdom” (Colli 1977, 1978 a, b). The sophoi did not write textbooks on 
physics, nor philosophical texts in the sense of the literary genre initiated by Plato and 
Aristotle. They wrote poems peri physeos (On nature) that were destined for oral 
transmission and diffusion. And, as we have seen, the physis that is the object of their 
poems is not our “physical reality” : rather, it is nature in its most general sense, the 
sphere of the totality of being that, literally, comes to light.
The dynamic interpenetration of myth and philosophy is also reflected in the 
semantic proximity of the two terms “mythos” and “logos”. No sharp dichotomy 
between mythos versus logos was indeed yet stated at least up to the fourth century BC 
(Morgan 2000). Herodotus, for instance, uses “mythos” only twice, but, as has been 
observed, he uses the term “logos” in a way which corresponds to what we would 
today call “myth” (Morgan, 2000, 19ff). When narrating two different versions of 
Helen’s arrival in Troy, he calls them both logoi, even the version that he does not 
believe is true (Herodotus II, 116). Thucydides, who, by condemning the “mythodes”, 
the “mythical element” (Thucydides, I, 22), also started a new phase o f more
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ostentatiously “scientific” historiography, did not make any definitive association 
between mythos and false speech or even with what we would today call “myth” 
(Morgan 2000,20).
The association between these two is, at best, the result o f the later self­
presentation of intellectuals willing to distance themselves from the world of myth. An 
important role was probably here played by the movement o f the so-called “sophistry”. 
With sophistry began a process professionalising philosophy. The sophists aspired to 
be recognised as professional teachers for the technique of reasoning (dialektike 
techne), the importance of which increased notably in the fifth century Athens. 
According to Plato, the sophists labelled the rhetorical, dialectical and literary 
education that they were teaching to youths wanting to start a political career as 
philosphy (Symposium, I, 5). Indeed, it is with the centralisation of the cultural life in 
Athens and with the political climate of the middle of the fifth century that dialectics 
massively entered the political arena: it was then that the sapientia of the old sophoi 
entered in competition with the “dialectics” of Gorgias and Protagoras.
The sophists, in their attempt to present themselves as new professional 
figures, attempted to clearely distance themselves from the world of the traditional 
poets such as Homer and Hesiod. According to the platonic dialogues, it was at that 
time that mythos took on, together with the general meaning of tales, the further 
connotation of fable, fictitious narrative (see for instance Plato’s Gorg. 527a, 5; Phil. 
14a.4; Phaedr. 60c.2; Soph. 242c.8, d.6; Resp. II, 377a.4, b.6, d.5, 379a.4). However, 
no sharp opposition between mythos and logos was yet part o f the common meaning of 
the term. Even for the sophists, the old mythoi were part o f  a reservoir of traditional 
material to which they themselves did not disdain to recur in their art of constructing 
discourses.
According to Plato’s testimony, learning to express one’s arguments in the 
form of the logos and the mythos was part of the basic training in the rhetoric-dialectic 
curriculum: on the one hand, there was the demonstration o f truth based on rational 
argumentation, and, on the other, its narration through figurative expressions. For 
instance, Protagoras, who represents the professional “sophist” in the homonymous 
platonic dialogue, asks Socrates whether he wants an argument to be delivered in the 
form of the mythos or of the logos {Protag. 320c.3, 320c.7; but also 324d.6 and 
328c.3). In many platonic dialogues, indeed, we are given the impression of a double
31
track of the arguments: discursive arguments, on the one hand, and mythical narratives, 
on the other. The Phaedo is paradigmatic from this point of view because for every 
bloc of dialectic arguments there is a correponding group of mythical narratives 
(Phaedo 80b.ff; 107c.ff).21
This confirms the fact that the further connotation of untruthfulness entailed 
by myths was not yet part of the primary meaning of the term. Thus, whereas the 
narrative of the “birth of philosophy” as an “exit from myth” would seem to suggest a 
linear road “from mythos to logos'\ if one looks more closely at the sources upon 
which such a narrative rests, not only does one find that the very few fragments may 
reflect Aristotle’s conception of philosophy more than that of the Presocratics, but that 
even later sources suggest quite a different story: far from being counterpoised to each 
other, a proximity between the two is suggested at least up to the fourth century BC. 
Indeed, if Plato can continually move in his dialogues from rational argumentation to 
the narration o f myths, this is because the question of the “truth or reality of myth” had 
not yet been posed: the mythos was generally juxtaposed to the logos simply as a 
different way by which to express a similar content and the difference between the two 
was held to be on the level of their different protreptical impact, and not of their 
respective truth or reality.
Plato’s constant recourse to myth is perhaps the most conspicuous scandal for 
the narrative of the “birth of philosophy” as the exit from myth.22 Different strategies 
have been historically employed in order to reconcile them: platonic myths have been 
read both as the containers for a kind of truth which is superior to that entailed by the 
logos, and as a primitive way of expressing a truth which was to be superseded by the 
logos itself. An example o f the first approach can, for instance, be found in Joseph 
Pieper, who conceives o f platonic myths as a message from a divine source - on 
analogy with the idea of the original revelation that would later be developed by 
Christendom (Pieper 1965). The second approach is more common and sees among its 
supporters Hegel. According to Hegel, platonic myths are simply beautiful 
representations to which Plato make recurse only for pedagogical purposes or because 
he cannot give “more pure representations” of the thought. Myths are thus said to be a
21 On this point, see Reale 1991: 74,124.
22 It should also be noted here that, as Colli observes, although Plato is the first thinker to explicitly call his
own activity philosophy, this does not mean that he is in this way distancing himself from the old tradition of
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form of “pollution of thinking through sensitive images” {Verunreinigung des 
Gedarikens durch sinnliche Gestalt), which would be avoided by Plato in any case 
when he has to express the crucial parts of his argumentation (Geschichte der Philos., 
XIX: 29-30).
Many objections can be raised against both these interpretations. It is, for 
instance, quite difficult to see how Pieper’s interpretation could suit a myth such as that 
of the cave, which is used by Plato to describe his conception of the different levels o f 
knowledge and the role of philosophers in society (Resp. 514A-521C). The human 
condition can be described, according to this myth, as that of people in a cavern who 
are fettered in such a way that they can only see the bottom of this cave. Having always 
been imprisoned in this way, they believe that what they see at the bottom, namely, the 
shadows produced by statues outside the cave, are the things themselves. Philosophers 
can be seen as those people who, having liberated themselves from these fetters, were 
given the opportunity to see not only the things directly but also the sun itself, i.e. the 
idea of the good (Resp. 517c). Having been given the opportunity to contemplate the 
idea of good, i.e. - in Plato’s view - the source of being, philosophers must then go 
back to the cave in order to help their fellows free themselves: even if they take a great 
risk in doing so, because their fellows, imprisoned as they are by the appearances, may 
not believe in them, this is nevertheless the philosphers’ duty (Resp. 519c.ff).
This myth, like many others in Plato’s writings, is presented as a figurative 
description of a philosophical theory, rather than as a “revealed truth”, which is 
impossible to express in rational terms. The myth o f the cave also suggests, against 
Hegel’s interpretation, that Plato commits not only marginal or introductory themes to 
myth, but rather very crucial parts of his conception. This holds for the myth of the 
cave, which is introduced by Plato to explain his theory of knowledge and his 
conception of the role of philosophers in society, but also for the myth o f races or the 
myth of Hr in the Republicy or the myth of the chariot in the Phaedrus, and many others 
can be added to the list (Thaet. 156c.4, I64e.3; Laws 1645b. 1; Tim. 69bl).
Furthermore, Hegel’s view seems to contrast with what Plato says in the 
Seventh letter, i.e. that the most important part of his own philosophy is not contained
the sophoi. Rather it seems as if by calling his own activity “philo-sophicT he was referring precisely to the 
past tradition of the sophoi (Colli 1975: 13).
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in his dialogues (341C).23 This statement has been widely debated, but most 
interpreters agree in relating it to the criticism Plato raised in many places against the 
“written word”(Protagoras 329A, Phaedo 276C, 277A, 277E, Phaedrus 274 C-278 E). 
In an epoch when Greek culture was still moving from a culture of orality to literacy, 
Plato proposed considering the practice of writing only as a “medicine for the memory” 
which should never substitute the practice of dialoguing (Phaedrus 274 C-278 E). In 
his opinion, the written word is “dead” because it is unable to give answers if you 
interrogate it, whereas the “discourse written in the soul of the disciple” is alive, and he 
is thus able to defend himself and distinguish the appropriate moment for speaking or 
being silent (Phaedrus 276A).
In this line of interpretation, the myth - as a figurative expression - could be 
held to entail a surplus of meanings acting as a stimulans for thinking, and could be 
considered as a way of overcoming some of the shortcomings of the practice of 
writing. Rather than providing an inferior means of argument, platonic myths could - 
on the contrary - be interpreted as way of expressing a conceptual content which is 
superior to rational argumentation, because, whereas this latter, once is translated into a 
single written form, is dead, myths are open to a generation of meaning that can always 
generate further discussion.24
Furthermore, both Pieper’s and Hegel’s interpretations seem to reflect later 
worldviews too closely: Piper’s view is clearly linked to the Christian conception o f 
revelation, while Hegel’s approach is a good example of the typically modem attempts 
at rationalising myth. In both cases, mythos is placed on a heterogeneous level with 
respect to logos -  standing either above or below it. In both interpretations, mythos and 
logos are considered as counterpoised, whereas, as we have seen, by the time of Plato, 
myth was most probably seen as a means to express a content that could also be 
developed through rational argumentation.
23 Some interpreters read this passage in connection with Aristotle’s testimony on Plato’s “unwritten 
doctrines” (agrafa dogmata). See in particular, the work of the so-called “Tübinger Schute”, whose major 
representatives, in their attempt to revaluate the indirect platonic tradition as fundamental for an accurate 
image of Plato, strongly emphasise Plato’s scepticism towards the practice of writing (Krämer 1982, 1995; 
Geiser 1963; Reale 1986).
24 The extent to which literacy influenced the rise of philosophy is still very controversial. Among those 
emphasising the impact of literacy for the rise of abstract rational thought, see Goody & Watt 1968, Goody 
1977,1986, Havelock 1986, Vemant 1965 and among the critics see Comford 1952, who focuses on the link 
between traditional religion and the origin of philosophy, and Finnegan 1988, Thomas 1992, both 
emphasising that literacy is finally what a specific culture makes of it, i.e. that it can have very different 
outcomes and consequences in different cultures.
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Indeed, it is only by considering rational argumentations and mythical 
narrations as two different dialectical techniques (dialektike techne) that one can one 
come to terms with Plato’s usage of the term “m y th o s Plato sometimes uses the term 
in the sense o f what we would call “fables” (Gorg. 523 a.2, 527a.5; /7w7.14a; Phaedr. 
60c.2; Resp. II 377 a.4, b.6, c .l, d5; Soph. 242c.8;), most often, in the sense of “tale” 
without any further connotations (Resp. 1350e.3; III 391e.l2; X 62lb .8; Thaet. 164d.9; 
Phaedr. 2312l.9\ 241e.8; Prot. 320.c3,7; 324d.6; 328c.3; Ale. 1123a. 1; Laws III 682a.8; 
IV 713a.6; VIII 841 c.6; Gorg. 505c.l0), but sometimes also in the expression “ton 
eikota mython”, which designates a form of common or probable knowledge (Tim. 
29d.2; 59c.6; 68d.2), and, finally, sometimes also in the sense of discourse containing a 
rational theory (in particular, Thaet. 156c.4; 164e.3; Resp. 376 d.9; Laws I 645b5; Tim. 
69b.l). Thus not only are images such as Phedros’ chariot said to be “m ythof\ but also 
Timaeus' speech over the constitution of the world and Socrates’ discourse on the 
education of the guardians in the Republic (Tim. 69b. I; Resp. II 376d.9).25
Plato, as a philosopher, i.e. an intellectual willing to claim the specific role 
that philosophy has to play, had to criticise the mythological narratives provided by 
poets such as Homer and Hesiod. Not by chance it is precisely in the Republic, where 
he presents the education that should be given to rulers-philosophers, that we find the 
term mythos systematically used in the sense of “fable”, “untrue narrative”: rulers must 
be philosophers, not poets (Resp. II 374a-HI 417b;and also Resp. II 377a). However, it 
is not for their fictitiousness that the tales told by Homer and Hesiod are condemned 
(Resp. II 377d-378e; III 386a-392c). It is because the religious and ethical models that 
are transmitted through them could be morally deceptive: poets, in Plato’s view, should 
not attribute all sorts of vices and inclinations to gods, because they must serve as 
moral models (idem, II 378e-379b; HI 392 a-c).
The platonic condemnation of poetry must be understood as a proposed moral 
emendation of traditional material, i.e. as a critique done according to a moral criterion. 
Otherwise one cannot understand why, after such a condemnation, Plato himself, in the 
same book, could possibly make such extensive use of traditional myths. Not only does 
Plato recognise the importance of mythical narratives for the transmission of moral 
models, as is shown by the fact that he recommends myths to the rulers’ guardians as a
25 See entry myth* in the Thesaurus graecae linguae and also Brandwood’s Word Index to Plato 
(Brandwood 1976, 593).
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helpful means to promote social cohesion (Resp. HI 414c; 415 d), but also he also uses 
myths as an important medium for discussing philosophical issues, such as his theory 
o f knowledge, which could also had been presented in an argumentative form.
According to this reconstruction, one can still contend that, if not with the 
“birth of philosophy”, it is with Aristotle that the definitive passage from mythos to 
logos, and the consequent association of myth with a distorted reproduction o f reality, 
took place. Whereas up to that time, a sophos like Parmenides could still start his 
philosophical poem with an invocation to the Muses, with Aristotle philosophy seems 
to have acquired a distinguished epistemological status: philosophy became the science 
o f first causes and principles whose results are ultimately guaranteed by logic. Whereas 
Plato could still intermingle dialectical argumentations and mythical narratives, 
Aristotle, by starting his theorising with the statement o f the formal conditions of 
discourse and by identifying thereby a type of reasoning -  the syllogism -  meant to 
guarante the correctness o f discourses, provided philosophy with a method {organon) 
which set it definitely a part from the stories told by myths.
All the same, not even in Aristotle there is a definitive association o f myths 
with untrue tales.26 Aristotle explicitly claimed a specific status for philosophy. It is 
therefore no coincidences that, whilst Plato was the first to define his activity as “philo- 
sophia”, i.e. love for the sophia (Colli 1975: 13), Aristotle provided philosophy with a 
place and date of birth, a history, and - most importantly - a specific job. The problem 
then becomes to estabilish what precisely distiguishes philosophy from myth, i.e. do 
they depart from each other. Let us return for a moment to the passage o f Metaphysics 
where he presents his view of the presocratics: this should provide us, if not with an 
accurate reconstruction of their thinking, at least with some clues about the reasons 
why Aristotle saw in these thinkers the “first philosophers” and, therefore, what he 
considers as specific to philosophy itself.
26 It should here be remembered that, whereas we only possess Plato’s essoteric writings, in the case of 
Aristotle we possess only his esoteric writings, basically notes he used for teaching. However, we know from 
testimonies that he wrote “platonic dialogues”, all of which have been lost and which would probably reveal 
a more complex image of his thinking and its relationship with myth. Still it is significant that what Aristotle 
himself wanted to publish were precisely those “platonic” dialogues, whereas the writings known as corpus 
aristotelicum were the doctrines that he - as the old sophoi - communicated orally to his disciples. In fact, we 
cannot even say that we possess the texts of his esoteric lessons: the actual shape of the corpus aristotelicum 
derives from the edition of these notes made by Andronicus Rhodius, a later disciple of the Peripatetic who 
probably gave to the corpus a division that reflects more the first century A.C. cultural scheme than 
Aristotle’s intentions (Adorno 1961b, 287).
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In this passage, Aristotle observes that, in saying that water is the principle 
(arche) of everything, Thales was stating something that was already contained in 
many myths of the origins (Met. 983b). Therefore, from the point of view of the 
content, Thales’ theory does not contain any radical novelty. Why should we then 
consider such a statement as the onset of that specific discipline that is philosophy?
Aristotle does not provide any explicit answer to this question, but in the 
passage quoted above he continues by saying that Thales derived his theory from the 
observation that the nourishment of everything is humid and that even the heat comes 
from the humid and lives in it (Met. 983b, 30). Here, there is -  at least in Aristotle’s 
perspective - a novelty, and this concerns the method employed: no longer mythical 
narratives, but direct observation. Again, what was new in Thales’ statement is not the 
content, and therefore its truth or falsehood, but the form of argumentation: whereas 
aquatic mythoi were narratives, this statement was presented by these thinkers -  at least 
according to Aristotle’s testimony - as the result of observations. Therefore, as already 
in Plato, mythosj.ind logos were considered to differ only from the point of view of 
their form and not of their truth or falsity.
However, Aristotle seems to go further. Not only does he not present myth 
and philosophy as false and true respectively, but he also seems to recognise the links 
between them. In fact, in the Metaphysics, a few passages before those quoted above, 
we read that both myth and philosophy stem from wonder (to thaumazein) (Met. 982 
b). Indeed -  so continues the passage -  s/he who doubts and wonders shows thereby 
that s/he does not know, and this is the reason why we can say that s/he who loves the 
myth (o philomythos) is also somehow a philosopher (o philosophos) (Met. 982 b).
Aristotle’s statement that the philomythos is a philosopher is very significant. 
We have seen to what extent myth and philosophy differ for him. How could he say 
that the philomythos is also a philosopher precisely where he states that philosophy 
concerns the knowledge of principles and causes? One possible answer requires a 
further clarification of Aristotle’s view o f  the aitiai themselves. This is a point that is 
hard for a modem mind to catch - used as it is to conceiving causes in the 
mechanicistic terms of an abstract relationship between events. However, such a view
37
of causality started only with modem science, whereas antiquity understood it 
according to what I would call a model of production.27
Indeed, both the noun aitia, as well as the corresponding nominalised 
adjective aitiony derive from the adjective aitios, which means "responsible of, guilty 
o f ’, also in the juridical sense. Aitia  thus means in the first place responsibility 
(Liddell, Scott, Stuart 1968:44). For instance, in order to understand Aristotle’s 
distinction between the four types of causes - formal, material, efficient, final - we have 
to make recourse to the image of the artistic creation that Aristotle himself suggests in 
his Physics. Aristotle does not develop the concept of cause in terms of abstract 
relationships between events, but through the description o f artistic production. In the 
creation of a sculpture, the formal cause is the idea of the statue, the material cause is 
the marble itself, whereas the efficient cause is the artist himself and the final cause is 
the ultimate result of the artistic creation (Physics, II, 194b ff).
Thus, since for Aristotle "to know” means “to know” why things are like 
this, i.e. to know their causes (Met. 983a), one must conclude that for Aristotle 
mythological narratives are also a form of knowledge. Indeed, inasmuch as they tell us 
where things come from or who has made them, they also aim at identifying causes in 
the sense of the Greek aitiai. This does not mean that for Aristotle there are no 
differences between myth and philosophy. It only means that he recognises that, by 
stemming both from wonder, and therefore from the recognition o f a need for 
knowledge, they both aim at providing some kind of explanations of why things are in 
a certain way and not in another.
Once we have recognised that myths, too, are a form of knowledge, the next 
question is to spell out what kind of knowledge we are dealing with. Even a very quick 
look at a list of the Aristotelic concordances for the entry myth* reveals that if one 
wants to find out the specificity of myth it is in the ambit o f poiesis that we have to 
search.28 Indeed, it is in the so-called Poetic that the term mythos appears most often in 
comparison with all the other texts, and there are thus reasons to suspect that it is here 
that a more systematic use of the concept is made. In the very first paragraph of the 
Poetic, we in fact read that the aim o f this book is to look at the poetic technique
27 A similar point is made by N. Abbagnano in the entry “causalità” of his Dizionario di Filosofia
(Abbagnano 1971: 118), and by Pellegrin in his recent Le vocabulaire d ’Aristote (Pellegrin 2001: 12).
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(techne), i.e. at the way in which mythoi should be composed. Therefore, from the very 
first sentence, we know that mythoi -understood as tales and plots without any further 
qualification - are the constitutive elements of poetry (1447a.ff).
A few paragraphs later, when explaining the difference between poetry and 
history, Aristotle affirms that poiesis is a more philosophical and elevated 
(philosophoteron kai spoudaiteron) subject than history (1451b.6). Thus, far from 
associating myth with untrue speech, Aristotle places it closer to philosophy than 
history and seems therefore to attribute to it a capacity to catch the universal that is 
superior to even that of history.
Indeed, for Aristotle, given that the historian has to deal with the particular, 
i.e. with unrelated and dispersed facts, he will be further from the truth than the poets. 
That is, whereas the historian tells facts as they happened, the poet tells them as “they 
could have happened according to likelihood and necessity” {kata to eikos e td 
anangkaion 1451b). Thus, in Aristotelian terms, poetry deals with something closer to 
the universal and is therefore a much more elevated and philosophical subject than 
history.29
However, the universal entailed by poetry is not the same as philosophy. 
Therefore, one might object that, however important, the role of myth is still limited to 
the ambit of the poiesis. This latter, according to a possible reading of the passages 
where this distinction is made,30 differs from theoresis because it “creates” its objects. 
This, however, does not necessarily imply that the ambit of mythos is that of 
arbitrariness and, as such, that it must be counterpoised to that of the logos - as we 
often tend to assume when talking about poetic creation. To say that poetry creates its 
objects does not mean that these are fictitious and exist only in the poet’s head.
Let us go back to the passages in question. In both the Metaphysics and in the 
Topica, the expression used by Aristotle to state the differences between theoresis and 
poiesis is not “to create its objects” but “to have or not to have in itself the principle of 
movement” {e arche tes kineseos) (Topica, VI, 145al5; Met. VI, 1025, XI 1064a). 
According to these passages, both praxis and poiesis differ from theoresis because only
2ft
Whereas in the Metaphysics we only have two examples for the word mythos (Delatte et al. 1984: 260), in 
the Poetics we have 50 (Denooz 1988,61). Analogous results can be obtained by searching or the entry 
myth* in the Thesaurus Craecae Linguae.
29 On this point, see also the beginning of the Metaphysics and the distinction between empeira (knowledge 
of the particular) and techne (knowledge of the universal) (A/er.980ba and ff).
30 See in particular Topica VI, 6 , 145a 15 and Met. V I,1 ,1025 b and ff; XI,7,1064 a and ff.
39
this latter deals with substances having the principle o f movement in themselves. On 
the contrary, the arche of the poiesis is in he who produces and not in the things 
produced; and, Aristotle adds, this principle is either the intellect (nous) or another 
power (Met, 1025b 22). Similarly, in the ambit o f the praxis, the arche o f actions is not 
in the things “acted”, but in the agent - so it is volition (proairesis) (Met. 1025b 22). 
Thus, one can conclude that in order to understand the kind of universality with which 
poetry deals, it is at the subject of the poiesis, or better the poietes, that we must look.
On the other hand, from these passages it also clearly emerges that, for 
Aristotle, poetry is far from being “imaginary” and “fanciful”. Indeed, as we read in the 
Poetics, the essence of poetry is the mimesis/1 the representation of reality (Poetics, 
1447a 20). This latter is not understood as the reproduction o f an empirically conceived 
“objective” reality, but rather as mimesis of human beings who act. Mimesis is not the 
reproduction of what has “actually” happened, but rather of what “could have 
happened” according to the “likelihood and necessity” that is intrinsic to the different 
human characters (Poetics, 1448a).
In the following passage, Aristotle continues by saying that human beings 
have from childhood a genuine instinct for mimesis and that this is the way by which 
they first learn their lessons (ta matheseis) about the world; this learning (manthanein) 
gives pleasure not only to philosophers, but to all human beings, because it is in this 
way that we learn and infer (syllogithesthai) what each thing is (Poetics, 1448b). 
M ythoi thus display a kind of knowledge that is fundamentally a knowledge about 
human beings, about the “likelihood and necessity” intrinsic to their nature. In 
particular, the universality with which poetry deals is the universality that resides in 
knowledge about the different human characters in the plural; and, in this sense, it is 
therefore a plural universality.
However, as E. Auerbach has shown in his analysis of the Western evolution 
of the concept of mimesis, it is precisely this plurality that got lost in the passage from 
antiquity to modernity. Whereas both Plato and Aristotle conceived of different levels 
of mimesis of reality, this plurality went through a process o f reductio ad unum whose 31
31 The translation of the term “mimesis” has always been a problem for translators, because its meaning 
ranges from the semantic area of the term “imitation” to that of “representation”. I will use the original Greek 
term, as far as possible.
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result is modem realism (Auerbach 1946).32 Whereas when we talk of “realism” in art 
we mean the “closeness to an empirically conceived reality”, for antiquity there were 
different levels of “reality” to be reproduced -  and it was not said that the proximity to 
empeiria was the criterion for what is “more real”.
Indeed, it is precisely the plurality of Greek myths that is a scandal for us. We 
cannot but keep asking ourselves “Did Greeks really believe in their my/Zis?”;33 and 
this is because we cannot come to terms with the fact that Greeks accepted a plurality 
of contrasting variants simply coexisting one next to the other: to our minds, this 
plurality should definitely have undermined the faith in their truth. This is perhaps the 
most conspicuous sign of a completely different attitude towards what we call “truth”.
The ancient Greek word that comes closer to our word “truth” is aletheia, 
which, in contrast to “truth”, is a privative word. Aletheia, according to its etymology, 
is “what is not hidden”, “what is not forgotten”. The term is composed by the privative 
prefix “alpha” plus the root lath- that forms the verb lanthano, “to remain hidden” and 
the composite epilanthanomai, “to forget” as well as the substantive let he, 
“forgetfulness”. Therefore, as Martin Heidegger first pointed out, according to its 
original meaning, the semantic area expressed by the Greek term aletheia is that o f the 
“unhiddenness” and “unforgetfulness” (Heideggerl988).
Many interpreters have noticed that the world of myth, linked as it is to the 
archaic culture of orality, was defined by aletheia. This was conceived of not as the 
opposite of non-correspondence, but rather as the opposite of forgetfulness: true is 
what is worth preserving from oblivion (Detienne 1967; Cole 1983). The poet is he 
who preserves things from oblivion and thus discloses the truth. Thus, for instance, the 
poet Hesiod can claim to be a vehicle of aletheia. At the beginning of his Theogony, he 
celebrates the Muses who, he claims, to have inspired in him the voice to progressively 
disclose the aletheia, i.e. “the things that shall be and that were aforetime” (Theogony, 
vv. 1-32). On the other hand, in the same passage the Muses are said to be the vehicle 
of an aletheia that is plural and even goes hand in hand with falsity, as “they know how
32 On the evolution of the concept of mimesis in Western culture see Auerbach 1946. Moving from Plato’s 
discussion of the concept of mimesis and Dante’s assertion that he presented the true reality in the Commedia, 
Auerbach reconstructs the different methods of interpreting human events in European literature. He 
particularly focuses on the passage from antiquity’s idea of the several levels o f the mimesis of reality to the 
modem literary realism, which implies, on the contrary, a reductio ad unum of this reality (Auerbach 1946).
33 This is the illuminating title of the book of a prominent French historian (Veyne 1983). Indeed what still 
strikes us is precisely the plurality of stories of Greek myths, and this is the reason why we keep raising the
41
to speak many false things as though they were true; but they know, when they will, to  
utter true things” (Theogony, w . 1-32).
The archaic world o f Hesiod was no longer the world of Plato and Aristotle. 
These latter still conceived of aletheia as the result of a process, but the road to it was 
no longer opened by the Muses -  as it was for Hesiod and still could be for 
Parmenides. In Plato’s dialogues, aletheia had already become the result o f the 
dialogue of the soul with itself (Thaet. 189e-190a; Sophis. 263a, 264b). Plato states that 
the discourse that tells the things as they are is alethes, whereas the discourse that tells 
things as they are not is false (Crat. 385b). Similarly, according to Aristotle, “the false” 
is to negate what is and to affirm what is not, whereas “the alethes” is to affirm what is 
and to negate what is not {Met. IV , 7, 1011b 26 ff). Indeed, from this and similar 
passages,34 it seems that both Plato and Aristotle conceived o f aletheia as 
correspondence to reality. Thus, if they conceive of truth as correspondence to reality, 
how did they conceive of this latter?
! The Greeks did not even have a word that corresponds to our term “reality” .
We, children of the Cartesian revolution, conceive of the “real” as fundamentally 
opposed to what is “ideal” . On the contrary, for a Greek there were only “ta onta ”, the 
things that are, or “to on”, the being as expressed by the nominalised participle o f the 
verb to be (einai). All these words come from the verb einai, whereas “reality” comes 
from an altogether different root. And, as we will see this different root is the sign o f a  
different approach to the definition of “reality”.35 The Greek ta onta are only things 
inasfar as they are already conceptually clear, whereas the individual things that are 
just given in the experience are simply ta pragmata. Things coming under the umbrella 
of ta onta are the things that reveal themselves for what they are: in this sense, “to be” 
(:einai) does not simply mean to exist, but designates a certain mode of existence. In 
other words, in the perspective of Plato and Aristotle, things that can be described as ta  
onta are only those entities that have already revealed themselves to the understanding, 
whereas ta pragmata is what remains still to be determined. In this sense, ta onta are 
more true and more real than ta pragmata.
question, whereas on the contrary we do not ask ourselves so often -  let's say - “Do Christians really believe
in the history of the Bible?”
34For Plato’s view of aletheia see also Soph. 262e and Phil. 37c, whereas for Aristotle see also Met. V,
1024b5.
35 On this point see chapter 2 and chapter 3.
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This does not mean that ta pragmata are not “real”. It simply means that they 
are less “real”, or - even better - that are less “true”. This brings us to Plato’s 
understanding of the different degrees of beings (Vlastos 1965). Follwoing Plato, there 
is no dichotomy between being and not being, as Parmenides had thought: in contrast 
to Parmenides, Plato distinguishes the being in its absolute meaning, i.e. as opposed to 
nothingness, from the being in a relative sense, that is, from “being a certain thing” as 
opposed to “not being a certain thing” {Sophist 257b). Only by criticising Parmenides* 
view of being it becomes possible according to Plato to talk of the becoming together 
with the being: the becoming is not absolute negativity, but a relative one. When we 
make an assertion about a certain state of being, we look only at certain relationships 
that the things entertain with each other. Through our language, we point to only few 
aspects of its position within the sphere of being, because there are potentially endless 
divisions and communications between the things, and our language can only express 
parts of it each time.
Plato’s theory of ideas confirms this reading. Inasmuch as they present the 
being in its clearest way, ideas are being that truly is. Ideas constitute the maximum 
form of reality, since compared with them sensitive reality is just a pallid imitation. If 
we want to talk of Plato’s conception of “reality”, then this latter must be understood as 
the opposite of appearance, because ideas are being that remains in the instability o f 
becoming, and in this sense ideas themselves must account for appearances (Moravcsik 
1992).36 78 The task of philosophy, understood as dialectics, is to show the divisions and 
correlation of being {to on) in order to reconstruct the interrelation between ideas 
(eidos, idea). These latter, far from being purely mental contents as we, since 
Descartes, have started to understand them, were at the same time thought and reality.39
Thus, the “birth of philosophy” cannot be interpreted with Vemant as the rise 
of “positive thought” since not even in Aristotle can knowledge be said to be the
36 The term ousia too, far from designating what we mean by “reality”, indicated being in the sense of the 
substance -also in the sense of material substances (Liddell & Scott 1968: 1274).
37 On Plato’s theory of ideas see Ross 1951, whereas on the platonic idea of different levels of reality see 
Vlastos 1965. On the way in which, according to Plato, “reality” in this sense accounts for appearances see 
Moravcsik’s seminal work on Platonism (Moravcsik 1992)
38 This view of “reality” as opposed to “appearances” went on to become extremely influential in subsequent 
philosophical thinking. Examples of this view can still be found today. For instance, according to Audi’s 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, “ Reality: in standard philosophical usage, how things are, in contrast 
to their mere appearance” (Audi 1999: 775).
39 See entry “Idee” in the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Neumann 1972: 56) and also “Idea" in 
the Abbagnano’s Dizionario di filosofia (Abbagnano 1971: 450).
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discovery on the part of a “thinking” subject of a given “physical reality”. The idea of a 
hiatus between the knowing subject and the known object seems to be alien to 
antiquity. Knowledge, until Aristotle, was istead conceived as a passive process 
because it is being that manifests itself in physis. In Aristotle’s terms, for instance, the 
knowing subject cannot be separated from the object, because this latter immediately 
“affects” the soul {De Interpretatione 16a3).
Aristotle does follow his master Plato in both his view of the truth and in the 
idea o f “different degrees of reality”. Aristotle also states that aletheia and falsity 
pertain to the ambit of unification and separation {Met. IV 1011b26, V 1024b25, De 
Interpretatione, 16a9). Moreover, he also conceived of what we call “reality” in terms 
of different degrees. He even states an explicit correspondence between the ideas o f 
degrees of reality and of degrees of truth. According to what we read in his 
Metaphysics:
“Now every thing through which a common quality is 
communicated to other things is itself of all those things in the highest 
degree possessed of that quality (e.g. fire is hottest, because it is the cause of 
heat in everything else); hence that also is most true which causes all 
subsequent things to be true. Therefore in every case the first principles of 
things must necessarily be true above everything else—since they are not 
merely sometimes true, nor is anything the cause of their existence, but they 
are the cause o f the existence of other things,—and so as each thing is in 
respect of existence, so it is in respect of truth” (Met. 993b).
Thus according to Aristotle, each thing possesses as much being as it has 
truth. Aristotle, unlike Plato, conceived of being as a synolon of matter (ule) and ideas- 
forms (eidos-morphe) and he conceived of becoming as the actualisation (<enteiecheia) 
of a being which has it in potency {dynamis) (see in particular, Physics, II). The two 
theories are also combined for, while the matter is the material cause of the becoming 
and its potency, the form is the formal and final cause as well as the principle o f the 
actualisation (enteiecheia). Now, given that what is in potency can pass into act only 
under the effect of something which is already in act, this made it necessary for 
Aristotle to postulate the existence of a being that is already in act and, following the 
chain of dynamis and enteiecheia, we therefore arrive at the postulation o f a being that 
is always in act, namely god itself {Met. XII).
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The Greek term entelecheia comes from the adjective enteles which means 
“complete, perfect”. Entelecheia thus, properly speaking, designates a “full, complete 
reality” as opposed to what has it only potentially (Liddell, Scott, Stuart 1968: 575). 
And, as we will see, the Latin term “realitas” was used as a synonym of “perfection” 
(Courtine 1992 a, 1992 b) -  a view which is understandable only by moving from the 
ancient view of the different degrees of “what is real”.40
To conclude, it is only within such a view of being and truth that the 
pluralistic Greek myth was possible. As Paul Veyne maintained, a plurality of 
programs of truth existed for the Ancient Greeks: it is because of this plurality that one 
could believe in both the “legendary” world of myth and the truth of everyday “reality” 
(Veyne 1983). What appears to us as an untenable contradiction between a plurality o f 
narratives was no problem for them - and not even for Aristotle, the father of the 
principle of non-contradiction. Indeed, when stating this principle Aristotle was very 
cautious and added an extremely important qualification to this principle: “It is 
impossible for the same attribute at once (hama) to belong and not to belong to the 
same thing and in the same relation (kai kata to hauto)” (Met. IV 1005b). The 
importance of this apparently insignificant adverb “hama' ’ can never be underlined 
enough.
Let me finish with a story. The Ethiopic people of Dorzes believe that 
leopards are Christian animals and that they will therefore respect the precepts of the 
Copt church and, in particular, fasting on Wednesdays and Fridays41. All the same, 
leopards being very dangerous for their livestock, they keep guard over their animals 
even on Wednesdays and Fridays. They see no contradiction between the two beliefs, 
that leopards fast on those days and that they might attack their livestock in those days. 
In one case, it is the truth of their tradition that is at stake; in the other is what they 
learnt through experience. Clearly, for them, it is a different truth that is at stake each 
time. The emergence of the idea of myth as “purely fictitious, untrue tale” from which 
we departed is the sign that this plurality has now been lost.
40 On this point see also chapter 2 and chapter 3.
41 The story is told at the beginning of an essay on the concept of truth (Messeri 1997: 1).
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2. THE BIBLOS AND THE DIALECTIC OF 
THE SACRED LOGOS
While the Hellenistic epoch was still capable of producing an intellectual and 
artistic movement such as that of Aetiology, this would have been impossible in the 
Christian epoch. The aim of aetiological poetry was to narrate the origins of things by 
re-elaborating mythological material. It was not only a manifestation of the 
Alexandrian taste for erudition, willing to recover ancient traditions, but it was also an 
expression of the desire to provide a meaning for features and aspects of ordinary life -  
a need that became particularly acute as the system of the polis declined. Aetiological 
poetry, as represented by Callimachus’ Aitia , aimed at overcoming the sense of 
displacement produced by such a decline, and it did it by re-elaborating the 
contingency of reality through the identification o f the aitia of things -  where these 
latter are to be understood in the sense of the Greek aitia.42 This approach entails a 
relationship with myth and its plurality that would have been impossible in a Christian 
worldview. Why?
In order to understand what happened to the concept of myth, we have to look 
at the transformation of the other side o f the dichotomy: the logos. This is because it 
was with Christendom that it was given a completely new meaning. The genealogy of 
myth begins with the term logos originally meaning simply “word”, “discourse” and 
being thus almost a synonym of mythos. Around the fifth century BC, the term logos 
began to occupy the semantic space o f mythos, adding to it the connotation implied by
42 Aitia is the title of Callimachus’ collection of elegies. The object of these elegies was the narration of tales 
explaining the origins of rituals, fests and institutions. The text of the Aitia got lost during the Middle Ages. 
We possess only a small number of papyruses coming from Greek-Roman Egypt, whereby it was possible to 
reconstruct the original design together with part of the text (Callimachus 1949,52).
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the verb legein, “to say” but also “to count” and ‘"to enumerate”. While mythos started 
to be used in the sense of “popular tale”, the term logos acquired further connotations 
such as “measure”, “esteem”, "proportion”, “explanation” and “definition”. All these 
meanings were nevertheless still part of the primary meaning of the term: “calculus”, 
“discourse” and “reasoning”. In this sense logos did not, however, designate a “mere 
discourse” as we understand it; it rather meant at the same time “discourse over” and 
“structure of reality”. It was used in this sense by Heraklitus (Diels & Kranz 1951, 114) 
and through Plato (see for instance Thaet. 206d) and the stoics, it reached the 
neoplatonists (Abbagnano 1971: 547).
With Christendom the term acquired a completely new meaning, a meaning 
that, apparently in continuity with the past, had in fact a revolutionary impact.
“At the beginning there was the logos, the logos was with God, and 
the logos was God. He was with God in the beginning” (John, 1 ,1).
The overwhelming power of the transformation brought about by 
Christendom is inscribed in this incipit o f the Gospel according to Saint John. Here the 
logos is not only the structure of being: logos is the Word of God, a Word which has 
been written in the will of God since the origin of times. And, as we will see, when the 
logos became the word of God, a word that is written, and that is written in a definitive 
form because it is the sacred Will of God, there is no more space for the recognition of 
myth.
Logos is the term used by Hellenised Jews in their translation of the Old 
Testament to render the Hebraic term dabhar, the scriptural name for the creative word 
of God. 43 By comparing the incipit of the Biblos, the “Book”, with Hesiod’s Theogony, 
which systematised Ancient Greek mythical material, a triplex level of rupture can be 
captured.
“At the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth” (Genesis, 1 ,1).
As well known, Jews did not accept the so-called “Bible of the Seventy”, i.e. the Greek translation of the 
Old Testament made around II century BC in Alexandria by some Hellenised Jews of the Diaspora. This text, 
encompassing both writings excluded by the Jews' canon and others directly written in Greek, reflects the 
attempt by Hellenised Jews to reconcile Hebraism with the Greek tradition. However, after the destruction of 
the temple of Jerusalem (70 AC), Jews felt there to be a strong incompatibility between Hebraism and the 
Greek-Roman culture. Whereas they returned to the original source of the Hebraic tradition and therefore 
rejected the Bible of the Seventy, this latter became the Old Testament of the Christians.
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Whereas at the origins of the world, according to Hesiod, there was chaos 
(Hesiod, Theogony, 116), which was only later mitigated by the division of power 
among different gods (idem, 110 ff), in the Genesis the world presents itself as a  
cosmos from the very beginning. Whilst Greek gods divided a world, which already 
existed, among themselves, the world of the Christians is a world created by God 
himself.
“And God said: « let there be light » and there was light. God 
saw that the light was good, and he separated the light from the 
darkness. God called the light «day» and the darkness he called 
«night». And there was evening, and there was morning -  the first 
day” (Genesis, 1,3).
i
The text carries on by describing the way in which all things were created, 
and the model is always the same: it is by naming things through his word (logos) that 
God created them. The rupture could not be greater. Whereas Hesiod’s Gods divided 
among them an already existing world, the world of the Christian is a world created ex 
nihilo. Whereas the conception of a creation ex nihilo was completely alien to Hesiod’s 
polytheistic universe, the world of the Genesis can be created ex nihilo because it is the 
world of an omnipotent God.
The omnipotence of the unique God is thus the omnipotence of his Word 
(logos) -  in the singular. The world of the Genesis is thus not only created ex nihilo: it 
is created through the Word of God. The Greek logos, discourse, structure of a 
polytheistic world became here the Creative Word of the unique God. If Hesiod’s 
mythical universe reflects the human need to have a world ordered through a plurality 
of narratives corresponding to a plurality of gods, in a Christian worldview there is no 
need - but also no space - for any further narratives besides that of the Sacred Word of 
God, because everything is provided with a meaning from its very beginning. In the 
idea of the Sacred History there is, therefore, an absolute pretension: no further 
narrative is needed because the logos was there from the beginning so that from their 
very coming into being all things were endowed with a meaning.
We move here to another point - the different conceptions of time expressed 
in the Old Testament and Hesiod’s incipit, respectively. The Christian conception of 
history differs from the ancient one because it is a linear conception, whereas Greek
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antiquity had a cyclical view of historical time.44 The Ancients Greeks, as most of the 
ancient peoples, conceived of time as the continual return of the same sequences of 
time or epochs. This is a view linked to the cyclic rhythms of nature: becoming in 
nature is characterised precisely by the continuing return of the same phases. Whilst 
according to this view there is no proper evolution in history, according to the Christian 
view history itself has a beginning and a telos.
The three revealed monotheist religions share this linear view of history. In 
the first place because for all o f them the world is created, it is created by God and, at 
the very same moment, it is situated in a linear flux of time and provided thereby with a 
telos. This latter corresponds with the day of the final judgement: the coming of the 
Messiah for Hebraism, the return of the judging Christ for Christendom and the yawm 
ad-deeny literally “the day of the religion”, for Islam. The three great world 
monotheisms share thus a triplex schema “creation -  revelation - final judgement” : 
notwithstanding the huge differences among them, they all share this schema and the 
linear view of time that it implies. '
In particular, for Christians, the first great eschatological event is represented 
by the coming of Christ: this is the first defeat of sin and death. Through the mystery o f 
the incarnation, passion and resurrection of Christ, time is given a further connotation. 
The coming of Christ represents the beginning of time in a more human sense, because 
it is only after the liberation from the original sin that time - understood as sequence o f 
occasions for the exercise of human freedom - began. Notwithstanding the endless 
theological disputes on this issue, Christendom will never go beyond the eschatological 
schema of the Old Testament and the omnipotence of God that it exhibits.
As emphasised by Hans Blumenberg in his Arbeit am Mythos, the difference 
between Greek antiquity and Christendom is also reflected in their different attitudes 
towards chronology: in Greek myths there is no proper chronology, but rather a series 
of sequences; Christians, on the other hands, were obsessed by chronology. Inasmuch 
as time is divinised it also acquired a completely new meaning. And this is the reason 
why - as Blumenberg puts it - negligence in chronologising is unforgivable in dogmatic 
observance (Blumenberg 1979,1, 2).
44 Many commentators have raised this point. See for instance Löwith 1949, Eliade 1954. On the Greeks' 
equivalent to the concept of progress, see Meier 1980.
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; If the logos defines the beginning and the end of time, then the kind of truth
that the logos itself embodies needs and can be situated in a linear flux of time. 
Hesiod’s stories are thus replaced by a single History. We are moving here to a third 
level of rupture. Whilst a feature of myth is its continual re-transmission and re- 
elaboration, the “truth revealed” in the Holy History presents itself as unique. Once the 
truth is revealed and it is revealed in a Holy History, there is only the need to interpret 
it. The biblical saying “so it is written” represents the funeral epitaph of ancient myth, 
whose essence was the possibility of a plurality of stories.
Indeed, there is something in the idea o f a “religion of the Book” that is 
fundamentally hostile to myth (Gadamer 1981b). And this is precisely the fact that 
when the written word became the means through which God reveals himself and 
reveals himself as Unique God, the biblos became the bearer of an absolute pretension 
to truth that was alien to myth. We have above seen that Ancient Greeks conceived of 
the truth (aletheia) as the progressive uncovering o f being; the idea of a religion o f the 
Sacred Scriptures instead implies that truth is revealed and is revealed in the definitive 
form of uniqueness.
All the three revealed monotheistic religions are religions of the “Book” and 
they all reflect this absolute pretension to truth. They all share the Exodus* 
commandment: “You will have no other gods before me” {Exodus, 20, 3).45 The sacred 
logos is not only the creative Word of God, but is also, at the same time, the Word 
through which God reveals his Will: the logos is the Word o f God and thus the Law. 
Even if certain forms of monotheism have accentuated the aspect of Law more than 
others, it still remains that this absolute pretension represents a revolution that is 
common to the three monotheistic religions.
There is a clear symmetry between this God, the absolute creator and 
lawgiver, and the forms of political domination in which these ideas have been 
affirmed. Recently, the idea of a “political theology” has been advanced in order to 
emphasise this link (Assmann 2000). According to Assmann, the belief in God as 
absolute law-giver is a political theology: by this he means that the relationship 
between the religious and the political order should not be read as dualism or as the
45 Monotheism was already present in other religious experiences. For instance, famous is the attempt by 
Amenophy the Fourth in the Egypt of the XVIII dynasty (XIV sec B.C. ca) to reform the Egyptian religion in 
a monotheistic sense. All the same, what we are interested in is not an exhaustive reconstruction of the
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Subordination of one to the other but rather as a relationship of Repräsentation 
(Assmann 2000: 28). By reversing the thesis of Schmitt,46 Assman has shown how the 
religious concepts developed in Ancient Egypt, Israel and Europe were originally 
political concept (Assmann 2000). The connexion between domination (Herrschaft) 
and the sacred (das Heil) does not only go in the direction of the instrumental use of 
the sacred in order to uphold political domination, but also the other way round: it is 
the political institutions that, by shaping the contexts help to create certain attitudes 
towards the world. The sacred does not only produce domination, but is at the same 
time its result.
To put it in Hegel’s words, only in the unhappy times o f generalised fear and 
serfdom could monotheism have established and asserted itself (Phänomenologie, part 
B. Freiheit des Selbstbewusstseins). The religious consciousness of monotheism is a 
fundamentally unhappy consciousness (Unglückliches Bewusstsein), because it 
alienates all freedom from itself by projecting it into a transcendent immutable 
(Unwandelbare) and thus remains entrapped in its self-created serfdom. The world o f 
the unique omnipotent God is thus the religious counterpart of a political alienation. 
The omnipotence of the dominus is the impotence of its servi. The struggle between the 
dominus and its servi takes thus the form of an alienating scission of the consciousness 
in itself (die Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins in sich selbst), where the essence 
(das Wesen) is projected into the Immutable (das Unwandelbare), whereas what 
remains for the conscience is only what is inessential (Das Unwesentliche) 
(Phänomenologie, part B. Freiheit des Selbstbewusstseins).
Such a process of emptying out of the world in favour of a transcendent 
being, bearer of an absolute pretension is clearely fundamentally hostile to the 
polytheism of the myth. In the world of the Unique God, myths could not but be 
perceived as blasphemy. “MythoF, originally simply “words, tales”, could thus be 
relegated to the idea of “fanciful”, “imaginary” tales that, far from containing any kind 
of truth, are deceitful and dangerous for the salvation of the soul. Given that all
history of myth, but rather a much less ambitious reconstruction of one of its possible genelogy. And from 
this point of view, it is only with Hebraism that monotheism came to its fullest expression
46 According to Schmitt, “all significant concepts of modem theory of the state are secularised theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development -  in which they were transferred from theology to 
the theory of the state, whereby , for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver -  but 
also because of the systematic structure” (Schmitt 1922, III). Schmitt’s preferred examples are thus the 
parallel between God and the absolute lawgiver and the idea of exception that he sees as analogous in 
jurisprudence to the miracle in theology (Schmitt 1922, III).
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pretensions to truth were advanced by the sacred logos, the Word of God, no space was 
left for myth. It was then that the negative connotation of “myth” was first established: 
the myth became all that the sacred logos, the Unique Truth, is not -  the enemy to 
defy, the pagan to be converted.
Certainly the revealed Word of God must also be interpreted. Both a Jew and 
- to some extent -  a Protestant would thus, for instance, agree that, interpretations of 
the Sacred Scriptures being endless, the Sacred Scriptures admit of a plurality within 
themselves.47 However, even if one agrees on the openness of possible interpretations, 
it still remains that this plurality is only admitted as that of mere interpretations. As 
Castoriadis has pointed out, “interpretations” and “commentaries” are the means 
employed by world religions in order to process and assimilate the new: once a closure 
of meaning has been operated, “interpretations” become the means through which the 
new can be subjected to a fictitious but efficient reductio and the closure o f meaning 
thus perpetuated whilst apparently accepting the new (Castoriadis 1988:153).
In other words, interpretations are provided within a general plot that is 
already given and thus presented as the revealed and unique sacred truth. The 
absoluteness of the pretension to truth already defines the range of possibilities. On the 
contrary, the plurality of myth is not only a plurality of interpretations: it is also a 
plurality o f Gods. First, it is a plurality of variants within a mythologem, where each 
variant presents itself as legitimate in its own right: there is no possible contradiction 
among the different variants of a myth because no superior criterion is given. Rather, 
each variant finds in itself its ratio essendi. Second, the plurality entailed by myth is 
not only a plurality o f variants within the same narrative plot, but also a plurality of 
mythologems, i.e. a plurality o f different narrative cores. Each mythologem is 
legitimate in its own right because each god has his myth and none of these gods aspire 
to being a unique God.48
Thus, the idea o f myth implies the recognition of a plurality of truths that was 
denied by the idea o f a Holy History as such. A comparison between Hesiod’s
47 The creative force of Hebraism is expressed by the fact that the biblical comment (midrash) is composed 
by both halakhah, which is the part that interprets the Torah by actualising its precepts, but also by the 
haggadah, the exegetic tradition composed by tales inspired by the biblical text and aimed at clarifying its 
meaning.
48 On polytheism of myth, see Schmitt (1923) and also chapter 10. In his analysis of the myth of Prometheus, 
Blumenberg speaks of a conflict between different gods (Blumenberg 1979). The idea of the polytheism of 
myth was then developed by Odo Marquard who, in the context of the divided Germany of the 1970s, used
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Theogony and the Exodus can further clarify the point. As we have seen, in the 
proemion to his Theogony, Hesiod starts with an invocation to the Muses, which are 
said to have breathed a divine voice into the poet to celebrate things that shall be and 
things that were a foretime {Theogony, 30ff). At the same time the Muses present 
themselves as those who “know how to speak many false things as though they were 
true but also know, when we will, to utter true things” (Theogony, 26 ff). Thus, Muses 
are introduced as the source of a divine knowledge, but at the same this knowledge is 
intrinsically plural not only because the Muses are many, but also because they tell 
‘true  things” as well as “false things as though they were true”.
On the contrary, the God of monotheism is a God who could never tell false 
things, because this would contradict his absolute pretension to truth. Thus, whereas 
Hesiod’s Muses appear to the poet saying who they are, the God of the Exodus presents 
himself to Moses with a tautology: “I am he who I am” {Exodus, 3, 13). The pretension 
to truth can be absolute only because it is based on a tautology: God is not defined by 
any other Word than His own. God is causa sui and has thus no other ratio essendi than 
Himself. Precisely because it is tautological, the logos is sacred and thus unique and 
needs no other Words. This is, finally, the fundament on which its Commandment is 
based: “you will not have any other gods before me” {Exodus, 20, 3).
Nor does the Euangelion mitigate this absoluteness. On the contrary, the New 
Alliance announced by the Gospel {Euangelion) reinforced this pretension to truth by 
adding a new dimension to it. Now the logos is not only the creative Word of God and 
the word with which God reveals his will (the Law): it is now the living Christ, the God 
that became flesh. The incipit of John’s gospel quoted at the beginning continues with 
the following words: “The logos became flesh and lived for a while among us. We 
have seen his glory, the glory of the One and only Son, who came from the Father, full 
o f grace and truth” {John I, 14). Christendom legitimises itself as the fullest revelation 
o f the nature of the logos', whereas the Old Testament has already known the creative 
Word of God (Genesis, I, 3ff; Isaiah 40, 8; 44, 24-28; 48, 13; Psalms 33, 6) and its 
revealing mission {Psalms 107, 20; 147, 15-18), it is the task of the Euangelion to 
complete the revelation by announcing the personal nature of the Sacred Word {logos).
the concept of polytheism of myth in order to oppose it to the “monomythie” of the great narrative of 
emancipation (Marquard 1979).
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The words of Christ “I am the way and the truth and the life” (,John XIV, 6) 
thus closed the circle opened by the creation-revelation of the Old Testament. As such 
they further justify a process of theologisation of the truth. It is to these words that 
Saint Augustine referred when stating that the truth is God himself. This identification 
is developed in reference to Saint John’s passage quoted above. Truth for Augustine 
coincides with God, because the “truth” is the source that we must necessarily admit in 
order to understand the condition of true things: the truth is the measure, so that the 
true thing is true because it is measured by it (Corifessiones, VII, 10-11; 17). 
Analogously, according to Saint Anselm, God as the “summa veritas” is the source o f 
each single truth. The influence of Augustine is clear. Recovering, again thorough 
Augustine, the neoplatonic interpretation o f Platonic ideas as the thoughts of God, 
Anselm states that things are true inasmuch as they are agree with their ideas, i.e. with 
the thoughts with which God has created them: “there is truth in the essence of the 
things that are, because they are as they are in the supreme truth (summa veritas)” (De 
ventate, cap. 7).
God as the measure of truth is also the measure for what is real. God himself 
is the ens realissimum, the presupposition necessary in order to explain the existence o f 
reality. In what sense can God be said to be the ens realissimum'} What “reality” are we 
referring to? We have seen that Greek antiquity did not have a word corresponding to 
our word “reality” . Indeed, it is in the Latin Middle Ages that the word “realitas” was 
first coined. The first attested occurrence o f the term appeared in late Scholasticism 
(Courtine 1992 a). However, the term “realitas” at this stage refers primarily to the 
substantive “res” in its widest meaning and designates what makes a res to be what it 
is, i.e. its essentia, or even better, the essentialitas of each “res” as such (Courtine 1992 
a, b).
In this sense, “realitas” is identified with the formalitas and “realismus” was 
indeed said to be that conception according to which these formalitates exist as 
universals in re. Thus, “realismus” as a philosophical position sustaining the existence 
of universals in re was opposed to nom inalism i, i.e. the view asserting that they only 
exist in voce. The terms “realismus” therefore originally meant a conception that is 
almost the opposite of what it came to mean in modem philosophical usage at least 
after Kant. Whereas this latter understood “realism” as the opposite of “idealism”, the
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original medieval term “realismus” designated a position that is in fact closer to what 
Kant would call “idealism” (Hoffmann et a l  1992).49
The term “realitas” thus designated a semantic area close to what we call 
“perfection” -  where “perfectio” must be understood in its etymological meaning of a 
“complete being”. We are now used to a completely different meaning and have 
therefore forgotten that in medieval sources the word “realitas” meant something else 
(Courtine 1992 a,b). Traces of this use can, indeed, still be found in the work by 
modem philosophers. Descartes for instance uses the expression “realitas sive perfectio 
in aliqua re” (Med. 3, Ax.3, 165). Spinoza, on the other hand, explicitly states in the 
Second Part of his Ethics that “per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo” (Spinoza, 
Et. II, def. VI).
We must take this identification of the “realitas” with the “perfectio” 
seriously. This does not mean that those who used this expression did not believe in the 
reality o f “this world” -  which is certainly not perfect. It simply indicated that they 
conceived pf “this world” as only one possible level of “reality”. In Scholasticism, the 
concept that was in fact associated with it was that of “analogy”. The being of the 
creature is neither identical with the being of God nor completely alien to it: it is 
analogical, i.e. similar, but different. As Thomas Aquinas put it, only God has being as 
His essence, whereas the creatures have being only for participation; in this they are 
similar to God, who is the first principle o f being, but for the same reason, God is 
incommensurable with them, and can therefore be the subject of only an analogical 
predication (Summa theologiae, I, q. 4, a.3).50
The concept of realitas as perfectio thus suggests a view of “reality” which, 
like the Greek to on, contemplates different degrees of reality but within which, in 
contrast to it, God Himself, the ens perfectissimum by definition, works as the ordering 
ontological criterion. The omnipotent God creator of being, and thus the measure of 
truth, is also the ens realissimum and thus a measure for what is “real”: according to 
this position, the closer to God things are, the more they are real.
49 On this point see also the entry on “realismo” in Abbagnano 1971,732.
50 When Duns Scoto criticises this view by saying that omne ens habet aliquod esse proprium, he aimed at 
reconstructing the unity of being as common to all that exists. He did this because he thought that it would 
have been impossible otherwise to know the true nature of God, but by recognising the autonomy of each 
single individual being he thereby opened a way that went beyond the typically medieval view.
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Traces of this approach to truth and reality can still be found in some 
fragments of the medieval imaginary.51 Cosmology was particularly crucial from this 
point of view, conveying images of the universe that were echoed in the numerous 
astrological and magical handbooks and practices as well as in the representations of 
the afterlife used in sermons and the curing of souls.
As Pierre Duhem observed, commentaries to the Genesis, which functioned 
as the bases for early medieval cosmology, were not writings directed towards 
specialists: they addressed their views to the Christian masses, who were expected to 
progress not in the studying of astronomy but, rather, on the road to salvation (Duhem 
1965: 396). Whereas some of these commentaries, following Origen, tried to reconcile 
the Scriptures with previous cosmological speculation, others proposed an approach 
that was characterised by a strict adhesion to the text of the Sacred Scriptures. These 
latter were also considered to contain all the truths regarding the constitution of the 
natural world: the world was perceived as a second “book written by God” and was 
therefore interpreted as sacramentum salutaris allegoriae and then read through the 
biblical exegesis itself (Duhem 1965: 396ff).
Thus, for instance, in the VI century, Cosmas Indicopleustes, a pious 
Christian wrote a very influential Christian Topography o f the Universe, demonstrated 
through the Sacred Scriptures and whose truth Christians cannot question (Cosmas 
1897). Mixing o f the ancient doctrines re-elaborated by Fathers o f the Church and the 
more recent biblical exegesis, Cosmas affirmed that the right model for the universe 
was the tabernacle constructed by Moses. The earth is flat and the stars are transported 
by angels. And this was, thus, the universe depicted in churches, books and 
representations of afterlife for a long time. Around the XI century, however, a new 
series of previously unknown Greek and Arabic classics were translated into Latin. The 
Platonic Timaeus, known in its first part and accompanied with a comment by 
Calcidius (IV century), together with Ptolemy, translated from the Arabic, generated a 
new view that, on the basis of a rediscovered Aristotle’s Physics,52 went on to prevail 
for centuries.
51 On the notion of imaginary, see in particular Castoriadis 1975 and Chapter 10.
52 Whereas Plato was known to the Middle Ages essentially through the testimony of Augustine, Aristotle 
was know only through Boetius’ translation and comments of and on his De interpretatione and Categoriae. 
The physical and metaphysical writings were translated only in the XII century (the ethical, political and 
rhetorical even later). Initially seen with suspect for their idea of natural necessity ( which was considered as 
a possible threat to the dogma of God’s omnipotence), Aristotle’s writings were later on reconciled with
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Aristotle conceived of the world in purely qualitative terms, that is to say he 
divided the universe into several parts constituted by different qualities corresponding 
to different degrees of perfection. In this universe there is, on the one hand, the sub­
lunar world, whose elements earth, water, air and fire, move according to a linear 
movement, which is imperfect. On the other, beyond the sky of the moon, there are the 
skies, conceived as spheres, of the sun and the other planets, which are made by an 
incorruptible substance (ether) and which move according to a circular movement, 
which is perfect. Beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, which is the limit of the 
Aristotelic universe, there is the first immovable motor, the first principle of 
everything, which is non-material - because matter is subject to corruption, pure 
thought of thought. Imperfection on the one hand, all the perfection culminating in an 
immovable motor on the other: the Church liked this cosmology. And its agreement 
with the dogmas of faith certainly helps to explain its persistence.
Supported by the authority of the church, the Aristotelic-Ptolemaic 
cosmology dominated for centuries. This also means that for centuries people were 
exposed to this particular image of the universe: they saw such a world in churches, in 
the paintings adorning them, in astrological and magical handbooks, in sermons, and in 
the various representations of the afterlife. This was a world constructed according to a 
multilevel scheme, where to each level corresponds a further grade of perfection. The 
culminating point was obviously the being always in act, the perfect being, or ens 
realissimum. This is not to say that people did not believe in what we can call the
“external empirical reality”, but only that this latter was thought of as only one level of
«
reality and, possibly, as the level entailing the lowest degree of perfection.
Medieval figurative art is quite often characterised as “non-realist”, this 
meaning that medieval painters did not paint bodies and objects as they are “in reality”, 
i.e. as we perceive of them through our senses. However, the point is not that these 
paintings are not “realistic”: it is, rather, that “realitas” was itself perceived differently. 
It is not that medieval painters could not see that their paintings did not reflect the way 
in which things appear through senses. The way in which things appear to our sensitive 
experience was on the contrary not so important for a medieval painter. There was no
Christendom particularly thanks to the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, who made Aristotle’s natural necessity 
into an instrument to demonstrate the truth of faith.
point in depicting bodies and objects in this way for him. Only together with a new 
Weltanschauung, where not God but the human being is the measure of everything, 
then the way in which things appear to our sensitive experience would be given a new 
centrality (Geertz 1983,5).
Thus, whereas the myth could not be encompassed within such a Christian 
worldview because of its subversive plurality of histories, Christendom was still able to 
negotiate with ratio inasfar as this was accepted as being a means to reach the revealed 
truth. Myth was instead subjected to a fundamentally hostile attittude. At first sight, the 
attitude of the Christendom towards the mythological heritage might appear to be 
ambiguous rather than outrightly hostile, because Christendom itself made recourse to 
it to such a great extent. However, even this ambiguity reflects a fundamentally 
negative attitude, which transpires even when previous mythological narratives were 
apparently “admitted”. In fact, for all the reasons we have seen above, myth could not 
be recognised in its own right within a Christian worldview. On the contrary, myths 
were “christianised”, through both the reductio ad unum o f their truth and the 
conversion of their content. This is to say, they were not recognised because, even 
when apparently “recovered”, their plurality was denied. Ancient myths were either 
deleted by material oblivion or, when possible, they were read as involucra, 
integumenta of the revealed truth, i.e. read as an anticipation o f it.
Among the hermeneutical devices that led to this reductio ad unum, two have 
been particularly efficient. Both of them have their origins in the biblical exegesis. One 
of the fundamental problems for the Christians of the origins was indeed how to 
interpret the stories of the Old Testament. Among the Fathers of the Church, in 
particular, two fundamental approaches were elaborated. The first, recommended by 
Origen, was more “spiritualist” and proposed interpreting these stories as allegories, 
i.e. as stories or imagines referring to some hidden and remote meaning that was 
different from the literal one. In this perspective, the literal meaning was dissolved into 
a spiritual one.
The second more “realistic” approach was proposed by Tertullian and is 
constructed around the notion of “figura futurorum”.53 4 Tertullian pointed to the
53 Criticism of this view was raised in particular within the mendicant orders. According to Saint Francis, for 
instance, it is each single creature that, having been created by God himself, carries signs of its perfection. 
However this was the view of only a minority and it was opposed for long time for its political implications.
54 See in particular “Figura” in Auerbach 1938.
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historical truth of the tales of the Old Testament -  that was, on the contrary, completely 
ignored by the allegorical reading by Origen. In Tertullian’s view, Moses actually went 
through the desert, and this is a historical truth that must be preserved in the exegesis. 
At the same time, Moses leading the Jews out of the desert is read as the figura  or “real 
prophecy” of the coming of Christ and the liberation of souls from sin. Both are 
historical events, Moses and Christ, but the first is a figura futurorum , an “umbra'’ or 
“imagery that finds its realisation in the future coining of Christ, which is, in fact, its 
“veritas”.
Figural interpretation was very influential in Latin Middle Ages, as a 
consequence in particular of Augustine’s authority. As Erich Auerbach points out, it 
was Augustine who most emphatically recommended it for the sermon and the mission 
of evangelisation; furthermore he gave examples of how to further develop it: Noah’s 
ark is “prefiguratio Ecclesiae” (De Civ. 15,27), Moses is in different ways “figura  
Christr (De Civ. 10, 6 or 18,11); Aaron’s “sacerdotium is “umbra et figura aetemi 
sacerdotir (De Civ. 17,6), and so on (Auerbach 1938).
The two hermeneutical devices, allegorical and figural reading, enabled the 
whole history to be read as a history of salvation: each event, each narrative can be 
read through them either as allegorical involucra of the superior truth of salvation or as 
its “real prophecy”, which in a chain of successive figurae futurorum, will find its final 
truth at the end of time and final triumph of the judging God. The figural interpretation 
could thus be used as the basis for the interpretation o f history: if the world is a liber, a 
book created by the Word of God, than it is natural to interpret it with the same means 
used to interpret the Sacred Scriptures. The two hermeneutical devices described above 
were particularly helpful to this process, then.
Through such devices, the pagan world of myth, even when apparently 
recovered, was in fact reduced to a unique truth and thus denied in its pluralistic nature. 
Noteworthy examples of this can be seen in Dante’s Divina Commedia. This summa of 
both the ideological and imaginative medieval apparatus is full o f figures drawn from 
the pagan world. This seems to be the obvious consequence of the fact that the object 
of this sacrato poema (Paradiso, XXV, 1) is the description of Dante’s voyage in the 
afterlife and his visio of the status animarum post mortem (Lettera a Cangrande della
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Scala).55 Pagans do not only appear among the damned. Virgil is Dante’s guide, and 
this has always been explained by referring to an allegorical reading of Virgil, as an 
allegory of human reason: Virgil who cannot accompany Dante in the Paradise would 
then be the allegory of the impossibility of human reason to go beyond certain limits, 
much as Beatrice, who comes to Dante’s aid, would be the allegory of divine grace. 
But what about other pagan figures such as Cato or Ulysses - just to take only a few 
examples?
Cato, pagan and guilty of one of the most horrible sins for Christians, i.e. 
suicide (Purgatorio, I, 70-75), is nothing less than the guardian o f Purgatory, the realm 
where souls can gain the freedom from sin that they have lost. This is possible because 
the story of Cato is not denied in its historical truth, but the historical Cato, who 
committed suicide for the sake of political freedom, is read as the figura  of the Cato 
that is here presented as guardian o f Purgatory (Auerbach 1938). Only inasmuch the 
political freedom for the sake of which he committed suicide can be read as “umbra 
futuroruni” o f Christian freedom, can Cato represent the guardian of Purgatory, i.e. of 
the place where the soul can free itself from the serfdom of sin.
Dante’s recovery of the myth of Ulysses should be interpreted in a similar 
vein. The story of the Ulysses, burnt with Diomede in the XXVII Canto of the Inferno, 
is conceived by Dante as the fullest realisation of the Homeric Ulysses: the pagan 
Ulysses is only a figura o umbra of its fullest Christian truth. Thus, the Ulysses who is 
here burning is not only condemned to be burnt eternally for the fraud of the Trojan 
horse, but, in Dante’s account of this myth, he is swallowed up by the sea for having 
dared to navigate beyond Hercules’ Columns. Thus, Dante’s Ulysses is neither a 
recovery of Homer’s mythical character nor one of the possible variants of a variously 
reinterpreted myth: it is the figura of the human reason and its incapacity to go beyond 
the limits imposed by God.
The point is not that Dante rejected Homer’s version of the story of Ulysses, 
or, even less, denied the historical truth of Cato’s story. It is only that these events are 
subordinated in their fullest realisation to the coming of Christ. Analogously, it is not 
that Christendom refuses altogether to admit mythological stories; but that these latter
55 Here, as well as when he compares his vojage in the afterlife with that of Aeneas and Saint Paul (Inferno,
II, 32), it is clear that Dante conceived of it as “real”. The reality of Saint Paul’s descensus is guaranteed by 
the Sacred Scriptures -  an authority that such a deeply Christian mind as Dante’s would never have
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were reinterpreted as the involucra of a superior truth and thus reduced to a unique 
History.
History is unique because it is the History of salvation. And the Church, as 
the material incarnation of this History of salvation, was the authority that claimed to 
be destined by God to interpret its truth. On this basis, the Church claimed its right to 
determine the criteria for the figural interpretation. The struggle for authority thus 
becomes the struggle for the right to interpret.
Luther’s principle of an individual reading o f the Sacred Scriptures (sola 
Scriptura) was the most tangible sign of a rejection of the authority of the Catholic 
Church. Luther strongly opposed allegorism in biblical exegesis. The Lutheran 
hermeneutical principle of sola Scriptura was fundamentally contrary to an allegorical 
and figural reading because the privileging of literal over allegorical meaning was also 
an opposition to the authority of the Catholic Church in fixing the codes of the 
interpretation.
But once the principle of the free interpretation starts to be admitted with the 
Reformation, a new process begins at the end of which the sacred logos cannot but find 
itself again as a plurality. Here the dialectic nexus of myth and the sacred logos fully 
emerges: the logos, the Word that presented itself as the uniqueness of a tautological 
truth (“I am he who I am”) and constitutes itself as Holy History precisely by 
condemning the polytheism of myth, must find itself again as a plurality once more. It 
is at this point that Holy History, which was presented itself as a History in the singular 
precisely because it was unique in contrast to the plurality of myth, is shown to be 
nothing more than one of the many possible stories.
The first reaction to the rediscovery of the plurality o f Histories is that of 
trying to recompose the unity on a different level. Protestant liberal theology, a result 
of the application of the philological method to the Sacred Scriptures and ending up as 
a claim for its “de-mythologisation” (Entmythologisierung) is clearly an attempt to 
recompose the dialectics of theological truth. In his programmatic conference of the 
1941 Neues Testament und Mythologie, Bultmann denounced the mythical in the 
Sacred Scriptures: it is to this mythical element that, in his view, all the inconsistencies 
of the text are due. On the other hand, he contends, we can no longer believe in the
questioned, whereas for the reality Aeneas’ travel the authority is Virgil, an authority that Dante fully 
accepts: (Inferno II, 13-15).
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stories o f the Gospels: stories about the Resurrection and Assumption can no longer 
appeal to modem ears and must be considered nothing more than mere “myths”. Hence 
the proposal for a new hermeneutical tool for the interpretation of the Sacred 
Scriptures: “demythologisation” (Entmythologisierung) - defined as the hermeneutical 
tool for assessing content of reality (Wirldichkeitsgehalt) o f mythological texts 
(Bultmann 1962: 19).
The debate over demythologisation thus moves from the recognition within 
Christendom of the plurality that is defining of myth. All the same - so Bultmann 
continues - this plurality is simply a contingent plurality, i.e. it is the plurality o f 
antiquated representations added to by the primitive catechesis and predications; as 
such, it must be kept separated from the kerygma, the unique, always living Christian 
message. Thus, whereas the stories in the New Testament are recognised as plural but 
then said to be antiquated, the kerygma, is said to be the always living and real unique 
message of salvation (Bultmann 1962: 33). In this way, the Entmythologisierung, 
whereas the on the one hand recognises the plurality of stories, it aims on the other at 
neutralising it by recomposing a new unity at the level of the kerygma.
Bultmann’s proposal for an Entmythologisierung raised a huge debate. 
Among the scholars involved in this discussion, particular attention should be paid to  
the contribution o f Jaspers (Bultmann and Jaspers 1954). Jaspers points out that for 
Christians the Entmythologisierung is a road full of traps since it can lead to the denial 
of the sacred character o f the Scriptures. “Entmythologisierung -  so writes Jaspers to 
Bultmann - ist fa s t blasphemisches Wort” ((Bultmann and Jaspers 1954:19). His 
response to Bultmann’s proposal is not only an attempt to rehabilitate the mythical that 
was present in the Biblos:56 it was the recognition that once the mythical nature of the 
Sacred logos had been recognised, its range cannot be limited.
As a result, demythologisation is blaspheme because it amounts to denounce 
the dialectic of the sacred logos itself and thus to its own self-destruction. Indeed, once 
the mythical nature o f God’s Word has been recognised, it clearely becomes arbitrary 
to determine what the borderline is between the “mythical side” and the “kerygmatic 
core” of the sacred logos. And this arbitrariness cannot but reveal the tautological 
emptiness of the sacred itself. Thus, Jaspers’ reply is not so much an attempt to
56 This is, for instance, the interpretation by Jamme, who saw in Jaspers’ reply a simple attempt to 
rehabilitate myth (Jamme 1991,107).
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rehabilitate the mythical as much as an attempt to save the sacredness of the logos, i.e. 
to recompose that opposition between “sacred logos” versus “myth” upon which the 
Exodus Commandment ultimately rests.
Ecumenical movements can be interpreted as the last of the attempts to 
recompose the uniqueness of the sacred logos at another level. When commenting on 
the concept of demythologisation, the theologian of inter-religious dialogue Raimondo 
Panikkar, observes that it is in the inevitable encounter of Christendom with other 
religions that the problem of demythologisation is exacerbated: the attempt to 
demythologise becomes inevitable precisely because of the inevitable confrontation o f 
Christendom with other world religions (Panikkar 1962: 243). On the other hand, 
Panikkar observes, what renders the dialogue of Christendom with other religions 
impossible is precisely the pretension to exclusivity typical of Christendom: a Hindu 
might well recognise one avatara in the Christ, i.e. one of the possible manifestations 
o f God in space and time, and even recognise His absoluteness, inasfar as any religion 
aims to be absolute, but he could never come to terms with its assumption of 
uniqueness and exclusivity (Panikkar 1962: 262).
According to the theology of the Anglican John Hick, the Euangelion o f the 
salvation in Christ must therefore be recognised as a myth in itself, i.e. “the myth of the 
incarnate God” (Hick 1977). The Holy History of the Christ is now said to be nothing 
but a myth, simply one among many possible stories. However, even now that 
Christendom is recognised as a myth next to many others, a new reductio ad unum is 
predicated on a different level. In Hick’s view, the recognition that Christ represents 
only one single “myth” i.e. one of the stories through which God has revealed Himself, 
should lead from a model constructed over the Christ of Christians to a model 
depending only on God: the different names of God are thus said to be only different 
historical incarnations of the unique divine truth, i.e. historical incarnations of the 
unique sacred logos. Once again, then, it is through the logos that a pretension to 
uniqueness is advanced, because it is the logos itself that is said to be the soteriological 
promise that is common to all religions (Hick 1982; Panikkar 1964).
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3. SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY AND THE DIALECTIC OF 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT
Pierre Bayle, the author of the monumental Dictionaire historique et critique, 
the “real arsenal of all the Enlightenment philosophers’*, “the Bible of the eighteenth 
century*’ (Cassirer 1951: 167), imposes him self as philosophe with an earlier book, 
Various Thoughts on the Occasion o f  a Comet (1682). The occasion for this book was 
provided by the appearance of a comet, an event that caused a huge debate at the time. 
According to a widespread belief, comets were considered as a divine presage of great 
misfortunes and this clearely gave priests and theologians on all sides the opportunity 
for a lively discussion.
Various Thoughts was first published anonymously: the author presented 
indeed the book as a series of letters written by an anonymous writer to a theologian of 
the Sorbonne (Bayle 1682, 4). Camouflaging himself in this way, Bayle was thus able 
to express his criticism o f the belief in comets as presage. Moreover he presented his 
criticism in the language of a theologian so that, as we read in the Preface, he could 
claim that the merit o f these spontaneous letters written to a friend was that its 
“unknown author is willing to use, against the presage of comets, the same weapons 
belonging to piety and religion that have been used until now in favour o f these 
presages” (Bayle 1682,5).
Through this cover Bayle was thus able to put his intentions into practice 
optimally and even to put forward the most revolutionary statements, such as his 
famous argument in favour of a society of atheists.57 In particular, he could develop his 
argument against theologians in favour of an explanation of comets in terms of their 
physical causes. This latter only, in his view, could have deprived comets of their status
i
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of presages, a belief that he held responsible, among both the learned and the ignorant, 
of the worst sorts of foul prejudices and superstitions.
Through the typical escamotage o f commenting an event of the past, Bayle 
was also able to explain the reasons why he has to make recourse to all these 
“precautions”. By quoting Plutarch, he writes that in Nicias’ time one did not dare to 
explain lunar eclipses in terms of natural causes except with one’s own best friend and 
taking all sorts of precautions (Bayle 1682, 110). This is so because when events are 
reduced to their natural causes, they presage nothing anymore and this, in its turn, 
deprives people of an infinite number of “vain imaginings” on which they feast and, as 
a consequence, it also deprives diviners of their employment (Bayle 1682,110).
On the other hand, the political implications of these religious beliefs are 
clear. Indeed, a political critique seems to be the very rationale of Bayle’s critique of 
the belief in comets as presages and of his appeal, against them, to the “enlightenment 
of philosophy”. Again, in a humble passage, Bayle observes that in all times politicians 
have had a major interest in fomenting these beliefs, because nothing is as powerful in 
order to keep populaces in check. As Bayle explicitly says “however unruly and 
inconstant [populaces] may be, if their minds are once stuck by a vain image of 
religion, they will obey the diviners better than their chiefs” (Bayle 1982, 81).
Thus, in order to criticise this use of religious beliefs and to give support to 
his explanation of comets in terms of physical causes, Bayle found himself putting 
forward a critique of the reliance on “vain images and tales” in general. In this, it is not 
only the authority of theologians that he criticises, but also that of poets. In addressing 
the issue with his interlocutor, the presumed anonymous writer of the letter made 
explicit the approach that he expects from him: we should “nourish our mind only with 
an altogether pure reason” since “it is not possible to have a more miserable 
foundation that the authority of the poets” (Bayle 1682, 3).
In the name of ‘"the enlightenment of philosophy” (les lumières de la 
philosophie) a criticism of all the “traditional tales” is put forward. “Pure reason” tells 
us that comets are natural events and are therefore explainable in terms of their purely 
natural causes; once this explanation has been put forward, there is nothing else in 
them that can link their occurrence with fortunes and misfortunes. Why, though should 
this view bring with it a condemnation of poets’ tales? 57
57 On this point see in particular chapter 7.
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We have seen that Plato condemned traditional stories because they were 
morally deceptive, the sacred logos condemned them because of their plurality; here, 
the condemnation is on a new ground: they are judged to be deceptive because they are 
“vain” and “imaginary” and thus “unreal”, or, in other words, because they are mere 
myths (Bayle 1682, 3). What kind o f “reality” is Bayle talking about? As we have seen, 
the Greeks did not even have a word for our “reality” and Scholasticism conceived o f 
realiias primarily in reference to the res in it widest meaning and designating thus
c o
mostly the essentia of each res, so that realitas was used as a synonym of perfection. 
Clearly, it is to another view of the “real” that Bayle is referring. The “R ea r  is not here 
opposed to what is “imperfect”, but rather fundamentally opposed to what is merely 
imaginary or ideal (Hoffmann et al, 1992).
Descartes was a turning point for the emergence of the “real” versus “ideal” 
dichotomy. He was the first to inaugurate the modem use o f the term “idea” in the 
sense o f a “mental content”, whereas, as we have seen, the Ancient Greeks conceived 
of ideas as a being, or - even better - as the being that really is.58 9 Indeed, Descartes was 
one of the founding fathers of the scientific revolution and was thus one o f the first 
philosophers to set up the typically modem problem of the separation between the 
knowing subject from the object of knowledge. It was because o f this separation that 
the problem of the existence of an external world was first formulated. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Descartes used the word realitas in the old sense of 
perfection,60 he formulated the set of problems that went on to give rise to the 
contraposition between “real” versus “ideal” as it will be fully developed by Kant 
(Hoffmann et al. 1992)
Let us dwell briefly on the lines of reasoning presented in his Discours de la 
Méthode and his Meditationes de philosophia prima -  they delineate an approach that 
was to become the model for successive enquiries into the possibility of knowledge. 
The staring point is one of methodical doubt: in order to test the certainty of 
knowledge, Descartes starts by casting doubts over whatever is liable to doubting. Thus 
he finds that all the tmths he had received from his personal experience and education -
58 As we have seen, this conception reached modem philosophers such as Spinoza (Et. II, def. 6) and 
Descartes (Med. 3, ax. 3).
59 See chapter 1. For an analysis of the history of the term ide, see “idea” in Abbagnano 1971,450 and “Idee” 
in Neumann 1972
60 As we have seen, in the Meditationes de prima philosophia one can still find expressions such as “ realitas 
sive perfectio in aliqua re '\ Med. 3, ax. 3)
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ranging from Scholastic metaphysics to sensitive certainty, and to mathematical 
knowledge - can be doubted.
Even in the case of mathematical thinking (the kind of knowledge entailing, 
in his view, the highest level of certainty) Descartes admitts the possibility of mistakes: 
this happens through the hypothesis of a malicious demon, which makes him believe, 
for instance, that “two plus two equals four”. We get thus to the hyperbolic doubt 
where there seems to be no more truth, but only doubts. The way out of this is to claim 
that this is the truth itself: the only truth which cannot be questioned is precisely the 
fact that when one is in the process of doubting, and even if one is deceived, at that 
moment one will nonetheless be thinking and one can thus draw from it the certainty 
that one exists - at least as a res cogitans. This is the meaning of the Cartesian cogito 
ergo sum: the first certainty that human beings can reach is the fact of their existence as 
a res cogitans, i.e. the certainty of their existence as a knowing subject.61
The problem, to which Descartes devoted his thinking until his death, thus 
became that of the relationship between the res cogitans and the res extensa, i.e. how to 
move from the certainty of the knowing subject to that of the existence and 
knowableness of the external world. The solution proposed by modem science was to 
consider the external world as intelligible by the knowing subject only because of its 
being formed by matter and movement and therefore as expressible in mathematical 
language. Thus the multi-layered and complex world of the sacred logos was 
transformed into the simple world, made of matter and movement, of modem 
mechanicism. Only in virtue of this simplicity was the world readable by the knowing 
subject.
Descartes also gave a specifically philosophical formulation to a set of 
problems that Galilei had already partly and was partly formulating, whilst 
experimenting with his telescope and rolling balls. In Galilei’s terms, the universe is 
also a book, but it is now readable because it is written in a mathematical language. 
This latter is what sets the scientific logos definitively apart from the “mythicaf’and the 
“imaginary”. In his II saggiatore -  a book that, whilst discussing the nature of comets, 
delineates this new scientific method, Galilei strongly defends the “new philosophy”,
61 See the second Meditation, where Descartes concludes: “If I convinced myself of something or thought 
anything at all then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is 
deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let
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i.e. “science”, specifically by juxtaposing it to what is described as a mere “fantasia 
d ’uomo” (Galilei 1623, VI, 36).
Our philosophy, Galiei argues in this book, is not “una fantasia d ’uomo come 
Uliade e VOrlando Furioso” precisely because “philosophy is written in this vast book 
that is continually open before our eyes, i.e. in the universe; but this book cannot be 
understood without learning the language and the characters in which it is written. The 
book of the universe is written in a mathematical language, and its characters are 
triangles, circles and other geomethrical figures, without which it is impossible for 
humans to understand a single word; without these, it would be like wandering around 
a dark labyrinth in vain (e’ un aggirarsi vanamente per un oscuro laberinto)” (Galilei 
1623, 6; trans. mine).
The universe is in front of us, we simply have to read it, but it is possible to 
read the universe only by learning to understand its mathematical language: without 
learning this language, “e ’ un aggirarsi vanamente" and it is impossible to understand 
anything about it. Experience, the same experience to which Bayle would refer as the 
only authority recognised by the “enlightenment of philosophy” (Bayle 1682, 4), is 
thus the trait d*union between the knowing enlightened subject and the object of the 
universe.
However, as the Galileian expression “sensata esperienza e certe 
dimostrazionF, i.e. sensible experience and certain demonstrations, suggests, it was not 
that all sensitive experience played such a role (Galiei 1613). If the world is written in 
purely quantitative terms, we have, in order to read it, to dismiss everything that has to 
do with qualities, i.e. all that becomes “merely subjective.” Galilei is also the first 
thinker to formulate the distinction between what would be called “primary and 
secondary properties”: whereas figures, weight, and movement are necessarily attached 
to any object of our experience and cannot be separated from it, other qualities such as 
colour, taste, etc are not necessarily attached to it and are therefore simply secondary. 
As he puts it:
“For this reason I started thinking that, in virtue of the part of 
the subject in which they lie, all these tastes, odors, colours, etc. are 
nothing but pure names that reside in the sensitive body, so that, once 
the animal is taken away, they also are annihilated” (Galilei 1623, 48; 
trans. mine)
him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring about it about that I am nothing so long as I think that 
I am something” (Descartes 1641, Medit., II, 25).
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In these words, a boundary is drawn between what can be subject to scientific 
enquiry and what cannot inasfar as it resides in the “animal part” of the subject. 
Seventy year later John Locke, would write in his Essay concerning Human 
Understanding that only primary qualities are the “real properties'* because they only 
“really exist” in bodies (Locke 1688, U, Vin, 9ff). On the contrary, colours, smells, 
tastes, sounds, and the other qualities perceived through the senses, “whatever reality 
by mistake we attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the object themselves”: they 
derive from “a power of the subject to produce various sensations in us, whose real 
existence, though, depends on those other qualities such as bulk, figures, texture and 
motion that are primary because they are the real ones” (Locke 1688, II, VIII, 14).
Learning to read the book of universe therefore required a process of learning 
how to discern between “primary” and secondary “properties”. These latter are, 
properly speaking, “not real” and one must therefore prescind from them in a scientific 
enquiry. In Galilei’s words, we must get rid of the “animale”, so that once “taken away 
ears, tongues, nases, there would remain only figures, numbers and movements” 
(Galilei 1623, 48; trans.mine). All that is not reducible to figures, numbers and 
movement is the merely subjective, i.e. in Locke’s terms the unreal, and we must rid 
ourselves of it.
Myths -  which are not reducible to a mathematical language - were thus said 
to be “unreal” . As Horkheimer and Adorno pointed out, even if he had not yet 
understood the crucial role of mathematics, Francis Bacon’s philosophy best represents 
the attitude of science towards myth (Adorno & Horkheimer 1944). In Bacon’s view, 
the construction of a true science should be preceded by a critique of all the false 
conceptions, or idola, in which human beings are immerged because of their subjective 
experience -  be it the experience they derive from their nature or from their culture and 
education (Bacon 1627). The subject conducting the scientific enquiry has to deprive 
himself of every residue o f myth since nature can only be mastered by “pure reason”.
Bacon distinguishes four types of idola that must be removed in order to 
construct a Novum Organon: 1) the idola tribus, deriving from the innate 
characteristics of the human mind, such as its tendency to look for uniformities and that 
to make anticipations; 2) the idola specus, or the prejudices that human beings derive 
from their own “cave” , i.e. according to the homonymous Plato’s myth, from the fact 
that human beings usually live in the darkness and can only contemplate the shadow of
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things; 3) the idola fori, or the mistakes that derive from the use of language in social 
life, 4) and, finally, the idola theatri, i.e. the mistakes derived from a belief in the 
authority of traditions and ancient theories.
All the four types of idola are thus identified by Bacon as sources of 
prejudice, ambiguity and incomprehension: therefore, notwithstanding the fact that 
they are rooted in the very nature of the human mind, language and social life, the pure 
subject of scientific enquiry must rid itself of them. The idola theatri are, in a sense, 
the most significant because they reveal what is at stake in this process of removal. 
Why, one could ask, should human beings engage in such a costly enterprise and not 
remain in their idola if these are rooted in the nature of human mind and social life? 
The answer leads us to the core of the project of the Enlightenment: human beings had 
to rid themselves of the idola because otherwise they would remain prey to the 
authority and influence of others; in this sense, the struggle for liberation from the 
idola coincide with the struggle for individual autonomy.
It is no coincidence then that the modem scientific revolution took place 
through a discussion about the nature of comets and other astronomic phenomena. That 
is to say, the new scientific method was developed in order to uphold an astronomic 
revolution, and cannot be separated from it: the battle for modem science was a battle 
for a new conception of the cosmos and therefore also for the place that human beings 
occupy within it. When Galilei, using his self-made telescope, observed that, 
according to the “certezza che e data dagli o cch i\ the lunar landscape is similar to ours 
and that, again according to the authority o f direct observation, there was no single 
centre of the universe (Galilei 1610), he was undermining the traditional view of the 
universe and of the human position within it.
This “traditional” image of the universe against which the “new philosophy” 
was constructed, was built around two pillars: the division between the lunar and 
sublunar worlds, and the idea of a closed universe in which the earth was at its centre. 
In 1600, Giordano Bruno was burnt as a heretic in Campo dei Fiori for having 
questioned these two pillars by sustaining the infinity of the universe. Subsequently, in 
1616, Galilei was first ordered to abandon his Copemican view and then condemned 
for holding it in 1633. 62
62 Many authors have underlined this point: see in particular Blumenberg 1966. It is no coincidence then that, 
both Galilei and Bayle put forward their theories whilst discussing the nature of the comets (Galilei 1623, 
Bayle 1682).
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The reason for those condemns is not only that all the teachings of the 
Church were enmeshed in the geocentric view supported by certain canonical passages 
from the Bible, but that they entailed a revolutionary change in the conception of the 
world and of the place of human beings within it. As a result o f this revolution, 
operated on the basis of the “certainty given by eyes”, the closed universe of the 
Aristotelic tradition divided into two spheres - perfection on the one side and 
imperfection on the other - became an infinite homogeneous universe made of matter 
and movement, where human beings were no longer relegated to imperfection. 
Whereas in the old multi-layered world human beings were finalistically assigned by 
God to the sublunar world, with the new image they found themselves projected into an 
infinite and homogeneous universe where no distinction in terms of greater or lesser 
degrees of perfection could be made.63
The battle for the new science was thus also a human battle for self­
legitimacy against theological absolutism (Blumenberg 1966). Among the chief means 
by which this absolutism ruled was the “traditional” image of the universe as a closed 
and teleologically assigned multi-layered scheme. The process o f self-legitimating 
went therefore through the destruction of this image of the world and the criticism of 
the authorities that supported it. The battle of the scientific logos for its self-legitimacy 
thus coincided with the project for human autonomy.
Kant defined Enlightenment (Aufklärung) as the exit from a condition of self- 
incurred immaturity: immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding 
without the guidance of another and it is self-incurred because it derives not from a 
lack of understanding, but rather from a lack of resolution and courage to use it. The 
motto of the Aufklärung, according to the Kantian formulation, is therefore “sapere 
aude'\ to have the courage to use one’s own reason, i.e. to be autonomous (Kant 1784).
However the Enlightenment’s identification of autonomy with pure reason 
also threaten to become a mythology in its turn. As Horkheimer and Adorno pointed 
out in their Dialektik der Aufklärung, reason is not separated from myth, as the 
Enlightenment expects, so that the Enlightenment’s celebration of the pureness of 
reason risks remaining entrapped in a dialectic movement at the end of which the 
pureness of reason can turn into a mythology of its own (Adorno & Horkheimer 1944).
63 On this point see for instance the classical work From a closed World to the Infinite Universe by A Koyre 
(Koyre 1957).
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In its search for self-legitimacy, the Enlightenment {Aufklärung) tends to exacerbate its 
contrast with myth and thus hides the fact that myth is already Enlightenment 
(Aufklärung); in this way, though, the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) itself risks to fall 
into a mythology, i.e. the mythology of an absolutise pure reason. r
By criticising myth as being subjective and thus “unreal” , the Enlightenment 
strengthens itself, for it asserts thereby the possible and necessary separation of the 
knowing subject from reality -  a separation that, as we have seen, is at the very basis of 
the existence of scientific rationality as such. In this way, Enlightenment hides the fact 
that the myth is already Enlightenment because myth is already a form of explanation 
0Erklärung). But, on the other hand, the pureness of reason that Enlightenment 
celebrates can become a myth in its tum: once a pure reason has unified the whole 
world within its pure relationships and thus completely dominates it, what it finds 
outside there is no longer the world, but its totalitarian abstract categories (Adomo & 
Horkheimer 1944). This dialectic o f Aufklärung is the trap into which any sort of 
absolutisation of pure reason always risks to falling.64
In fact, the role of myth is to explain (erklären) inasfar as it concerns telling, 
naming and discovering the origins of things. For instance, if, together with Aristotle, 
we understand “causes” in the sense of the Greek aitiai, then we should also conclude 
with him that myth is the knowledge of causes. Instead, the Enlightenment denied that 
myth is already a form of knowledge, deriving this from a strict adhesion to the 
conception of causes that was developed by modem science. According to this view, 
causes are not the production of something, but rather the objective connections 
between events.65 The difference between this view and, let us say, Aristotle’s view is 
best captured by comparing the image of artistic creation through which Aristotle 
explains his view of the aitiaf*6 and the typically modem metaphor of the billiard balls.
Billiard balls are the image used by D. Hume in his discussion of the problem 
of causality. Here, we no longer have the production o f something, responsibility, as 
was the case for Aristotle, but rather two events where one is the cause of the other: 
ball A touching ball B, and ball B moving from a status of quiet to movement. To say
64 When writing their Dialektik der Aufklärung, Horkheimer and Adomo were faced with the positivism of 
the first half of the twentieth century. The idea of “dialectic of enlightenment” refers, however, here more to 
a category of the spirit, to an ever-open trap in which the absolutisation of pure reason can fall, rather than to 
a historically given form of Enlightenment.
65 On the distinction between the Greek conception of aitiai and the modem view of causes see Chapter 1 and 
in particular Abbagnano 1971: 118.
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that “the movement o f A is the cause of the movement of B” is to affirm that there is an 
objective, necessary connection between the two. But what is the basis of this 
“objective” connection? Hume maintained that there was no other basis for such a 
connection than mere habit (Hume 1739,1). Kant agreed with him that connection is 
not objective, but subjective, but he, however, called this subjectivity “transcendental”.
Facing the sceptical objection raised by Hume over the possibility of 
grounding the connection between two events on something more than mere habits, 
Kant’s answer was to admit that we cannot reach things as they are in themselves 
Cnoumenon), but precisely because of this, i.e. precisely because every possible 
knowledge is a phenomenical one, it is the subject, the transcendental subject, which 
becomes the criterion o f truth itself. It is a “subject”, then, but in Kant’s view it is a 
transcendental subject, because it is the bearer of the a priori categories of experience, 
i.e. the bearer o f the categories (space, time, causality, etc.) without which experience 
itself cannot exist (Kant 17811).
If the external world has to be presupposed as the matter o f knowledge, but it 
is capable of being only a formless substratum of experience, then once reason has 
reached the whole world, what it finds outside there is nothing other than its own 
categories. As Horkheimer and Adomo point out, by following Kant’s line of thought, 
one must conclude that philosophy knows nothing because it merely repeats what 
reason itself has placed in the object (Horkheimer and Adomo 1944, I). “Reality” is 
thus nothing but what reason, disguised as objective empeiria, puts in it. In his 
Transcendental Analitic of experience, in the section of the Kritik der Reinen Vemunft 
aimed at deducting of the a priori intellectual categories of experience, we read that 
“possible” is whatever agrees with the “formal conditions of experience”, whereas 
“real” (wirklich) is that which is connected {zusammenhàngt) with the “material 
conditions of experience” (Kant 17872, B 266).
Kant’s treatment of imagination is perhaps the most conspicuous sign of the 
Enlightenment’s embarrassment with regards to myth. From the point of view of a 
genealogy of myth, this is perhaps the best way to show how the “mythical” that is 
constituted via exclusion from “rationality” is in fact often intermingled with 
rationality itself. Whereas in the first edition o f the Critique, Kant emphasised the 
central role played by imagination for the possibility of knowledge itself (Kant 1781 \  6
66 On this point, see chapter 1.
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A101), in the second edition he retreats from this discovery and relegates imagination 
to a secondary role (Kant 17872, B 181).67
Thus, in the first edition of the Critique, when looking for the source of that 
“pure transcendental synthesis” understood as condition of possibility of all 
experience”, he identifies it with imagination itself and thus come close to admitting a 
sort of primacy of imagination (Amason 1994:160). As we read in a crucial passage o f 
the 1781 edition:
“If we can demonstrate that even our purest a priori intuitions 
provide no cognition except insofar as they contain the sort of 
combination o f the manifold that makes possible a thoroughgoing 
synthesis or reproduction, then this synthesis of the imagination would 
be grounded even prior to all experience on a priori principles, and one 
must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of this power which 
grounds even the possibility of all experience ” (Kant 1781 \  A101).
Imagination, as the active capacity for synthesis of the manifold, is thus said 
to be the condition for bringing the manifold of intuitions into single images and 
therefore also the transcendental condition of all knowledge. As has been observed, 
imagination, inasfar as it is the faculty that loosens mankind’s relation to and reliance 
on wholly empirical conditions, can be said to be the truly transcendental faculty and 
therefore also the paradoxically concealed, yet “real”, condition of all knowledge 
(Rundell 1994). Reason without imagination is dead reason.
However, in the second edition of his Critique Kant retreats from this 
perspective and relegates imagination to a more subaltern and intermediary role 
between intellect and intuition. Section A95-A130 of the Critique is replaced by a new 
section (B129-B169). In this latter, Kant distinguishes between what he calls the 
figurative synthesis of imagination from its intellectual counterpart, the transcendental 
schematism, which remains still today one o f the most obscure concepts in the Critique 
(Kant 17872, B 152, B 181):
‘This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances 
and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose 
true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes 
only with difficulty. We can only say this much: the image is a product of 
the empirical faculty of productive imagination, [...] the schema of a pure 
concept of the understanding, on the contrary, is something that can never
67 Among those who have recently insisted on this point as a crucial step in order to rethink the faculty of 
imagination, see Amason 1994, Castoriadis 1994; Rundell 1994.
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be brought to an image at all, but is rather pure synthesis” (Kant 17872, B 
181).
Thus whereas the Kant of the first edition of the Critique seems to hold that 
imagination is the truly transcendental faculty of the synthesis and thus the very 
condition of the possibility of knowledge, a few years later he drew back from this 
discovery. By downsizing his previous claim over the formative power of the 
imagination and its crucial role in the process of knowledge, he restates a more 
conventional division between reason and imagination, science and art, and thus also, 
as we will see, between critique and creativity: in this way, critique collapses into 
cognitivism and the imagination is treated either mediately or aesthetically (Rundell 
1994a).
“Imagination”, which Bayle has condemned as “vain”, was thus 
progressively associated with the ambit of aesthetics. Correspondingly, the Aristotelic 
term for imagination, “phantasia”, was moved to the realm of the unreal (Friese 2001). 
Whereas Aristotle recognised a crucial role for the “phantasia” in the process of 
knowledge, both because it preserves that which has made an imprint on memory 
(reproductive phantasia) and for it belabours the phantasmata of knowledge 
(productive phantasia) (Friese 2001),68 Galilei, as we have seen, instead considered the 
“fantasia” as the ambit of poetic “fantasy” and thus as the opposite of scientific 
knowledge (Galilei 1623, 6). At the same time, “imagination”, as the modem 
correspondent to Aristotle’s “phantasia”, was excluded from the ambit of knowledge 
and became the faculty of poetry par excellence (Vattimo 1999b).
This process corresponds to what Gadamer has called the subjectification of 
aesthetics (Gadamer 1960, I, II). “Art” as an autonomous domain grounded on the 
notion of taste is indeed a creature of modernity. Whereas up to modem times the term 
art (ars) covered a very wide meaning including everything that had to do with the 
application of general principles to a certain domain, so that in the middle ages artes 
included dialectic (i.e. philosophy itself) together with grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy and music; in modem times, the meaning of the term was 
restricted to that of “beautiful arts”.69 689
68 For an analysis of the view he put forward in the De Anima in comparison with the modem view, see 
Friese 2001, and Castoriadis 1994
69 A trace of the medieval use of the term “art” can still be found in institutional labels such as “Faculty of 
Arts” or the titles "Bachelor of Arts” or “Master of Arts”.
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Thus, whereas the category o f beauty was initially dealt with in the treatises 
of metaphysics, now it became the object o f a specific discipline whose autonomy is 
guaranteed by the concept of taste (Vattimo 1999a). Kant’s third Critique (Kant 1790) 
is a turning point: in the preface of this book, Kant labels aesthetical the judgement 
concerning the beautiful and the sublime in nature and in art (Kant 1790, pref.). The 
judgement of taste is defined by a contraposition with cognitive judgment: whereas this 
latter operates by subsuming the particular in a general rule, the former is that kind of 
judgement where a universal is looked for in the particular. Therefore even if these 
judgements rest on a spontaneous aggrement with a subjective sentiment of pleasure- 
displeasure and at the same time they are expected to have some kind of universality 
because linked to a sort of “aesthetical common sense” (Kant 1790, 22), they do not 
contribute in any way to the advancement o f knowledge.70
The process of the subjectification o f aesthetics thus went hand in hand with 
its autonomisation. Morals went through an analogous process. In other words, if 
“possible” and “real” came to mean what respectively “agrees” and is “connected” with 
the conditions of experience, namely, the intuition of space and time and the categories 
of understanding, for a reason caught in the dialectic of Aufklärung the problem arises 
of what to do with evrything that does not fall within these conditions. Are we destined 
to “ag girar si vanamente per un oscuro laberinto” as Galilei suggested?
The answer given by romanticism to the autonomisation o f different spheres 
was to call for a “new mythology” (Frank 1982). In Das älteste Systemprogramm des 
deutschen Idealismus, a text attributed to the three disciples of the Tübinger Stift - 
Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling, the restoration of myth took the form of an appeal to a 
new mythology presented as the only way by which to overcome the mechanisation 
operated by the Enlightenment. The myth appears in this text as to encompass all that 
pure reason is not. However, as we will see, in this way the appeal for a “new 
mythology” ends up with reproducing the Enlightenment’s view of myth by simply 
inverting its axiological connotation, rather than radically questioning it.
In particular, according to the authors of this document, the program of a new 
mythology should encompass ethics, politics, aesthetics, and religion. The document
70 Thus, Kant set the judgement of taste a part from knowledge and at the same time, by referring to the 
notion of “common taste” i.e. a way of feeling shared by a human community ideal and effective he laid the 
ground for that connection between aesthetics and the philosophy of history that is characteristic of 
romanticism (Vattimo 1999a).
76
Starts with an invocation o f an ethics understood in a Kantian fashion as a system of all 
the ideas or postulates of reason -  first o f all, the postulate of the Ich as the absolute 
free essence (Hegel, Hölderlin & Schelling 1796: 234). With the idea of a free essence 
also emerges the idea of nature understood as world for a moral essence; from this we 
move to the realm of the Menschenwerk: here, the claim is advanced that all human 
products that are incompatible with the idea of human freedom should be overcome 
0aufgehoben); in particular, the political form of the state, which always implies 
something mechanical {etwas Mechanisches), since it treats human beings as 
Räderwerke rather than as free essences, should disappear {aufhören). The program of 
new mythology thus becomes also a political program for the demolition of the state: 
“Wir müssem also überden Staat hinaus r  (Hegel, Hölderlin & Schelling 1796: 234).
From this radicalisation of the Kantian idea of freedom the document moves 
on to the idea of beauty, presented in the “platonical sense” (Hegel, Hölderlin & 
Schelling 1796: 235). Beauty is seen as the culminating point of the program since it 
unifies all other ideas (freedom, truth and goodness) within itself. As a consequence, 
the young authors of the text can conclude: “Die philosophic des Geistes ist eine 
ästhetische Philosophie” (Hegel, Hölderlin & Schelling 1796:235). The philosopher is 
therefore required to exhibit the aesthetic sense (äesthetische Sinne) of a poet: those 
who do not posses it are “BuchstabenphilosophenThe Buchstabenphilosophen, the 
ultimate products of the Enlightenment, are those who can work only with numbers and 
the abstract categories of intellect and are thus completely lost “when it comes to going 
beyond Tabellen und Register”: beyond tables and numbers the
Buchstabenphilosophen must necessarily confess that they know nothing (Hegel, 
Hölderlin & Schelling 1796:235).
In the text, thus, a dichotomy is drawn between the Buchstabenphilosophie, 
product of the Enlightenment with its mechanicistic view of the world, and - on the 
other hand - a “Philosophie des Geistes” which unifies within itself all that is seen as 
left out by the former: the idea of human beings as free essence, grounding the 
possibility of a moral and also political realm of absolute freedom; the aesthetical 
sense, with its unification of truth, freedom and goodness; and, finally, also a new form 
of religion. Paradoxically the program for a new mythology, which moves from a 
radicalisation of the Kantian idea autonomy up to the extreme result of an anarchic 
program, ends with an appeal for a religion:
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“The great masses, so they wrote, need a material religion of the 
senses [eine sinnliche Religion]. Not only do the great masses, but also the 
philosopher needs it. Monotheism o f reason and heart, polytheism o f the 
imagination and art, this is what we need [...]. We must have a new 
mythology, but this mythology must be at the service of ideas. It must be a 
mythology of reason [...]. Then perpetual unity will triumph among us” 
(Hegel, Hölderlin & Schelling 1796,235; transl. mine).
Thus, whereas in the mind of the young architects o f  the program the claim 
for autonomy should have led to a reign of absolute freedom where even the state, seen 
as “etwas Mechanische s '\ should have disappeared in the name of individual freedom, 
already in this text, but in particular in its successive historical manifestations, the 
appeal for a new mythology tends to be resolved into the sole appeal for myth 
understood as the totality. In this way, myth and religion, which were assimilated by 
the Enlightenment’s critique of all the “vain imaginings” (Bayle) or “fantasie d'uomo” 
(Galilei), are unified once more, so that the appeal for a “new mythology” tends to 
simply reproduce the Enlightenment’s view of myth. Perhaps the more conspicuous 
sign of this tendency is that the appeal to myth tends to resolve into religion and 
therefore into the heteronomy of a divine revelation.
Schelling’s intellectual trajectory is paradigmatic from this point of view. 
Schelling, who is considered the major contributor to the text,71 identified mythology 
as the place of the divine revelation of God a person in the later developments of his 
philosophy (Schelling 1856-1861, XXIV). Myth becomes here the ambit of the 
immediate intuition, where the God of monotheism reveals himself. In this way the 
new philosophy of mythology resolves itself into an attempt to simply “restore” myth, 
i.e. into an appeal for myth as it had been conceived by the Enlightenment itself. As 
has been observed, Schelling’s philosophy of mythology does not deal with the new, 
but rather with the oldest of the mythologies (Marquard 1979:50).
Indeed by subordinating the content o f truth of myth to revelation, Schelling’s 
philosophy o f mythology more than a theory of myth is a theory of the end of myth, 
which is overcome by revelation (Lotito 2002: XL). Schelling subordinates myth to the 
logos (Volkmann-Schluck 1969:11 Iff). In other words once that the logos, now 
understood as reason and now as sacred logos, i.e. as word of a God revealing himself,
71 On this point see Frank 1982,6.
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is identified as the telos o f myth, there is only space for “a final great myth”. In this 
sense, as Blumenberg has pointed out, Schelling’s philosophy of mythology is an 
attempt to bring myth to an end (Blumenberg 1979, VIII).
Blumenberg extends his interpretation of Schelling’s philosophy as attempt to 
“bring myth to an end” to the whole German idealism. On the other hand, Blumenberg 
suggests rather than folly develops his interpretation. Nevertheless, his few remarks on 
the topic, seems to be sufficient for suggesting a new possible interpretive perspective 
on German idealism. Indeed, it seems as if to read for instance Hegel’s philosophy as a 
reply to the program of a “new mythology” could be a very productive heuristic 
strategy.72 For instance, whatever the role of Hegel was in the writing of Das älteste 
Systemprogramm, the idea of a philosophy of spirit as an “aesthetical philosophy”, i.e. 
as a combination of the “monotheism of reason” with “polytheism of imagination”, 
may perhaps throw some light over the interpretation o f the Phénoménologie des 
Geistes (Hegel 1807).
All the same, it seems as if it is the aspect of “monotheism of reason” that 
prevails in the later developments in Hegel’s thinking. Myth becomes here an earlier 
stage in the unfolding of the spirit understood as freedom, precisely the stage where it 
does not yet know itself as free, and needs therefore the pollution o f sensitive images 
(Verunreinigung des Gedankens durch sinnliche Gestalt) (Hegel 1832-45, XIX, 1,3, 
A). At the same time, the Kantian idea of autonomy, which should have led to the 
Aufhebung of the state in virtue of the realisation of a pure realm of freedom in the 
program for a new mythology, is here replaced by the adhesion to a real (wirklich) that 
is said to be rational (vernünftig) in itself (Hegel 1821, Vorrede).
On the other hand, the idealist philosopher that most influenced romantic 
theories of myth was not Hegel, but Schelling (Jamme 1991:35). The first Hölderlin for 
instance also aims at recovering the ancient world of Greek mythology as a tool for the 
critique; in the first lyrics such as the Hymne an den Genius Griechenlands or in the 
Hymne an die Göttin der Harmonie, he presents the mythological figures of ancient 
Greece as symbols of a natural harmony that is seen as lost under modem conditions 
(Hölderlin 1981). The Greek mythology is thus recovered as symbols of harmony 
ruling a nature pantheistically conceived. Myth becomes the medium of an aesthethical
72 This is a point that would deserve to be pursued. To my knowledge, Blumenberg’s suggestion has not yet 
been taken up systematically. Apart from Blumenberg’s remarks (Biumenberg 1979: VIH) helpful insights 
towards this direction can be found in Frank 1982.
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experience in which the union o f the subject and the object is realised once more 
(Hyperion) . 73
Through a trajectory similar to that of Schelling, in his later production, 
Hölderlin* s conception increasingly assumes the connotation of a religious experience: 
myth becomes the dress of God (“Gott an hat ein Gewand*), the medium of a superior 
religious experience in which the Luteran Deus Nudus reveals himself as Deus Vestitus 
(Griechenland, Zweiter Entwurf). The God that appears in the later lyrics is indeed the 
God of monotheism: the recurring figure of Christ, which is syncretistically 
accompanied by Heracles and Dionysius, is now celebrated as the only universal God 
(Patmos; Der Einzige).
However, once more this view o f myth as a totality assimilating myth and 
religion does not question, but simply invert the axiological connotation of the 
Enlightenment’s view. When myth is considered as the ambit of the immediate 
intuition, through which only the true revelation, i.e. the manifestation of God as a 
person, can take place (Schelling), o r as the dress of God, the medium of a superior 
aesthetical experience which embodies the ethical experience of a people (Hölderlin), 
the presuppositions o f  the Enlightenment are not rejected but instead reinforced. The 
fact that the intellectual trajectories of these authors end up in the celebration of myth 
understood as the medium of a divine revelation and thus as heteronomy is thus 
perhaps the more conspicuous sign that romanticism has accepted the dichotomy of 
scientific reason versus myth created by Enlightenment.
On the contrary, it is by radically questioning these presuppositions that we 
must start. In the first place, thus, by rediscussing the identification of the project of 
autonomy with the project of a “pure reason”. Not all that is not “pure reason” is 
heteronomy: myth, in particular, does not always coincide with religious revelation in 
general and even less with the revelation o f God as a person of Christendom in 
particular. Rather, as the dialectic o f the sacred logos shows, the plurality of myth can 
be fundamentally hostile to theological absolutism.
On the other hand, following a crucial insight of early romanticism we must 
recognise that myth is itself a possible means for the project o f autonomy. Only by 
identifying - together with Kant - “autonomy” with the “pureness of reason” can one
730 n  Holderlin’s recovery of myth as the medium of a superior aesthetical experience realising the union of 
the subject and object, see Hiibner 1985.
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possibly deny this fundamental fact. However, if one literally understands by 
autonomy the possibility of giving oneself one’s law, one must also recognise that 
autonomy means interrogation of the existing. As a consequence, imagination can 
also be one of the means for questioning what is given and thus of critique.74In other 
words, we should recognise that imagination is as central as reason to modernity 
(Amason 1994).
Together with the repetitive imagination, one should also recognise the 
existence of what Castoriadis has called the radical imagination (Castoriadis 1975). 
Imagination is radical because, as Kant discovered in the first edition of the Critique,, 
it is at the basis of the possibility o f knowledge itself, but also because it creates ex 
nihilo -  which means not in nihilo or cum nihilo. Imagination operates with 
preexisting material, but it can also always create ex nihilo because it can potentially 
always question its own products (Castoriadis 1994).
Whereas a great deal of philosophical work has been done on the concept of 
reason and its possible contribution to the project of autonomy, nothing similar has 
been done on the concept of imagination. In comparison to reason, imagination has 
thus remained a marginal topic in recent philosophical debates. In particular, just as 
the move from a philosophy o f subject to a new emphasis on context has led from a 
theory of “reason” to one of “rationality”, we need a parallel development from a 
theory of “imagination” to a theory of the “imaginary” (Amason 1994). Certainly 
some steps have been taken in this direction -  Castoriadis’ work on the “imaginary 
institution of society” being the major recent example (Castoriadis 1975); but the 
disparity with the amount of work done on the concept of rationality remains 
overwhelming.
In addition, we now seem to dispose of the theoretical means for going 
beyond the very alternative between Enlightened versus Romantic views of myth. In 
particular, starting with the second Wittgenstein’s philosophy, alternative views of 
meaning and language have been developed. Now that the linguistic turn has given 
rise to a new emphasis on the different routes for the construction o f reality and that 
the virtual, the imaginary par excellence, has in a sense become the most real, there 
is a chance for further steps ahead.
74 On myth, the project of autonomy and the possibility of critique, see in particular chapter7.
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n . THE NEED FOR MYTH
The genealogy o f myth must not be understood as an invitation to return to the 
“origins of myth”. It would be wrong to conclude from a genealogy of myth that 
“myth” is simply “word” because in Homer mythos was “word”. This reasoning rests 
on a sort of fallacy of the origins, namely on the idea that what came at the beginning 
was good just because it was at the beginning. Indeed, such an idea, if not further 
justified, can indeed easily turn into an empty tautology.
At the same time, even if the tautology is avoided, doubts may still arise over the 
feasibility of a hermeneutical jump back. The world we live in is much more complex 
than Homer’s, so that to hope that, by simply going back to the Homeric “mythos”, we 
could also go back to that simplicity. This, indeed, is the reason why Nietzsche’s 
appeal for a return to myth could not but tum into a call for an impossible restoration. 
In particular, Nietzsche shares with Romanticism the idea of modernity as the epoch 
that has exterminated myth (Nietzsche 1872). As a result, his approach to myth also 
tends to reproduce the Enlightenment’s view o f myth, by simply inverting its 
axiological value.
On the contrary, the proposed genealogy o f myth is not a call for a restoration of 
myth, but rather an attempt to recall the conceptual movement that gave birth to the 
view of myth as “untruth” and “unreal” from which it began. Once the forces at work 
in it are identified, there is hope that we can go beyond the view that they have shaped. 
In particular, once it is discovered that the “untruth” and “unreality” of myth are 
consequences of the dialectic, respectively, of the sacred and of the scientific logos, we 
can attempt, by leaving the assumptions that they have brought with them aside, to go 
beyond the view of myth as untrue and unreal from which we started.
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Contemporary thinking seems to provide the means for doing so. If the genealogy 
o f myth shows that to stigmatise myth as untruth and unreal means to approach it from 
the point of view of a unique truth (sacred logos) and o f an absolutisation o f reason 
(Enlightenment), Chapter 4, follwing Wittgenstein’s insights, is meant to point out that 
any approach to myth in terms of truth is essentially flawed. This is indeed a crucial 
step because, as we have seen, the most important contemporary theories of political 
myth, despite the fact that they do not stigmatise myth as necessarily false, still define 
it in terms of its claims to truth (Lincoln 1989, Flood 1996).
Moving from Wittgenstein’s characterisation of human beings as “ceremonious 
animals”, Chapters 5 and 6 delineate a possible approach to myth understood as one of 
the forms in which the ceremonious activity of human beings takes place. Whereas 
Wittgenstein scattered remarks on myth unify very different phenomena such as rituals, 
religious beliefs etc. under this heading, Blumenberg’s reflection on myth provides 
crucial insights on the specificity of the working on myth. While discussing some of 
the most important theories of myth (in particular Cassirer and Vico), Chapter 5 
focuses on some crucial features of the working on myth, whereas Chapter 6 discusses 
Blumenberg’s view of myth as a narrative that responds to a need for significance.
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4. MYTH AND MEANING
rt. •
In 1890 the first two volumes of a monumental anthropological work on magic and 
religion were published: they were Fraser’s Golden Bough. In this work, later 
republished in twelve volumes (Fraser 19I1-19152), Fraser collected an enormous 
amount of material concerning traditional beliefs and social practices from different 
societies. By classifying the material according to the criteria of evolutionary 
comparativism, he attempted to develope an explanation o f “magic behaviour”. Magic, 
he argues, is based on the belief of a correspondence between entities that are separated 
in space and time but are, nevertheless, linked to  one another. This link, according to 
Fraser, can be thought about in two different ways: either as the relationship between 
part and whole, so that by acting on one part, an influence on the whole can be realised, 
or as an imitation, so that by fictitiously reproducing an object or an act, its effective 
realisation can be expected to come about (Fraser 1911-19152)75.
Thus, according to Frazer magic is based on the application of beliefs that are 
inaccurate in se, and are therefore pure myths, but that are nevertheless applied in a 
way that can be defined as rational and coherent. Whilst analysing the myths of “ruder 
ages and races, we shall do well to look with leniency upon their errors as inevitable 
slips made in the search for truth, and to give them  the benefit of that indulgence which 
we ourselves may one day stand in need o f ’ (Fraser 1911-19152: 264). In other words, 
“their errors were not wilful extravagances or the ravings of insanity, but simply 
hypotheses, justifiable as such at the time when they were propounded, but which a 
fuller experience has proved to be inadequate. It is only by the successive testing of
75 According to Kirk, Fraser’s work on myth is the archetype of the comparative anthropological trend that 
dominated for the whole twentieth century (Kirk 1970,3).
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hypotheses and rejection of the false that truth is at last elicited. After all, what we call 
truth is only the hypothesis which is found to work best” (Fraser 1911-19152).
Myths, according to this view, are thus read as a sort of forerunner, however 
mistaken, of the inductive and deductive procedures of science. One of the strongest 
critics of this view was Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his Remarks on Frazer's Golden 
Bough, he points out that the major weakness of Frazer’s account of the magical and 
religious notions expounded is that “it makes these notions appear as mistakes” 
(Wittgenstein 1967b, le). In other words, even if Frazer appears to be indulgent 
towards the notions and practices he analyses, he does by adopting a point of view that 
is fundamentally flawed: he looks at them as if they were supported by certain 
“hypotheses” about the constitution of the world and, thus, as if they could be found to 
be “true” or “false”, “right” or “mistaken”.
As we will see, these kinds of judgements are not only deem to fail to capture the 
nature of social beliefs and practices, since they interrogate them as if they were 
scientific hypotheses, but -  moreover - they are based on a limited view o f what 
language and meanings are about. Judging magical and religious notions as mistakes 
means bringing these notions onto a terrain that is not their own and interrogating them 
from the standpoint of an overtly limited view of language. Thus, after having pointed 
out to the deficiencies of Frazer’s account, Wittgenstein asks provocatively:
“Was Augustine mistaken, then, when he called on God on every 
page of the Confessions?
Well -  one might say- if he was not mistaken, then the Buddhist 
holy man, or some other whose religion expresses quite different 
notions, surely was. But none of them was making a mistake except 
where he was putting forward a theory” (Wittgenstein 1967b,le).
Thus, according to Wittgenstein, one cannot come to terms with myth, magic and 
religious notions by interrogating them over their truth value. As the dialectic o f myth 
and logos also shows, there must be an expectation of “truth”- understood as “unique” 
or as “objective” - in order to have a “mistake”. In magic and religious notions, 
however, no mistakes can ever exists inasfar as they do not aim at advancing any 
theory. Indeed, as Wittgenstein points out, there is a whole set of meanings and actions 
that human beings carry out in their everyday life that clearly do not rest on any
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expectation of truth and that do not thus presuppose any theory. As he argues by using 
two persuasive examples:
“Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of a loved one. This is 
obviously not based on a belief that it will have a definite effect on the 
object which the picture represents. It aims at some satisfaction and it 
achieves it. Or rather, it does not aim  at anything; we act in this way 
and then feel satisfied” (Wittgenstein 1967b,4e)
There are actions thus that do not aim at something, but are rather 
fulfilled by simply performing them. The meaning of “kissing the picture of a 
loved one” must not be looked at as something different from the action of 
“kissing the picture o f a loved one” itself. As an action, it expresses a desire 
and fulfils it at the same time; as a meaning, it is all present in itself. It is in this 
context that Wittgenstein puts forward his provocative thesis of “human beings 
as ceremonious animals”76 (Wittgenstein 1967b, 7e):
“We could almost say, man is a ceremonious animal. This is 
partly false and partly nonsensical but there is something in it.
In other words, one might begin a book on anthropology in 
this way: When we watch the life and behaviour o f men all over 
the earth, we see that apart from what we might call animal 
activities, taking food &c. &c, men also carry out actions that 
bear a peculiar character and might be called ritualistic.
But then it is nonsense if we go on to say that the 
characteristic o f  these actions is that they spring from wrong 
ideas about the physics of things (this is what Frazer does when 
he says magic is really false physics, o r as the case may be, false 
medicine, technology, &c.)
What makes the character of ritual action is not any view or 
opinion, either right or wrong, although an opinion -  a belief -  
itself can be ritualistic, or belong to a rite (Wittgenstein 
1967b,7e).
Frazer’s view of myth and rituals as “mistaken” derives from a 
misunderstanding about the nature of these notions and practices. Indeed, only by 
assuming that the aim of these notions is to describe facts -  what can only be either 
“true” or “false” -  can one consider these notions as “diseases of language”. This latter
76 On Wiigenstein’s idea of human beings as ceremonious animals and its relationship with anthropology, see 
in particular Bouveresse 1982. On Wittgenstein and anthropology, see Bouveresse 1982, Das 1998, and
Clack 1999.
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is the famous expression coined by Max Midler to underline the fact that the stories 
told by myths are intrinsically “untruthful” and “unreal”. By starting from the 
assumption that the fundamental business of language is to describe facts, Midler was 
led to conclude that ancient myths derived from the misunderstanding of names, 
especially those attached to celestial objects (Kirk 1974:43).
Paradoxically, though, Frazer’s view of myth is based on a conception of 
language to which Wittgenstein himself made a fundamental contribution. Simplifying 
things, one might state that this is the paradigm that has dominated in the philosophy 
o f language over the last century (Marconi 1999: 15). Gottlob Frege first elaborated its 
fundamental theses. However they were precisely Russell’s and the early 
Wittgenstein’s writings -  in particular the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (1921) - 
that filled out the fundamental countours of this paradigm.
The paradigm can be briefly summarised as the combination of three theses 
(Marconi 1999: 15 ff). The first asserts that the meaning of a proposition is given by 
its “truth conditions”, i.e. by the specification of the circumstances in which a 
proposition is true. Thus, this theory of meaning is a theory of the propositions and 
assertive propositions are the privileged units of interest. Second, the meaning of a 
complex expression is considered to be functionally dependent on the meaning of its 
smallest basic parts, so that, for instance, the meaning of any single unity o f a 
proposition is given by its contribution to the meaning of the proposition. This is the 
thesis known as “logical atomism” and points to the composite nature of meaning. The 
third thesis asserts that, given that the meaning of an expression is provided by the 
combination of the first two theses, any psychological consideration over the mental 
representations associated with the linguistic expressions is irrelevant for a theory of 
meaning.
Sentences are thus pictures of facts, the meanings of complex expressions are 
given by the combination of their constitutive parts and everything that cannot be 
reduced to this belongs to the category of the “mystical” and, properly speaking, is 
deprived of meaning (Wittgenstein 1921, 6.44). As Wittgenstein concludes his 
Tractatus, “The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say 
nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural sciences -  i.e. something 




something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to 
a certain sign in his propositions” (Wittgenstein 1921,6.53).
Even from such a brief picture it should be clear that within such a view of 
language there cannot be much place for a philosophical treatment of myth. 
Scepticism would be twofold: towards myth as an object and towards philosophy as a 
suitable method of enquiry. In other words, if “the essential business of language is to 
assert or to deny facts” (Russell 1921:10), and assertive propositions are consequently 
the atoms o f any meaningful expression, then either we can reduce myths to these 
assertive propositions or we have to conclude, with Max Muller, that myths are a 
“disease of language”. This seems to be early Wittgenstein’s position: only how things 
are in this world can be said, the rest being “mystical” (Wittgenstein 1921, 6.44). Or 
again, as he wrote at the end of his Tractatus: “We feel that even when all possible 
scientific questions have been answered, the problems o f life remain completely 
untouched” (Wittgenstein 1921,6.52).
Philosophy is not reserved any better place within this paradigm. No philosophical 
enquiry had ever limited itself to a collection o f assertive propositions and no place 
seems therefore to be left for her in the field o f meaningful enquires. On the other hand, 
this limitation to such a restricted ambit of language -  assertive propositions -  is self- 
defeating in the long run, for not only is the assertion of the meaninglessness of 
philosophical enquiry self-contradictory, given that any such assertion is itself 
philosophical, but also entails too a limited view of language.
When Herbert Marcuse was imprecating against the reduction o f philosophy to the 
analysis of sentences such as “the broom is in the comer”, he was not only pointing to 
the dangers o f political conformism that such one-dimensional thinking implies 
(Marcuse 1964, 7). He was also pointing to the fact that what is analysed is not the 
language that we actually use in our life, with all its complexities, but desegregates 
atoms of language. These latter - he observed -  are, in the best-case, baby talk: 
sentences like “he saw a robin”, “I had a hat” are far from being representative of our 
language (Marcuse 1964: 175). Yet, much of contemporary analytic philosophy is still 
devoted to this kind o f analysis. Tarski’s widely accepted theory of meaning is all 
enclosed in the profound and complex sentence: “the snow is white if  - and only if  - the 
snow is white”. The problem here is not only that by taking fragments of common 
language as a guide to the research there is a great risk o f remaining trapped in the
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positive acceptance and reification of single historical forms; it is also that these 
fragments represent such a limited part of our language that to take them as unique 
objects of enquiry cannot but be misleading for an understanding of what human 
language is about.
Wittgenstein’s self-critique is perhaps the best way of distancing ourselves from 
these views. And notwithstanding all the claims about the continuity of his thinking, 
most of the philosophy he developed after the thirties appears as a sort of profound 
self-critique, so that, it has became common to talk of a “second Wittgenstein”. The 
insights that can be drawn from his later writings opened up a completely different 
perspective on the nature of language and meaning -  and this perspective, as we will 
see, is perhaps the perspective that can best support a philosophy o f political myth.
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations start with a critique of the view of 
meaning that we have been analysing above. He now puts this view under the name of 
Augustine and his major criticism is that such a “philosophical concept of meaning has 
its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it 
is the idea of a language more primitive than ours” (Wittgenstein 1953, 3; emphasis 
mine).
Wittgenstein now moves from the assumption that the essential business of 
language is not to describe facts, but that we instead do a number of things that are not 
-  and cannot - be judged according to their truth or falsehood with language. When we 
give an order, provide a suggestion, make a joke, ask for something, thank someone for 
something, pray someone, tell a story or even construct a scientific hypothesis - just to 
give few examples - its is not by the criterion of their truth that we expect them to be 
judged. Wittgenstein’s major point is now that, we play all sorts o f language-games 
through language (Wittgenstein 1953). Meanings are not the picture o f facts, but they 
are embodied in the language-games that we play continuously, where a language- 
game is defined as an indissoluble whole made of language and the actions into which 
it is woven (Wittgenstein 1953,7).
The concept of “game” is meant here to stress that the rule embodied in wholes 
made of language and actions are constitutive of meaning. This does not mean that 
language is the domain of the arbitrariness of games - however. Indeed, rules govern 
our use of language, as is shown, for instance, by the fact that we do not learn a 
language sentence after sentence. Rather, we construct sentences by putting words
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together according to certain rules -  no matter whether we have learnt these rules 
intentionally as when we learn a foreign language or we internalise them by imitation, 
as children do.
When Wittgenstein elaborated the concept of language-game, he probably had in 
mind precisely the constitutive role o f the rules of games. When one does not follow a 
rule in the game o f chess, one is not simply doing something wrong: one is playing 
another game. However, the idea of a game also points at the same time to the fact that 
it is our acting that lies at the bottom of the language (Wittgenstein 1969, 501). When 
dealing with meaning, it is not only with an act of saying that we have to do, but also at 
the same time with an act of doing.
In other words, the grammar o f a language, i.e. the eliciting the rules governing 
certain linguistic expressions, is not sufficient to reconstruct their meaning. 
Wittgenstein does not provide a definitive answer on this point, and, for instance, in the 
Philosophische Grammatik there is a passage where he seems to suggest the opposite, 
i.e. that: “der Ort eines Worts in der Grammatik ist seine Bedeutung” (Wittgenstein 
1969, 23). The problem seems to be to understand what Wittgenstein meant by 
“Grammatik” - a point on which he always remained ambiguous.
However, it seems that towards the end o f his life he became increasingly sceptical 
about the possibility o f even describing the rules of language-games. These latter are 
always changing and are much too varied to provide a definitive grammar of them. All 
these perplexities emerge particularly in the remarks published with the title On 
Certainty. As we read here: “Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the 
end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will 
see it” (Wittgenstein 1969b, 501).
Whatever the right interpretation of Wittgenstein is, a couple of points can be 
drawn from this debate. One of these is that grammar - understood a compilation of 
rules - is a necessary but not yet sufficient condition for understanding the meaning of 
a sentence. In the first place, this is because sometimes a fully descriptive rule cannot 
be compiled. In these cases, there is simply not enough generality to extrapolate them 
from use. Whoever has some experience in learning a foreign language knows that 
there are sometimes no rules for the employment of certain expressions. They are 
simply used, and are used in a way that does not allow for generalisation and therefore 
for the eliciting of rules.
90
Here it becomes clear that, as Wittgenstein persuasively sustained, the meaning of 
an expression derives from its use. And the term “use” must here be understood in its 
widest meaning - as encompassing both the possibility to extrapolate rules and the 
dimension of action (Wittgenstein 1953, 43).77 In other words, the meaning of an 
expression is not only given by the rule that emerges from our use of a certain 
expression in our action. It is also the continuosly-changing context against which this 
rule must be seen that contributes to the meaning of an expression. To put it in a 
slogan, we might say: “no meaning without use, and no use without a context”. Indeed, 
it is also the context, i.e. the background against which we see each actions within each 
single language-game that is crucial to our understanding of the meaning of a word 
(Wittgenstein 1967a, 567).
Let me illustrate the point with an example. Take the sentence “Close the door”. 
Clearly this expression can acquire very different meaning according to the different 
contexts in which it is applied: it could be an order, an ironical comment over the 
failure of an order, the expression of a desire, a reproach and many other things. In all 
these cases it will be the context that can take us in the right direction. In particular, the 
understanding of this expression does not only require the mutual recognition of certain 
rules, i.e. those governing the place of each single expression as well as those o f the 
use of orders, reproaches etc. Apparently meaningless actions such as the tone of the 
voice or the expression of the face, or also the prehistory of a situation will guide us 
towards a successful understanding. A rule cannot be recognised without some 
knowledge of the context in which it is applied. This may seem very banal: people 
understand our expressions only if they have some knowledge of the context in which 
that expression is situated.
What emerges here is an essentially immanent view of meaning that is at odds not 
only with the twentieth-century paradigm, but also with the prevalent modem view. 
W hen Wittgenstein wrote that logic cannot be described, but must be seen through 
practice (Wittgenstein 1969b, 501), he was not only distancing himself from his 
previous conception according to which sentences are pictures of facts or state of
77 Wittgenstein states that “For a large class of cases -  though not for all -  in which we employ the word 
“meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein 1953,43). 
Again, here he seems to mean that meaning is defined by the place in language. For an interpretation that 
puts more emphasis on action in use see Schneider 1999.
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affairs. He was implicitly criticising the whole modem paradigm according to which 
meanings are something that can be “transferred” from one mind to another78.
In the third book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke wrote: 
‘To make Words serviceable to the end o f Communication, it is necessary that they 
excite, in the hearer, exactly the same Idea, they stand for in the mind of the speaker. 
Without this, Men fill one another’s heads with noise and sounds, but convey not 
thereby their Thoughts, and lay not before one another their Ideas, which is the end of 
Discourse and Language” (Locke 1688, 9, 6). Here the process of understanding a 
speaker’s utterance is presented as a mental event occurring in the head of the hearer 
when he derives from the utterance the thoughts that the speaker intended to convey by 
it. This passage discloses a view of verbal communication that has dominated most of 
modern philosophy o f language (Taylor T.J. 1986: 172). Be it viewed as naturalistically 
grounded or as conventionally imposed, the underlying idea is that the meaning of a 
word is something that could be transferred from one head to another.
Whereas the first Wittgenstein distance himself from this view and dismissed the 
problem as a pseudo-problem, i.e. a problem that concerns only psychology, he went 
on to elaborate a view of meaning that took on board the problems that the modem 
view had addressed and provided an alternative answer. In this new view, meanings are 
not conveyed by words from one mind to another, but are constructed in language- 
games. Or even better, since they are not something that is “added” to the interaction, 
they simply are there, immanent to any communicative action and context. It is the 
sharing of these latter that provides the guarantee of a possible mutual understanding.
This does not mean, though, that Wittgenstein adopts an “expressivist 
understanding of language”. In his Philosophical Arguments, Charles Taylor 
distinguishes between two fundamental paradigm of language: the first is best 
represented by Locke and is mainly concerned with language as an instrument for the 
construction of our picture of the world, with its proper use and abuse, whereas the 
second moves from a romantic critique of this view and has Herder as its key exponent 
(Taylor 1995, ix). Wittgenstein, according to Taylor’s reading would be an exponent of 
this second paradigm (TaylorI995, ix; and in particular, 66 ff). In fact, it can be shown 
that Wittgenstein’s reflections on language are part of a “linguistic turn” that, by going
78 The Fregean paradigm described above also distances itself from the typically modem view of the 
“transfer” of meanings, but, as we have seen, it does it either by liquidating the issue as meaningless or in the 
best case by leaving it to psychology.
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beyond the presuppositions of modem philosophy of consciousness, have also gone 
well beyond the “expressivist” paradigm and rather point to the uselessness if not 
impossibility of even separating the two paradigms79.
Certainly Wittgenstein shares a emphasis on language as a fundamentally social 
phenomenon with romantic theories such as that elaborated by Herder. And for this 
reason Wittgenstein, perhaps more than any other representatives of the linguistic turn, 
has been widely used within the social sciences.80 His view of language is a 
fundamentally social view, where by “social view” I do not simply mean that language 
is for him a social business i.e. that we need a language, we learn it, we use it because 
and by interacting with other people. Moving from Wittgenstein’s insights, one might, 
for instance, argue that a human being who had never had contact with other living 
beings -  no just with other humans, and the reason for this will be clear later on - 
would have no language at all. Such a creature, if s/he could ever exist, would at best 
produce sounds, not words.
Thus, in order to have words, i.e. signs having a meaning within a language, you 
need to have a criterion for the correctness of their use. But any measure needs to be 
independent of the thing that is measured and therefore the use that one single person 
makes of a word cannot be the criteria for its own correctness. And it is the “social” 
that provides this criterion. However, with his critique of the possibility of a private 
language and of the possibility of ostensive definitions, what Wittgenstein does is to 
open the way for a view of language and meaning that departs fundamentally from the 
romantic philosophies of consciousness.
It is in this sense that we must also read Wittgenstein’s argument against the 
possibility of a “private language” (Wittgenstein 1953, 243 ff).81 By “private language” 
Wittgenstein meant a language that a person could use to give expression to his own 
immediate inner experience without it being possible for another person to understand 
it. Let us suppose with Wittgenstein that, for example, I want to keep a diary o f the 
recurrence of a certain sensation and I decide that I will write the sign “S” each time
79 On Wittgenstein and expressivism, see in particular Clack 1999. After analysing Wittgenstein Remarks on 
Frazer from the point of view of expressivism, he suggests that perhaps Wiitgenstein theory would rather go 
towards overcoming the distinction between expressivism and instrumentalism (Clack 1999: 129ff).
80 Recently, for instance, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language has been used as the basis for developing a 
social psychology. On this point, see Jost 1995.
81 On this point see in particular Kenny 1973,10.
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that this sensation recurs (Wittgenstein 1953, 258). But how can I discern this 
sensation?
Of course, Wittgenstein replies, I can give an ostensive definition of it: concentrate 
my attention and point to it inwardly. But what can guarantee me, he further asks, that I 
will recognise it in the future? This is not to  say that I cannot have a memory of this 
sensation. It rather means that I can have no criteria for the correct association of that 
sign “S” with that sensation in particular so that whatever association will appear as 
right to me can be defined as “right” (Wittgenstein 1953, 258). This situation is similar 
to that of someone saying “I know how tall I am”, and by putting his hand on top of his 
head believes that he has proved it (Wittgenstein 1953, 279). The point is that a 
measure must be independent from what it is measured thereby,82 and therefore it is 
impossible to control the association o f “S” with a certain object if it is not inserted in a 
public language.
By criticising the idea of a private language, Wittgenstein did not mean to deny the 
possibility of communicating our inner experience. On the contrary, inasmuch as we 
are, have been, and will be engaged in language-games where the expression of pain, 
anger, joy, etc. is at stake, we also learn to express our inner experience. The 
recognition of a common bodyliness helps this task -  so that if someone in front of me 
is hurt by a heavy object in his body, I expect a  reaction o f pain. But the point is that in 
order to understand his expression as a meaningful expression, I must have been 
trained through certain language-games.
A common bodyliness is thus not sufficient to elaborate meanings. If I find myself 
in India and I want to express my inner disapproval at something by shaking my head 
left and right, I am simply playing the wrong game in that context, because Indians will 
take it as a sign of my approval. To be successful in communicating my feelings in that 
specific context I must also have some experience of it. Similarly, Wittgenstein’s point 
is that even in order to recognise a certain meaning as an expression of my own pain, I 
must have gone through a specific language-gam e training.
This, however, does not mean that since Wittgenstein puts emphasis on the 
embeddedness of language that he must be put together with Heidegger and other 
representatives of the hermeneutical turn within the romantic or expressivist paradigm 
(Taylor 1995,4). The point, is in fact, how the context itself is understood and there are
82 On this point see also Wittgenstein 1953,265.
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reasons to suspect that Wittgenstein’s concept o f language-game entails a concept of 
the context that is fundamentally at odds with both Herder’s and Taylor’s views and 
thus cannot be assimilated within the romantic paradigm.
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on context has indeed been often interpreted as an 
argument for the distinction and even incommensurability between different cultural 
contexts. If the meaning is the use and use is the context, then whenever you leave a 
given context you also leave that universe o f meanings. But this view reflects too 
reified a view o f the context, as it was some sort of self-enclosed unit. And this is the 
view to which Taylor, following in this Herder, refers. It is on the basis of this view 
that Taylor can, for instance, call for a politics of recognition of different cultures 
understood as different contexts or horizons o f meaning (Taylor 1992).
However, from the point view of Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning, Taylor’s 
view of cultural contexts as singular units appears as the exchange of the egocentric for 
an ethnocentric point o f view, i.e. solipsism on a larger scale. The concept of language- 
games implies, indeed, the idea o f fluid and continuously changing contexts and 
situations, where even the idea of boundaries can hardly be applied. The difficulty is 
both diachronic and synchronic. Not only there are most often many and different 
language-games taking place at the same time, so that it becomes difficult to identify 
the boundaries between them. But we are ourselves continuously within a plurality of 
language-games and thus contexts.
Most of the misunderstandings on this point have been generated by Wittgenstein’s 
scattered and never fully developed identification of the language-game with what he 
calls “forms of life” (Wittgenstein 1953, 19, 23, 241).83 4 Thus for instance he wrote, 
“the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein 1953, 
23). Unfortunately, Wittgenstein never develops the concept of “form of life” and it is 
as a consequence very difficult to understand what he meant by this. This omission, on 
the other hand, has left a great deal of space for speculation and many authors have 
consequently interpreted this concept in over-culturalist terms.
83 Rorty 1989, Von Savigny 1991 and Coulter 1999 for instance advance culturalist interpretations of 
Wittgenstein.
84 On the problems raised by the concept of “forms of life” within Wittgenstein’s philosophy, see Scheman 
“Forms o f  life": Mapping the rough ground' (Scheman 1996).
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Culturalist interpretations of the identification “language-games” with different 
“forms of life” have also been used as an argument in favour o f the incommensurability 
between different “cultures”: if meaning is use and use is a form of life then, 
communication between different forms o f life is deemed to be problematic, if not 
impossible.85 Other passages have been used to support this interpretation. For 
instance, at the end of his Philosophical Investigations, after saying that one human 
being can be a complete enigma to another, Wittgenstein continues by saying that “we 
learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and 
what is more, even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not understand 
people (and not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves). We 
cannot find our feet with them”. And again, as we read few lines below, “If a lion could 
talk we could not understand him” (Wittgenstein 1953, 223e). Indeed, as we read in 
Zettel: “we do not understand Chinese gestures any more than Chinese sentences” 
(Wittgenstein 1967, 219).
Together with these culturalist interpretations, there have been those who, in the 
expression “forms o f life”, prefer to point to the importance of the second term - “life”. 
According to Stanley Cavell, for instance, Wittgenstein wanted to point to the fact that 
it is life - and thus activity - that lies at the bottom of language- games. Therefore one 
can also point to a biological basis that is common to all human beings (Cavell 1979): 
this is what would guarantee a common background86 against which to insert any 
single language-game. It would be to this background that Wittgenstein was referring 
when speaking of a “common behaviour of mankind” (Wittgenstein 1953,206).
We do not need to solve all the problems that these two opposing interpretations 
raise. The first impression is, however, that Wittgenstein could not have embraced a 
radical incommensurability thesis. All the same, the very idea of “forms of life” 
remains a fundamentally problematic concept that created more problems than it 
solved. Indeed, it inevitably suggests the idea of some kind o f “unity” within each
85 Arguments a la Wittgenstein of this sort can also be found quite often in the social sciences: see, for 
instance, the “ethno-methodological approach” developed in Coulter 1999. For a culturalist interpretation 
closely based on a reading of Wittgestein’s writings, see Von Savigny 1991.
86 On the importance of the concept of background see also Zettel, 567, where we read: “ How could human 
behaviour be described? Surely only sketching the actions of a variety of humans as they are all mixed up 
together. What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions is not what one man is doing now, an 
individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any 
actions” (Wittgenstein 1967,527)
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single form of life, i.e. something that is, on the other hand, at odds with the idea of 
putting acting at the basis of the concept of language-game.
Human (interaction cannot be limited within the spheres of single self-enclosed 
“forms of life*’ -  and today less than it ever was . We are able to interact not only with 
people from other cultures, but even with other animals o f other species (Churchill, 
1989). Certainly there is no guarantee that by precipitating into a strange country we 
will not feel the impossibility of finding our feet with them. However, this is due to our 
contingent lack of familiarity with these language-games, and not to an ontological 
incommensurability between them. Here, it is the fact that we can, if trained, learn 
different language-games that is most important. Maybe I do not, in the present 
circumstances, understand Chinese gestures any more than I do Chinese sentences, but 
I can, potentially, Ieam to understand both of them
Reversing Wittgenstein’s statement, we can therefore conclude that even if a lion 
cannot talk, we can - and we do - understand it. Whoever has the experience of having 
shared an interaction context for a long time with an animal knows quite well that we 
do understand their “language”, as well as they understand ours, because we have been 
participating in the same language-games. It is simply a matter o f creating an 
interaction context and progressively entering and learning language-games. In other 
words, meanings are not something we carry around with our identity cards. They are 
much more the result o f what we do -  than the consequence of what we are.
Thus, if the forms of life that lie at the bottom of language-game must not be 
identified with self-enclosed cultural units, it becomes even clearer that Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on context does not mean that he is one of the representatives o f the romantic 
paradigm. Rather, Wittgenstein’s statement that “human beings are ceremonious 
animals” means that he has gone well beyond the distinction between the two 
paradigms: if meanings are language-games, then it is, in fact, meaningless, if not 
impossible to distinguish between the two paradigms identified by Taylor, since in a 
language-game no distinction between the “designative” versus the “expressive”
g 7
functions can be made.
Going back to Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s, we might recall here that, 
according to this text, “a whole mythology is deposited in our language” (Wittgenstein 
1967b, lOe). This also implies that one cannot approach the meaning of certain 87
87A similar point is made by B.R.CIack in his book on Wittgenstein and Fraser (Clack 1999:129).
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practices and notions by looking for what they “designate” as distinguished from what 
they “express”. This can ultimately be only a fallacious attempt at separating what 
cannot be separated and it reflects too a limited view of the concept of truth and 
meaning. Thus, according to Wittgenstein:
When we explain, for example, that the king must be 
killed in his prime because, according to the notions o f the 
savages, his soul would not be kept fresh otherwise, we can 
only say: where that practice and these views go together, the 
practice does not spring from the view, but both are there 
(Wittgenstein 1967b).
Otherwise stated, what we have are practices and views that simply are there, 
together and inseparable: one does not designate, or express the other. An act of saying 
is thus intrinsically an act of doing. Thus, in the end Wittgenstein observes: “we can 
only describe and say, human life is like that” (Wittgenstein 1967 3e).
Wittgenstein did not go into the description of the “mythology” that he held to be 
deposited in our language. He had not written the book in anthropology whose first 
words he already possessed. As a consequence his remarks remained scattered and the 
all these notions -  myth, magic and religion -  remain undifferenciated. The task of the 
next chapters is to start to distinguish between them.
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5. APPROACHING MYTH
As we have seen, myths as such could not be recognised within a Christian world 
view because of their “deceitful” plurality of stories. However, it is precisely this 
plurality that characterises myth, in contrast to the idea of the sacred logos. This does 
not simply mean that myths are object of different interpretations, but rather that, 
phenomenologically speaking, myths present themselves as a plurality both of variants 
and o f mythologems that are all legitimate in their own right.
To catch this intrinsic plurality o f myth one cannot simply analyse single myths -  
i.e. the stories that we can fortuitously collect orally or find transcribed in books. These 
latter are only the final product of myth, the reified traces o f the working of myth. Not 
only is myth meaning involving language-games, i.e. an act of saying that is at the 
same time an act of doing and vice-versa; it is also a process - a process of continually 
retelling that involves a multiplicity o f subjects. There are narrators, on the one hand, 
and receivers or potential re-narrators, on the other -  without there being any 
possibility of tracing any sharp divide between the two.
As H. Blumenberg puts it, it is precisely in the relationship between narrators and 
receivers that we should look for the specificity of myth: the myth is the “Arbeit am 
Mythos”, i.e. working o f  myth and at myth. Indeed, the plurality of myth is not only a 
plurality of mythologems, basic narration patterns centred on a character or and 
episode, such as the myth of Prometheus or the myth of the foundation of Athens.88 
Even a single mythologem expresses itself through variants, where each single variant
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presents itself as a story that is legitimate in its own right. This is the difference 
between the Sacred History and the stories o f  myth: even if they both present variants, 
since it is implicit in the act of telling a story that there can be variants, the plurality o f 
myth is both a plurality of variants and a plurality of mythologems all of them 
recognised in their own right. In other words, the plurality of myth is the plurality o f 
polytheism, where there is no God advancing any pretension to an absolute truth, but 
rather a plurality of gods, i.e. of truths.8 9
The idea of working on myth (Arbeit am Mythos) stems precisely from the 
polytheistic vocation of myth. As Blumenberg shows, reconstructing the re-elaboration 
of the myth of Prometheus through the centuries, there is not one single myth of 
Prometheus whose meaning is given once for all. Prometheus can thus be better 
defined as a mythologem , i.e. a basic narration pattern which evolves over time and 
which acquired new and unexpected meanings with the changing of the historical 
circumstances (Blumenberg 1979).
Now if the working of myth is constitutive o f the concept of myth, then it is only by 
looking at the relationship between narrators and receivers that the specificity of myth 
can be caught. Following Blumenberg’s insights, one should adopt an inter-relational90 
approach to myth. This is to say, one should not look at single myths, by focusing on 
their content and their structures. This would mean reifying myth, making an “object” 
out of a relational process. It is at the actual life of myth that one should look, namely 
at the whole Arbeit am Mythos, the working at and o f  myth, whose traces can only be 
found in those reified products of this process that are the stories we read in our books.
This is clearly only one of the innumerable possible approaches to myth.91 In the 
face of the variety o f the possible theories of myths it is useful to recall Cassirer’s 
remarks: myth seems to work like the enchanted glass in which Goethe’s Faust thought 
he was seeing a beautiful woman that was in fact seeing his own image (Cassirer
88 In this perspective my approach differs from those who consider the definition of myth as story and that of 
myth as mythologem as alternative (Henry 2001). In my approach it is implicit in the very concept of myth 
as story that there can be more variants of it.
89 On die polytheism of myth see Marquard 1979. The idea of myth as intrinsically polytheistic was already 
present in Carl Schmitt, who, however, moving from the perspective of a “political theology” could not but 
see in this plurality a danger (Schmitt 1923).
90 The terms “inter-relational”, in contrast to “intersubjective” puts the emphasis on the contexts, instead than 
on the “subjects”. As such, it points to the fact that it is in the relationships between nairators-receivers that 
one should look for the specificity myth. As we will see, the working of myth is such that it becomes even 
difficult to separate narrators from the receivers of myth.
91 Particularly helpful overviews of the different approaches to myth from a philosophical perspectives are: 
Bohrer 1983, Jamme 1991, Jammel999, Poser 1979.
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1946:5): linguists found a world o f signs and names in myth, philosophers found a 
“primitive philosophy”, psychologists a product of the unconscious. Each scholar has 
found in myth those objects with which he was most familiar. Faced with such a 
enchanted glass, one should better look at oneself, reconstruct one’s own genealogy '
and then possibly situate it within the spectrum of other possible approaches.
The starting point o f an inter-relational approach does not, for instance, coincide 
with that of Freud’s. That is to say, although psychoanalytical considerations are part 
of the approach adopted here, they do not exhaust it. Simplifying things, one can say 
that whereas Freud, mainly interested in the general understanding of the human mind, 
aims at identifying its general features, an inter-relational approach instead points in 
the opposite direction. The aim here is thus to search for the specificity of myth, in 
order understand out what differentiates it from other kinds of human expressions.
Otherwise stated, if no modem thinker has perhaps made such extensive use of 
mythological narratives as Freud, given that the ubiquity of the Oedipus complex can 
be read as the ubiquity o f myth, it still remains that he has done so from the perspective 
of an “etiological reductionism” that aims at discovering the universal of human mind.
The Oedipus’s complex works as a platform for explaining all the manifestations of the 
human mind -  from religion to society, morals and art (Freud 1899, 1913). Now, this 
reductionism might be helpful - and even fundamental. But the approach does not say 
much about the specificity of myth, which is the primary object o f this enquiry and 
which must be emphasised from the point o f view of the peculiar relationship that it 
implies between narrator and receivers, and not for what it has in common with other 
forms of expression of the human mind.
Furthermore, Freud’s etiological reductionism also seems to bring with it the 
corollary of the primitivity o f myth. In particular, Freud’s parallel between the mythical 
constructions of animism, neurotic symptoms, and the process of secondary elaboration 
of dreams -  as developed in Totem und Tabu -  reduces myth to a “primitive” 
phenomenon -  one that concerns the “savage mind”, but which is destined to be swept 
away by the development of abstract intellectual language:92whereas the primitive, as 
the neurotic, overestimates its own thoughts over reality, civilised men, full of 
conscious perceptions, can separate what is “real” from what is not. Thus, behind the 
contrast between “civilised’ versus “savage” mind we again find the separation
92 This is suggested at many points in Totem und Tabu ( Freud 1913).
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between “thinking” and “reality”, which is one of the fundamental presuppositions o f 
the Enlightenment and which should therefore be overcome if one does not want to risk 
falling once more into the dialectic of the Enlightenment.
Freud’s analysis o f mass psychology is also linked to his general etiological 
reductionism. In particular, the analogy he put forward between the neurotic’s 
overestimation of his own mind in relation to reality and the primitive mind o f 
primitive peoples reflects the attempt to analyse the problems of a psychology o f 
peoples with the tools o f the individual psychology. This is recognised as problematic 
by Freud himself, for it presupposes something like a “collective soul” (Freud 1913,7) 
which creates more problems that it seems to solve.
When Freud deals extensively with the issue in his Massenpsychologie und Ich- 
analyse (1921), he points out that psychoanalysis is already a social psychology inasfar 
as it cannot analyse individual minds without taking into consideration their relating to 
others (Freud 1921,1). However, as he points out later on, the others that are taken into 
account are those encompassed in the pre-given and limited plot of the individual’s 
complex (Freud 1921, 1), whereas mass psychology considers the way in which being 
the member of a mass -  a race, a people, a social group or class, etc. -  affects an 
individual’s behaviour. Freud moves to this ground through the analogy “mass” = 
“undisciplined infant” = “passionate savage”, which suggests a reified view of social 
groups as homogeneous entities. But the always possible unity of the infant’s mind is 
different in comparison with the fundamentally problematic unity o f a mass,93 so that if 
we want to find out what kind of relationship is entailed in the narrators-receivers 
relationship, we cannot assume it as given from the beginning.94
As a result, the inter-relational approach also differs from structuralist theories of 
myth. As Claude Lévi-Strauss makes clear at many points in his work, the aim of 
structuralism is no different to that of the “hard sciences”, since both are moved by the 
“quest for the invariant”.95 In Lévi-Strauss’s view, structuralism would allow the 
contrast between the scientific positivism of Durkheim and the historical particularism
93 For a critique of the analogy between personal identity and the identity of social groups see Chapter 1 l.On 
the concept of group identity as a “problématique”, see Wagner 2002.
94 The approach here adopted also differs from other psychoanalytical approaches to myth. For instance it 
differs from Gustav Jung’s approach: here, the focus is that of an inter-relational approach is the specificity 
o f the myth as a relational process, and not the universal truths of the archetypes expressed in all kinds of 
human expression - poetry, rituals, totemic practice, etc. -  as described by Jung.
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of the cultural anthropology of F. Boas -  the two approaches to social sciences which 
most influenced him -  to be overcome. In this view, Durkheim was right in asserting 
the existence of the universal invariants of the human society, but these should not be 
looked for in what different cultures superficially seem to have in common, but rather 
in the systematic relationships between those cultural differences -  as they have been 
emphasised by cultural anthropology. In his view, this can be done by applying 
Jakobson1 s linguistics to anthropology. According to Jakobson, the structure of a 
language consists in the system of differences occurring between its terms: the 
invariants are thus not to be identified with superficial resemblances, but rather with 
the invariance of the hidden relationships, Lévi-Strauss called these constants the 
“structures of the human spirit’* and claimed they were to be found not only in verbal 
utterances, but in all sorts of symbolic systems: totems, masks, rituals, and all kinds of 
cultural expressions -  from totemic practice to cooking and music (Levi -Strauss 1958, 
1987).
Lévi-Strauss*s theory of myth also seems to comprise an approach concerned with 
outlining the working of universal structures of the human mind rather than with 
defining the specificity of myth. It comes as no surprise, therefore, when Lévi-Strauss 
maintains that there is a close “similarity” and “contiguity” between myth and music -  
a theory for which he was strongly criticised. By similarity he meant the closeness of 
structure between the two and by contiguity, the fact that the point at which myth 
passed into the background in Western thinking -  that is, during the Renaissance and 
the seventeenth century -  corresponds to the emergence o f the great musical styles 
(Lévi-Strauss 1964,1965). As to the first point, one may object that the fact that he was 
able to identify the same structural invariants in such different fields might well be the 
result of the fact that the same invariants can be found everywhere for they are the 
product of the same mind which is now trying to “discover” them. What he treats as 
“objects” are in fact human products, that is to say products of the same mind that is 
now trying to analyse them as if they were not its own product.
On the other hand, his view of the contiguity between myth and music also reflects 
the same dichotomic approach that we have seen in Freud, and which aims at 
classifying myth as a product of the “savage mind” destined to be swept away by 9
9S See for instance his 1977 interview where he clearly asserts that the structuralism in the field of 
linguistics, or anthropology and the like is nothing other than a very pale imitation of what the “hard 
sciences’* have been doing all the time (Levi- Strauss 1978:9)
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scientific rationality. He sometimes seems to push the dichotomy as far as to 
“naturalise” it through the argument of the mutually exclusive capabilities of the 
human mind. In a significant passage, Lévi-Strauss suggests that “primitive thinking” 
and “civilised mind” rely on two different sorts of mental capacities and that these 
capacities cannot be developed by the same mind at the same time. This is, in his view, 
a necessary consequence of the fact that humans can use only a small sector of their 
mental capacities, and that therefore each culture and each stage of human evolution 
has to develop its own sector (Lévi-Strauss 1978:19).96
However, such a dichotomic approach is unable to explain why myth has survived 
over time despite and next to scientific rationality. How can we explain this? Lévi- 
Strauss’s approach seems unable to handle the issue because he approaches myth from 
the perspective of its having to be overcome by the same forces of scientific rationality 
through which he himself tries to catch the invariants o f myth. Thus he too remains 
entrapped in the dialectics of scientific logos which tries to distinguish itself from myth 
by charging it with the accusation of subjectivity. As he puts it: “Myth gives man, very 
importantly, the illusion that he can understand the universe and that he does 
understand the universe. It is of course only an illusion” (Lévi-Strauss, 1978:17). In his 
view, the most important difference between the ambition of the savage mind to 
achieve a total understanding of the universe and scientific thinking is that the first 
does not succeed, because only science can provide any real mastery over nature. What 
remains of myth is thus only illusion.
The only way to try to avoid the dialectic o f the Enlightenment, which legitimises 
itself by charging myth with subjectivity but it turns itself into myth, seems to be by 
leaving the issue of the reality of myth open. This does not mean that myth is real and 
objective; rather, it means to taking some distance from the scientific view of myth as 
fanciful stories and, consequently, leaving the issue of the “reality of myth” between 
parentheses, which means, in its turn, suspending the question of the correspondence of 
its contents to “reality” .
96 For criticism of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnocentrism, see in particular Geertz’s “The Uses o f Diversity” in Geertz 
2000. As Geertz observes the problem with ethnocentrism is not that it commits us to our own “cultural” 
commitments, but rather that it impedes to us from discovering at what sort of angle we stand to the world. In 
particular it obscures the fact that foreignness does not start at the water’s edge but at the skin’s (Geertz 
2000: 76).
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Thus an inter-relational approach to myth is also a phenomenological approach. 
What characterised the phenomenological method, as first elaborated by Husserl,97 was 
precisely this intention to put the question of realism between parentheses. Since we do 
not have the means to determine whether our representations of the world correspond 
to the world as it is “in itself’ (if this expression has a meaning), phenomenology 
chooses to leave this question aside and to examine the way in which our 
consciousness relates to the phenomenological world - no matter whether this latter 
corresponds to a supposed world in itself or not. 98
In this sense, phenomenology was defined as a “return to the things themselves”, 
by which Husserl meant that these latter are phenomena, understood not as appearances 
counterpoised to hypothetical things in themselves, but rather as original disclosing of 
“reality” in consciousness (Husserl 1901). The aim of the phenomenological method is, 
then, to describe phenomena “as they are given in the consciousness” in order to grasp 
its pure form or idea (eidos). It therefore requires a preliminary “reduction” through 
which all common judgements are suspended, which is what Husserl called 
phenomenological epoché. This means that all theories - ranging from scientific 
theories to judgements of common sense - are placed between parentheses. Among 
these theories, Husserl includes naïve realism, which is a belief in the existence of an 
“external” world that should be faithfully reproduced by consciousness (Husserl 1912).
To adopt a phenomenological approach to myth means, fundamentally, to explicitly 
move from an epoché over the question of the “reality of myth”. In other words, one 
should not consider the myth’s entertaining a certain relationship with reality -  be this 
correct or not - as being constitutive o f it. By raising the issue of the reality of myth, 
one risks adopting a pre-given conception o f reality. On the other hand, it is a 
phenomenological starting point that is combined with an inter-relational approach.
97 Reference is made here to the phenomenological method developed by the early Husserl (Husserl 1901, 
1912). Insights are drawn from this early Husserl and not from the idealistic turn of his later writings, which 
is particularly clear in the series of lectures given in Paris in 1929, published only after his death ( Husserl 
1950).
98 It might appear as bizarre an appeal to a phenomenological method following a Nietzschean genealogy. 
Phenomenology, in Husserl sense, is characterized by the recommendation to prescind from what lies 
“behind” our representation of reality, whereas Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals might be interpreted 
precisely as an attempt to look at what lies behind our moral judgments. However, if one takes the 
phenomenological method in its most radical sense, one should recognize that there is no “behind”. Even if a 
“behind” existed we would know nothing about it, and it is therefore meaningless to suppose something that 
cannot be known.
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This primarily means that the emphasis is placed on relationships, and thus on contexts, 
rather than on consciousness.
What is a myth, then? Moving from the approach sketched above, there are at least 
three features of the working of myth that can be emphasised. The most general is that 
the working of myth takes place within a network of symbols. In a sense, then, a myth 
is a symbol - or better - it involves a network of symbols. But while all myths are 
symbolic, not all symbols are, on the contrary, myths. Indeed, although symbols are 
everywhere, at least wherever there is language and communication, myths are not. We 
need more than a symbol in order to have a myth.
Keeping the two categories o f myth and symbols analytically distinguished is 
crucial. In avoiding the Scylla of neglecting myth, we must not fall into the Charybdis 
of mythologysing everything. To distinguish myth from symbols is necessary in order 
to distinguish myth from all the other symbols that are not myths. For instance, both 
rationality and myth rely on symbols, but they do so in a different way. Indeed - and 
here we approach the First feature o f myth - a myth differs from rational argumentation 
because, despite the fact that both operates with symbols, myths operate with figurative 
means: a myth is made of images, figures and characters. This is a first feature of myth, 
which differentiates it from all other kinds of symbols in general and from rationality in 
particular.
This does not, however, mean that, following the self-presentation of the 
Enlightenment we must understand myth and rationality as mutually exclusive. It 
simply means that the two categories must be analytically distinguished if we want to 
capture the specificity of myth. Myth is not incompatible with rationality, but at the 
same time it does not coincide with it. Indeed, a string of numbers in a mathematical 
proportion is a series o f symbols, but nobody - or at least only a very few - would argue 
that it is a myth. Thus, it is not in the category o f symbols that we must look if we want 
to find the specificity of myth
The conflation between myth and symbol stems, perhaps, from a further conflation 
between two different mainstream meanings o f the term “symbol”. In a broad sense, a 
symbol is simply a sign for something else. This is the original meaning of the Greek 
word synbolon, stemming from the verb synballo, “to put together”. It originally 
designates the two halves of a broken object that can be recomposed only by putting 
them together: in this way each half is a sign referring to something else. However, the
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term acquired a further meaning over time. In a more restricted sense, a symbol is a 
special kind of sign, i.e. it is a sign that is indeterminate, referring to some hidden or 
remote reality. In this sense, we say, for instance, that a symbol is a sign with an 
equivocal meaning.
The concept of symbol has been the subject of much of philosophical speculation. 
The first philosopher to take precisely “symbol”, and not some other related concept 
such as “sign” or “meaning”, as the key concept of a philosophical system was E. 
Cassirer. According to Cassirer, symbols are the transcendental conditions of human 
thinking because they are the only means through which meanings are possible. As we 
read in the Introduction to his Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms, the symbolic function is 
the fundamental function of our consciousness, the function through which only the 
activity of human consciousness is possible. Consciousness, according to Cassirer, is 
nothing but a “pure form of referring” i.e. each single content of the consciousness is 
interwoven in a net of relationships, and it is through this net that a content, in its 
simple being, implies reference to other contents (Cassirer 1925, I, Introduction, 4; 
trans. mine). Symbols are thus the products of this original activity o f consciousness.
In Cassirer’s view, therefore, every significant realisation is a symbol. In a symbol, 
the sensitive element -  a written sign, a sound, an image etc. - presents itself, simply on 
account of its being, as both differentiation and materialisation, i.e. as the manifestation 
and incarnation of a meaning (Cassirer 1925, Ilia, part I, ch.3). It is therefore 
unnecessary for the two elements, the sign and the object referred to by the sign, to be 
already known as separated in order to have a symbol. On contrary, according to 
Cassirer, it is precisely through conceiving the “image” and the “object” as separate 
that the “expressive” can be distinguished from the “conceptual” function. Whereas in 
the pure phenomena of expression, there is no “skin” or “core”, no “one “ or “other”, 
because even if the expression is an extériorisation, in this exteriorising we are still in 
the inferiority, with conceptual knowledge the representation and the object of the 
representation are posed as clearly distinguished.
These are in Cassirer’s view, the two fundamental forms of consciousness, to the 
analysis of which he devoted most o f his thinking. He also went further in this and 
identified the expressive form as the basis of the lower formations of the 
consciousness, or “mythical consciousness”, and the conceptual form as the basis of 
scientific consciousness. Myth, in his view, is thus a form of the expressive experience
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that is primitive precisely because the consciousness is here completely absorbed 
(überwältigt) by the object of his representation, without it being possible to clearly 
distinguish the sign {Zeichen) from the object designated by it (Cassirer 1925).
As has already been observed, this approach to myth somehow presupposes 
scientific rationality as a terminus ad q u e m Myth is here characterised as inferior 
precisely because it is assumed that it must be superseded by scientific rationality, with 
which only, in Cassirer’s view, a clear distinction between the representation of 
consciousness and its objects can be realised. However, as we have seen, the separation 
between the “object” and the “subject” of representations is the result o f a self- 
presentation of the scientific logos, which risks falling into the dialectic of the 
Enlightenment.
The only way to try to escape this dialectic is to analyse myth autonomously. 
Suggestions in this direction can be drawn from Giambattista Vico, the first modem 
thinker to dedicate systematic thinking to myths. In his polemic against Descartes’ 
rationalism, Vico supported the rights of fantasy and rhetoric and contested the idea of 
a unique “scientific method”. By appealing to the principle that we can only know the 
truth of what we ourselves are the authors (verum ip sum factum), he claimed the need 
for a “new science” of human history. It was to this project that he dedicated most of 
his life. La Scienza nuova represents the science of the human world, a world that is 
contructed by human beings and whose knowledge is therefore assured by the very fact 
that the subject of knowledge is also at the same time the maker of this world. Thus, it 
is in the human mind itself that the principles of this new science can be found. And 
the human mind, in Vico’s view, is characterised by the great part played in it by the 
fantasia , understood as an autonomous faculty and upon which, in its tum, the 
autonomy of the “scienza poetica” rests.
Two prejudices, Vico argues, have prevented human beings from recognising this 
autonomy: the boria dei dotti (Vico 1744, 59, 127) and the boria delle nazioni (Vico 
1744, 53, 125,126). One the one hand, there is the boria of the nations, all of them 
pretending to have discovered “tutti i comodi della vita umana” (Vico 1744, 125) and 
therefore tracing back to some remote epoch of their past the origins of all that they 
hold as valuable in human life. The narrative of the birth of philosophy as the act of 
baptism of “Western man” is a very good example of this boria. Vico’s argument 9
99 See in particular Blumenberg 1979,1 ,1.
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against the boria delle nazioni can thus also be used an argument against “enlightened” 
readings o f myth such as that developed by Cassirer: myth, Vico contends, must be 
analysed in its autonomy and not in the perspective of rationality as terminus ad quem.
The second prejudice hindering an autonomous understanding of myth is the boria 
dei dottiy “ i quali ciò che essi sanno vogliono che sia antico quanto che il mondo” 
(Vico 1744, 127). According to Vico even those who have not rejected the rights of 
myth and fantasy against rationality have often fallen into the opposite prejudice, i.e. 
that of presenting myths as the fount of some remote and ancient sapientia of which 
they themselves were the heirs. Vico’s polemic was here directed against all those 
neoplatonist readings that, by means of allegory, aimed at recovering some sort of 
“hidden” sapientia of ancient myths.
Vico’s criticism towards the boria dei dotti is also used as an argument against the 
continually recurring “romantic” approaches to myth: those who present myths as the 
deposit of a lost past are not recognising the autonomy of myth, that is the autonomy, 
as Vico taught us, of a continuously operating faculty of human mind. To conclude, 
two dangers must be avoided if we want to recognise the autonomy o f the “sapienza 
poetica”: the rationalistic disdain for what preceded the rise of scientific rationality, but 
also the nostalgic attempt to “discover” the origins of a lost “sapienza behind ancient 
“favole””.
It is through this attitude toward a “new science” that Vico’s polemics against his 
time still provides crucial insights for an understanding of myth. Vico, who spent all 
his life in the Spanish and then Borbonic Naples of the eighteenth century, lived at the 
margins, both temporal and spatial, of modernity and was thus perhaps in the best 
position to perceive its limits. However, he still remains a child o f his time and, 
therefore, even if he criticised the pretensions o f the emerging scientific method, he did 
so while accepting at least some of the terms in which it had posed the question.
In a sense, then, Vico’s theory of the sapienza poetica also partially reflects an 
“enlightened” attitude towards myth. In particular, his theory of the tre età through 
which all the nations must pass -  età degli dei, l ’età degli eroi e l ’età degli uomoni - 
reflects a teleological scheme where myth, which corresponds to the età degli eroi, also 
appears in the perspective of rationality as the terminus ad quem. This corso of human 
history reflects a truth that Vico derives from what he takes to be the corso of the 
development of the human mind. The theory of the three stages of development of
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humanity is constructed via an analogy with the development of the human mind: “Gli 
uomini -  Vico sustained - dapprima sentono senza avvertire, dappoi awertiscono con 
animo perturbato e commosso, finalmente riflettono con mente pura”. The 
development of the human mind is, thus, characterised by the fact that reason is the last 
faculty to be developed, after the senso and the fantasia. La sapienza poetica, thus, 
corresponds to an early stage of development both of human mind and the “corso 
storico”.
In other words, Vico vindicated the rights of myth and poetry against those of 
science, but in doing so remained entrapped in a dichotomic approach of myth versus 
rationality, which is presupposition o f the Enlightenment itself. Thus, on the one hand, 
Vico claimed the rights of myth and consequently the necessity o f a “logica poetica”, 
not only because poetry and myth, which Vico uses synonymously,100 are recognised as 
forming the origins of the language, 101but also because Vico claims the “truth of 
myth”. Vico seems to push his claim to the point of vindicating, through an audacious 
etymology, the view that myth is the “vera narratio, o sia parlar vero” (Vico 1744, 
400). On the other hand, he also claimed these rights from the point of view of a tmth 
that must be recovered against rationality and in so doing he accepted the self­
presentation of scientific rationality and, in particular, the idea that myth and rationality 
are mutually incompatible, i.e. the presuppositions of the dialectic of scientific 
rationality itself.
All the same, both Vico and Cassirer remain the starting point for any reflection on 
myth, as both have caught the first and perhaps most basic feature of myth. Myth, they 
argue, is a form of poetic expression. Myth, like poetry, relies on figurative tools and 
this is what primarily distinguishes it from other symbolic forms. All the same, we 
must not draw from here the conclusion that myth and reason constitute two mutually 
incompatible faculties, one preceding the other. This is only to say that a myth, in 
contrast, for instance, to rationality, evokes images and figures.
Neither does this mean that a myth necessarily implies heroism. Indeed, whereas 
for Vico, who identifies myth with the language spoken in the “età degli erof \  myth is 
a language where “si parlò per imprese eroiche, o sia somiglianze, comparazioni,
100 On this point see Cantelli 1986,1.
101 The point is raised in many points of the Scienza nuovaand is based on an analysis of the way in which 
human mind develops. For instance, in paragraph 34, we read “ /  primi popoli della gentilità, per una 
dimostrata necessità di natura, furon poeti, i quali parlaron per caratteri poetici' (Vico 1744, 34).
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immagini, metafore e naturali descrizioni' (Vico 1744,32), we should not reduce myth 
to a language that expresses itself only through the narration of “imprese eroiche”. If 
we do not accept the teleological scheme implicit in Vico’s theory of the “tre etcC\ 
there are no reasons why we should identify myth with the stories of heroes and 
heroines.102
On the contrary, the history of myth shows that everything can be the object of a 
mythical narrative. We do not need princesses to be saved or dragons to be killed in 
order to have a myth. This is its second crucial feature: the working on myth can 
operate with different possible contents. This means that no particular kind of content 
can be considered as defining of myth. Myths do not only have to do with stories of 
imaginary gods, heroes and undertakings -as  an enlightened approach would expect. 
The content of mythological narratives has changed continuously over time -  ranging 
from the Greek stories o f gods and heroes to the Nazi myth of races. Given such a clear 
versatility, there is no reason to presuppose that the contents of myths will crystallise 
and that the past contents of myths will remain as their contents forever. On the 
contrary, myths have revealed to be extremely flexible and capable of carrying very 
different contents.
This is a crucial point. The reason why so many people today still maintain that the 
myth has to deal with stories of gods and heroes is perhaps due to the fact that these are 
the myths with which we are more familiar. Stories of imaginary gods and heroes are 
the myths that even an Enlightened approach, caught as it was in its dialectic, was 
prepared to recognise as such. It comes as no surprise if most of the literature on myths 
deals with “primitive myths”. Rather, the fact that so many myths were “found” among 
the “primitives” could work as further confirmation of the self-presentation of 
scientific reason.
On the other hand, thinking of myth as the product of the “savage” or “primitive” 
mind has impeded to see the myth that we -  civilised, clothed white human beings -  
“live everyday by” (Migdley 2003). And this is a problematic attitude which, as we 
will see, can open the way for the affirmation of myth in its most dangerous form, i.e. 
the myth without any possible mediation (Blumenberg 1979). Instead, one should start 
from the assumption of a possible banality of myth.
102 Various authors have followed Vico on this point See for instace Henry 2000,2001 and Passerini 2003.
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Therefore, to sum up, myths are made o f images and figures: they rely on figurative 
tools but they do not necessarily do so at the service of any particular “heroic” content. 
To put it rather crudely, we do not need primitive blood rituals in order to have a myth. 
Rather, everything can be an object of myth just as everything can be an object o f 
poetry. However, although myth - like poetry - evokes images and figures, poetry and 
myth do not coincide. Lyrics, for instance, are not myths -  at least not necessarily. In 
fact, and here we move to the third feature o f myth, myths are a particular kind of 
poetry: they are narratives.
What is a narrative? On a very basic level, narratives are sequences of events, 
where the idea of sequence already implies that it is by being inserted in a narrative that 
events are given a certain meaning.103 By sequences of events, on the other hand, I do 
not mean sequences o f facts. Many authors have defined narratives as series o f facts, 
where the term fact is understood as a description of what has actually happened. 
According to Labov, for instance, narrative “is one method of recapitulating past 
experience by matching a verbal sequence o f clauses to the sequence of events which 
(it is inferred) actually occurred” (Labov 1972:359-60).
This is still a widespread view o f narratives104 and it is rooted in the work of the 
Russian formalists o f the beginning o f the twentieth century - in particular, Propp and 
Tomashevski (Tomashevski 1925). More recently a similar view has been used by 
French structuralists such as R. Barthes (Barthes 1977). The basic idea here is that we 
can distinguish the narrative (sjunet, discours o r recit\ i.e. the plot, as the organisation 
of facts from the story (fabulay histoire), i.e. the mere set o f brute facts . According to 
Tomashevski, “the plot is distinguished from story. Both include the same events, but 
in the plot events are arranged and connected according to the orderly sequence in 
which they were presented in the work [....] in brief, the story is the «action itself», 
...[whereas the plot] is how the reader learns o f the action “ (Tomashevsky 1925: 67).
Thus, this approach presupposes the possibility of separating events -understood as 
facts, actions -  from their organisation. However, it can certainly be argued that the 
distinction between the two is fundamentally problematic because there is no such a 
thing as a “brute event”. An event is such inasmuch as it e-venity i.e. it becomes
103 On the concept of narrative and, in particular, on the distinction between historical and mythical 
narratives, see also Chapter 10.
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perceivable against a background, namely it becomes “something” out of a bulk of 
•non-becoming events that remain in the background. Therefore an event is always 
already organised because, inasfar as i.e. it e-venit against a background, this already 
presupposes a choice. In this sense events are always already organised. First, because 
they become instead, of remaining in the grey background of non-becoming events. 
Second, because they become in a way rather than another. Indeed, we all have 
experience of the different ways in which an event can be told: not just in what is not 
allowed to become, but also in the fact that it is made to be in that way and not in 
another -  these operations imply a choice as well as the organisation of what is chosen.
Further, what the event becomes for the narrator, is not yet the event that it 
becomes for the reader. We face here the limits of any approach that focuses only on 
the “content” of narratives. A narrative is not a container into which the narrator puts 
meanings that are thereafter delivered into the mind of the receiver. Any narrative 
presupposes a context within which it becomes meaningful, i.e. within which it only 
becomes a narrative. This context can better be described as a language-game made of 
acting and saying and in particular of “acts of telling” and “acts of interpreting” the 
narrative -  where it is difficult to distinguish the two moments.
Most of the structuralist studies on narrative are devoted to the search for the 
structural elements of which a narrative is comprised, i.e. for that surplus of meaning 
that makes an ordered plot emerge from a set of brute facts. To this end many scholars 
have distinguished structures that are narratives from others that are not. For instance, 
according to Barthes, we must distinguish between cardinal functions (or nuclei) and 
catalysers (Barthes 1977:93-4). Catalysers “merely fill in the narrative space” whilst 
cardinal functions fundamentally alter the status quo and they do so by providing an 
order to the events. Therefore, according to Barthes, while “catalysers are only 
consecutive units, cardinal functions are both consecutive and consequential” (Barthes 
1977:94).
However, in this search for the structural nuclei o f the plot in a narrative, what gets 
lost is the role that the reader play and, particularly, the role that s/he plays in the 
language- games that give meaning to a narrative. A narrative is not a narrative if it is 
not narrated to someone, and this someone, the reader, is never a passive receiver. As 104
104 For instance, in Cohan and Shires we read “the distinguishing feature of narrative is a linear organisation 
of events” (Cohan and Shires 1988:52-53) or in Toolan: “ a minimalist definition of narrative might be: a 
perceived sequence of nonrandomly connected events” (Toolan 1988: 7)
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the phenomenology of the act of reading proposed by the so-called school of Konstanz 
has demonstrated, the analysis of the act o f reading shows that the readers are 
fundamental in the construction of meaning o f the events narrated (Iser 1976).105 For 
instance the reader will typically tendentially provide logical connectives that link one 
sentence to the other, when they are missing.
This is not to say that the elements that the narrator includes in the narrative are 
irrelevant for its meaning. In trying not to overemphasise the act of producing the 
narrative, the opposite mistake of overstressing the act of reading should not be made. 
It is by combining of the two that a (meaningful) narrative is constructed. And the 
degrees and modality o f this combination varies from text to text and from context to 
context. For instance what characterises a  piece of art is its higher degree of 
indeterminacy, which fosters a more active participation on the side of the reader. This 
is what is at the basis o f the asserted polysemy o f the work of art (Gadamer 1960).
Something similar happens with myth. Indeed, not all narratives are myths. There is 
something in the Arbeit am Mythosy namely the process of telling-receiving and 
retelling of myth that distinguishes it from other kinds o f narrative. In particular, a 
myth is a narrative that provides not just meaning, but also significance by placing 
events in a more or less coherent plot. The working on myth is thus also the working on 
the significance. The task of the next chapter is to investigate this point further.
105 On the relationship between the so-called “theory of reception” and in particular Jauss and Iser and 
Blumenberg’s concept o f Arbeit am Mythos, see Leghissa 2002:27.
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6. NAMING THE UNKNOWN, GROUNDING SIGNIFICANCE
Both Cassirer and Vico have approached myth from the point of view of 
scientific rationality as the terminus ante quem. For this reason, Blumenberg observes, 
they have fallen once more in the enlightenment narrative of a passage “from mythos to 
logos” and have thus at least partially failed in their attempts to theorise myth in its 
autonomy. A much more promising approach would seem, instead, that of looking at 
myth from the point of view of what it follows, i.e. analysing myth as a terminus post 
quem (Blumenberg 1979,1, 1). Thus, instead o f approaching myth in terms of what it 
serves as a “preliminary” substitute for, i.e. science, one should rather look it from the 
perspective of what it follows, i.e. at what it serves to overcome.
The basic performance of myth is to provide names. A myth is always “the myth 
of...”. That is to say, that the prerequisite of any myth is to give names to things. It is 
only by giving things a name that they can become “graspable” and can therefore 
become the object of a story. Providing names does not only render stories possible; 
naming the unknown is already a way by which to dominate it. Denominating a thing is 
the first -  if not the most interesting - answer to the question “What is this or that?”. 
Moreover, by giving a name to the unknown, a whole net of other meanings are 
recalled.106
In replying to Phaedrus’ question “What is the soul?”, Socrates says that he 
cannot say what a soul is in itself. This is the task, he admits, of a divine exposition in 
every sense. On the contrary, to say “what it resembles” is a perfectly human task 
(Phaedrus, 246A ff). The soul, Socrates states, is a chariot. A chariot has horses and a
106Cassirer, as we have seen, has insisted on the concept of symbol as an unlimited net of references. Today 
the same claim is advanced by the semiotics developed by U. Eco 1974.
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charioteer. The charioteer represents the nous, which guides the two horses: one black, 
made of opposites, and one white, which is good and beautiful. To lead the chariot is, 
therefore, inevitably very difficult. The image of the chariot is extremely powerful and 
generates a whole myth: each chariot aspires to follow its respective god in the 
hyperuranion in order to see to the “land of truth”, but because of its mixed 
composition, it is destined to fall and lose its wings. It is only through contemplating 
beauty that the charioteer can dominate the black horse and let the wings of the soul 
grow again (Phaedrus 256a ff).
Modernity, Blumenberg observes, is perhaps the epoch that has gone the furthest in 
providing names and, in a sense, it can thus be defined as the epoch that has found a 
name for everything. It is no coincidence therefore, according to Blumenberg, that 
Francis Bacon connected the recovery o f Paradise with the rediscovery of the original 
name of everything (Blumenberg 1979 I, 2). Bacon perceived the power of 
nomenclature clearly: it was manifest to him that it is only by naming and classifying 
the world that the bases for its mastery can be laid.
To name the unknown is thus not only to render familiar the unfamiliar. It is also a 
way of providing a means for orientation. Names are meanings and meanings are 
meanings in contexts of meanings: they recall other meanings and, in doing so, they 
provide a whole web orientating action. The sovereign can thus be defined as s/he who 
has the power to impose names. T. Hobbes observed that however ingenious all other 
human inventions are, there can be no comparison with the invention of what he calls 
“speech”. This latter, defined as “consisting of Names or Appellations and their 
connection” is the means by which human beings “register their thoughts, recall them 
when they are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and 
conversation” (Hobbes 1651, I, 4). Thus defining things and their reciprocal 
connections is the sovereign’s function par excellence. The first “author” of names, 
Hobbes also observed, was God, the omnipotent God of Christians (Hobbes 165,1,4).
According to the narrative o f the Genesis, God dominates the world because he 
created it with his words {Genesis I, 1 ff): at the beginning, earth was formless and 
empty, but God said «Let there be the light, etc...», and by naming the things of the 
world he created them .107 God also created the human beings and he created them in
107 For a discussion of this passage of the genesis, see chapter 2.
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his own image: as God created the world by naming it, it was through the power of 
imposing names that the mastery of the world was given to “man”.
“Now the Lord had formed out of the ground all the beasts o f the field 
and all the birds o f the air. He brought them to the man to see what he 
would name them; and whatever the man called each living creature, that
was its name” (Genesis II, 20).
Names are not just the means by which webs of meanings are created and the world 
therefore mastered. Names are also reassuring in themselves: they fill up an empty 
space. Ancient poetry was full o f long lists o f names. Blumenberg observes that the 
reason why we now find these long lists of names “unpoetical” is that we live in an 
epoch, that of modernity, which aspires to give a name to everything and it is therefore 
overwhelmed by names (Blumenberg 1979).
All the same, the traces o f this “filling-up” power of names can still be found in the 
long lists of names spread throughout ancient texts such as those of Homer and Hesiod, 
and the Ancient and New Testaments. The function of these long lists was to reassure 
about the familiarity of the poet with what he was narrating: no empty space is left, 
because the poet has a name for everything. Any biblical figure, thus, for instance, 
provided an occasion for an outburst of names, cast in the form of their genealogies. 
These genealogies were not only aimed at delineating a continuity of a story. 
Sometimes names that appear were not mentioned either before or after in the story. 
They play no other role in the story - apart from just being there. This happens not just 
for the genealogies of the great figures of the Old Testament - see, for instance, Adam’s 
(Genesis V, 1) or Abraham’s genealogy (Genesis XI, 10). Aso Christ’s genealogies108 
in the New Testament are full of names that have no sequitur or prehistory: they simply 
are there -  filling up a space.
We need names to master the world, because we need names to master the 
emptiness. Emptiness generates fear -  fear for something but also anguish (Angs/)109, 
i.e. the fear without any object. As Blumenberg observes, a fright that has found again 
the word is a fright that is already over (Blumenberg 1979). Magic manifestly exhibits
108 See in particular the genealogy of Christ provided in (Matthew 1 ,1-16)
109 In his essay on Blumenberg, Robert Wallace observes that the term “Angst, which is usually translated 
with “anxiety”, would be better rendered in English by the psychiatrist’s paraphrase “ intense fear or dread 
lacking an unambiguous cause or specific threat" (Wallace 1984:95)
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the exorcising power of names. Anguish generated by the unknown can be dominated 
by pronouncing the right word: magical words do not only evoke hidden forces, they 
also exorcise them. By pronouncing names, the empty space o f the unknown can be 
filled and -  through this fullness - can be mastered.
Anguish (Angst) refers more generally to the horizon of the empty possibilities that 
can present themself. As Blumenberg points out by recovering a fundamental Freudian 
insight, anguish is never realistical: it is never commensurate to the perception o f 
determined peril. Anguish has no object. Therefore, according to Blumenberg, it is 
always pathologic. Those who are prey to anguish are those who have lost the 
possibility to “put something forward”, i.e. to mitigate the absolute power of the 
unknown. Therefore those who can name things, so Blumenberg continues, have a first 
powerful means by which to fight the “absolutism of reality” and have thus already 
gone beyond the threshold of this absolutism (Blumenberg 19791, 1).
Blumenberg defines the “absolutism of reality” as the condition in which human 
beings come close to losing control over the conditions o f  their existence, or, what is 
more important, they believe that they lack any control over them (Blumenberg 19791, 
1). The concept of the absolutism of reality, he also observes, is corroborated by 
theories of anthropogenesis. These latter depict the initial situation o f humankind in 
terms of exit from the pluvial forest. The abandoning of the forest led to the humans* 
definitive acquisition o f an erect position, which in its turn implied a widening of their 
horizon of perception. Thus, this erect being, who abandoned the advantages of a 
hidden way of life for those of the savannah, was obliged to face the challenges of a 
widened horizon of perception and visibility: it is this being that had to face the 
absolutism o f reality (Blumenberg 19791 ,1).
Blumenberg was here clearely influnced by the ideas o f the German philosophical 
anthropology, as elaborated by Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen. According to these, 
human beings, in contrast to animals, have not adapted to a specific environment and 
are therefore weltoffen (Scheler). This has two basic consequences. First, according to 
Gehlen, human beings are subject to all sorts of stimulations and impressions from the 
outside world, what places a great burden on them from which they must seek relief 
(Entlastung). The set of devices and apparatus by which they can obtain relief is 
culture, which therefore constitutes a sort of “second nature” (Gehlen 1950).
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From these remarks derives a second consequence: to have a world is always the 
result o f an art - even if, to use Blumenberg’s words, the world can never be a total 
work of art (Gesamtkunstwerk) (Blumenberg 1979). The means through which all these 
actions, aimed at providing relief, takes place is language and thus meaning. Myth, 
according to Blumenberg, together with magic, science and metaphysics, among 
others, is one of the possible means for obtaining such relief (Entlastung).
As Blumenberg has noticed, there is a functional analogy between myth, science 
and metaphysics: by naming the unknown they all contribute to its mastery. 
(Blumenberg 1979, n , 2). As we will see, this does not mean that there is no difference 
between them. It simply means that, as Blumenberg again observed, myth defined a 
standard of performance that metaphysics and science could not fall short of satisfying.
Blumenberg thus also follows Gehlen in his reference to theories of 
anthropogenesis, deriving the image of a primordial condition of humanity from them 
that he mixes with the old philosophical tradition of the status naturalis (Blumenberg 
1979,1 ,1). The “old state of nature” is here presented as philosophical devices, i.e. as a 
limit concept, but nevertheless doubts can still be raised over the helpfulness of such a 
reference.
In fact, as Blumenberg seems to suggest in many places, whatever starting point 
one takes, the work of demoliting the absolutism of reality has always “already started” 
(Blumenberg 1979). We are always beyond the threshold of this absolutism. There 
seems, therefore, to be no need to call on the state of nature, a category that might be 
misleading from a number of points of view. In particular, the idea of a status naturalis 
cannot but evoke its normative corollary: the need to enter into a status civilis. In 
whatever way one presents this state of nature, something is always presupposed by the 
very fact that it is a natural state: i.e. human beings must leave this condition and enter 
a civil(ised) one.
Blumenberg was here probably influenced by Gehlen’s view of man as a 
Mangelwesen. According to this, human beings are not naturally assigned to a specific 
environment and are therefore incomplete beings in comparison with other animals. 
Precisely because of their incompleteness, they must undergo a process of disciplining: 
the Mangelwesen is also a Zuchtwesen (Gehlen 1950).
The Entlastung from the excess o f impulses to which human beings are subject 




First, human beings distance themselves from the immediacy of drives and move on to 
the level of symbolic and intellectual action. Second, they seek-an Entlastung through 
the mediation of institutions: these latter, by mediating the relationship of man with his 
needs provide man with a stable horizon (Gehlen 1950).
Many authors have criticised this conception for its political implications and have 
seen in it the sign o f Gehlen’s connections with the authoritarianism of the Nazi 
regime. However, the idea of human beings as weltoffen, which ultimately derives from 
Nietzsche, does not necessarily imply the disciplinary view of man that Gehlen draws 
from it. Gehlen opens his major work Mensch, seine Natur und seine Stellung in der 
Welt (1950) with the reference to Niezsche’s view of “man” as “the not yet determined 
anim arX to noch nicht festgestellt Tier). But the idea that human beings as not yet 
festgestellty i.e. not yet deterministically assigned to a specific environment, does not 
necessarily call for a view of human beings as “beings that must be disciplined” 
(Zuchtwesen).
On the contrary, if one points to the fact that human beings are, at the same time, 
given to certain circumstances of existence but because they are always not yet fest­
gestellt, i.e. they must re-elaborate the very conditions o f their existence, then they 
appear as a Surplus-wesen rather than as a Mangelwesen. The idea of a Mangel 
immediately calls for a closure, and thus for discipline, but in this way it is only one 
aspect of the ambivalent relationship that human beings entertain with the conditions of 
their existence that comes to light.
The relationships between an always noch nicht festgestelltes Tier and the 
conditions o f its existence are ambivalent: the “not yet determined animal” does not 
completely control these circumstances, since, to put it in Heiddegger’s terms, it is 
“thrown into the world” (Heidegger 1927) but, at the same time, s/he does intervene 
over them in a way in which no other animals do. This is not the sign of a Mangel: it is 
rather that of abundance.
The working o f myth is thus the working against an “absolutism of reality” 
understood in this way: whatever stage we are at, we have always already gone beyond 
this absolutism, because we have gone beyond pure chaos.110 A synonym for
110 Castoriadis makes a similar point in his work on the imaginary constitution of society. Instead of the 
concept of "absolutism of reality” he uses that of “chaos” : whatever stage of the institution of the society be, 
the work of its imaginary significations against the absolutism of the chaos has already started (Castoriadis 
1975).
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“absolutism of reality” might thus be the concept of chaos (Angehm 1996), even 
though what gets lost in this is the political register of the category of “absolutism of 
reality” and thus the possible political nature o f the answers.111 Whatever concept one 
decides to employ, however it should be clear that the working against the “absolutism 
of reality” or “chaos” has always already started and that myth is thus the sign o f its 
overcoming.
As Blumenberg observed, there is thus a functional analogy between myth, science 
and religions, inasfar as they all are a means for the creation of meaning. What 
differentiates, then, the working of and on myth from other forms of Sinngebung such 
as science or religion?
In the first place, myth, in contrast to science, does not technically aim at 
explaining (erklären). As Malinowski observed in his essay on Myth in Primitive 
Psychology, myths do not explain (or better they do not explain in the sense in which 
science does), although they still make everything clear. Myth, in other words, is not an 
explanation that is put forward to satisfy a contemplative curiosity over the world. 
Rather, it derives its crucial features from the fact that it has a specific social function. 
As we read in a passage describing the role played by myths among the “primitive” 
peoples:
‘The myth in a primitive society, i.e. in its original living form, is not 
a mere tale told but a reality lived [...].These stories are not kept alive by 
vain curiosity, neither as tales that have been invented nor again as tales 
that are true. For the natives, on the contrary, they are the assertion of an 
original, greater and more important reality through which the present 
life, fate, and work of mankind are governed, and the knowledge of 
which provides men on the one hand with motives for ritual and moral 
acts, on the other with directions for their performance” (Malinowski 
1926).
Whilst commenting this passage, C. Kerenyi observed that Malinowski understood 
that the function of myth is not to provide a scientific or “pseudoscientific” 
explanation. However, according to Kerenyi, he lacked the proper word to describe its 
function: he rejected “explanation” (Erklärung) but the sense in which myth can make
111 This political register of Blumenberg’s concept of myth facilitates the task of linking philosophical 
theories of myth with the social sciences* treatment of political myth. All the same, at this stage it should be 
clear that even if Blumenberg’s theory had clear political connotations, it is not specifically aimed at an 
understanding of political myth.
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things "clear” (Jklar) remains obscure. The German language has however - Kerenyi 
observed - the right word to describe this: it is begründen (Kerenyi 1941: 6).
The root of the concept of begründen, which can perhaps at best be rendered with 
"to ground” or to "substantiate”, is the term "Grand”. Grund means indeed both the 
English abstract noun "reason” and the concrete noun “ground”. Myths tell stories, they 
tell what the origins o f things are, and, thus, at the same time, where they are going to. 
They provide a "ground” but they do so by answering the question “whence?” rather 
than "why”. In this way they provide things with what in the German language 
correspond to a Grund.
According to Kerenyi, the difference between myth and science can be elucidated 
very well in Greek. Myth does not indicate aitia. Or better, it provides aitiai only to the 
extent that, as taught by Aristotle (Met. 1013a), the aitiai are archai, i.e. beginnings or 
first principles. The happenings in a myth are not "causes” in the modem sense, i.e. in 
the sense of a necessary connection between events, but are rather grounds or primary 
states. And it is in this sense only that they can be said to lay "the foundation” of things 
(Kerenyi, 1941:7).112
Myths are thus not only simple stories about the origins. There are, indeed, stories 
of the origins that are not myths. Together with Blumenberg, and perhaps against 
Kerenyi,113 we must recognise that the reason why myths succeed in their begründen is 
that they generate significance (Bedeutsamkeit). A myth is not just a story, but is a 
story that works as Begründung because it “makes significance” of a certain 
experience. Whereas all narratives provide facts with a meaning by simply inserting 
them in a plot, a myth is a narrative that succeeded also in making significance of them.
Blumenberg defines the Bedeutsamkeit as a "defence from indifference”, mainly 
understood as “indifference in space and time” (Blumenberg 1979,1, 3). Consequently, 
myth can be defined, as what makes things closer to us: whereas something can have a 
meaning, but I can still be completely indifferent to it, something that is significant is 
something that I fell "close” to. This has at least one major consequence: whereas 
science can be universal, significance is always particular. What is a myth under 
certain conditions and for certain subjects can be a simple story for others. Further:
112 On myth as form of justification see also Frank 1982. In the context of his discussion of German idealism, 
Manfred Frank also observes that the typically mythical justification is “eine Begründung aus Zwecken" 
(Frank 1982:160).
what is a myth for me “here” and “now” can in the future be declassed to the status of 
simple story. What, then, lies beyond this situatedness of significance?
As has been observed, Blumenberg derives the term Bedeutsamkeit from Dilthey.13 14 
The concept thus recalls the context of the discussion about the difference between the 
Geistes- and Naturwissenschafien. Whereas positivist approaches, following the 
Humean tradition, claimed the unity of scientific method on the basis of the dogma of 
invariability of natural laws, Dilthey claimed the autonomy of the human sciences on 
the basis of their different object: the Geist, i.e. what is specifically human, as opposed 
to Natur.
However, the distinction between Geist and Natur seems to be very problematic in 
itself, in the sense that the Geist can be seen as natural and that the Natur on the other 
hand can be said to be spiritual. However, the connection of the term “Bedeutsamkeit” 
with the debate about the nature of the Geisteswissenschaften is very significant. If 
human beings are noch nicht festgestellte Tie re, i.e. not yet determined animals, they 
entertain a problematising relationship with the conditions of their existence. Whereas 
these latter, are “given” for most the other animals, in the twofold sense that a fish dies 
out o f water and that, as far as we know, it does not raise questions about this fact, 
human beings question them: not only do they change, at least to a certain extent, the 
conditions of their own existence, but they also question these conditions. It is from all 
these questions that a need for significance derives and the working on myth stems.
This does not mean that myth is the only way to provide significance and thus to 
combat indifference. It only means that, to put it in Geertz’s words, the human being is 
an animal suspended in webs of significance (Geertz 1973:5) and that myth is one of 
the way in which this animal has elaborated those webs and thus provided a 
“grounding” (Grund) to the conditions of his existence.
The plural is very important here. In the sentence “conditions of existence” the 
emphasis must be on the plurality o f these conditions. Everything that is part of the 
experience of human beings is part of these conditions and can therefore be the object 
of this questioning. The point is crucial because not all myths aim at explaining the 
whole sense o f being, i.e. the “condition o f the existence of human beings” in the
113 See in particular the passage where Kerenyi states “it is no groundless generalization to say that 
mythology tells us of the origins or at least of what originally was (Kerenyi 1941:7).
1,4 On this point, see Jamme 1991: 116 ff. Jamme does not, however, draw any conclusions from this fact.
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singular. Some of them, but not all, do, and to assume that they all do would preclude 
the possibility to see the working of myth in its variety, richness and also banality.
On the one hand, thus, myth differs from science because instead of looking 
for the abstract relationships between causes and effects it aims at “grounding” the 
world in which human beings live -  a task that science, limited as it is to answering 
the question o f “how?” cannot perform. To put it in Wittgenstein’s words, the problem 
of science is “how” the world exists, and not “why”, and as a consequence he is right 
in saying that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems o f life remain completely untouched (Wittgenstein 1921, 6.52).
On the other hand, though myth does not for this reason coincide with religion or 
mystic. Simplifying things, we can say that myth answers the question “Why?” raising 
the issue “Whence” : as such it can limit itself to telling a story about some of the 
conditions o f existence, without necessarily aspiring to answer the question of the 
sense of life in general. Bedeutsamkeit situates itself precisely between two extremes: 
meanings on the one hand (the Bedeutung- or Sinnfrage: “What is th is?’) and the sense 
of “the Being” on the other (the Seinsfrctge: “What is the sense of being?”). 
Bedeutsamkeit is not (only) meaning, because there is meaning each time that there is 
language. But Bedeutsamkeit is not necessarily Seinsfrage either, because some myths 
do not aim at providing explanations o f the “ultimate meaning”.
Thus, it is not necessary to question the whole sense o f life in order to enable the 
working of myth and on myth: everything, even the most banal event, can be the object 
of a mythical narrative - just as everything can acquire significance. In other words, 
there is no need for any shedding of blood in order to see a myth at work. The working 
on myth starts indeed before than raising the issue o f the meaning of death. Therefore, 
if we agree with Cassirer and Malinowski in saying that religion, notwithstanding its 
variety of manifestations, has always been and always will be “a question of life and 
death” (Cassirer 1946,4), then we also have to conclude that not only not all myths are 
religious myths (and that this must necessarily be so), but also that religion is a way an 
attempt to “bring myth to an end”.
“Bringing myth to an end” is the expression used by Blumenberg to designate the 
attempt at a closure exercised by any attempted “final myth” (Blumenberg 1979, II, 7; 
V, 19). By advancing a whole interpretation of the sense of life and death, religious 
myths aspire to get rid o f the need for significance. On the contrary, the working on
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myth is moved by a need of significance that is continually fostered by the changing of 
the circumstances in which we live. In particular, whereas religion, by answering the 
question of the meaning of life and death, also radically aims to resolve the problem of 
the incongruence between “good” and “luck”, the working on myth is fostered 
precisely by the impossibility of providing a definitive solution to the problem of this 
incongruence.
This is a crucial point. The problem that Greek tragedy shared with Greek 
philosophy was the need to face problem of the “fragility of goodness” that emerges 
from the problematic relationship between “good action” and “luck” (Nussbaum 1986). 
It is from this problematic relationship that the pathos o f myth emerges. Whereas 
religions, as Weber pointed out, aim at resolving this problem at its very roots, the 
working of myth stems from the variety of possible configurations of the relationship 
between “good” and “luck”. And whereas philosophy mainly deals with this problem 
by rational argumentation, myth deals with it by telling stories.
If myth has to make significance of the changing circumstances of fortune, it has to 
be open to a process of retelling. Hence, what I have called the “plurality of myth”, 
something that different authors -  from Aristotle to Blumenberg -  have always 
emphasised. Myth is pluralistic not only in the sense that its meaning is construed by 
the interplay between the narrators and receivers of myth, but also in the sense that 
what can provide significance, and thus be a myth for someone, may not be a myth for 
another person. Therefore there is also no definitive answer to the question o f the 
concrete means by which significance can be created. There are many ways by which 
which significance, thus understood, can be generated and they cannot be limited to 
any single form or type of content.
The concept of significance thus escapes most of the dichotomies created by an 
“enlightened reason”: “myth” versus “reason”, “passions” versus “reason”, 
“consciousness” versus “unconsciousness”. The working on myth can take place 
through conscious working on it, but it can also be located at a completely unconscious 
level. Myths, as a consequence, can be learned by conscious learning, but can also be 
learned by unconscious exposure to them.
The exposure to certain mythical narratives can influence how we perceive 
ourselves and the conditions of our existence, and thus also our orientations within 
them. In this sense, myths are stories that always bring a “morals with them”: they can
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be more or less dramatic, but nonetheless, by making significance o f certain conditions 
of life they always display a certain pathos. This latter must not, however, be 
understood in purely passive terms. Myths can be the product and the producer of the 
most inflamed passions, but passions can also turn out to be simple “upheavals of 
thought” (Nussbaum 2001).
Myths do not operate in a vacuum. Blumenberg’s concept of working on myth 
(Arbeit am Mythos) suggests precisely this: each variant of a myth, as well as each 
different mythologem, works over the ruins o f pre-existing edifices. The pre-existing 
material is then directed towards to new exigencies and transformed in order to give 
significance to the new circumstances through a process that Blumenberg called 
“Umbesetzung”, i.e. “re-occupations” (Blumenberg 1971).115 The ways in which this 
can happen are innumerable. Return of the identical, linear sequences, proximity in 
time, correspondence in places, circularity in space, and so on - they can all be ways of 
creating and reproducing significance.
Thus, for example, the power of the mythologem of Homer’s Odyssey rested in the 
circularity o f Ulysses* voyage. Left his Ithaca for the war of Troy, he has to overcome 
all sort of human and divine obstacles on his way back. Going through the different 
vicissitudes o f fortune, his travelling delineates however a circular process. Indeed, it 
was assumed that this circularity would generate a cathartic effect in the reader.
But myths are recounted, and as far as they are told- received they are also possibly 
told again. The Ulysses that we find the Divina Commedia is a Ulysses who paid the 
high price of his return back to Ithaca to the God of the Christians: the fraudulent 
Ulysses who has suggested the stratagem of the horse to overcome the Trojans’ 
resistance and violated the limit of the Hercules’ columns imposed by God would 
never see his faithful Penelope again and would eventually die swallowed down by the 
sea (Inferno, XVIII). With this episode Dante aimed at showing the dangers hidden in 
an absolutisation of human hybris: the way to do so was to break the circularity of the 
Homeric Odyssey.
In a letter to Carlo Linati, Joyce writes that the intention of his Ulysses was to 
render the myth “sub specie temporis nostri” {Letters o f James Joyce, 21 September 
1920). The odyssey o f the banality of the itinerary covered in one day in Dublin at the 
beginning o f the twentieth century by Leopold Bloom seemed to recover the circularity
ns On Blumenberg’s concept of Umbesetzung see alsoLeghissa 2002:23.
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of Homer’s Odissey, but in fact breaks it, whilst apparently recovering it. Leopold 
Bloom woul then go home, but, in a monologue by Molly Bloom, we know that 
Penelope is thinking about being unfaithful to her husband. The Arbeit am Mythos 
continued and the reassuring circularity of the old myth breaks up when seen sub 
specie temporis nostri.
Consequeltly, when Mircea Eliade, following Nietzsche, identified myth with the 
eternal return he was pointing to one of the possible means for the working of myth. To 
make recourse to the circularity of the eternal return is, indeed, a way of reproducing 
significance, but it is only one of the narrative plots whereby significance is produced 
and reproduced and it can therefore be identified with the myth tout court. According 
to Eliade, the main function of the myth as eternal return is to fix the exemplar model 
for every significant human deed, like rituals, in a way such as to provide an a- 
historical and a-temporal model. According to Eliade, thus, it is to this model that we 
can make recourse each time we have to do something for which the empeiria does not 
provide a guide (Eliade 1954).
However, not all myths are the sites for a hierophany thus understood. Not all 
myths are based on the eternal return of the identical, and not all myths are sacred 
myths. For instance, the Roman foundation myth was a truly historical myth, in the 
sense that it referred to a peculiar and singular event in the profane world of history. 
There was some dispute as to the date: Cato placed the founding o f the city in 755 BC 
whereas Varro’s more careful calculation made it 753 BC. But the point remains that 
the city was founded not in the sacred world of primordial time, which is destined to 
return, but in the profane world of everyday life.116
Identifying myth with the eternal return o f the identical is again a consequence of 
treating myth as the product of a primitive or traditional mentality. Myths have thus 
been identified with magic and religious beliefs and practices and thus they have been 
associated and often conflated with rituals. The parallel myth-ritual has been pushed so 
far that, for instance, according to the so-called the ritualistic school myths are nothing 
but the spoken correlative of acted rites.117
The problem with this view is not only that it neglects the fact that, as has been 
observed, not all myths have a ritual origin or are associated with a significant corpus
116 For this critique regarding Eliade see Tudor 1972: 62.
117 We will come back later on to this point when discussing the relationships between political myth and 
rituals.
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of rituals (Tudor 1972:29). By conflating myth and ritual into a common category of 
mythical or primitive thinking, the clanger is that the working of and on myth is 
completely overlooked. Myths are indeed the sign of a working on myth that is fostered 
by the need to make significance of constantly changing circumstances, and it must 
therefore be open to the possibility of retelling. Rituals, on the contrary, are literally 
what is “well done” or “done according to the rules” -  from the Latin rite. Therefore, in 
order to be effective for the cohesion of a social group, myth and ritual must operate in 
opposite directions: rituals must be kept unchanged, myths must continually change or, 
when this is not possible, as in the case of closed myths, simply be dismissed.
Rituals represent, in fact, a stability and continuity that is acted out and re-enacted 
in a visible way. They imply a visible continuity. By dint of repetition they deny the 
passage o f time, the nature of change, and the extent of indeterminacy in social 
relations (Moore 1975: 167). On the contrary, the working on myth in order to be 
effective, i.e. to produce myths and not simple narratives, must be also the work of 
significance and thus reflect the conditions that are given hie et nunc. Myths, in other 
words, are always situational and must therefore always be retold from the point of 
view of the present. This is, in the final analysis, what moves the whole Arbeit am 
Mythos.
The emphasis on the difference between myth and ritual is more the result of a 
phenomenological approach to myth than the application o f functionalism. In 
particular, to adopt a functionalist approach at this stage would mean decide from the 
beginning the role o f myth within politics. If one assumes with Malinowski, for 
instance, that myth supports and maintains the social state o f affairs (Malinowski 
1948), there would be no need to develop a philosophy of political myth. On the 
contrary, it is only after having established what a myth is that the issue of its 
relationship with politics can properly be dealt with.
The approach to myth sketched above can thus perhaps be understood as 
“interpretative”. Indeed, even if it does not presuppose a functional relationship 
between myth and the social-historical, this approach moves from a theory of meaning 
that presupposes some kind of relationship between the two. Wittgenstein did not write 
the book in anthropology whose first words he had expressed in his Remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough . The interpretative anthropology proposed by Clifford Geertz 
can perhaps be considered as an attempt to write such a book (Geertz 1973, 1983,
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2000). Following Geertz’s approach, we can say that myths - inasfar as they have a 
meaning - presuppose a context and therefore a semiotic system within which only they 
can make sense and significance, and which, in its turn, it contributes to creating.
When Geertz stated that human beings are “animals suspended in webs of 
significance” (Geertz 1973:5), he seems to have been pointing out that we do not only 
need meanings to oriente us in the world, but also significance to rendere the world less 
indifferent to us. The task o f the next chapters is to investigate the consequence that 
this have when it comes to political life and political circumstances.
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i n POLITICAL MYTH
The process o f modernisation has deeply transformed European societies and 
the relationship human beings have with one another, as well as with society as a whole. 
One could indeed assume that the affirmation of a rational orientation of action (Weber), 
a highly developed social differentiation (Durkheim, Parsons) and an increased 
secularisation (Lowith) have brought about such a condition where there is no more need 
for mythological narratives: in the modem epoch, it is the rational Copemican man, who, 
against any absolutism o f the tradition, is the subject of the process o f legitimation.
History has disavowed this self-presentation of modernity. Myth has always 
reoccurred in Western civilisation -  and the more powerful the attack against it, the more 
disruptive the forms in which it has reappeared. Thus, whereas the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment, in its critique of myth did not deny the legitimacy of the need from which 
it stemmed, nineteenth century positivism, by denying as meaningless and mystical any 
enquiry that is not subsumable to the principle o f verification, denied legitimacy to those 
very needs and favoured the return of myth without mediation, i.e. myth as it has been 
used by totalitarian regimes (Blumenberg 1979).
In fact, modernity has not diminished the need from which myth stems. Rather, it 
can be argued that it has enhanced this need. To put it in Weberian terms, the old peasant 
may well die full o f life, having fulfilled the circle o f biological life, but the 
Kulturmensch, who is inserted in a never-ending process which transcends him and about 
which he is able to understand only a very limited part (Weber 1919a), is destined to feel 
the need for significance even more. The process of disenchantment (Entzauberung) 
implies an increased intellectualisation, which, on the one hand, reflects the human 
awareness of being able to master the world, but on the other, given the high level of
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specialisation of knowledge, also means an increased distance from the possibility of 
understanding the conditions under which we live. To again use a Weberian example, 
while the savages know how the instruments they use in their everyday life work, the 
Kulturmenschen are surrounded by many objects and means that they depend on and 
whose mechanisms are completely unknown to them (Weber 1919a); hence possibly an 
increased distance from the world and, consequently, also an increased need for 
significance.
It comes as no surprise then if it is in the conditions of modernity that the role 
played by political myth becomes conspicuous. The complexity of modem societies and 
the acceleration that they involved by transcending the individuals’ space of experience 
rendered more acute the need for a symbolic mediation of political experience. Complex 
and vast political phenomena transcending the individual’s horizon o f experience need to 
be imagined even more in order to be experienced. The concept of political myth points 
to the fact that this imaginary mediation can also take the form o f a narrative that 
produces and coagulates significance, i.e. of a myth.
Myth however must not be understood as a regression into superstition. By 
criticising Bayle’s approach, considered as paradigmatic of the Enlightenment’s attitude 
towards myth, Chapter 7 argues that myth can play an important part in the critique of 
political reason. Accordingly, definitions of political myth in terms of regression 
(Cassirer) must be rejected (Chapter 8). This does not mean that political myths are 
necessarily means for critique or for progress. The following discussion of the classical 
theories of political myth, following Spinoza, rather concludes that political myths are 
neither good nor bad per se (Chapter 8).
Indeed, one should, in the first place, see in political myths the always changing 
working on a common narrative by which the members of a social group (or society) 
make significance of their experience and deeds (Chapter 9). In this sense they are an 
important component of modem political life, together with ideology and utopias, with 
which they sometimes overlap but from which, however, they must be kept distinguished 
(Chapter 9).
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7. MYTH AND THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL REASON
The aim of Bayle’s Various Thoughts on the Occasion o f  a Comet (1682) 
was to undermine the influence o f “superstition” in politics. To this end, by 
criticising the view of comets as presages o f misfortune, he made his notorious claim 
that a decent society of atheists is possible: sound political life does not require and it 
might even be harmed by religious beliefs. The claim, revolutionary for the epoch, 
was advanced with all possible precautions and the book was first published 
anonymously.
The reason for his precautions, as we have seen,118 is that according to 
Bayle when events are reduced to their natural causes, they presage nothing 
anymore, and this deprives the people of an infinite number of “vain imaginings” on 
which they feasted, diviners of the most considerable part of their employment and 
statesmen o f the possibility to take advantage of them (Bayle 1682, 110). Statesmen 
have indeed in all times fomented these beliefs, because, as Bayle clearly states, 
“nothing is as powerful as superstition for keeping the populace in check. However 
unruly and inconstant they may be, if their minds are once struck by a vain image of 
religion, they will obey the diviners better than their chiefs” (Bayle 1682, 81).
The strategy adopted to undermine the role of superstition in politics is then 
twofold. On the one hand, Bayle argues that the beliefs in presages are ill-based, 
because if we analyse the phenomenon of comets with an “altogether pure reason” 
we see that there is nothing in them that links them with the advent of fortunes and
118 On Bayle’s Various Thoughts see also Chapter 3. In this chapter the focus is however explicitly on the 
political implications of the Enlightenment critique towards the role played by religious beliefs in politics.
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misfortunes: the link between their happening and any sort of calamity, is purely 
imaginary and stems from people’s natural inclination to treat the slightest things as 
presages (Bayle 1682, 80, 110). On the other hand, Bayle points to the danger of 
these beliefs for a sound political life. Here he advances the claim that a decent 
society of atheists is possible. In the part devoted to argue “that atheism is not a 
greater evil than idolatry” (Bayle 1982, 114-193), Bayle with his usual technique of 
camouflage gradually leads the reader to concluding that atheism is superior to both 
idolatry and biblical worship. Not only, he argues, do religious beliefs not constitute 
a brake on human behaviour, because human beings act according to their passions 
and not their opinions, so that “both [atheists and Christians] could never constitute a 
society if a brake stronger than that of religion, namely human laws, did not repress 
their perversity” (Bayle 1982, 129). But moreover, he suggests that religious beliefs 
might even undermine the possibility of a decent political life: both idolatry and 
biblical worship, in his view, have led human beings to committing such atrocities 
that they would never have committed, had they not been filled with religious zeal. 
By referring to the civil strife following the conversion of Henry IV, Bayle goes as 
far as to affirm: “Had the Court of France been atheistic, it would never have 
maintained such conduct” (Bayle 1682,160).
Thus, not only Bayle argues that they are human laws, and thus coercion, 
that make society possible, because human beings are prey to their passions against 
whose force mind’s general opinions and beliefs are completely impotent (Bayle 
1682, 138), but he also sketches all the atrocities that have been committed in the 
name of religion (Bayle 1682, 155, 197). Hence, Bayle can conclude that “a society 
o f atheists would perform civil and moral actions as much as other societies do, 
provided that it punishes crimes severely and that it attaches honour and infamy to 
certain things” (Bayle1682, 172). Thus, neither the possibility of a society that is 
held together by human laws, nor that of morality is undermined by atheism. Indeed, 
according to Bayle, the idea of decency, upon which morality rests, does not depend 
on the belief in God (Bayle 1682, 181), but, on the contrary, is rooted in human 
nature (Bayle 1682, 172). An atheist, Bayle observed, is certainly capable of 
returning a deposit when he sees that his good faith will earn him the praise of a 
whole city and that his infidelity could one day subject him to reproach (Bayle 1682, 
179).
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Bayle’s criticism of superstition is paradigmatic o f the Enlightenment’s 
attitude towards the role of religious beliefs in politics: a decent political life does not 
require and might even be harmed by religious beliefs. Thus, some critics have 
recently suggested that we can also understand from Bayle how high the stakes in 
deriding the Enlightenment and its political achievements are: according to this view, 
in Bayle “we see something of what the world was before the rise of modem political 
philosophy”, i.e. we see that, “absent the appeal to reason, the world teems with 
miracles and malevolent spirits.” Therefore - so this view concludes -  “those who 
celebrate the collapse of reason on the grounds that it will give rise to a more 
thorough toleration o f all the “otherness” , should be aware that this will in all 
likelihood give rise to religious superstitions” (Bartlett 2000).
Let us admit for the moment that modem political philosophy has actually 
succeeded in liberating politics from “miracles and malevolent spirits”, even though, 
one could argue, we are surrounded by evidences pointing to the contrary. The 
problem still remains that, as Bayle himself points out in many places, this appeal to 
“an altogether pure reason” (Bayle 1982, 3) deprives human beings of an infinite 
number of “vain imaginings”. These images, on the other hand, as Bayle recognises, 
stem from a natural inclination o f human beings to form images and see in certain 
events signs for something else. Among the products o f this natural inclination are 
also myths, i.e. those particular narratives that answer that which Blumenberg has 
called the human need for Bedeutsamkeit.
Now if the religious beliefs that Bayle criticises do live of this imaginary 
faculty, for it is not possible to believe in religious dogmas without imagining them, 
certainly not all the images that this faculty produces are religious. In particular, 
those images that, following Bayle, can appear as “vam” to an “altogether pure 
reason” are not necessarily religious images, which indeed are dangerous for political 
life. Otherwise stated, not all “vain imaginings” are necessarily “superstition”, i.e. 
heteronymously given beliefs.
The problem then is that the Enlightenment, in its attempt to ground 
political life on the autonomy o f  the individuals and the critique of tradition, has 
unified under the heading of “superstition” all that which is not grounded on pure 
reason and, in so doing, it has assimilated all the “vain images” to religious 
superstition. But there is no such dichotomy as “pure reason” versus “religious
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superstition”. There is much more in-between. Myth certainly escapes this 
dichotomy, since it cannot be reduced to “pure reason” - neither in the form of a 
strategic rationality nor in that of rationality in respect to values. On the other hand, 
this does not mean that they are superstitious beliefs. Indeed, there are myths that are 
religious myths, but not all myths are religious.
On the contrary, as we have seen, whereas religion, in whatever ways one 
tries to define it, “is always a matter of life and death” (Cassirer 1946, 4), a set of 
beliefs meant to solve the problem o f the sense of life and death in general, a myth is 
not necessarily so. The need for Bedeutsamkeit from which myth stems is not merely 
need for meaning, but it is also not necessarily Seinsfrage, or a question over the 
ultimate sense of life and death. Thus whereas religion, by providing an answer to 
the ultimate questions tends towards a closure of meaning, i.e. to reinterpreting all 
that happens (e-venit) within its categories -  thus this is the closure o f a system in the 
mathematical sense - a myth is not necessarily so, precisely because it does not 
necessarily aim at closure. On the contrary, myths as narratives aimed at answering a 
need for Bedeutsamkeit, must be open to the possibility o f changing in accordance 
with the changing circumstances and the new need for Bedeutsamkeit that they 
generate.
Thus, even if modem reason has undermined the role of religious beliefs as 
horizons of sense in the experience of the world in general, and of politics in 
particular, it has not necessarily undermined that of myth at the same time. In 
particular, if one can argue that modem political philosophy has detached politics 
from its transcendental anchorage in the great chain of being, this does not imply that 
it has also abstained from any possible recourse to mythical narratives. At the same 
time, as we shall show, it needed not do so.
Indeed, it seems as if the reason that is at work in modem political 
discourses can hardly be described as an altogether pure reason from this point of 
view. Even modem contractualism, which, it has been claimed, represents the apex 
of the struggle of political theory against myth, (Cassirer 1946:13), has also had 
recourse to mythical narratives. It would be easier to show the link between modem 
political reason and myth by taking other traditions of modem political thinking that 
have explicitly had recourse to a narrative dimension. It would most probably be 
easier to show the working of myth in Mandevilie’s Fables o f the Bees or perhaps
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even Machiavelli’s Discourses: in both cases there is some grounds to suspect that 
the narrative structure is used to construct a sphere of significance, i.e. that it leaves 
room for the working of and on myth. However, a much stronger argument would be 
to take precisely those traditions that have explicitly aimed at getting rid of myth and 
seeing whether they have actually succeeded in their intent or not.
Social contract theorists, in particular, are usually credited with the merit o f 
having provided a purely rational foundation o f political power. In contrast to 
mainstream medieval political theory, the necessity o f a common power is not 
derived here from the sacred history, but from the will o f individual human beings. 
In the mechanistic post-Galilean world, the existence of a polity is no longer a ring in 
the great chain of being, but simply a human artefact. The great revolution behind the 
idea of a “social contract” is that the existence of a political power can now only 
appear as justified on the basis of the will of single individual human beings. As 
Cassirer argued, by dissipating the mystery surrounding the origins of the polity and 
leading them back to the will of individuals, social contract theories have also got rid 
of myth (Cassirer 1946,13).119
Hence, according to the self-presentation of an enlightened reason one 
would indeed expect to find no traces of myth in social contract theories, but only the 
working of a pure reason. Hobbes, for instance after having laid the foundations o f 
the rights of the sovereign power and of the subjects in the commonwealth, claims to 
have derived them from the “Principles o f Nature onely; such as Experience has 
found true, or Consent (concerning the use o f words) has made so” (Hobbes 1651, 
III, cap. xxxii). It is only when moving on to handle the nature of a Christian 
commonwealth that Hobbes admits the need to recur to the supernatural revelations 
of the will of God, and then to the tales told by the prophets120 (Hobbes 1651, ID, 
cap. xxxii). Thus, whereas in the first two parts of the Leviathan it is only the 
principles derived from experience or from the consent concerning the use of words 
that are described, in the third -  and more substantial - part prophetical tales are also 
admitted.
119 As we will see, though, Cassirer’s approach to myth is still trapped in the Enlightenment dichotomy of 
myth versus reason, whereas, on the contrary, one can argue that it is not because social contract theories 
have aimed at dissipating the mystery surrounding the origins of the polity that they have thereby got rid of 
myth: myth, as Blumenberg argues, is already an attempt at dissipating the mystery.
120 On the concept of prophets, see Spinoza’s theory in the next chapter.
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Thus, when analysing the first two parts of the Leviathan we would indeed 
expect to see only our natural reason at work - where reason according to Hobbes is 
the faculty that “does nothing else but conceive a summe totall from Addition of 
parcels; or conceive a remainder from Subtraction of one summe from another: 
which (if it be done by Words) is conceiving of the consequences of the names of all 
the parts to the name o f the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to 
the name of the other part” (Hobbes 1651,1, cap v). Nevertheless if we analyse the 
overall reasoning concerning the justification of sovereign power, we do not see such 
a pure reason at work.
In fact, the mechanism of political obligation, i.e. the necessity of standing 
in awe of sovereign power, is triggered by a great narrative: that of the exit from the 
state of nature. According to Hobbes, human beings are driven to institute a 
sovereign power in order to escape the state in which human beings are naturally in, 
which is a state of perpetual (potential) war, where homo homini lupus, and in which 
any single human being, being equally equipped by human nature, is equally exposed 
to the possibility of death (Hobbes 1651,1, xiii). Once the state of nature is depicted 
in such a way, the next step in the argument consists of showing how natural reason 
prescribes each man to exit from it (Hobbes 1651, I, xiv). Thus, whereas in this 
second moment it is only a pure reason that is at work, i.e. a Hobbesian reason that 
merely calculates the consequences of living in such a state and then prescribes exit 
from it, on the other hand it can be argued that the reason that creates the narrative of 
the state of nature is not a pure reason.
The recourse to a mythical narrative within philosophical theory comes 
however as no particular surprise. Recent theories, in particular, have emphasised 
that philosophers in their “rational” theorising have also had recourse to images, 
metaphors, narratives and even myths. Among the mythological narratives that have 
played a major role among philosophers there has been the idea of a “state of nature” 
(Midgley 2003). A detailed analysis of the use of the narrative o f the state of nature 
in John Rawls has for instance suggested that this narrative, which is indeed 
presented as a device of “pure reason”, is in fact not so “pure” : rather it has been 
claimed that the narrative of the state of nature works to a great extent like myth (La
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Caze 2002, 4)121. In particular, it has been suggested that Rawls’s narrative of the 
“veil o f ignorance” and the “original position” work as a myth in as far as they 
disguise fundamental social inequalities and thus make it difficult to theorise group 
oppression (La Caze 2002: 94ff).
Whether Rawls’s original position works as myth or not, the recognition of 
the possibility that philosophers make recourse to myth no longer comes as a 
surprise. To put it bluntly, only reason caught in the dialectic of Enlightenment can 
assume a dichotomy of myth versus reason so that when reason is at work there is no 
space for myth. Rather, there is in principle no reason to assume that, within a 
philosophical system which presents itself as based on rational inferences, there can 
be no space for myth.
Hobbes, together with most other social contract theorists, explicitly claims 
that his state of nature must be understood as a rational device, an “Inference made 
from the theory of passions” (Hobbes 1651 ,1, xiii). All the same, when we move on 
to analyse the way in which the image o f the state of nature works, it seems that not 
only does such a rational device take the form of narrative, but that this narratives 
also comes from and, at the same time, generates a series of figures, images and 
symbols answering to what we have called a need for significance. In other words, it 
seems as if this narrative works as a myth.
In order to see whether the state o f nature is a myth or not, we must not look 
at its content and ask whether it is real or unreal. Thus, for instance, even if Hobbes 
had conceived the state of nature as an historical event, as Locke was to do, it could 
still be argued that it worked as a myth.122 Indeed, it is at the Arbeit am Mythos of the 
state of nature that we must look. This, in the first place, implies that even if for a 
contemporary reader it is only the aspect o f the rational device of the state of nature 
that comes to light, it was not necessarily so for Hobbes’s contemporaries. 
Significance, as we have seen, is always positional. Thus, even if one now might
121 La Caze focuses her attention precisely on the “analytic imaginary”, i.e. on the repertoire of images, 
metaphors and myths recurring in the writings of contemporary analytic philosophers (La Caze 2002)
122 As we will see, most modem political myths stem from historical narratives, i.e. from narratives that 




consider the state of nature as a “rational device” or even as a “mere story”123, it was 
certainly not so for Hobbes’s contemporaries and first readers.
In the passage quoted above, Hobbes continues by saying that for those who 
do not trust his view of the state o f nature because it might appear strange to them 
that “nature should dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one 
another, it can be shown that experience itself confirms this inference” (Hobbes 
1651,1, xiii). Thus, when confronted with the possible objection that there was never 
a  time or condition of war such as that he is depicting, Hobbes replies that even if 
there has never been such a condition, all over the world, “there are many places 
where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the 
government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have 
no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before” 
(Hobbes 1651,1, xiii).
Why did Hobbes need to make reference to the “savages of America” if he 
only wanted to build a rational device? Hobbes aimed at building a model for 
political obligation, and any model, by definition, cannot fully encompass the 
dimension of time. Thus, in the first place, one could argue that Hobbes’s reference 
to  the space and time of America is the necessary price paid by his model of 
temporality: the reference to the savages of America would then work as a means for 
leaving “time and space” out of the model.124
Hobbes does not only refer to the peoples of America. He qualifies them 
with precise terms. In the first place they are said to be “savages”. The “savages”, on 
the other hand, are described only in terms o f what they are not -  or rather of what 
they have not.: “in such condition, there is no place for Industry; [..]; no Culture of 
the Earth, no Navigation, nor use o f commodities that may be imported by Sea; no 
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as 
require much force; no Knowledge o f the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no 
Arts; no Letters, no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of
123 Doubts might however be raised over the fact that the state of nature does not constitute a myth any 
longer. According to a report written by a Palestinian research centre in Ramallah for the World Bank, “the 
role o f NGOs in Building Palestinian Civil Society” is to promote a “transition from a state of nature to a 
civil society” (Bisan Centre for Research and Development 2001: 5).
124 According to Tudor, this is the function played by political myths: “political myths supply the theoretical 
argument with a concrete reference and a temporal perspective it would otherwise lack; and the theoretical 
argument endows the myth with academic respectability and a certain timelessly abstract significance”
(Tudor 1972: 127). On this point see also Chapter 9, 10 and 12
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violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 
1651,1, xiii).
The construction of the image of the savage through a series o f negations 
was almost a common topos of the time. Not only was this common place in the 
huge literature circulating by that time - mostly made up of travel reports, novels and 
philosophical treatises but in the second half o f the seventeenth century the 
stereotype of the savage became fixed into a definition that was repeated in all 
dictionaries. For instance, in the dictionary of the French Académie published in 
Paris in 1694 we read: “Sauvage, se dit de certain peuples qui vivent ordinairement 
sans religion, sans lois, sans habitation fixe  et plutöt en bestes qu ’en hommes”. 125
The origins of the topos of the homines sylvestri go back to the large amount 
of reports from the exploration of the “New World” that started circulating at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century and, by Hobbes’s time, was already a widespread 
literary genus. In particular, it is to the natives of North America that the topos is 
referred since the inhabitants of regions such as Central America and Peru, who did 
not live naked and had constructed stone buildings, were considered to be more 
civilised populations. The natives of North America, on the contrary, continually at 
war with each other, appeared to be the real “savages”, the bottom of the 
civilisational scale.
As S. Landucci points out, around the figure o f the savage is coagulated the 
results of the first experience of a radical diversity; the shock of their discovery was 
so deep that some authors of that time saw in it the source of all sorts of speculations 
in moral and political philosophy (Landucci 1972: 20). In whatever way the savages’ 
lives weres evaluated, positive or negative, it still remains that the characterisation 
was made in terms o f their “difference”, so that Rousseau’s statement “pour êtudier 
Vhomme il fau t apprendre a porter sa vüe au loin, il fa u t d ’abord observer les 
differences” can be used retrospectively to describe the fundamental attitude towards 
the huge amounts o f new knowledge that could be drawn from the travellers’ reports.
Hobbes’s recourse to the narrative of the “state of nature” cannot be 
interpreted without referring to the sphere of significance surrounding the figure of 
the savages. Both when it is seen as the first expression of the discontent of civilised
125 For what follows, see Landucci’s I filosofi e I selvaggi, a systematic reconstruction of the role played by 
the figures of the savages in philosophers writing between 1580 and 1780 (Landucci 1972). More recently, 
see also Pagden 2000.
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Europeans (Freud 1929) or as the complex of the superiority of the European 
colonisers (Gliozzi 1977), the image of the savage is recognised as a very powerful 
reservoir of significance.126 The discovery of America was indeed an enormous 
shock that needed to be digested by Europeans and the figure of the “savage” 
coagulated the emotional and rational replies of the European to this challenge.
Not by chance thus Hobbes’s passage, making a long list o f the artes that 
locates human beings “supra conditionem caeterorum animalium” and the “gentes 
Europaeae” above the savage, is almost a topos in Hobbes’s writings.127 In Hobbes’s 
text, this figure refers to a very powerful image circulating in the literature of the 
time. Thus, despite the fact that some authors have contested the importance of the 
figure of the savage in Hobbes’s theory by saying that his men in the state of nature 
are not primitive men,128 the savage does play a crucial role for Hobbes, who 
continuously exhibits him, from the Elements to the De Cive and the Leviathan, as a 
factual exemplum o f his state of nature. On the other hand, what is of most 
importance in reconstructing the Arbeit am Mythos is that this figure played a 
fundamental role for Hobbes’s audience, for whom the reference to the state of 
nature was not only “a purely rational device”, but mobilised powerful resources of 
significance.
Thus, even if an analysis of Hobbes’s use of this figure would indeed 
require a close reconstruction of Hobbes’s sources, what interests us here is to 
analyse the role the figure of the savage plays in his politico-philosophical system 
and the way in which this was received. Indeed, the fact that all social contract 
theorists make reference to the figure of the savage in the same way, also suggests 
that this figure plays a rather crucial philosophical and systematic role. 
Notwithstanding the obvious difference in the sources available to authors as 
different as Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, there are striking similarities in the role that 
this figure plays in their systems.
In first place, when they referred to the savages they were all thinking of a 
well determined referent. The “savages” were “the savages of America” : the fact that
126 By recovering Le Goffs concept of ‘Oneiric Horizon' (Le Goff 1980), Padgen points out that the different 
variants of the figure of the savage must be read as attempts to reposition the ‘Oneiric Horizon* in different 
spaces and times: the dream expanded here to a vision of a world where a different kind of life was lived, 
where taboos were eliminated or exchanged for others (Padgen 2000: xviii).
127 See for instance De Corpore, I.i.7; De Cive beyond, of course, the English and the Latin Leviathan.
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a state of nature of humanity existed was accompanied, for them and for their 
readers, by a precise figurative image, an image that stems from the first experience 
of a “radical otherness”. On the other hand, what confers to this image its specific 
significance is the narrative that lies beyond the idea o f savages: as we have seen, the 
savages are what the Europeans are not, or better, what they no longer are because 
they have exited the state of nature. Thus, the significance of the figure of the savage 
cannot be understood without referring to the narrative o f the exit from the state of 
nature, i.e. without referring to the typical way in which mythical narratives 
coagulate and reproduce significance.
The narrative dimension of the state of nature can however take different 
forms. Whereas for authors such as Rousseau, this condition was completely lost, for 
Hobbes and his contemporaries the state o f nature was also a condition into which 
human beings could always fall again, if they did not stand in awe of a common 
power. In particular, the continual state of inter-tribal wars that struck all the 
travellers because it appeared reasonless -  now we know that they were wars for the 
division of hunting territories - appeared to Hobbes and his contemporaries to be the 
features of a civil war, for Hobbes the worst of evils and whose memory was not a 
distant one. Hence, the overall characterisation o f the savages’ natural condition in a 
completely negative way: the state of nature is depicted as a  “brutish manner of 
living” because it lacks -  or it appears to lack - all that which Hobbes held as worthy 
and appraisable in the world in which he lived, and also what he perceived as being 
in danger in the religious civil wars: peace, in the first place, and consequently, 
industry, culture, navigation, comfortable buildings, instruments of moving, 
knowledge and an account of time (Hobbes 1651,1, xiii).
Thus, the state of nature has a rather crucial function in grounding 
(begründen) the present state of things for the “civilised Europeans”. This grounding 
is not only achievable by a pure reason calculating abstract consequences, but also by 
telling a story and inserting the advent o f civil society into a narrative. This is the 
typical way in which myth produces significance. Thus, a great part of the reasoning 
rests on a sequence of events (state of nature, exit from this state and institution of a 
sovereign power through a social contract) that coagulates and recreates significance. 128
128 See in particular the classical interpretation by Warrender and Macpherson (Warrender 1957: 143; 
Macpherson 1964:18-29)
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Notwithstanding all the possible variants of this narrative, the means 
through which significance is created in social contract theories is the opposition 
chaos/cosmos, which is perhaps one of the most typical narrative schemes for 
making significance of the vicissitudes of fortune. The exit from the state of nature 
can be conceived either as a single moment or it can double as a pactum societatis 
followed by a pactum subjectionis, but in both cases the narrative is constructed 
around the two polarities: chaos and cosmos.
Rousseau, though, modified this scheme substantially. By reconstructing 
the changes through which the state of nature as myth went, is perhaps the best way 
to show the role that myth can play within the critique. Not by chance thus, have 
many critics seen in him the first big rupture within modernity. Rousseau began his 
Du contrat social with a description of the passage from the “Etat de nature” to the 
“état c iv ir  and ends by vindicating the need for a “religion civile”. By taking 
distance both from Bayle, by saying that no polity has ever been founded without 
religion as a basis for its construction and from those who claimed that Christendom 
is the best anchorage for a polity, Rousseau vindicated the need for “une profession 
de fo i purement civile dont il appartient au Souverain de fixer les articles, non pas 
précisément comme dogmes de Religion, mais comme sentiments de sociabilité, sans 
lesquelles il est impossible d ’être bon Citoyen ni sujet fidèle” (Rousseau 1762: IV, 
viii).
Thus, despite the fact that in the following paragraph, Rousseau seems to 
contradict this statement by moving on to delineate positive and negative dogmas of 
this religion - dogmas typical of the eighteenth century deism - what is interesting to 
us is that, in contrast to Bayle’s enlightened reasoning, which deprives human beings 
o f all sort of “vain imaginings”, Rousseau recognises the need to articulate loyalty 
towards the polity in an imaginative dimension. All the same, Rousseau’s 
characterisation of civil religion remains ambiguous, not only because he spells out 
the dogmas of this religion in a patently religious sense (so that, together with the 
holiness of the social contract, among those dogmas appears the existence of God, 
life after death, happiness of the righteous, and punishment of the impious), but also 
because he insists on the possibility of banishing those who do not believe in them. 
All this goes in the direction of assimilating myth to religion, whereas, as we have 
seen, not all myths are religious.
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Rousseau, though, went even further in questioning Enlightenment. He 
undermines the whole self-narrative o f political modernity by adding a third ' 
dimension to the mythologem o f the state o f nature/civil society, a different starting 
point. Despite the fact that it is very difficult to reconstruct the different phases o f the 
exit from the state of nature in his Discours sur Vorigine et les Fondements de 
Vinégalité parmi les hommes, it appears legitimate to state that, in his thinking, the 
narrative scheme of the state of nature is a threefold one: no longer, like in Hobbes, a 
linear passage from chaos to cosmos, but a passage from the cosmos of the primeval 
state of nature to the chaos following the exit from that state and finally to the 
possible reconstitution of a cosmos through the institution of a social contract.
Thus, human beings, according to  Rousseau, are not naturally driven to  a 
war of everybody against everybody: philosophers, such as Hobbes, who depicted 
them in such a way, thought they were describing savages but, in fact, they were 
depicting civilised human beings (Rousseau 1754, Discours, v). What authors such 
as Hobbes depicted are human beings who are in dependence of each other, because 
they have many needs and are therefore prey to violent passions. But these cannot be 
the savages, who according to Rousseau, have such limited needs and moderate 
passions that they are completely independent from each other, and therefore 
genuinely free. Rousseau’s savages live a solitary life, they have very basic needs 
that they can easily satisfy with the help o f nature, and they have thus calm passions 
and very sporadic contact with each other (Rousseau 1754,1). Far from being a state 
of war of everybody against everybody, it is a condition of peace from which human 
beings can exit only as a consequence o f an unhappy series of miracles.129 Among 
those miracles: the institution of private property, following the rise of agriculture 
and metallurgy (Rousseau 1754, II).
Even if  Rousseau sharply questions the narrative o f modernity as a linear 
progress from chaos to order, it can be sustained that, by neglecting the mythical 
nature o f this narrative, he still has one foot in the presuppositions of Enlightenment. 
Indeed, at different points Rousseau claims that the state o f nature must not be 
understood as a narrative of the historical origins, but rather as a rational device. In
129 In the first part of the second Discours Rousseau states talk of the exit from the state of nature as a 
“Concours singuliers et fortuits de circonstances" and “ qui pouvaient fort bien ne jamais arriver" (Rousseau 
1754,1, xi). At the beginning, he had talked of an “ enchaînement des prodiges" (Rousseau 1754, Discours,
4) .
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the second discourse, the Discours sur Vorigine et les Fondements de Vinégalité 
parmi les hommes, he clearly states that “we must not take the research that we can 
undertake on this topic as historical truth, but only as hypothetical and conditional 
reasonings, better suited to clarifying the nature of things than to showing their 
genuine origins, such as those that our physicists make every day on the formation of 
the world” (Rousseau 1754: Discours vi,:78; translation mine). Now if the reference 
to “only hypothetical and conditional reasoning” leaves space for interpreting this 
construction as a myth, with this reference to the “discourses of the physicians” he 
seems to deny the mythical side of the idea of a state of nature.
All the same, it can be argued that what he does in the second Discours is 
precisely to retell a myth. By adding a new moment to the narrative scheme 
chaos/cosmos, Rousseau gives a new interpretation to the myth of the state of nature 
and thus a new grounding {begründen) to the “société civile” that emerges with the 
exit from this state. By doing do, Rousseau is not only, as he claims, raising in his 
readers a chain of hypothetical and rational reasoning, but also a whole series of 
images, figures and narratives under which the discontent of civilisation finds 
expression. Thus it is not by chance that the referent changes too: instead of referring 
to the savages of North America, Rousseau continuously refers to the Caribbean, that 
he presents as, “Celui de tous le peoples existants qui jusqu'ici s'est écarté le moins 
de l'état de nature” (Rousseau 1754: I): he refers continuously to this exemplum, 
now to say that despite their nakedness they do not fear other animals because they 
have developed all their faculties so that it never happened to them to be eaten by 
ferocious beasts, that they live in perfect calm and that their passions are so calm 
that, despite the hot climate in which they live, they are less subject to violent 
passions and jealousy and that, as a consequence of their very limited basic needs, 
they have not developed reason, so that they sell their cotton bed in the morning and 
come back and cry for having it back in the evening because they could not even 
foresee that they may need it again the following night (Rousseau 1754,1).
By referring to the savages reinterpreted in this way, Rousseau could add a 
third moment to the scheme chaos/cosmos and thus fundamentally re-interpret the 
self-narrative o f modernity. Modernity does not represent a linear progress from 
chaos to order but, in the first place, the exit from a state o f freedom and peace for 
entering one of dependence and disorder. Once this has happened, the only way to
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recover the same freedom that human beings were enjoying in the state of nature at a 
different level is by means of political freedom: through a social contract whereby 
each human being gives himself to everybody and then to nobody, because it ceases 
in this way to depend on single individual human beings in order to subject himself 
only to the general will, human beings can recover the freedom they have lost by 
leaving the primeval state of nature on a different level (Rousseau 1762:1, vi).130
Therefore, Rousseau can conclude that with the exit from the state of nature 
and the constitution of the political body, human beings loose their natural freedom 
and then their right to whatever they can reach, but thereby acquire civil freedom, 
that is a moral freedom, because it is the only freedom that renders human beings 
masters of themselves (Rousseau 1762:1, vi). The passage is crucial and deserves to 
be quoted entirely:
“On pourrait sur ce qui précède ajouter à acquis de l'état civil la 
liberté morale, qui seule rend l 'homme vraiment maître de lui ; car 
Vimpulsion du seul appétit est esclavage, et l'obéissance à la loi qu'on 
s'est prescrite est liberté (Rousseau 1762:1, viii).
Civil freedom seems here to be real freedom because freedom is literally 
obedience to a law that human beings have given to themselves. Thus, according to 
Rousseau, only through subjection to the law as expression o f the general will to 
which each member of the political body contributes, can human beings properly 
speaking be autonomous, i.e. free. On the other hand, the subjection to impulses is 
said to be serfdom, because it is assumed that, in following their inclinations, human 
beings are not free.
Apart from the problems connected with this identification of autonomy 
with law and the exclusion of impulses from autonomy, since it is not said, unless 
one assumes a dualistic view of the subject, that impulses are necessarily 
heteronymous, what is interesting to note here is the tension that this view creates 
within Rousseau’s thinking. We have seen that Rousseau starts his Du Contrat Social 
with the exit from the state of nature and ends with the claim o f the need for a civic 
religion whose positive dogmas he does not hesitate to spell out. But how can 
freedom, i.e. the autonomy of a subject, be guaranteed if s/he who does not believe in
130 By primeval state of nature, I mean the condition in which human beings are at the very beginning and 
that is described in the first part of the second Discourse, in order to distinguish it from the condition in 
which they find themselves after the introduction of private property and that is described in the second part 
o f the Discourse: the error made by Hobbes and others who followed him is to take this condition, that is 
already a degenerated one, as the original state of nature (Rousseau 1754, II).
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those dogmas of faith can be banished from the polity? Is it not case a dogma of faith 
the opposite o f an autonomously chosen law?
The alternative, however, is not necessarily, as we have already suggested, 
between a heteronymously given religious faith or the autonomously chosen law. 
The fact that Rousseau cannot find a better name for his civil religion is revealing of 
the fact that even if he perceives the limits of an enlightened approach such as that of 
Bayle, he still remains trapped within the alternative “law and thus reason” versus 
“religion”.
The alternative between the autonomy of a general law and the heteronomy 
(and thus the serfdom), which Rousseau formulated at the political level, was 
transposed by Kant into the moral dimension. As is well known, Rousseau deeply 
influenced Kant’s moral and political thinking.131 132 In particular, Kant followed 
Rousseau in interpreting freedom as autonomy, i.e. as giving the law to oneself. In 
the Perpetual Peace, for instance, after criticising the view of political freedom as 
arbitrium, i.e. as a warrant to do whatever one wishes unless this means doing 
injustice to others as an “empty tautology”, he states that “external and rightful 
freedom should rather be defined as a warrant to obey no external laws except those 
to which I  have been able to give my own consent” (Kant 1795, II, i: 99).
There is a clear similarity between this political freedom, conceived as 
autonomy and the moral freedom that Kant, in a similar way, defines as to subject 
oneself to the universal moral law. In fact, whereas at the speculative level Kant 
conceived o f freedom as the faculty of starting a new series of causes, and thus as 
freedom of choice independently from the mechanism of natural causality (and for 
this reason he sometimes called freedom thus understood as causality by freedom), 
he subsequently identified this freedom with the subjection to moral law, and thus 
with the independence from impulses. Thus, whereas the problem of the Critique o f  
Pure Reason was to show that reason can be pure, i.e. justify the possibility of 
knowledge on an a priori basis, the problem of the Critique o f Practical Reason is to 
show that pure reason can be practical, i.e. that reason can affect the will directly.
131 As many commentators have shown, Kant’s political thinking is dependent on his moral thinking, because 
it depends on the categorical imperative. On this point, see Kersting 1992 and Habermas 1996.
132 On this point, see particularly Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason, the discussion of the three antinomies of 
reason in Kant 1787, Division Two, Transcendental Dialectic, Book II, Chapter II.
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And, as is well known, this is possible, according to Kant, only by recurring to the 
idea of moral law (Kant 1788).
Thus, it is in Kant that the Enlightenment’s identification of autonomy with 
the autonomy of a pure reason that follows a universal law reaches its apex. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that not even his political theory, a view that posits the 
issue of autonomy as the basic principle o f any rightful state,133 is completely “pure” 
from mythical elements. Kant did not write a “Critique o f political reason”.134 
Perhaps had he done so, he would have had to admit that his own political reason is 
not pure. He got close to affirming this when, in the preface to the Metaphysics o f  
Morals, he wrote that a system o f right is not possible because, being right a concept 
oriented towards practice, such a system would have to incorporate all the varieties 
and contingencies of experience within itself. Thus, in this domain we can only 
expect an “approximation to a system” (Kant 1797: Preface).
On the other hand, though, he assumed that the foundations of the system 
were already put in place by the Critique o f  Practical Reason. Indeed, the concept of 
right, defined as “the sum total o f those conditions within which the will of one 
person can be reconciled with the will o f  another in accordance with a universal law 
of freedom” (Kant 1797: Introduction, B) is derived via progressive qualifications 
from the concept o f obligation, o r categorical imperative that, in turn, is elaborated in 
the Critique o f Practical Reason. Kant presents his conception of right as derived 
from a priori principles of reason as they were first elaborated in the Critique o f  
Practical Reason. In his view, an autonomous reason is a reason that takes its 
principles from itself. There are no other ways to autonomy.
But in fact, if we move on to analyse the way in which the necessity of the 
institution o f a lawful condition is established, we do not see “pure reason” at work. 
Kant, like the other natural law theorists, recurs to the category of the social contract 
and the correlated pendant of the state o f nature. Hence in Kant’s political writings 
too there is a narrative of the human beings’ exit from the state of nature and the 
creation of a politically lawful condition. And it can also be shown that this narrative 
works as a myth.
133 See, in particular, his definition of the concept of right in the Metaphysics o f Morals as derived from that 
o f freedom (Kant 1797, Introduction).
134 Kant considered Critique o f Practical Reason, where he develops the concept of obligation, the critique 
that should precede the system delineated in the Metaphysics o f Morals.
148
1--------
Kant insists, even more than Hobbes and Rousseau, on neglecting the 
mythical side of his state of nature. He explicitly states that the state of nature must 
not be understood as an historical fact, since a fact drawn from experience could 
never, in his view, generate a right: the social contract is said to be an “an a priori 
idea of reason” (Kant 1797, I, II, §.43; Kant 1793, II, corollary). Thus, in the 
Metaphysics o f  Morals he affirms that
“It is not experience or any kind of factual knowledge that 
makes public legal coercion necessary. On the contrary, even if we 
imagine men to be as benevolent and law abiding as we please, the a 
priori rational idea of a non-lawful state will still tell us that before a 
public and legal state is established, individual men, peoples and states 
can never be secure against act o f violence from one another, since 
each will have his own right to do whatever seems right and good to 
him, independently of the opinion of others” (Kant 1797,1, § 44).
But how could reason state that each human being has her own right to do whatever 
seems right and good to her? What tells us that this is not pure reason, but a reason 
that recurs to the narrative of the state o f nature: Kant does so with an explicit 
awareness that what this narrative evokes in his audience is not a “pure” chain of 
rational reasoning.
As is well known, Kant depicts this condition, not as a Hobbesian condition 
of war of all against all, but rather as a condition in which rights are only provisory 
(Kant 1797,1, §9, 44). But this remains an unlawful condition because right cannot 
be secured and human beings must therefore leave this condition: even if there can 
be society in such a natural state, Kant asserts that there cannot be any “civ// 
society”, that is a society that can guarantee the mine and thine through public laws 
(Kant 1797: Division). The term civil is here counterpoised to the condition of the 
state of nature that is the condition in which the savages live. Thus, in Kant too there 
is not only the narrative scheme of the passage from a natural condition to a civil 
society, but also the reference to the contraposition of “civilised” versus “savages” 
that we have seen playing a fundamental role in Hobbes and Rousseau. And for 
Kant's contemporary readers, the state o f nature not only evoked rational reasoning, 
but also a whole reservoir of significance that grounds -  in the sense of begründen - 
the identity of the “civilised Europeans”.
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In the Perpetual Peace, Kant describes the condition o f the savages as that 
of a “lawless freedom”, or “freedom of folly”, as counterpoised to the “freedom of 
reason”, for “they [the savages] would prefer rather to engage in incessant strife than 
submit to a legal constraint which they might impose upon themselves” (Kant 1795, 
II). Kant is well aware o f the power that the figure of the savage evoked and has no 
doubt that his reader would have a  similar reaction to them: “we all regard [savages’ 
behaviour] as barbarism, coarseness, and brutish debasement of humanity” (Kant 
1795, II). It is by evoking the passionate contempt of his reader for the “savages” that 
Kant hoped to persuade his audience of the necessity of a social contract between 
states.
Thus, even Kant, the advocate o f the autonomy o f  pure reason, when 
elaborating his system of morals recurs to the working on the myth of the state of 
nature. All the same by identifying the critique with the pureness of reason and 
autonomy with the law, he seems to deny any legitimacy to  myth as part of the 
critique. However, it can be argued that, it is the very identification of autonomy 
with pure reason that is fundamentally problematic.
In the first place, as we have seen not all myths, and even less all the “vain 
imaginings”, are religious myths. Quite on the contrary, what characterises myth is 
precisely its plurality, i.e. the plurality that stems from the Arbeit am Mythos, from 
the fact that having to ground a world subject to change, myth has to be open to a 
process o f  continual re-telling. In this working of myth, which questions its own 
products, one can see a possible means for critique. The previous analysis o f the way 
in which the mythologem of the state of nature changed and worked as a means for 
critique also is an example of the possibility to combine myth and the quest for 
autonomy.
Myth thus conceived does not necessarily lead to heteronomy. If 
heteronomy must literally be understood as subjugation to the law of another -  be it 
the law o f God o r o f an unquestionable tradition, then myth, because of its plurality, 
i.e. the fact that it expresses itself through variants does not necessarily mean 
heteronomy. Certainly there are myths, such as the religious myths, that because they 
aim at providing an answer to the whole sense of life and death, tend to leave no 
space for any alternative narratives. The religious myth of the God and lawgiver of 
monotheism is, as we have, seen paradigmatic from thi spoint o f view.
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On the other hand, autonomy must not be identified with following the 
moral law given by reason. Kant arrives at this view of autonomy through the series 
of corresponding dichotomies that recurs throughout the Critique o f  Practical 
Reason: particular maxims for acting versus universal law, material principle versus 
formal principle of action, inclinations versus reason, pleasure versus duty, 
heteronomy versus autonomy. Thus in the heteronomy, Kant encompasses not only 
religious morals, but also, for instance, all the moralities o f pleasure. According to 
him, he who follows his own inclinations acts in a heteronymous way, whereas only 
by subjecting himself to the categorical imperative o f the law can he be autonomous. 
The problem here is the identification of inclinations with something that is 
heteronymous. In what sense, we may ask, are the inclinations the discourse of an 
“other” as much as the words prescribed by an omnipotent God can be said to be the 
discourse of the other?
We cannot here enter the details of a discussion o f the Kant’s view o f 
autonomy and the shortcomings of the dualistic view of human beings that it 
presupposes. Suffice is to point to the limited character of such a view. The 
possibility of autonomy does not necessarily mean pureness of reason. Autonomy 
literally means to give the law to oneself, i.e. self-rule. The mistake of the 
Enlightenment appears then to have identified all that which is not grounded on an 
altogether pure reason with heteronomy and superstition. However, going back to 
Bayle’s words, it can be sustained that a “mythical” society of atheists is not only 
possible: it is also desirable.
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8. CLASSICAL THEORIES OF POLITICAL MYTH
If modem political theory has to a great extent neglected the role that myth 
plays in politics, there has been a moment in European history when this role became 
tragically conspicuous. The massive use made by totalitarianism of political symbols, 
myths, and the achievements thereby reached not only manifestly exhibited the 
power of myth, but also posed a major intellectual problem for those intellectuals 
who had believed in the Enlightenment’s promise o f a liberation of politics from 
myth.
In 1946, the first book in Western political philosophy that, from the very 
title, promised to deal with the role that myth plays in the typically modem form of 
politics was published: it was Cassirer’s posthumous The Myth o f the State. The man 
Ernst Cassirer, German of Jewish origin, who had to leave his homeland just after the 
advent of Nazism could not but perceive the morally tragic challenge posed by what
l
I appears to him to be the “appearance o f a new power: the power of mythical 
thought” (Cassirer 1946: 3). On the other hand, the philosopher Cassirer, who had 
spent most of his intellectual life developing a theory of the symbolic forms in which 
myth was presented as a primitive form of consciousness, which had to be 
superseded by the advent of modem science, was also deemed to feel the intellectual 
challenge that this advent posed to him as to other theorists educated in the school o f 
the Enlightenment.135
“In the last thirty years -  so begin The Myth o f the State -  we 
have not only passed through a severe crisis o f our political and social 
life but have also been confronted with quite new theoretical problems.
[..] If we look at the present state of our cultural life we feel at once that
135 Cassirer is, in first place, one of the major representatives of the so called neo-Kantian Marburg school, by 
which is usually meant a series of intellectual trends that between the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth drew inspiration from Kant’s thinking against both idealism and positivism. 
Beyond his major work on The Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms (1925), Cassirer is also author of a monograph 
on Kant’s life and theory (1918) and of an essay on the Philosophy o f Enlightenment (1932).
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there is a deep chasm between two different fields. When it comes to 
political action man seems to follow rules quite different from those 
recognised in all his mere theoretical activities. [..] Scientific knowledge 
and technical mastery of nature daily win new and unprecedented 
victories. But in man's practical and social life the defeat of rational 
thought seems to be complete and irrevocable. In this domain modem 
man is supposed to forget everything he has learned in the development 
of his intellectual life. He is admonished to go back to the first 
rudimentary stages of human culture” (Cassirer 1946: 3-4).
In the following pages, the problem is formulated more explicitly: if modem 
societies are characterised by their rational organisation and it is precisely on this 
basis that they are distinguished from traditional ones, how can the success of 
Nazism’s appeal to myth be explained? The Myth o f the State that, from its very title, 
had promised to be an analysis of the role that myth plays in the state is in fact the 
reconstruction of the Western attempt to get rid o f myth. The text starts with a 
section where myth is defined as the form of life that characterises traditional 
societies and then moves on to analysing “the struggle against myth in the history of 
political philosophy”, a section that occupies two thirds of the work. The “myth o f 
the state” appears only at the end of the text, in a section which significantly recalls 
in its title Rosenberg’s “The Myth o f the Twentieth Century”, one of the main 
ideological texts of Nazism,
Cassirer’s The Myth o f the State, thus, consists mainly of a huge synthesis o f 
the history of political thought, starting with the first attempt o f the West to exit from 
myth by the Greeks and moving on to medieval religious conceptions of the state, to 
Machiavelli and the social contract theories as a founding moment of a purely 
rational theory of the state,136 and finally ending with a relatively small section on the 
conceptions that prepared the advent of Nazism: Carlyle’s theory of Hero worship 
and Gobineau’s theory of races.
At the beginning of the last chapter, devoted to analysing the Technique o f  
Modem Political Myth, Cassirer sustains that even after having reconstructed all the 
conceptual premises of the advent of Nazism, the success o f its appeal to myth 
remains unexplainable (Cassirer 1946: 277). It may be recalled here that Alfred 
Rosenberg’s “The Myth o f the Twentieth Century” had an incredible editorial success 
selling more that 680,000 copies in only a few years (Rosenberg 1930: preface to the
136 On the relationship between social contract theories and myth see previous chapter.
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1937 edition). The content o f this book was a strange mixture of mysticism and 
“scientific” and “historical and archaeological” discoveries all devoted to 
demonstrating the existence o f a superior race, the Aryan one. How could the success 
of this myth be explained?
It has been noted that, in Cassirer’s view, myth is not just a simple way o f 
thinking or speaking: myth, in his view, is a whole form of life (Lebensform). As 
such, Cassirer’s myth encompasses all that which anthropologists have described 
using such different names as magic, religious practices and beliefs, worship and 
rituals (Krois 1979: 199). In this ensemble there is no space for a distinction between 
myth, religion and rituals: “myth” became the general name for all these beliefs and 
practices; and it is in them that Cassirer identifies the form of life {Lebensform) that 
in his view must hold together primitive societies.
If myth is what characterises traditional forms of political communities 
(what Cassirer calls “Gemeinschaften” and Schicksalsgemeinschaften) how could 
Rosenberg’s appeal to the myth of the Aryan race have been so successful? In 
Cassirer’s view, the difference between modem and traditional societies is precisely 
the difference between a Gemeinschaft held together by mythical beliefs and 
practices and a Gesellschaft that is instead a product of the will, what he calls a 
Willensgemeinschaft as counterpoised to a Schicksalsgemeinschaft (Krois 1979). A 
political myth, Cassirer affirms by referring to Doutté’s anthropological analysis o f 
magical and religious practices, is a “collective desire personified” (Cassirer 1946: 
280). But if myth is a collective desire how can the emergence of such a desire be 
explained in the case of the “Myth o f the Twentieth Century”?
Cassirer’s answer is twofold. First, political myths are “desperate means”. 
The return of myth, he affirms, is only explainable as the last resource for facing a 
situation of deep crisis when the rational means are out of disposal. According to 
him, “In desperate situations man will always have recourse to desperate means - and 
our present-day political myths have been such desperate means” (Cassirer 1946: 
279). And again, by depicting the situation with even clearer colours, he wrote
“[With the advent of modernity] the mythical organisation of 
society seems to be superseded by a rational organisation. In quiet and 
peaceful times, in periods of relative stability and security, this rational 
organisation is easily maintained. It seems to be safe against all attacks. But 
in politics the equipoise is never completely established[...].In all critical
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moments of man’s social life, the rational forces that resist the rise of the 
old mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In these 
moments the time for myth has come again. For myth has not been really 
vanquished and subjugated. It is always there, lurking in the dark and 
waiting for its hour and opportunity. This hour comes as soon as the other 
binding forces of man’s social life, for one reason or another, lose their 
strength and are no longer able to combat the demonic mythical power” 
(Cassirer 1946:280).
However, Cassirer himself realises that this is not yet an answer. To say that 
myth has returned because rational means appeared to be out of disposal, even if one 
accepts this dichotomy of myth versus rationality, it is not yet an explanation of why 
this happened. Thus Cassirer is led to look elsewhere and precisely to the power o f 
what he calls the “new techniques of power”. So he wrote, “Myth has always been 
described as the result o f an unconscious activity and as a free product o f 
imagination” (Cassirer 1946: 282). And Cassirer, we should note, with his definition 
of political myth as a “collective desire personified” was the last one to follow this 
line.
The passage in question, though, continues with an important “but”: “But 
here, observes Cassirer, we find myth made according to plan. The new political 
myths do not grow up freely; they are not wild fruits of an exuberant imagination. 
They are artificial things fabricated by very skilful and cunning artisans.” Here, one 
can then argue, Cassirer is facing a counterexample to his own previous theory o f 
mythical consciousness. But instead o f reconsidering his theory, he attributes this 
“anomaly” to the development of new techniques: “It has been reserved for the 
twentieth century, he argued, our own great technical age to develop a new technique 
of myth (Cassirer 1946: 282).
Thus instead of recognising the failure of his view of the mythical 
consciousness in dealing with political myth -  a failure that is clear from the very 
structure of the book, he limits himself, in the last twenty pages of the book, to 
explaining political myth as regression into primitive forms of thinking and society 
as favoured by the advent of new techniques of power. By facing a myth that cannot 
be explained through his own reading of modernity as an exit from myth, he repairs 
to these “new” techniques in order to explain the success of Nazism. Among these 
techniques, three of them are analysed at length: the magical use of words, the use of
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rituals and finally the concourse of prophecy. As we shall see, there are reasons to 
suspect that all these ‘techniques” are not a prerogative of totalitarianism.
Let us dwell on Cassirer’s analysis. First, according to Cassirer the 
fabrication of such a personified collective desire as that of the Aryan race is only 
explainable by referring to a change in the function o f language operated by Nazism. 
According to Cassirer’s philosophy o f language, there are two possible uses o f 
words: the semantic and the magical. The former, that is the main one, consists in 
using a word for describing an objective state of affairs, whereas the latter consists in 
using words for producing certain effects. Even if the semantic function is never 
missing, because without it there could not be human speech, according to Cassirer, 
in primitive societies the magic word has an overwhelming influence. The magician 
or sorcerer does not describe any relation o f things, but aims only at producing 
certain effects, at changing the course of nature: his power is therefore irresistible.
Our politicians, so Cassirer continues, therefore, unite within themselves 
two figures that have appeared separate until now: homo faber  is now also homo 
magus (Cassirer 1946: 283). Cassirer does not explain how such a change is possible, 
he simply notes that ordinary words are charged with further meaning and that new­
fangled words are charged with feelings and violent passions (Cassirer 1946:283).
But the skilful use of words, he observes, is insufficient: if the word is to 
have its effect, it has to be supplemented by the introduction of new rites (Cassirer 
1946: 284). Again, it is the primitive societies that provide the example of a form of 
life vinculated by thousands of rituals and social practises: the progress of 
anthropological research have, according to Cassirer, falsified Rousseau’s image of 
the savage: far from being the free and unfettered creature of Rousseau the savage is 
hemmed in on every side by the customs o f  his people; he is bound by the chains of 
innumerable rites grounded in tradition. The effects that all these rites produce are 
the obliteration o f the responsibility of the subject: in primitive societies there is no 
individual responsibility, according to Cassirer, but only a collective one. In a similar 
vein, in his view, totalitarianism by deleting the distinction between the private and 
the public sphere, has succeed in inundating the whole life of individuals by a high 
tide of rituals that are as rigorous and inexorable as those that we find in primitive 
societies (Cassirer 1946: 284).
Methods of repression and compulsion have always been in use in political 
life, but, Cassirer notes, modem myths did not begin with demanding or prohibiting 
certain actions: “they undertook to change the men in order to be able to regulate and 
control their deeds” (Cassirer 1946: 286). The modem techniques of power, so he 
continues, by overwhelming the individual with an ensemble of rituals suppress the 
sense of individual responsibility and, in this way, destroy freedom. Freedom, 
Cassirer argues following Kant, is not something that is given by nature but rather a 
task, an ethical imperative: to be autonomous. By melting the individual into the 
collective responsibility, they destroy the very sense of freedom but, at the same 
time, they relieve men from a heavy burden: personal responsibility (Cassirer 1946: 
288). The destruction of the freedom of the subject and its autonomy is the sign that 
we are leaving modernity: the advent of the new techniques o f power represents then 
for Cassirer a fall into primitive forms of life.
Cassirer’s analysis gradually becomes more and more rich, but still does not 
fully explain how such a deep change, if it represented as he argues such a 
revolution, was possible: why, in other words, did modem individuals accept to 
exchange their freedom for a return to “primitive” forms of life?
The new politicians are identified by Cassirer with the magicians of 
primitive societies. The new sorcerers do not only use words in a magical way, but 
they also promise the medicine to cure all evils. This leads Cassirer to the third 
feature of the new techniques of myth: the sorcerer, the homo magus is at the same 
time the homo divinans. He does not only provide the cure for everything: he can 
also reveal the will of gods and foretell the future. Again a parallel between primitive 
and modem societies is introduced:
‘T o  be sure, we no longer have the primitive kind of sortilege, the 
divination by lot; we no longer observe the flight o f birds nor do we 
inspect the entrails of slain animals. We have developed a much more 
refined and elaborate method of divination -  a method that claim to be 
scientific and philosophical. But if our methods have changed, the thing 
itself has by no means vanished. Our modem politicians know very well 
that the great masses are much more easily moved by the force of 
imagination than by the sheer physical force. And they have made ample 
use of this knowledge. The politician becomes a sort of public fortune­
teller. Prophecy is an essential element in the new technique of rulership. 
The most improbable or even impossible promises are made; the 
millennium is predicted over and over again” (Cassirer 1946: 289).
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Reading this passage one cannot but think of our contemporary political 
techniques: at first sight it seems as if it is still the case that “the most improbable 
and impossible promises are made” and “the millennium is predicted over and over 
again.” 137 We will come back to this point later on, but it is now important to stress 
that there are some reasons to suspect that Cassirer’s statement’s “prophecy is an 
essential element in the new technique o f rulership” seems still to hold true (Cassirer 
1946: 289). This suggests that the Nazi’s recourse to prophecy is not an anomaly in 
modernity: far from being a prerogative o f totalitarianism, it seems to be part of the 
most different techniques of power.
Cassirer continues by analysing the way in which philosophical conceptions 
such as that elaborated by Spengler’s in his Der Untergang des Abendslandes and 
even Heidegger’s idea of human beings being thrown into the world (which he 
expresses through the neologism Geworfenheit) could have fomented in their readers 
a prophetic sense of fatalism that prepared the way for the “new prophets”. What is 
interesting here is to note that when Cassirer moves on to specifically analysing the 
way in which the new myths work, all the dichotomies that he built before break 
down. For instance Spengler’s catastrophic prophecy cannot be grasped through a 
dichotomy such as “semantic” versus “magic” uses of the word. Cassirer himself 
could not but admit that Spengler’s words, even if they were not directly aimed at 
dominating people’s deeds and minds, worked both as semantic and magic devices: 
they were at the same time describing a presumed state of affairs, the decline of the 
West, and producing effects in their readers. Thus, as Cassirer notes, the great 
success of Spengler’s book, must lay in its title more than in its content: the title Der 
Untergang des Abendlandes was an “electric spark” that set the imagination of 
Spengler’s readers aflame.138
On the other hand, in light o f  Wittgenstein’s philosophy it appears 
legitimate to ask whether the distinction between a semantic and a magical use of the 
word is possible at all. As Wittgenstein’s critique of the possibility to explain
137 On this point, see in particular Chapter 12.
138 Cassirer analysis of Spengler’s success cannot but draw our attention to the success of the “prophets of 
our time”: it seems as if the success of books such as "The Clash of Civilisations” or "The End of History” 
depends on their titles rather than their content: like Spengler’s book, titles like the "The Clash of 
Civilisation” or “The End of History” set the readers’ imagination aflame before appealing to their intellect. 
On this point see Chapter 12.
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meanings on the basis of merely ostensive definitions has shown, there cannot be 
meaning without a whole made of language and actions, i.e. language-games. The 
meaning of a word is its use, and its use is always aimed at describing something by 
producing certain effects and vice versa. To put it in Cassirer’s terminology, there 
cannot be a semantic without a magical meaning use of words.
The point is that, as we have seen, Cassirer’s general philosophy is still 
within the Enlightenment’s presupposition of a philosophy o f the subject. In his 
view, the two main forms of experience of meaning are the mythical and the 
scientific consciousness, and the distinction between the two is drawn on the basis of 
the possibility to  distinguish between the subject and the object of the 
representations. Whereas, as we have seen, according to his Philosophy o f  Symbolic 
Forms, scientific representations (Vorstellungen) are based on a clear distinction 
between the subject and the object of knowledge, in mythical consciousness the 
subject is overwhelmed (überwältigt) by its object, and this explains why, according 
to him, it can have a magical impact.
Thus, against those who sustain that Cassirer’s general philosophy is not a 
philosophy of the subject because he points to the social character of the mythical 
consciousness (Krois 1979: 203), it can be argued that, quite on the contrary, 
Cassirer still remains within the presuppositions of a philosophy of the subject 
because he conceived the myth in such a totalising way precisely because he 
counterpoised it to the scientific representations: he does not conceive of the subject 
of mythical representation in a “solipsistic” way, precisely because he counterpoised 
it to the “solipsistic” subject of scientific enquiry. In this, he thus remains within the 
Enlightenment.
From the point of view of a theory of political myth, the problem seems to 
be that by analysing myth as a form of consciousness or as an entire form of life the 
differences between phenomena such as myths, religious beliefs and practices as well 
as rituals of all sorts, all get lost. But in fact, myth, religion and rituals are different 
things. First myth is not religion and, if it can be argued that human beings are 
überwältigt by a religious representation that pretends to an ultimate truth, the same 
does not hold for myth.139 By leaving aside a discussion of the issue in terms of a
139 A similar point is made by H. Tudor when he observes that it is not true as Cassirer argues that in myth all 
reality and events are projected into the fundamental opposition of the "sacred” and the "profane”since, as he 
points out, there are many myths in which the sacred plays no role whatsoever (Tudor 1972: 35). The reason
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subject-object relationship, it can be sustained that mythical constructions are not 
impenetrable by rational arguments: Cassirer’s own critique of “modem myths” 
demonstrates precisely the contrary*
Secondly, the two categories of myth and rituals must also be kept 
separated. In fact, even if the Arbeit am Mythos can only be grasped by looking at its 
working from the point of view of its being a language-game made of language and 
action, the concept of rituals brings in a new dimension that is not entailed in the 
concept of myth. As we have seen, ritual is not any action. Only a particular class o f 
actions can be classified as rituals. Rituals, from the Latin word rite, is literally “what 
is well done”, or “what is done according to the rules”. Thus, even if political myths 
and political rituals are quite often associated, the two work in quite different ways 
within a society: whereas political rituals must be kept unchanged to be effective, 
political myth in as far as it provides significance to an always changing world, must 
remain open to the possibility o f being renegotiated according to new experiences 
and needs. To put it bluntly, a political myth expresses itself through variants, the 
political ritual through fixed rules.140
Hence it can be argued that it is precisely because Cassirer remained linked 
to the Enlightenment dichotomy o f “mythical consciousness” versus “scientific 
consciousness” that he cannot but analyse Nazism’s use o f myth in terms of ‘‘the 
return of demonic forces”, i.e. as regression (Cassirer 1946). Only by following the 
Enlightenment identification o f myth with all that which pure reason is not, i.e. with 
a whole form of life entailing religion as well as magic he could have assumed that, 
since modernity has undermined the role of religion, it should have also got rid of 
myth.
At the beginning of the twentieth century and thus well before the Myth o f  
the State, another book was published where an alternative theory of political myth 
was developed. It is Sorel’s Reflections sur la violence (1908).141 Its major argument 
about political myth is that myth is not religion, and it is precisely for this reason that
why Cassirer argued this is that he saw in the modem totalitarian myth maker “the priest of a new, entirely 
irrational and mysterious religion” (Cassirer 1946:282). But myths, despite all the enthusiasm they can 
inspire, are not a form of religion. A similar point is made by another contemporary theorist of political myth, 
C. Flood who distinguishes between political myth and what he calls “sacred myths” (Flood 1996).
140 On the distinction between myth and ritual in general see Chapter 6.
141 According to some interpreters Sorel’s Reflections on violence remains “the most interesting attempt to 
elaborate the notion of political myth” (Tudor 1972: 12).
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it can and should play a role in politics. Whereas Cassirer saw in myth a form of 
“regression”, Sorel presents political myths as a form of “progress”.
Sorel, in contrast to Cassirer was not a professional philosopher. In all his 
writings, he is continually taking a polemical distance from “les Intellectuels” or “les 
Hommes d ’école” (Sorel 1908: 7). The Réflections sur la violence, a collection of 
articles previously written in the context on the discussion on syndicalism, clearly 
have an activist intent: to develop a severe critique of the parliamentary socialists and 
their neglect of the primary role played in history by proletarian violence. In Sorers 
view, it is proletarian violence, and not the sophisticated moves of parliamentary 
socialists, that is the real engine of history. And the myth of general strike is the 
highest point of proletarian violence, a complex of images able to immediately evoke 
all the different manifestations of the war engaged by socialism against capitalism.
Sorel’s reasoning is quite straightforward:
“In the course of these studies, he wrote, we ascertained something 
that looked so simple that we have not been insisting too much on it: human 
beings taking part to big social movements represent their own future action 
in the form of images of wars assuring the triumph o f their cause. I 
proposed to call myths these constructions whose knowledge is so 
important for the historian: the general strike of syndacalists and the 
catastrophic revolution by Marx are such myths” (Sorel 1908: Introduction,
III: 21).
According to Sorel the action engaged by human beings in big social 
movements cannot be explained without powerful images such as myths: the more 
dramatic the action, the more powerful these images. In as much as the Christian 
martyrs were moved by the catastrophic representation of the Apocalypse, so the 
passage from capitalism to socialism must take the form of a catastrophe in order to 
be effective as a pouvoir moteur (Sorel 1908: 143).
Why, one can ask, should we use the concept of myth to describe these 
images? First, it can be argued that Sorel meant here to take distance from all kinds 
of positivistic explanations. There are facts, according to Sorel, that cannot be 
explained by an “intellectualist philosophy”, which he, in other places, also indicated 
as being “petite science” (Sorel 1908: 23). The readiness to sacrifice their own lives 
shown by the Napoleonic soldiers or by the Greeks and Romans cannot be explained 
on the basis of purely rational explanations. In order to explain them, according to 
Sorel, we must have recourse to Bergson’s explanation of the way in which human
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beings create an artificial world that is placed in the future and that is formed by 
movements depending entirely on us (Sorel 1908: 28). Sorel refers to Bergson’s 
psychology in order to explain the way in which it is possible that such complexes of 
images are formed. These images, thus, in Sorel view’s depend only on movements 
within the subject, i.e. a sort o f Bergsonian élan vital, and precisely for this reason 
they are defined as myths. This also enables him to distinguish these images both 
from utopia and religion.
The general strike is a myth and not an utopia precisely because it is not a 
theoretical model: the general strike is a “determination o f  the will”. A myth is not 
the construction of the single mind of a theorist who, after having observed and 
discussed facts, establishes a model for comparing existing societies and measuring 
the good and bad they contain (Sorel 1908: 30). A myth cannot be divided in its parts 
and judged according to their correspondence to reality or their feasibility: a myth, in 
Sorel’s terms, is a whole made of images that only together can express a specific 
determination of the will.
What interested here the revolutionary syndacalist Sorel was indeed to 
understand in what conditions a socialist revolution is possible. In this respect it is 
crucial for him to distinguish myth from utopia. So he states that despite the fact that 
socialism has been a utopia for a long time, it has now reached a completely different 
stage: socialism, in his view, is no longer utopia because it became a preparation of 
the proletarian masses that wanted to suppress the state and property (Sorel 1908: 35)
Thus, if on the one hand, the general strike is no longer a utopia because it is 
now a determination of the will, it must also, on the other, be distinguished from 
religious beliefs. Sorel explicitly wrote that “people living in this world of myths are 
secure from refutation; this led many to assert that socialism is a kind of religion. For 
a long time people have been struck by the fact that religious convictions are 
unaffected by criticism and from that they have concluded that everything that is 
below science must be religion” (Sorel 1908: 35).142 But not all that which is not 
science is religion.
Sorel, in contrast to Cassirer emphasises the point: this enables him to 
recognise the role of myth in modem politics. Thus, whereas Cassirer, by moving
142 Curiously, the English translator rendered the French “au -dessous de la science” with “beyond science”, 
whereas the fact that Sorel posits myth and religion au-dessous and not “beyond” the level of science is, as 
we will see, very significant.
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from the self-narrative of an enlightened reason that unifies under the heading of 
“superstition” or “mythical consciousness” all that which is not grounded on 
scientific reason, is unable to explain the presence of myth in modem societies and in 
the face of the tragically conspicuous role played by the myth of the Aryan race he 
cannot but interpret it in term of “regression” into myth. Sorel by distinguishing 
myth from religion is able to recognise the presence o f myth in modem societies and 
even to see in them a form of progress. If modernity has undermined the role of 
religion as a horizon of sense in the experience of the world, it has not in any way 
undermined that o f myth. Quite on the contrary, it is precisely in typically modem 
phenomena such as the big social movements that the role played by mythical 
constructions became evident. It is only because people taking part in big social 
movements can represent their action as an event within a narrative assuring the 
triumph of their cause that they engage in such actions as the proletarian struggle. 
‘These results, Sorel wrote, could not be produced in any certain manner by the use 
of ordinary language; use must be made of a body of images which, by intuition 
alone, and before intellectual analyses are made, is capable of evoking as un 
undivided whole the mass of sentiments which correspond to the different 
manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against modem society” (Sorel 
1908:131).
Thus, it is not important to know whether the single details that form a myth 
will actually be part of the future history. It might even be the case that nothing 
which they contain will ever happen: this will not undermine their pouvoir moteur. 
Also, as in our everyday day life we continuously make experience, Sorel observes, 
there is a huge gap between what actually happens and our preconceived notion of it, 
and this does not prevent us from continuing to make resolutions. Myth, to conclude, 
according to Sorel, must not be judged as an astrological almanac making previsions 
about the future, but as means o f acting on the present (Sorel 1908: 135).
But if it is true that myths cannot be falsified, they on the other hand can be 
discussed. Sorel is ambiguous on this point, but in different places he seems to 
conceive of myth as an absolute dimension beyond the possibility of discussion. For 
instance he goes as far as to write that “the idea of the general strike is so admirably
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adapted to the proletarian mind than can dominate it in the most absolute way [...] 
and that even the power of dispute is reduced to nothing” (Sorel 1908: 122).143
In fact, this statement contrasts precisely with what Sorel does, that is 
rationally discuss a myth. In particular, in the fourth article of the Réflections sur la 
violence, an article devoted to the defence of the general strike against the criticism 
of many parliamentary socialists, Sore] discusses the myth o f the general strike from 
the point of view of its rationality. Sorel defends this myth by showing how it 
corresponds to Marx’s doctrine. In Sorel view, the general strike is well adapted to 
convey in an immediate image all the most important views and values of this 
doctrine: the division of the society into two classes, whose interests oppose each 
other, the idea o f class struggle, the revolution of the present state of things. This is a 
crucial point that can be grasped only by looking at the same time at what Sorel 
actually says about the myth of the general strike and what Sorel actually does with 
it. If one looks at both dimensions it becomes impossible to sustain that for Sorel 
myth is only a matter of faith that eludes any possibility o f critical discussion (Tudor 
1972:15): to critically discuss myth is precisely what Sorel does in his work.
The reason why he, at different points, in contrast to what he himself does, 
seems to hold that myths are not subject to rational discussion is that he remained 
linked to what we can call a “dualistic view of the self*. Referring to Bergson’s 
psychology, he interprets it according to a theory of the two selves. As we read in the 
Introduction to the Reflections, according to Sorel there are two different selves: on 
the one hand the free creative side and on the other the rational, external and spatial 
one. It is to this latter that the stable affirmations of science are due, whereas myth is 
the product of the other self (Sorel 1904: Introduction).
Sorel on the other hand, does not go much further than this very brief 
reference to Bergson’s psychology: he was not so much interested in the 
psychological implications of his theory o f myth than with its practical ones. His 
major point was to show that the proletarian violence is the real engine of history 
and, to this end, he points to the pouvoir moteur of the general strike. In doing this, 
though, he does formulate a theory o f political myth for he recognises that there 
cannot be a mobilisation of political action without a powerful set of images that
143 In other places for instance Sorel defines myth as a total experience (une expérience intégrale) that cannot 
be permeated by rational arguments (Sorel 1908: 124).
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assure to those who are engaged in that action the certainty that their cause will 
triumph. When these images, as it is in the case of the myth of general strike, 
assumes a narrative form and when it aims, by inserting events in such a narrative, at 
creating significance, then we can talk of a political myth. On the other hand, Sorel 
does not deeply investigate the psychological implications of such a view: for the 
point he wanted to make in the Reflections, some scattered references to Bergson 
were enough. And this is the reason why the psychological theory of the two selves 
to which he refers remains inadequate to support his analysis of the role that is 
played by those complexes of images that constitute a political myth.
Despite the dualistic view o f the human mind implicit in the theory of the 
two selves, his own analysis of political myth in fact goes well beyond such a view. 
Sorel’s explicit conception, and even less what he actually does when dealing with 
the myth of the general strike, cannot be grasped through a dualistic approach. 
Gramsci points to this when he criticises Croce’s interpretation of Sorel. Croce 
himself thought of myth as the product of a sphere of human mind - i.e. the sphere of 
passions - which is impenetrable by rationality and for this reason he sustained that 
Sorel, by rationally discussing the myth of the general strike, dissolves it (Gramsci 
1975, II, Quademo 10, 41). To this view, Gramsci replies that only such an 
intellectualistic and idealistic approach as that of Croce could have assumed this. In 
Gramsci’s view, the myth of the general strike is neither a mere piece of paper (una 
cosa di carta) that could be dissipated by some doctrinarian pages, neither the 
expression of a set of passions impenetrable by rational discussion (Gramsci 1975, II, 
Quademo 10,41). Why, one could argue following this line of reasoning, should we 
assume that reason has not its own passions and that vice-versa passions cannot be 
reasonable? Why should the passions disappear when rational considerations come 
in? Any dichotomy o f “passions versus reason” reveals its serious limitations here. 
What Sorel does whilst discussing the myth of the general strike is no different from 
what we all do when reflecting upon a future course of actions: to consider its 
correspondence to our own views, values and passions, without it being possible to 
separate between all these components. Far from dissolving myth, by discussing its 
correspondence to Marxism, Sorel reinforces it: he shows what is implicit in this 
narrative, the morals of the story, and thereby he reinforces the belief in it and thus 
the determination to act correspondingly.
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A more elaborated theoretical framework for a theory of political myth can 
be found in Spinoza’s thinking. Whereas, most early modem political philosophy 
neglected or marginalised the role o f political myth, a fully developed theory of 
political imagination can instead be found in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologicus- 
politicus (1670). As Pierre Francois M oreau recently pointed out, to witness such a 
detailed analysis o f the symbolic conditions of the existence of a polity and such an 
emphasis on the logic of adhesion and identity we would have to wait for the 
twentieth century, with Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas (Moreau 1994:495).
Now maybe we do not have to wait until Arendt, since sociology, for 
instance, from its very beginning has largely dealt with such phenomena144; but 
Moreau rightly points to the fact that Spinoza does constitute an anomaly within 
modem political theory: not only for his radical theory of democracy but in particular 
because, in contrast to other modem philosophers, he goes as far as to deeply 
investigate the symbolic conditions for the conservation of political power. In the 
fifth chapter o f the Tractatus Spinoza clearly states that all kinds of state laws must 
be instituted in such a way that human beings are bound not by fear (metu) but by 
hope in something that they desire in a particular way (spe alicuius boni, quod 
maxime cupiunt).145 Spinoza’s theory o f political imagination can be considered as a 
reflection on the problem of how such a hope can be socially created.
To this end, Spinoza analyses the role that prophecy played in the creation 
and conservation of the ancient state o f Israel. The approach that Spinoza adopts 
though in this analysis is not theological, but theological-political, or, to put it in 
more contemporary terms, “sociological”. Spinoza is not interested in defending the 
truth of the Jews’ prophecy, but in analysing the role that it played within society. 
Thus, as it has been argued, from this point of view Spinoza inaugurates the modem 
study of religion (Preus 1989: 72).146 From the very outset, Spinoza describes the 
method that he employs in the interpretation of the Scriptures on the basis of two 
premises. The first can be described as a shift from an approach to the truth of the
144 One just has to think of Dürkheim whose analysis of the role of religion on primitive society has many 
points of contact with Spinoza’s. On the other hand, also the romantic theories of the polity focus on these 
kinds of problems.
145 See Spinoza 1670, V, 20. There are many places in the Tractatus where Spinoza makes a similar point. 
Here the critique seems to be directed towards Hobbes.
146 On this point see for instance Preus 1989: 72; Lang 1989: 296. Lang argues that the theory of 
interpretation of the Tractatus is an anticipation of the modernist turn towards a politics of interpretation.
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text to one focused on its meaning, and the second as the recognition of the 
contingency of meaning, i.e. o f the fact that meaning is contingent because the text is 
contingent (Lang 1989: 328ff).
Firstly, Spinoza explicitly states that, in the interpretation of the Bible - and 
by implication of any text - we are in the first instance “at work not on the truth o f 
passages, but only on their meanings” (Spinoza 1670, VII 100-101; XII 17-171 and 
163). Two extremes must thus be avoided when interpreting the scripture: on the one 
hand that of the “dogmatists”, those rationalists or philosophical allegorists, who, in 
order to save the truth of the text, attribute to the prophets what they never even 
dreamed of; and, on the other hand that of the of the sceptics, i.e. those literalist 
interpreters who force us to accept as divine utterances all the possible prejudices of 
the ancient vulgi (Spinoza 1670: XV, 190/180).147 Both these interpreters, according 
to Spinoza, are concerned more with the truth of the text that with their meaning and 
they fail to understand the contingent character of meaning. God, though, does not 
have a style, Spinoza repeats in many places, and therefore all differences and 
incongruities of the Scripture cannot but be attributed to the contingency of the 
context in which the texts have been written. But since meaning cannot be separated 
from use, and thus from its context, then meaning itself must be contingent.
Meaning, in Spinoza’s view, is contingent because it is determined by the 
use of a word. This view leads Spinoza as far as to say that the Scriptures can be said 
to be “sacred” only in as far as they are designed to promote piety, and continues to 
be sacred only as long as it is “religiously used”. As we read in a passage that could 
have been written by Wittgenstein:
“Words have a certain meaning only on the basis o f a certain use 
(verba ex solo usu certam habent significationem), and if they are 
arranged, according to their use, in such a way as to move those who read 
them to devotion, they will become sacred, and the book so written will be 
also sacred. But if their usage afterwards dies out so that words have no 
meaning, or the book becomes utterly neglected, whether from unworthy 
motives, or because it is no longer needed, then the words and the book 
will loose both their use and their sanctity” (Spinoza 1670: XII, 20).
According to Lang, Spinoza not only argues that interpretation presupposes or implies a political framework, 
but even that interpretation is itself a politics. For our purposes it is not necessary to go as far as this.
147 The similarities between Spinoza’s criticism of the literalist and dogmatist as interpreters and Vico’s 
criticism of the "two conceits” have been noted: that of nations who pretend that their own myths are literally 
true corresponding to the form, and that of scholars who maintain that what they know is as old as the world, 
i.e. that the rationality with which they now apprehend the world was shared from the very beginning (Preus 
1989). On Vico’s two conceits see Chapter 5.
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Spinoza’s analysis o f  the role o f prophecy for the ancient Hebrews is thus 
the occasion for a more general reflection the social nature of meaning. Spinoza, who 
was excluded from the Jewish Community in Amsterdam, could largely work free 
from those ordinary constraints that in Europe of the time determined popular as well 
as scholarly perspectives on religion. He does not have to bear the apologetic burden 
to save the religious meaning of the text he studies or of the people that have 
produced them (Preus 1989: 72). This puts him in the condition to be able to adopt a 
genuinely critical approach towards the texts so that many authors have seen in his 
analysis the origins of modem critical theory (Norris 1991, Hippier 2000).
Biblical prophecy, according to Spinoza does not derive, as Maimonides 
sustained, from a particular kind of knowledge. Prophecies are not the result of a 
divine revelation since no divine revelation, as traditionally understood, exists: God 
does not have a particular style and He adapts himself to the particular circumstances 
of the linguistic and historical context in which prophets live. Thus, their obscure, 
enigmatic and figurative character derives not from God, but from the vivid 
imagination o f the prophets. As a consequence, in order to prophesise one must not 
have a more perfect mind, but a more vivid imagination (ad prophetizandum non 
esse opus perfectiore mente, sed vividiore imaginatione) (Spinoza 1670:1, 25).
On the other hand, as has been recently pointed out, imagination, in 
Spinoza’s view, is not “imaginary”, i.e. false (Hippier 2000: 97). Imagination, 
according to his Ethics, is simply a set of ideas produced on the basis of present or 
past bodily impressions and as such it is not necessarily false. In its turn, an idea is a 
“concept of the mind” (Ethics II, def. IE) and the mind is nothing other than an 
expression of the body -  the body that is felt and thought (Ethics II, prop. 13). As is 
well known, the mind and the body are in Spinoza’s view simply two attributes of 
Gods, i.e. the ways in which God, the unique substance, is given to us. Furthermore, 
according to Spinoza, the structure of the two attributes is parallel: “the order and 
connection of ideas is at the same time the order and connection of things” (Ethics II, 
prop.7)148.
148 As it is well known, the polemical objective of this conception is Descartes’s radical dualism of the res 
cogitans and res extensa. It would be interesting to further investigate the link between Spinoza’s radical 
monism and his conception of political imagination: prima facie there seems to be a strict link between his 
ontology and his denial of the purely “imaginary” character of imagination.
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The parallelism between body and mind, or extension and thinking, does not 
mean though that all ideas are adequate. Quite on the contrary, what characterises 
imagination is precisely its inadequacy: imagination, in Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge, is in fact only the first level of knowledge. Nevertheless, even if these 
ideas are not yet adequate, since it is only through intellectual knowledge that 
adequate ideas can be obtained, they are not necessarily false, because a mind has 
false ideas only in as far as it considers these bodily perceptions to be adequate ideas 
when they are not (Ethics, II, 24, 27-31). Thus, if imagination cannot be considered 
as adequate knowledge, it nonetheless plays an extremely important role in the 
sphere of praxis.
As Spinoza points out, prophetic imagination concerns the practice of life 
and virtue and the authority of the prophets is based on this moral role (Spinoza 
1670: II, 30). As he openly states, the certitude stemming from biblical prophecy is a 
moral one: “the certitude deriving from the sign in the prophets was not 
mathematical, i.e. it was not the certitude that derives from the necessity of the 
perception of an object, but rather moraF (Spinoza 1670: II, 32, 10). Spinoza repeats 
in many places that the intent o f the scripture is mainly a moral one and the certitude 
of the prophets derives from the fact that “their mind was totally given to what was 
right and wrong” (Spinoza 1670: III, 31, 30).
It has been sustained that since, for Spinoza, the categories of good and right 
do not exist outside of a political community, one can conclude that prophecy is valid 
because the prophet belongs to a community whose laws and rules he precisely 
embodies (Hippier 2000: 99). Thus, the social function of prophecy is to recall these 
norms in the memories of the members of society. But if the prophets can be 
prophets only in the community whose norms they embody and if, on the other hand, 
the aim of prophecy is precisely to strengthen the community’s adhesion to those 
same values, then the prophets and the community are products of each other, i.e. 
they have a purely circular relationship (Hippier 2000:100).
A similar interpretation of this point that seems to suggest, on the other 
hand, a way out of this circularity has been put forward by Michael A. Rosenthal. In 
his view, Spinoza chooses the example of the Hebrews because the analysis of the 
role of prophetic language enables him to make a general point about the way in 
which an appeal to an imaginative narrative example contributes to justifying a
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particular set o f institutions: when the prophets called the Hebrews “the chosen 
people” they were performing a function essential to any society, i.e. they were using 
imagination to transcend individual interests and to create a common standard o f 
judgements and behaviour (Rosenthal 1997).
The concept that enables making this passage is that of the exemplar o f 
human nature, a concept which is developed by Spinoza in the fourth part of the 
Ethics (Rosenthal 1997: 247). Here Spinoza defines “good” and “bad” from the point 
of view of utility: “By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful 
to us” and “by evil I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from being 
masters of some good” (Ethics IV, d.1, d.2). Clearly the problem arises of how to 
determine this utility because what is useful for one person at any given time and 
place may not be to another. So if the value terms “good” and “bad” are to mean 
something more than the mere subjective utility of an individual, then it is necessary 
to find a basis for transcending the particular judgement of the individual; this is the 
purpose of the concept of the “exemplar o f human nature”.
Thus after the above mentioned definitions of good and bad, Spinoza points 
the reader back to the preface of the fourth part of the Ethics where he says “I shall 
understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach 
nearer and nearer to the model (exemplar) of human nature that we set before 
ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that 
model.” Spinoza then further explains that exemplars, thus defined, serve as a bridge 
from subjective to objective judgement because they are formed not on the basis of 
an individual judgement, but on the basis o f  a universal idea (Ethics, IV, Pref.).
What is a “universal idea” according to Spinoza? As Rosenthal points out, 
according to Spinoza so-called “universal ideas” are not “adequate ideas”, i.e. the 
clear and distinct foundations of reason, but they are rather inadequate ideas, 
incomplete and confused images of the world. Spinoza distinguishes between 
“common notions” which are the foundations of our reasoning, on the one hand, and 
notions that derive from other causes and are therefore ill-founded, on the other 
(Ethics II, pr.40). Despite their names, “these notions are not formed by all [human 
beings] in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance with what the 
body has more often been affected by, and what the imagination recollects more 
easity” (Ethics II, pr.50). Thus universal ideas can also be characterised as the
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notions “we are accustomed to feign” (Ethics IV, pref.) and should therefore be 
called “beings of imagination” rather that “beings of reason” (Ethics I, appendix).
Spinoza’s notion of the exemplars of human nature cannot but recall Vico’s 
concept of “imaginative universals”. In both cases we have certain constructs of the 
imagination that far from being simply individual creatures aspire to be universal in 
their nature. In both cases we have universal beings o f imaginations. It is precisely 
due to this “universality” that they can serve to mediate between individual and 
universal judgements. In turn, this conception of imaginative universals cannot but 
recall Aristotle’s conception of myth as developed in the so-called Poetics. As we 
have seen, mythoi, according to Aristotle, are superior to history precisely because 
whereas this latter tells things as they happened, mythoi tell them as they could have 
happened and for this reason they contain a more universal truth.149 This, in 
Aristotle’s view, is the “universality” of the knowledge of different human 
characters, or, to put it in Spinoza’s terms, the knowledge of the different “exemplars 
o f human nature”.
Whereas Vico, by historicizing his analysis of the role of imaginative 
universals and attributing it to the childhood of humankind, limits his theory of 
imaginative universals to a certain historical phase o f humankind,150 Spinoza, like 
Aristotle, considered the power of imagination to create order as a normal feature of 
human beings at any time and in any society. This is the reason why Spinoza’s 
analysis of the role played by imagination in prophecy can become the basis for a 
more general theory of political imagination. The example of Jewish prophecy is the 
basis for constructing a whole theory of political myth: a theory that consents both to 
reconstruct the role that myth plays in politics but also to set the limits for the 
legitimacy of its use. Instead of labelling political myth as a form of “regression” or 
“progress”, Spinoza’s elaborate theory provided the means for analysing the 
conditions of their use.
The fact that Spinoza understood his analysis of the history of the ancient 
Hebrews as a basis for a more general theory is made patent in the structure of the 
Tractatus. Indeed the text, after having dealt with all aspects of the constitution of 
the state of Israel, ends with a chapter on the Principles that can be drawn from the
149 See above Chapter 3.
150 For an analysis of Vico’s view of myth see above II, 2. On the possible influence of Spinoza on Vico as 
well as on the difference between the two see Preus 1989.
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Hebrews* history followed by another two chapters devoted to showing, on the basis 
of that example, that freedom of thought and speech does not harm the state but is 
instead fundamental to its survival (Spinoza 1670, XIX, XX). From the very preface 
to the text Spinoza clearly states that the aim of the Tractatus is precisely to argue for 
the freedom o f thinking and speech: Spinoza’s main argument is indeed that, if all 
societies are in a sense imaginary, where imagination implies an inferior and still 
confused kind of knowledge, what they differ in is the degree to which this 
imagination is subject to critical scrutiny. Thus despite the fact that most of the 
people live at the level of imagination, the state should guarantee the possibility to 
those who can to elevate themselves to higher levels of knowledge and exercise a 
critical function (Spinoza 1670, pref, XIX, XX). What Spinoza actually does in his 
critique of the sacred scriptures is precisely this.
In doing so, Spinoza wanted to make a general point about the role of 
political imagination, but the reason why he chooses the Hebrews is also linked to 
the particular circumstances in which he wrote. It has been shown that the 
seventeenth century Dutch saw themselves in the light o f three important sets of 
narratives or myths: their heroic struggle against the Spanish, the story of the 
Batvians depicted in the writings of Tacitus (and other Roman historians) and drawn 
upon by Grotius (among others) and, finally, the story o f the ancient Israelites 
(Rosenthal 1997: 267). It is in reference to this latter founding myth that Spinoza 
chooses the Hebrews: his contemporary Dutch Calvinists had spread the belief that 
their nation was chosen to endure and triumph over their travail in order to maintain 
a certain political order. Spinoza’s use o f the ancient Israelites is meant to be the 
basis for analysing and setting the limits to the legitimate use o f such political myths.
Let us develop this point by going back to the analysis of Jewish prophecy. 
According to Spinoza’s reconstruction, after the exit from Egypt the people of Israel 
had fallen again into a pure state of nature, because having left the laws of the Egypt 
to which they had been subjected hitherto they had not yet been able to build other 
laws. In this context, Moses had called the Hebrews “chosen” and has used the idea 
of the covenant with God as a means o f morally inciting his people to subject 
themselves to a lawful condition. This use made by Moses was, according to 
Spinoza, legitimate because the Hebrews were by that time a lawless band of people 
cast out into the desert, and Moses, in order to give them a law, had to place their
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particular experience into a framework of a divine plane in which they played a 
special role.
People listened to prophecy because it provided them with a consistent set 
of expectations about the results of their action. The recourse to prophecy was thus 
necessary because the Israelites in that situation were not able to otherwise perceive 
the necessity of a polity. So, Spinoza observes “if any one wishes to persuade his 
fellows for or against anything which is not self evident, he must deduce his 
contention from their admission, and convince them either by experience or by 
ratiocination [....] But the deduction of conclusion from general a priori truth, usually 
requires a long chain of arguments, and moreover very great caution, acuteness, and 
self-restraint -  qualities which are not often met with; therefore people prefer to be 
taught by experience rather that deduce their conclusion from a few axioms. Whence 
it follows that if anyone wishes to teach a doctrine to a whole nation (not to speak of 
the whole human race), and to be understood by all men in every particular, he will 
seek to support his teaching with experience and will endeavour to suit his reasoning 
and the definition of his doctrines as far as possible to the understanding of the 
common people, who form the majority of mankind” (Spinoza 1670, V, 70). Thus, 
given that only the learned can elevate themselves to intellectual knowledge, 
whoever wants to communicate to a whole nation has to have recourse to 
imagination.
This does not mean that these histories are necessarily false: on the contrary 
the reference to imagination as a way to “teach by experience” leaves open the issue 
of the truth of these images. Spinoza also explicitly admits the possibility that the 
content of such stories is true: the only point is that only s/he who can reach the level 
of intellectual knowledge will also have a concept of them as “clarum et distinctum” 
(Spinoza 1670, V78). The Scriptures, whose true moral content, according to 
Spinoza can be summarised in very few principles, were written for an entire people 
and therefore had to communicate through stories appealing to people’s imagination. 
On the other hand, those very few principles could also be grasped with the lumine 
naturali\ this, in his view is reserved for the learned few. This, Spinoza explicitly 
argues, is the sense of the histories of the Bible: to inspire devotion and obedience
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(Spinoza 1670, V, 78 ff)151. As a consequence the populace (vulgus) must not know 
all the stories of the bible, but only the stories “that can move their mind to 
obedience and devotion in the strongest way (quae maxime eorum animos ad 
obedientiam et devotionem movere possunt)” (Spinoza 1670, V, 79). In the case of 
the Hebrews cast out in the desert, among those histories were the prophetic histories 
of their “chosenness”.
Biblical prophecy therefore played a double role for the Hebrews in the 
particular situation in which they found themselves. First, like all the other stories 
from the Bible, they transmitted a moral message. Second, the story o f their 
“chosenness”, by addressing their particular needs, contributes to grounding -  again 
in the sense of begründen - the specificity of their polity: theocracy. The biblical 
prophecy by recalling to the Hebrews their covenant with God made respecting the 
law appears necessary.
In this sense, it does not differ from other political myths to which Spinoza 
refers. Among them, he quotes for instance the Roman foundation myth: all the 
kings, Spinoza observes, that have usurped the power have always tried to make the 
people believe that they had divine origins: only if the people could think that these 
rulers were Gods could they have borne their government. This is the reason why 
August let the Romans believe that he was Aeneas* descendent (Spinoza 1670: 
XVIII, 204). Thus, the prophecy is only one of the possible ways in which “to 
arrange laws so that people are kept in bounds by the hope of some greatly-desired 
good, rather than by fear, for then everyone will do his duty willingly” (Spinoza 
1670, V, 74).
To this end, Moses also introduced the ceremonial laws. After having 
analysed the use made by Moses of prophecy, Spinoza observes:
“ Lastly in order that the people which could not govern itself be 
entirely dependent on its ruler, he left nothing to the free choice of 
individuals (who had hitherto been slaves); the people could do nothing but 
remember the law and follow the ordinances laid down at the good pleasure 
of their rulers; they were not allowed to plough, to sow, to reap, nor even to 
eat This, then, was the object of ceremonial law: that men should do 
nothing of their own free will, but should always act under external authority, 
and should continually confess by their actions and thoughts that they were
151 It should be noted that Spinoza in order to assert that the Scripture teaches certain principles through the 
narrations of histories he uses the expression “Atque heac Scriptura sola experientia comprobat, nempe his 
quas narrat, historis”, i.e. these things are proved by the Scripture only through experience, that is through 
the stories that they tell.
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not their own masters, but were entirely under control of others” (Spinoza 
1670, V, 76).
Thus for Spinoza, like for Cassirer, political myths are also accompanied by 
specific rituals. The function of rituals is to continually recall to the mind of the 
people their obedience to the laws. This role is not though a prerogative of the 
Hebrews’ ceremonies. A few paragraphs later, Spinoza analyses the similar role plaid 
by Christian ceremonies. With a passage worthy of Malinowski he wrote:
“As for the Christians rites, such as baptism, the Lord’s supper, 
festivals, public prayers and any other observances which are, and always have 
been common to all Christendom, if they were instituted by Christ or his 
apostles (which is open to doubts) they were instituted as external signs of the 
universal church, and not as having anything to do with blessedness, or 
possessing any sanctity in themselves: even though these ceremonies were not 
intentionally ordained for the sake of upholding a government, they were 
ordained fo r  the preservation o f the society, and in fact he who lives alone is 
not bound by them” (Spinoza 1670, V, 76, emphasis mine).
Thus, Christian ceremonies too had nothing sacred in themselves, but they 
rather played a specific social function: to remember obedience to the law. In the 
case of the Hebrews, a people used to serfdom and that was again thrown into a state 
of nature, the ceremonial laws prescribed took a particularly detailed and alienated 
form: they had the function of remembering the subjugation to God’s law and had 
therefore to work in such a way that in their everyday life Hebrews would 
continually confess that they “were not their own masters, but were entirely under 
the control of others”.
Furthermore, Spinoza observed, all these rituals serve not only to recall in 
the people’s mind their obedience to the law, but also to separate the Jews from other 
peoples (Spinoza 1670, III, 56). In particular, all these meticulous external rituals, 
that are different from that of other nations, kept Jews separated from all others. 
Among those rituals, circumcision, by writing the covenant with God on the body, 
played a crucial role so that, Spinoza observes, circumcision alone would be 
sufficient for explaining how the Jews survived as a nation through the centuries 
notwithstanding the destruction o f their state (Spinoza 1670, V, 57). According to 
Spinoza, “the sign of circumcision is so important that [...] it would alone preserve 
their nation for ever. Nay, I would go so far as to believe that if the foundation of
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their religion had not emasculated their minds they may even, if occasion offers, so 
changeable are human affairs, they would raise up their state again and God may a 
second time elect them” (Spinoza 1670, V, 57).
By writing the obedience in their own bodies, circumcision is thus the 
strongest means for political discipline.152 The parallelism between the order of idea 
and that of things takes here the form o f a sign in the body. The importance of the 
exterior or bodily sign is also confirmed by the reference to the Chinese that, 
according to Spinoza, by means of a distinctive mark on their head, which they most 
scrupulously observe, keep themselves apart from  everyone else so that they 
preserved their unity even when they had no empire (Spinoza 1670, HI, 57).
The reference to the Hebrews’ history thus serves to draw the limits of the 
legitimate recourse to political myths and rituals. As for political rituals, we have 
seen that, according to Spinoza, the extremely strict ceremonial prescriptions that 
Moses gave to his people are justified only on the basis of the contingent situation in 
which the people of Israel was: a people cast in the desert after many years of 
serfdom. The institution of ceremonies served then to recall obedience to God’s laws 
in every single act of their life for a people that, having just come out of serfdom, 
could not think of themselves. But in no way must these ceremonies be considered as 
possessing any sanctity in themselves (Spinoza 1670: V, 76). Rather, we can assume 
that in a polity formed by people not used to serfdom, political rituals - however 
necessary - must not takes such meticulous and alienating form.
In a similar vein are the contours drawn for a legitimate use of political 
myth. Again the history of the Hebrews -  as retold by Spinoza - works as an 
exemplar. After the death of Moses, Spinoza says, the Hebrews’ theocracy 
degenerated into superstition and this finally led to its defeat. In his view, this is due 
to the fact that whilst Moses used the prophecy as a means of morally inciting his 
people, but never confused the laws of the Hebrew theocracy with the eternal laws of 
nature, the priests that followed him interpreted the “laws of right conduct” as “laws 
of nature”. Thus whereas Moses always showed that he was aware of the 
epistemological limits of prophetic foundation in the way he organised its 
constitution, i.e. by separating the powers of political authority, whom he charged
152 Suggestions on the similarities between Spinoza’s and Foucault’s thinking can again be found in Hippier 
2000. In particular, though, it would be helpfiil to examine this passage in light of Foucault’s idea of 
biopower -  a task that to my knowledge has not yet been done.
with administering the laws, from those of the priestly caste, charged with 
interpreting them, the priest abused o f their authorities and claimed the right to 
interpret and enforce the laws directly (Rosenthal 1997: 259).
In fact, as we have seen, the role of prophecy was that o f an exemplar, i.e. of 
a “universal idea* that serves to mediate between subjective and objective 
judgements. Its aim is to teach knowledge about the right conduct, not to assert the 
truth about nature itself. When the beings of imagination are taken as true laws of 
nature, according to Spinoza, they tum into superstition. The epistemological and 
practical status of an exemplar is that o f a human construct that serves to compare 
things and their relative values and to promote emulation, but although they claim to 
represent the ideal or model of all things of a certain kind, they might in fact 
represent only a particular image or series of images blurred together. There is no 
guarantee that they constitute an adequate knowledge.
Therefore to take them as bearers of an absolute truth such as that entailed, 
according to Spinoza, by the knowledge of the laws of nature is to fall into 
superstition. Political myths must be recognised in their plurality, the plurality, in 
Spinoza’s terms, that derives from the fact that the universality of exemplars of 
human nature is the universality of what we are accustomed to feign. If we fail to 
recognise this, and take political myths as laws of nature, then they tum into 
superstition.
Thus, in Spinoza’s analysis of the Hebrews’ history we find the basis for a 
whole theory of political myth. In his view, even if imagination is not an adequate 
kind of knowledge, such as that that can be reached by the intellect, it is on the other 
hand not necessarily false: it turns into falsehood, or superstition, only when it is 
taken beyond its limits. On the other hand, as we have seen, according to Spinoza, 
imagination, as a set of bodily determined ideas, is necessarily passive. In his view, it 
is only at the level of intellectual knowledge that autonomy, and thus real morality, 
can be reached.
Spinoza had a stoic view of morality and he therefore identified morality 
with rationality. All the same, as we will see, it is possible to question such a 
completely passive view of imagination. As Castoriadis has pointed out, together 
with a repetitive, bodily and socially determined imagination, there is also a radical 
or primary imagination that explains the possibility, even within a disciplinary
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society, of a radical political imaginary (Castoriadis 1975). The next step consists in 
drawing some conclusions from the above discussion of the main theories of political 
myth, by spelling out what a political myth is and the place that it occupies within the 
social imaginary.
9. POLITICAL MYTH, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
Following the above discussion of the classical theories o f political myth we 
can now attempt to draw some conclusions as to what a political myth is and how it 
works within the social-historical. In the first place, all the authors we have been 
analysing stress the narrative dimension of myth. Cassirer stresses its being a 
narrative that by connecting past, present and future events posits itself as prophetic: 
the “myth of the twentieth century"’ is the myth of a superior race, the Aryan one, 
which, precisely on the basis o f  the narrative of its glorious origins, is presented as 
deemed to rule the world. Sorel also points to the narrative dimension of political 
myth: it is thanks to this dimension that people involved in big social movements can 
represent their upcoming action as part of a sequence of events that assures the 
triumph of their cause. Finally Spinoza too, who deals with political myth using the 
Jewish prophecy as an exemplar, stresses the narrative dimension that is implicit in 
the idea of “chosenness”, i.e. in the story of the covenant between God and the 
Hebrews that is the foundation of Jewish theocracy. In this latter case we have a 
narrative dimension that encompasses past, present and future; the biblical prophecy 
looks at the past, since the aim o f this prophecy is to recall the terms of the Covenant 
with God, and only on this basis it looks at the future and can predict the salvation of 
all peoples on earth through the “elected people”, Israel.153
If all these authors point to the narrative dimension they also stress that 
there is something more at stake in a political myth. For instance, they all make 
reference to “prophecy”, however differently understood: as foreseeing the future 
(Cassirer), as prevision of catastrophe (Sorel) or as a reminder o f a past covenant 
(Spinoza). In other words, they all stressed that the narrative that constitutes a 
political myth also grounds -  in the sense of begründen - the conditions in which the
153 See for instance Jeremy 31,31.
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human beings that believe in these myths are. Following Blumenberg, we have called 
this dimension Bedeutsamkeit, significance. Myth is a narrative that answers a need 
for significance.
The reference to the idea of “prophecy” should not however be misleading. 
If it is true that political myths are in a sense prophecy, it must also be added that 
they can be secular prophecies. Myth, we have seen, does not coincide with religion: 
significant is not simply that which possesses a meaning, but neither is it necessarily 
that which explains the meaning of life in general: something that is significant is 
something that situates itself between the two extremes of a simple meaning and the 
meaning of life and death.
This also clarifies the particularistic nature of myth and thus the reason why 
all these authors have dealt with singular political myths. What makes a political 
myth out of a simple narrative is the fact that the working on this narrative can in a 
certain context and for certain subjects come to coagulate and produce significance. 
Significance is thus always particularistic in the sense that what is significant for me 
here and now is not necessarily so in another context. At the same time the sphere of 
significance always refers to some possibility that what is significant for me here and 
now can also be recognised as significant by somebody else sharing the same 
conditions.
Spinoza points to this when he states that prophecy conveys exemplars of 
human nature. As we have seen, though, these latter are “universal ideas”, i.e. they 
are not necessarily adequate ideas, since the universality at stake here is that of a 
“being of imagination” and, therefore, the simple universality of “what we are 
accustomed to feign”. In other words it is not an absolute universal, but a relative 
one, and precisely a universal relative to the conditions in which these beings of the 
imagination are created.
This leads us to a crucial point. Political myths are always told from the 
standpoint of the present (Tudor 1972), and it is precisely for this reason that political 
myths are best defined in terms of a continual process of “working on myth”: it is in 
light of the continual change in the present conditions that human beings are 
impelled to go back to their political myths, revise them in the light of the new needs 
and exigencies through their reception or, when this is not possible, dismiss them.
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Thus, to sum up, a political myth can be defined as the working on a 
common narrative by which the members of a social group (or society) make 
significanceI54of their political experience and deeds. Thus what makes out of a 
simple narrative a political myth is not its content or its claim to truth (Lincoln 1989, 
Flood 1996), but rather the fact that this narrative creates significance, that it is 
shared by a group and that it affects the specifically political conditions in which this 
group operates.
The working of political myth unfolds thus in a dimension, that of the 
articulation and creation of significance (Bedeutsamkeit), that escapes any sharp 
contraposition between cognitive, practical and aesthetical spheres. A political myth 
can have at the same time a cognitive, practical and an aesthetical dimension, without 
it being possible to clearly distinguish between them in practice.
As Flood has also pointed out, political myths provide fundamental 
cognitive schemata for mapping the social world: it is by reducing the complexity o f 
social life to the relative simplicity of its narrative plot, that a comprehension of the 
multifaceted character of experience is possible (Flood 1996). This, in its turn, points 
to the practical dimension of myth, as it has been underlined by Sorel: people 
involved in social action need to represent their upcoming action in the form of a 
narrative or sequence of events that assures the triumph or their cause. As we have 
seen, a narrative of events does not simply imply a temporal sequence of what comes 
into being, but also a configurational dimension, or a plot, which construes a 
significant whole out of scattered events. This leads to the aesthetical dimension 
myth or, as Tudor has put it, to the fact that political myths are narratives of events 
cast in a dramatic form (Tudor 1972). It is in the articulation of a drama that the 
pathos of political myth emerges (Lincoln 1989). This, though, cannot be separated 
from the other dimensions: thinking too, not only acting, can have its pathos.
Thus, going back to our previous examples, one can conclude that the myth 
of the Aryan race, the general strike and the Jewish prophecy, they all are political 
myths because they are all shared narratives that answer a need for significance, and 
they are political because the significance that is here at stake is that of political 
conditions and actions.
154 To “make significance” does not simply mean to “make sense”, but must be understood in the sense 
elucidated in Chapter 6.
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This does not mean that a myth can only be political if its content is 
political. According to Tudor, on the contrary, what renders specifically political a 
myth is precisely its subject matter. As we read in his Political myth, just as nature 
myths deal with natural phenomena and religious myths deal with gods and their 
worship, so political myth deals with politics (Tudor 1972: 17). As a consequence, 
according to this view, a political myth is thus “one which tells the story of a political 
society” (Tudor 1972: 138).
Even admitting that it would be possible to stretch the definition of society 
so as to encompass all those groups that produced such myths as the proletarian 
revolution or the Christian millennium that Tudor himself recognises as truly 
political, the problem that emerges within this view is how to determine the contours 
of a political subject. Thus, for example, the Christian myth of the apocalypse to 
which Tudor himself devotes great attention was not political per se. There is nothing 
specifically political in the claim that the world is transitory, that it was created by 
God and will in the fullest o f time be destroyed. And in fact such an idea has not 
generated political myth at all times and epochs. It is only when inserted in particular 
contexts that they generate powerful political myths - the accurate analysis by Tudor 
of the myth o f the millennium being a case in point.
Thus what renders specifically political a myth is not an already political 
content of the story it tells, but rather the fact that the story it tells comes to “make 
significance” for a certain social group or society of the specifically political 
conditions, where by political conditions I mean the conditions concerning the 
struggle for the distribution o f power and resources that can, as last resort, have 
recourse to physical force.155
It becomes clear here that in order to catch the specifically political 
connotation of a myth one must look at the whole “working on myth”. As more 
recent theories o f political myth such as that elaborated by Flood have pointed out, in 
dealing with political myth it is not only at the production of myth that we must look, 
but also, and foremost, at its reception (Flood 1996: 7; III; IV). It is the way in which 
a story works within a given context, the way in which it is received, i.e. whether it
155 This is quite a widespread definition of politics. See, in particular, Weber’s Politik als Beruf (Weber 
1919b) and the beginning of the fourth book of his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Weber 1922). As it will 
emerge particularly in Part IV, precisely by analysing the working of political myth one is however led to 
rethink this definition of politics.
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can or cannot make significance and then affect the political conditions that 
determines whether it is a political myth or not.156
Political myths are not, to use Gramsci’s expression, “cose di carte”. If we 
want to reconstruct the working of a political myth, it is not under the dust of our 
libraries that we have to look. The working of a political myth cannot be perceived 
by simply looking at the stories that are deposited in books and archives. The 
working on myth is a process that can take place in most different settings: speeches, 
icons, arts, both visual and not, rituals and almost all other kind of social practices.
Indeed, the possible sites for the working of political myth can hardly be 
enumerated.157 We can only point here to the pervasiveness of the working on myth. 
All activities and practises can become vehicles of political myths as far as they can 
incarnate a narrative dimension that encounters the need for Bedeutsamkeit. Any 
kind of social activity can host the working on those particular kinds of narratives 
that Blumenberg called “mythologems” in order to stress the fact that it is implicit in 
the concept of myth in general and, we can add, of political myth in particular, that 
there can be variants of it.
Myth thus can be learned either as stories apprehended once and for all, but 
also, and more often, through a more or less conscious cumulative exposure. This 
also elucidates the “condensational power” of political myths, i.e. their capacity to 
condensate in few images or “icons” (Flood 1996): by means of a synecdoche any 
object or gesture -  a painting, an image, a song, a film, an advertisement, a gesture, 
etc. -  can thus recall the whole working on myth that lies behind it.
This pervasiveness of myths, on the one hand, explains the difficulty o f 
scientifically analysing them and, therefore, the relative discredit pending on this 
topic. It, on the other hand, has led many authors to conflate myth with other forms 
of human expressions and social practises. As we have seen for instance, Cassirer 
considered myth as a whole form of life encompassing most different phenomena 
such as totemism, religion, and rituals. However, a distinction must be drawn
156 Tudor also seems to get close to arguing this when he states that “a myth is always told from the 
standpoint of the present” and this carries the implications that as the circumstances in which human beings 
find themselves change so they reconstruct their myth (Tudor 1972: 21, 125), but he does not finally include 
this feature in his definition of political myth. This perhaps depends on the fact that he conceived his 
Political Myth more as an introduction to the different approaches to political myth rather that as a systematic 
attempt to construct a theory of political myth.
157 Some suggestions on the possible sites for the working of myth in contemporary societies can be found in 
Chapter 12.
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between what is a political myth and what can be the site for the working of a 
political myth.
In the first place, as we have seen, one must analytically distinguish 
between political myths and rituals. In everyday life, they are often associated since 
it is also through rituals that the working on political myth can take place. This does 
not only hold true for the so-called “primitive societies” or “forms of life”-  to which 
the so-called ritualistic theory of myth devoted most of its attention (Tudor 1972: I, 
IV). For instance, an imporant body of rituals such as national festivals, 
commemorations of the crucial events of the national history, etc. accompany most 
national foundational myths. Most national days, from the American 4th of July to the 
French 14th of July, are examples of political rituals that are connected with political 
myths such as the American myth of the Independence and the myth of the French 
revolution.158
But as Tudor observes by criticising the ritualistic theories of myth, not all 
political myths are accompanied by any significant body of rituals (for example the 
myth of the Norman Yoke), as well as many political rituals, such as inauguration 
ceremonies, are not directly connected with any myth (Tudor 1972: 30). The point to 
be stressed here is that, as we have seen earlier on, myth and rituals can work within 
the social historical through two different modalities. The “ritual” expresses itself 
through fixed rules and is effective only as far as these rules are kept unchanged. On 
the contrary a myth, and in particular a political myth, expresses itself through 
variants; if a political myth is always told from the standpoint of the present and it in 
the present political conditions that it must provide significance, than it follows that 
only in so far as it is possible to go back to it and transform it according to the 
changing circumstances and needs it can be effective. In the last analysis, political 
rituals must remain unchanged in order to promote social cohesion, whereas political 
myths, having to begründen always-changing present conditions, must be open to 
change in order to promote the same purpose.
Thus, for example, whereas the ritual celebration o f the 25th of April has 
remained fundamentally unchanged, the corresponding myth of the Italian Resistenza 
against Nazism has changed considerably in the last 50 years (Pavone 1995, Paggi 
1999, Strath 2000). The working around the narrative of the Resistenza has indeed
158 On the link between national days celebrations and political myth, see for instance Thorsen 2000.
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coagulated and provided significance to very different actors and in very different 
contexts. As Pavone observes, the problem in dealing with the Resistenza as an 
historian is that the Resistenza as an historical problem is quite often intermingled 
with the working around the Resistenza as a “civic problem” in general but also as a 
“myth” in particular (Pavone 1995:185).159 The narrative of the Resistenza has not 
only worked as narrative legitimating the new Repubblica Italiana -  as it is signalled 
by the widespread formula “Repubblica nata dalla resistenza”, but it has also worked 
as a narrative that, by operating at the crossroads between memory of the past and 
expectations for the future as embodied by certain of human exemplars, provided 
significance to different generations and in very different contexts.160
Political myths must always be up-to-date, otherwise they cease to be 
political myths and become something else. Political myths are not simple abstract 
models to which to compare existing political conditions. They can also be this, but 
they are never only this. They are always at the same time determinations to act: they 
are narratives that precisely because they answer a need for significance prompt 
people to action. Political myths therefore cannot be falsified: the fact that what they 
contain has not or will not be realised does not diminish their power. As Sorel 
pointed out, political myths must not be judged as astrological almanacs, but rather 
as a means for acting on the present.
This does not mean that they are impermeable to critical discussion. The 
fact that they cannot be falsified by what actually happens does not mean that they 
cannot be rationally discussed. What Sorel, Spinoza and Cassirer do in their theories 
is precisely to critically discuss them. The point is rather that the way in which the 
discussion must be done is not that of their “real or unreal content”, but rather that of 
their appropriateness as means for acting on the present: the moral of story they tell, 
i.e. the values that they purport, on the one hand, and their capacity to create 
significance in those particular conditions, on the other.
This, of course, holds for the pure ideal-typical political myths. In fact, as 
we shall see, the political myths we are more familiar with are often intermingled
159 On the difference between mythical and historical narratives, see Chapter 10.
160 As Pavone observes, the study of the myth of the Resistenza cannot but start from the study of the 
innumerable amounts of tales, novels, films, documentaries, monuments, etc. which in the last fifty years 
have been the privileged sites for the working on the myth of the Resistenza (Pavone 1995). This does not 
mean that there is one single myth of the Resistenza and even less that the narrative of the Resistenza always
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with other kinds of discourses. This is the consequence o f the pervasiveness o f 
political myth. The myth of the Aryan race is, for instance, constructed on the basis 
of scientific findings, which clearly bring to the ground other kinds of considerations 
that call for a different method of judgement: the biological finding upon which it 
rests and its mythical side must be judged with different tools, even if in reality the 
two kinds of discourse are intermingled. Thus even if there is no dichotomy of myth 
versus science such as that from which we departed in this work, there still remains a 
difference between the two that cannot but bring in different kinds of considerations. 
As Spinoza pointed out, the risk, when the two orders of considerations are not kept 
separate, is to fall into superstition: this for instance happened when the moral 
message encompassed in the Jewish prophecy of Israel’s election was taken as a law 
of nature. And this is what he fears would happen if his contemporaries, the Dutch 
Calvinists, interpret the myth of their “chosenness” in those terms.
Analogously, in many national myths, we have a melange of mythical and 
other elements. Clearly the two bring different sorts o f consideration to the ground 
and call for different tools of evaluation.161 The Italian Resistenza or the French 
Revolution are neither pure myths nor pure historical events. They can work as both, 
but we must accordingly analyse them with the most appropriate tools. As we shall 
see, even if there rarely are pure historians, what historians do, and what we expect 
them to do, when they present their historical narratives, is to refer to a method that 
asks them to base their narratives on documents and testimonies, i.e. on other (in 
principle revisable) narratives. The ideal-typical myth-maker, let us submit for the 
moment that there is a pure one, does not refer to other evidences: his capacity to 
address the present conditions is a sufficient condition. The myth-maker wants to 
incite to action, not (only) to accurately reconstruct the past. If  he looks at the past he 
does it with the immediate intent of inciting to future action.
Thus even if some historical narratives, such as the French revolution or the 
Italian Resistenza, work and have been working in certain contexts as political 
myths, there are plenty of historical narratives that are not political myths -  we do 
not even need to make single examples: just take all the narratives that do not 
provide significance for certain subjects in certain moments. Furthermore, there are
works as a myth: as Paggi points out, in order to estabilish whether this narrative is working as a myth or not,
one has to start from specific regional and local contexts (Paggi 1999).
161 On the relationship between myth and historical narratives see Chapter 10.
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also political myths, such as that of the general strike, that - as Sorel points out - are 
all constructed in a future dimension: and this is sufficient, at the ideal-typical level, 
for keeping historical narratives and mythical one separate.
Not even all the founding-narratives are political myth. What decides 
between different and alternative narratives to become political myths or not is their 
capacity to answer a need for significance, and not all the founding narratives are 
able to coagulate it in certain conditions and contexts. Let me illustrate the point with 
one example. The existence of the Sicilian “Assembled Regionale”, an organ that was 
given to the Sicilians in order to satisfy the constant striving for independence of the 
island, has at least two founding narratives. One tells that the assembly was instituted 
in 1946 together with the concession to the island of a “statuto speciale” within the 
newly constituted Italian Republic. Another one calls it the “Sicilian parliament” and 
states that the parliament was first instituted by Frederick II in the Middle Ages. 
According to this latter founding narrative, the Sicilian parliament was one of the 
first European parliaments, much older than the Italian one.
Now, whereas the first narrative is certainly an important founding 
narrative, it cannot, in the present conditions, aspire to have the same mythical 
impact as has the other narrative. The founding narrative must be significant for a 
certain group of people in order to become their myth. In fact, the second narrative 
only can provide significance to the present political conditions and actions of the 
Sicilians -  or at least most of them, whereas the first narrative cannot, in the present 
conditions.
It is not a matter of objective interests at stake: the question is not which 
narrative can be better used in order to uphold a certain material interests. Not all the 
possible narratives that suit those interests could have aspired to the role of political 
myths. This explains why a political myth cannot simply be fabricated around a 
table. Political myths must insert themselves within certain given conditions and 
which are most of the time intermingled with other kind of discourses, but they must 
not be conflated with them.
One of the reasons why political myth was given so little attention in 
theoretical debate is that it has been often deployed together with other and more 
familiar kinds of discourse. They somehow tend to get lost under them. And the 
reason why this happens is easy to see; we almost never see a pure myth-maker at
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work: his mythical account will inevitably deal with matters touched upon also by 
writers, philosophers, historians and scientists and it is most often only to these that 
the critical discussion appoints itself. One of the concept with which political myth is 
most often conflated is ideology.162 It can be argued, however, that notwithstanding 
the important interconnections between the two, political myth and ideology must be 
kept analytically separated and used to address only partially overlapping social 
phenomena.
A classical example of the attempt to deal with political myths under the 
heading of “ideology” is Raymond Aron’s Vopium  des intellectuals (1955). Written 
in the fifties in order to analyse the reasons for the uncritical attitude o f the French 
communist towards the politics of the Soviet Union, the book had a clear polemical 
intent. This latter is patent from its very title: with ‘T he  opium of intellectuals” Aron 
reverses Marx’s criticism of the religious alienation against Marxism itself, or -  
better - against the French Marxist militants of the beginning o f the fifties, in order to 
point out that Marxism, far from leading to liberation from alienation, had itself 
turned into a form of religious alienation.
According to Aron, the attitude o f the French communists toward Marxism 
could only be explained in terms of the power exercised by Marxism as a philosophy 
of history that provides a universal and all encompassing truth (Aron 1955, V) and 
that, thanks to its mobilising impact, can raise passions worthy of crusaders (Aron 
1955: ID): ‘T he doctrine provides true Communists with a global interpretation of 
the universe: it instils sentiments akin to those of crusaders of all ages; it fixes the 
hierarchy of values and estabilishes the norm of good conduct” (Aron 1955, IX: 
265).
This, in Aron’s view, is confirmed by the expressions used by the young 
Marx in his description of the class struggle. These expressions would not leave any 
doubts over the Jewish and Christian origins of the myth of the proletariat. In Aron’s 
analysis the myth of the proletariat reveals its religious origins because it is the story 
o f an agent of salvation, elected as a vehicle of the redemption of humanity on the 
basis of its suffering. It is precisely on this structure that all kinds o f Christian 
eschatology are based and it is from the passions instilled by eschatology that,
162 As we have seen, Hood 1996 is a typical example.
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according to Aron, the annihilation of the critical capacity of the French communists 
would derive (Aron 1955, III).
In particular, this loss o f critical attitude is evident in people’s tendency to 
impose everywhere the same eschatological scheme and thereby overlook the 
complexity of reality and the radical diversity of historical circumstances. This, in 
Aron’s view, is particularly evident in the working of three of the political myths that 
he analyses: the myth of the left, the myth of the revolution and the myth of the 
proletariat. All these myths, according to Aron would exhibit their correspondence to 
the eschatology depicted above and it is to the latter that he attributes the mobilizing 
and totalizing power of those political myths (Aron 1955,1-III).
There are therefore, according to Aron, three characteristics of “political 
myths” understood as “ideologies”, i.e. of the opium of the people: 1. They are 
systems of ideas that reveal a universal truth providing a meaning to everything, and 
are therefore totalizing; 2. They mobilize passions, and 3. They are utopian in as far 
as they neglect the complexity of reality and of the specific historical circumstances. 
On this basis, Aron was also predicting the advent of “the end o f ideologies”; in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, after the defeat of fascism and the affirmation of 
democracy, the longing for ideology was in his view deemed to be superseded by a 
careful pragmatism more inclined to look at the specificity of different contexts.163
There is however a double problem with this treatment of political myth. 
Firstly, from the point of view of a theory of political myth it is subjected to the same 
kind of criticism that can be raised against any attempt to unify myth and religion 
under common headings such as Cassirer’s “mythical consciousness” or “the opium 
of intellectuals”. I will not repeat here previous considerations, but simply observe 
that if political myths are characterised as narratives providing significance that, by 
locating human action within a coherent narrative, prompt people to act, this is not a 
sufficient condition for assimilating them to religion. If it is true, as Sorel and more 
recently Tudor has observed, that Marxism, when inserted in certain contexts has 
also worked as a political myth, this is not a sufficient condition for assimilating it to 
religion, on the one hand, or to ideology, on the other (Tudor 1996: 126).
Secondly, it can be argued that this view is constructed in such a way that is 
destined to fall victim to its own tools: the criticism of ideologies as the opium of the
163 Among the supporters of the “end of ideologies” thesis, see also Bell 1960 and Shils 1958.
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masses that was used by Aron against Marx who first formulated it can well be used 
against Aron himself. This becomes evident at the end o f the book when Aron is 
confronted with the objection that democracy and nationalism are also ideologies 
since they have also been able to instil ardour not less passionate than that instilled 
by the myth o f a society without classes (Aron 1955, IX). Aron’s reply to this 
possible objection consists in vindicating the uniqueness o f communism as ideology 
precisely on the basis of its prophetic structure.
Let us now look more closely at what, according to Aron, this means, i.e. at 
what precisely characterises ideology understood as prophecy. For Aron 
communism, like all kinds o f prophecies, is constructed around three elements: 
condemnation o f the status quo, the depiction of what should be, and (possibly) the 
individuation o f a subject in charge of leading from the present to a future condition 
(Aron 1955, IX). But in this sense, the “end of ideologies” thesis is itself an 
ideology: clearly, it entails a condemnation of the age of ideologies, as well as the 
prophetic assertion of its immanent end and individuation of a subject, the 
disengaged social theorist, that can, if not lead this transition, at least prepare its way.
The problem is that, once entered into the polemical use of the concept of 
ideology, it becomes impossible to call oneself out o f it: it triggers a vicious circle. 
The dichotomy o f “ideological versus real” upon which this use ultimately rests can 
always be reverted against those who employ it. Aron remains victim o f his own 
polemical usage of the concept of ideology. However, as many authors have pointed 
out, together with this polemical use of the term ideology, there is another, more 
neutral one.164 As has been stressed from different sides, notwithstanding the 
multifaceted varieties of the possible uses of the term ideology - Eagleton counts at 
least 15 of them (Eagleton 1991) - they can all be subsumed under two types.
The first kind in use is more restricted and might be defined as the negative, 
or at least polemical, view of ideology: ideology, in this view, fundamentally refers 
to some kind of false consciousness or disguise through a fictitious covering of the 
true reality of facts. The hallmark of this use, as we have seen in Aron’s theory, is the 
contrast between what is “ideological” and what is “real”. This use of the term was 
first inaugurated by Napoleon who with this term intended to criticise the abstract
164 See for instance Dubois 2001, Freeden 2001, Stoppino 1983, Thompson 2001.
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idealism of “les idéologues” as contrasted with the reality of facts and pragmatism of 
political affairs (Dierse 1976).
As well known, the term was most influentially used in this sense by Marx 
and Engels, who deeply contributed to physiognomy of polemical use of the 
concept.165 Initially Marx and Engels used the term in their criticism towards “The 
German Ideology”, i.e. the fundamentally illusory attempts of the Young Hegelians 
to modify the society they lived in through the sheer criticism of ideas (Marx and 
Engels 1845-6).
‘The entire body of German philosophical criticism, so they 
wrote, from Strauss to Stimer is confined to criticism of religious 
conceptions [...]. Their advance consisted in subsuming the allegedly 
dominant metaphysical, political, juridical moral and other conceptions 
under the class of religious or theological conception [...] The Young 
Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering” 
statement, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have 
found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are 
only fighting against “phrases”. They forget however, that to these phrases 
they themselves are opposing only other phrases and that they are in no 
way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating 
the phrases of this world [...] It has not occurred to any of these 
philosophers to inquire into the connection of the German philosophy with 
German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material 
surroundings” (Marx, Engels 1845-6: 148, emphasis mine).
The polemic is here conducted against a topos of the German literature, 
whose origins go as far back as the epoch of the French revolution, and according to 
which Germany, economically and politically backward in comparison with France, 
could only operate in thought, i.e. through the philosophical criticism, the same 
revolution that France has operated in action. The criticism of this “ideological view” 
is conducted through a continual contrast between the level o f ideas and that of 
reality, and, in this sense, early Marx and Engels’s usage of the term is closely 
related to Napoleon’s criticism o f “les idéologues”.
Since his Contribution to the Critique o f Hegel's Philosophy o f Right, Marx 
had already been vindicating the need for a “material basis of the revolution” against 
the view advanced by the “German ideologists” (Marx 1844). Against the illusions of
165 According to Mannheim, the anticipation of this concept of ideology goes as far back as Francis Bacon’s 
critique of the idola or prejudices (Mannheim 1936: 55). Nevertheless, it is without doubt only by the time of 





those ideologist, who could not but think o f revolutions in a glass of water, Marx had 
already since 1843 been emphasising that the arm of criticism cannot replace the 
criticism of arms (Marx 1844). Two years after, in The German Ideology (1845-6) 
the dichotomy “ideological” versus “real” takes the form of a contrast between 
“idealism” and what is now called the “materialistic conception of history”. Its 
method is very efficiently synthesised: “the premises from which we begin are not 
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be 
made in imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material 
conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and 
those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely 
empirical way” (Marx Engels 1845-6, emphasis mine).
With historical materialism, particularly in its successive elaborations when 
the reference to the material conditions o f existence was to take the form of a 
detailed analysis o f the economic modes and relations o f production, the term 
“ideology” tends to widen so as to cover the whole complex of social historical 
phenomena: not only religious and philosophical ones, but also political and 
juridical, in a word all that which is super-structural in respect to the economic 
structure, i.e. the real material conditions for the reproduction of life.
As has been observed from various sides, Marx and Engels’s analysis of 
ideology is a permanent acquisition: it contributed to rooting the evanescent world of 
ideas in the solid ground of the social structure, i.e. to show the necessity of 
ideological constructions, and if the Marxist view of ideology is no longer 
hegemonic in academic debate this is to a great extent due to the fact that it became a 
sort of standard intellectual equipment (Geertz 1964).
On the other hand, the questions raised by a theory o f political myth do not 
coincide with those faced by Marx and Engels: what is of interest here is not to raise 
the issue of why ideological constructions are necessary or to what kind of mode of 
production they correspond, but rather why human beings, among the different 
human constructions of meaning, also need to make recourse to narratives that 
respond to need for significance. Conflating myth and ideology can therefore only be 
impoverishing.
In particular, from the point o f view o f a theory o f political myth, the 
problem is that by contrasting both political myth and ideology with the “real
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material conditions of existence” not only does it become difficult to draw any 
distinction between myth and ideology but, in particular, there is the risk of falling 
once more into the Enlightenment’s dichotomy of “myth versus reality”. Marx’s 
analysis of the uses made by the French revolutionaries of the myth of the Roman 
Republic is a good example of this risk.
In the Preface to the second edition of The Eighteenth Brumaire o f  Louis 
Bonaparte, Marx states that his intention in this work was *10 demonstrate how the 
class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible 
for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero’s part” (Marx 1852: 395). He began his 
essay by observing that human beings do not make their history under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but rather under circumstances that they found as already 
given and transmitted from the past; among those circumstances is the tradition of 
the dead generations “that weight like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx 
1852: 398). Therefore, even when human beings seem engaged in creating something 
entirely new,
“[...] precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crises they 
anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, and borrow 
from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new 
scene o f world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed 
language. Thus Luther donned the mask of the Apostle Paul, the 
Revolution of the 1789 to 1814 draped itself alternatively as the Roman 
Republic and the Roman Empire, and the Revolution of 1848 knew 
nothing better to do than to parody, in turn 1789 and the revolutionary 
tradition of 1793 to 1795” (Marx 1852: 399).
Marx is here referring to one narrative, that of the Roman republic, that is 
likely to have worked to a great extent as political myth for the French 
revolutionaries. However, Marx is interested here in the phenomenon of ideology 
and thus states that the French revolutionaries needed to perform the task of their 
time, releasing and setting up a modem bourgeois society, in Roman costumes and 
with Roman phrases because, unheroic as bourgeois society is, it had need of 
heroism, sacrifice, and civil war to comes into being: “in the classical austere 
traditions of the Roman republic its gladiators found the ideals and the art forms, the 
self-deceptions that they needed in order to conceal from themselves the bourgeois 
limitations of the content of their struggles and to keep their passions at the height of 
the great historical tragedy” (Marx 1852: 399: emphasis added). Similarly, Marx
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further observes, at another stage of development, a century earlier, Cromwell and 
the English people made their bourgeois revolution by borrowing “speech, passions 
and illusions” from the Old Testament: “only when the real aim had been achieved, 
when the bourgeois transformation of English society had been accomplished, Locke 
supplanted Habakkuk” (Marx 1852: 399). Ideology, thus, is a self-deception, but a 
self-deception that is necessary.
Moving from this analysis, the only aspect that could be said to unite 
political myths and ideology is their being a self-deception, that, however necessary, 
is meant to present particular interests, in this case those o f  the bourgeoisie, in the 
form of universally valid and recognised principles such as those embodied by the 
Roman tradition or the Old Testament. Thus, when analysing the events of the 18th 
Brumaire, Marx constructs his account through a long chain of conceptual 
oppositions: “Roman phrases'’166 versus their “real task”, “the antediluvian Colossi 
and the resurrected Romans (from Brutus and Gracchi to the senators and Caesar)” 
versus “the sober reality of bourgeois society and its true interpreters such as its 
Says, Constants, Guizots and its real military leaders”, “ the heroic self-deceptions” 
versus “the bourgeois limitations of their struggle”, “ the magnification o f their tasks 
in imagination” versus “the finding of a solution in reality” (Marx 1852: 399-401; 
emphasis added). Phrases versus reality, imagination versus reality, the result o f all 
these conceptual oppositions is that political myths and ideology are necessarily 
presented as deceptions. But the problem raised by a theory o f political myth is why 
people needed to represent their action precisely in this way. Why did the French 
revolutionaries needed to perform the task of their epoch in Roman customs, and not 
Greek or Turkish? Why could only the narrative of the Roman Republic make 
significance for them?
Marx’s theory does not aim to deal with these questions. Thus, for instance, 
when he moves onto analysing proletarian revolutions, to the need for “self- 
deceptions” o f the French Revolutionaries, Marx counterpoises the proletarian 
revolutions: “the social revolution, he argues, cannot draw its poetry from the past, 
but only from the future; and therefore cannot begin before it has stripped all 
superstition in regard to the past”; thus, as he concludes, “there [in bourgeois
166 Marx used the same contraposition between “phrases” versus “reality” in order to criticize the attempt of
the German ideologists to make a revolution by simply criticizing ideas. As we have seen, for Marx and
Engels these were sheer revolutions in a glass of water.
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revolutions] the phrase went beyond the content, here [in the proletarian revolution] 
the content goes beyond the phrase” (Marx 1852: 400). Thus, the proletariat, which 
will only be looking at the future, will not need the self-deception of wearing Roman 
or other costumes for their revolution.
On the other hand, this does not say much about the proletariat’s need for 
political myth. Marx was right in saying that the proletarian revolution could only 
draw its poetry from the future - and Sorel would certainly agree with him on this 
point. But this does not mean that they do not need any form of narrative that 
provides significance. Therefore the concept of ideology understood as a more or less 
necessary false consciousness is of limited use for a theory of political myth.
All the same, one could assume that by elaborating a different view of 
ideology, the concept of political myth may still be treated together with that of 
ideology. For instance, as has been noted, in Marx there are signs of a passage from a 
polemical, and thus particular, view of ideology to what has been called a “total view 
of ideology”. Karl Mannheim, who explicitly proposed to adopt a neutral concept of 
ideology, has strongly emphasised this point.167 According to Mannheim, whereas 
the particular conception of ideology, by presenting ideas as the more or less 
conscious disguise of the real nature of a situation, makes specific assumptions as to 
the mystifying relationship between the two, what he calls the “total conception of 
ideology” simply presupposes that there is a correspondence between a given social 
situation and a given perspective or point of view (Mannheim 1936: 51). In this 
second sense, according to Mannheim, we refer to the ideology of an age or a 
concrete social historical group, e.g. o f a class, when we are concerned with the 
characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of 
this group (Mannheim 1936:49-50).
Thus, whereas the first conception of ideology focusing on the errors of the 
individuals is the field of psychology, the second one is the field of what he calls a 
“sociology of knowledge”, i.e. a discipline concerned with ideology in the sense of 
interwoven systems of thought and modes of experience that are conditioned by the 
social circumstances shared by groups of individuals. Marx, by having traced 
ideology back to its social roots, has taken an important step from the particular to 
the total concept of ideology, but by remaining attached to the idea of ideology as
167 See Dubois 2001, Freeden 2001, Stoppino 1983, Thompson 2001.
195
i
false consciousness he was still with one foot in the particular view of ideology 
(Mannheim 1936, II, ch.3).
To assume a neutral concept of ideology, as first inaugurated by Mannheim, 
is thus crucial in order to discuss its relationship with political myth. This does not 
mean that by using a neutral definition one aims at transcending the historically 
situated character of any sociology of knowledge: the intellectual is always himself 
within ideology and never a free-floating being transcending the inevitable 
perspectiveness of any enquiry. The performative impact o f any work in the social 
sciences is always such that absolute neutrality in this sense is impossible.
To assume a neutral meaning, however, does not mean this. It rather simply 
means not making any strong ontological assumption over the nature of the 
relationship between ideology and the social historical. Following Mannheim’s 
insights, this simply means to assume that there is a strict relationship between the 
two, without, however, entering into any substantive characterisation of their 
relationship. Indeed, it is to such a definition of ideology that contemporary theorists 
of political myth have been referring (see Tudor 1972 and more recently Lincoln 
1989 and Rood 1996).
According to Christopher Flood, for instance, political myth situates itself 
precisely between ideology thus conceived and what he calls the sacred myth, i.e. 
myth as it is used within religious systems. And the two definitions of ideology to 
which he refers are examples of the neutral meaning: ideology, he states picking up 
two o f the most common definitions in contemporary social science, is a “belief 
system that explains and justifies a preferred political order for society, either 
existing or proposed, and offers a strategy (processes, institutional arrangements, 
programs) for its attainment”, or otherwise stated ideology is a “set of ideas by which 
men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and 
specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, 
amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order” (Rood 1996: 13). 168
168 According to Freeden, Mannheim would, on the contrary, have attempted at overcoming the relativism 
through his own sociology of knowledge, since he would grant to the free-floating intellectuals the capacity 
o f incorporating the perspective of different groups into a holistic relationism and, thereby, to attain a critical 
approximation of truth (Freeden 2001). Independently from the correctness of this interpretation, the 
important point to stress here is that this is not what we mean by a “neutral” type o f use of the concept of 
ideology.
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The advantages in this perspective are clear. From the point of view of a 
theory of political myth, firstly, it does not carry with it any assumption over the 
reality or unreality of both ideology and political myth. Secondly, this view enables 
us to address one important common feature of political myth and ideology. Such 
definitions do not make any assumption over the nature of these beliefs: they do not 
limit ideology to false/true or conscious/unconscious beliefs and ideas. In other 
words, they do not analyse ideology from the psychological point of view, i.e. from 
the point of view of the single individual, and they, therefore, make no assumptions 
as to the degree to which these motivations must be present in the consciousness of 
single acting individuals. Indeed, in order to analyse the impact o f a political myth 
or, more generally, of an ideology one cannot limit himself to the level of individual 
psychology (let us admit for the moment that this is possible), since it can well be the 
case that not all elements constituting a political myth or an ideology are present in 
all their parts hie et nunc in the single mind of an individual.
As Geertz noted, only the first answer provided to the question “Why do 
individuals need ideology?” can be psychological (Geertz 1964). A huge amount of 
literature drawing inspiration from Freud’s discoveries would tell us that ideologies 
are collections of invested symbols that are needed in order to overcome the chronic 
misintegration of society: be it in the form of the scapegoat theory, according to 
which ideology is a symbolic construction that drains off emotional tension through 
the creation of a symbolic enemy, or any other way of overcoming the strain created 
by the very condition of living in a society. In any case, it is always at the 
psychological level that the determinant of the production of ideology is located. 
Again, the acquisitions in this field are enormous and permanent. But what interests 
here is not so much to investigate, to go back to the Marxian example, what 
emotional disequilibrium determined the need to invest the Roman customs of such 
an ideological power: the question is rather why they needed to perform their task in 
somebody else’s customs, how this came to be shared and why they needed to do it 
precisely with Roman rather than with other customs.
Two qualifications must however be added to the above-mentioned 
definitions of ideology. The first definition of ideology as a “belief system” does not 
simply correspond to the second in terms of a “set o f ideas” - as Flood seems to 
suggest (Flood 1996,1): it adds a further dimension, that of the systematic character
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of the set o f ideas constituting ideology. However this holds true only for certain 
types of ideology, notably those to which the thesis of “the end of ideology” refers. 
In comparison to them, contemporary forms of ideology rather evoke the image o f an 
archipelago in contrast to that of a continent (Boudon 1999). As R. Boudon reminds 
us, we have ideologies on what should be done about unemployment, educational 
opportunities, crime or drug addiction and on a myriad o f subjects, as well as to how 
it should be done. But these theories are weakly related to one another. We have 
ceased to believe that they could be derived from an all-encompassing theory. We 
have all kinds of local ideologies; we no longer believe in general ideologies 
(Boudon 1999). In other words, ideology is much more pervasive than any other 
“system of beliefs”.
As C. Geertz, among others, has pointed out, ideologies are mapping 
devices whose cognitive impact is secondary in comparison to their practical 
function: ideology serves to provide a map of the social reality that orients both at the 
cognitive as well as at the practical level (Geertz 1964). The reason why such 
symbolic templates are necessary is that human behaviour, in contrast to that of 
lower animals, is not for the most part determined by innate, physiologically 
determined patterns of behaviour: birds learn how to fly without wind tunnels and, 
whatever reaction they may have in the face of death, this is to a great extent 
physiologically preformed. On the contrary, the extreme generality and variability of 
human capacities of response mean that their patterns of their behaviour are guided 
predominantly by cultural rather than innate templates (Geertz 1964: 63). The tool­
making and lying animal is for Geertz, as it was for Gehlen, “an incomplete -  or 
more accurately, self-completing animal”169: the agent o f his own realisation, he 
creates out of his general capacity for the construction o f symbolic models the 
specific capacity that defines him, and in particular it is through the construction of 
ideologies, schematic images o f political order and actions, that he makes himself a 
V. political animal (Geertz 1964: 63).
Thus, going back to the second of the above mentioned definitions of 
ideology proposed by Flood we can conclude that an ideology is a sets of ideas by 
which human beings posit, understand and justify ends and means of a more or less
169 See the discussion of Gehlen’s recovery of Nietzsche’s definition of human beings as noch nicht 
festegestelle Tiere in Chapter 3.
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organised social action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, 
uproot or rebuild a given social order.170 *The intersection • with the concept of 
political myth is indeed clear: a political myth also entails a set of ideas by which 
human beings posit and represent ends and means of social action. But not all such 
sets of ideas constitute a political myth. In order to constitute a political myth two 
further conditions must be met. This set of ideas must take the forms of a narrative, 
i.e. of a series of events cast in a dramatic form and precisely on the basis of this 
narrative form it must be able to begründen or to coagulate and reproduce 
significance. To put it bluntly, political myths are narratives putting a drama on
s(nna 171stage.
From this point of view, political myths resemble modem utopias. Many 
authors have dealt with myth under the heading of utopia, by this latter meaning 
though a general state of the mind that is incongruous with the reality within which it 
occurs: a utopia is, latu sensu, the description of an unrealizable state of things.172 
According to Mannheim, for instance, both myths and utopias are indeed the product 
o f wishful thinking:
“When imagination finds no satisfaction in existing reality, it seeks 
refuge in wishfully constructed places and periods. Myths, fairy tales, other- 
wordly promises of religion, humanistic fantasies, travel romances, have 
always been continually changing expression of that which was lacking in 
actual life” (Mannheim 1936: 184).
As a consequence, according to Mannheim, the utopian mentality works in 
opposition to the status quo and aims at its disintegration, whereas ideology, even 
when it does not precisely correspond to the status quo, nevertheless tends towards 
its preservation because it is congruous with it: utopias are revolutionary because 
they tend to burst the boundaries of the existing order (Mannheim 1936: in particular 
173-184).
Apart from the general problems connected with the definition of the 
category of “reality” that, as Mannheim himself in many places recognises is a
170 In respect of the original formulation of this definition where reference is made to ideology as a means of 
“positing, explaining and justifying” I have omitted the second verb, since in the most general sense of the 
term “to explain” this is already implicit in the verb “to justify” whereas in the strongest sense, that of a 
“scientific explanation this would not enable me to encompass political myth within it. Similarly, I have 
modified the reference to “organized social and specifically political action”. The action that is promoted by 
apolitical myth, as well as by ideology, can in fact be more or less organized.
1 1 Many contemporary theorists of political myth insist on this point: see Tudor 1972 and Flood 1996.
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definition that is always historically situated (Mannheim 1936: 91, 174 and ff), from 
our point of view the problem is the impossibility of defining political myth in 
relation to its congruence/incongruence with social reality thus conceived: indeed, 
not all political myths are revolutionary, in as much as not all ideologies, at least as 
we have defined them, are conservative. Moving from such a characterisation o f the 
“utopian mentality”, it becomes impossible to grasp the difference between political 
myth, utopia and ideology.
However, if by “utopia” we rather understand strictu sensu that literary 
genus that was inaugurated by Thomas More’s Utopia, then similarities and 
differences between this genus and political myth come to light. Indeed, the literary 
genus that goes from More to the negative utopia o f Orwell’s 1984 through authors 
such as Campanella, Fontenelle and Fourier, is precisely characterised by the 
narrative form in which it casts the description, the ou-topos - the place that is 
nowhere, according to the fortunate expression coined by More. Typically, the 
description of the perfect or ideal society takes the form of narration by a traveller of 
his discovery of this ou-topos (no-place) - or perhaps eu-topos (good place),172 73 which 
is classically an island or at least a territory repaired from other societies and whose 
organisation, customs and habits are described up to  the most apparently 
insignificant details of everyday life.
But it is not just the narrative form that unites political myth and utopias. As 
has been observed, modem utopias were forms of radical secularised theodicy: they 
address the problem of the existence o f evil, but, in contrast to Christian theodicy, 
they move from the assumption that any form of evil is resolvable in this world 
through a radical reorganisation of social life (Moneti 1992: 406). Therefore, 
independently from the relationship with reality, we can say that what characterises 
utopias in this sense is rather their “regulative function”. By regulative I mean, 
following Kant, the capacity of ideas to serve as guiding ideals independently of their 
being more or less constitutive o f the world of phenomena.174
172 On utopia, particularly from the point of view of the social utopias, see Maffey 1983 and Cazes 2001.
173 As Maffey reminds us, the problem of the meaning of the neologism coined by More was a big problem 
for the interpreters of More since the very first years of its publication: U-topia can mean Eu-topia (the good 
place) or the Ou- topic (the no-place). Indeed, the same Thomas More seems to allow both interpretation 
(Maffey 1989: 1215)
174 In this sense, for instance, authors from the Frankfurt School recovered, against Marx and Engels’s 
critique of utopian socialism, the positive function of utopia: as Marcuse observed, in an age where the end of 
utopia is a real possibility because there seems to be no limit to technical mastery even over the laws of
Political myths and utopias both have a regulative function. Despite the fact 
that a political myth can also be articulated in the dimension of the past, as is the case 
with most of the foundation myths, its function is always to address the present 
conditions and orientations within them. The same holds for utopias: both positive 
and negative utopias, independently from their being more or less “realistic”, are 
always programs for the reform of the present. In other words, both political myths 
and utopias can be the sites for the working of the radical imagination. Imagination, 
as Castoriadis points out, creates “ex nihilo” -  not in nihilo or cum nihilo, as 
romantic theories o f imagination tend to assume. As we will see, this means that, 
together with the repetitive and passively conceived imagination, such as it has been 
depicted by Spinoza, there is also a creative or radical imagination: it is from this 
creative side of imagination that the critical impact, exercised by both utopias and 
political myth, stems. However, political myths are not necessarily the site for the 
working of critical imagination: they can, and perhaps most often, do the opposite. 
Despite the fact that political myths, in contrast to utopias, do not always exercise 
such a critical function, there is always the possibility for them to do it, and in this 
possibility lies its regulative function.
Another difference between political myth and utopia is that, whereas 
utopias are radical secularised theodicy in the sense that they aim at radically 
extirpating evil through the construction of a perfect society, political myths do not 
necessarily aim at a radical solution once and for all of all the problems. Utopias are 
theoretical constructions that have a regulative function because they are the means 
for measuring the general good and bad contained in any society, whereas political 
myths are regulative because, as Sorel pointed out, they are direct determinations to 
act: it is from their capacity to put on stage a drama whose protagonists are those 
involved in the working of myth that provides them with a regulative function. In 
other words, utopias are “no-places”, whereas political myths are invitations to act 
here and now: hie Rhodus, hie saltus.
Precisely because political myths respond to a need for significance here 
and now and because, in contrast to utopia, they do not necessarily aim at a definitive 
answer to the problem of theodicy, they must be open to the possibility of being
nature, it is necessary to go from science to utopia - and not the other way round as Engels sustained 
(Marcuse 1967).
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retold according to the changing circumstances. Whereas utopias can be eternal, a 
political myth can be old, even ancient, but never eternal. Otherwise said, political 
myths too address the problem of the theodicy, i.e. the problem of the congruence 
between good and luck, but they do not necessarily aim at resolving it once for all: 
rather we could say that it is precisely the impossibility o f providing a definitive 
answer to this dilemma that fosters the need for significance and thus the continual 
retelling of myth.
On the contrary, when the working on myth aims at providing a definitive 
answer, it tends to generate closed myths, i.e. myths that tend towards the elimination 
of contingency. These, however, are only a particular kind o f myth: among them, are 
quite often religious and naturalised myths. Both these latter are myths that deny 
their historical nature, either by invoking their sacredness o r their naturality. Political 
myth, however, lives out of history. Thus, whereas a narrative can be utopian by 
nature because it violates its alleged laws,I75nothing could ever be mythical by 
“nature” because it is always history that nourishes the Arbeit am Mythos.
175 When Marcuse announced the end of utopia he did it by pointing to the possibility that modem technique 
had definitely rendered the idea of a supposed “limit by nature” obsolete (Marcuse 1967). Certainly also the 
so-called “laws of nature” are historical, but they are historical in a different sense: they are historically 
determined, but they do not live out of history as political myth does.
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IV. MYTH AND POLITICAL IDENTITY
Political myths are narratives that coagulate and reproduce significance. They are 
the working on a common narrative by which the members o f a social group or society 
represent and posit their experience and deeds. As such they are an important part of what, 
following Castoriadis, can be called the social imaginary (Castoriadis 1975). Once political 
myths are defined in this way, the problem emerges of analysing their relationship with 
other kinds of narratives that also are constitutive of the social imaginary.
In particular, both myths and historical narratives are positional, that is they are told 
from the standpoint of the present. In other words, if the historian can also be defined as a 
“turned-back prophet” (Schlegel, F. 1798: Fragm. 80), in what ways does he differ from an 
ideal typical myth-maker? Or, otherwise put, in what ways do political myths and 
historical narratives respectively contribute to, or are the result of, present identities?
These are the questions addressed in the following chapters. In particular, Chapter 
10 discusses the relationship between historical and mythical narratives, the extent to 
which they can possibly overlap, but also the reasons why they must be kept analytically 
distinguished.
This, in its turn, leads us to exploring the ways in which political myth relates to 
cultural, social and political identities. By criticising Schmitt’s view of political myth as a 
symptom of an already constituted identity, Chapter 11 argues that the working on political 
myth is not just the result, but also the producer of common political identities. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Schmitt’s usage of the term, the chapter argues for a 
differentiation between the different forms of identity - personal, social, cultural, political 
etc. -  aimed at avoiding normatively problematic outcomes, such as Schmitt’s conclusion
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that dictatorship is not incompatible with democracy because it is based on the “identity” 
between the Führer and the people.
This does not mean though to disregard the possible overlapping between different 
forms of identity. In particular, precisely by confronting the issue o f political identity from  
the standpoint of the working o f political myth, it will be suggested that no sharp 
contraposition between political and cultural identity can be drawn. If not all cultural 
myths are political, there is always the possibility that the working on a cultural myth, 
which has nothing political in se, can come to affect specifically political conditions, and 
thus to contribute to shaping a common political identity.
Finally, Chapter 12 advances some hypotheses on the possible sites for the working 
of political myths today. There are reasons to suspect that, under the contemporary 
conditions of a global spectacle, the working of political myth, disseminated in 
archipelagos of icons covertly recalling each other, becomes not only potentially global, 
but also less and less beatable. Thus, the hypothesis is suggested that political myths today 
operate through an interplay of the banal and the extraordinary, where by “banal” I 
etymologically mean that which has become a commonplace by virtue of its continual use 
within a community.
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10. MYTH, HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AND THE SOCIAL 
IMAGINARY
According to one view, history consists of a congeries of events, individual and 
collective, whose faithful reproduction is the task of the historian. The historian, in this 
view, reconstructs events as they actually happened and reproduces them in a narrative the 
truth o f which resides in its correspondence between the story told and the story actually 
lived by people. According to this view, thus, the literary aspect of historical narrative is 
expected to be limited to only a few stylistic embellishments - as opposed to the kind of 
inventiveness presumed to be inherent in mythical and fictitional narratives.
The criterion for distinguishing between mythical and historical narratives would thus 
consist in the reality of the latter as counterpoised to the unreal or fictitious character o f the 
former. Recent theories, though, have sharply questioned this view.176 A variety of 
approaches, ranging from French structuralism and post-structuralism, to historians 
drawing inspiration from the Annales group, to literary theorists and philosophers such as 
Barthes, Foucault and Kristeva, tend to dissolve the distinction between “real” versus 
“fictitional” narratives by arguing that there is no ontological difference between the two. 
Notwithstanding the huge differences between such approaches, they all emphasise that a 
narrative is not only a form that can or cannot be added to the content without altering it: 
narratives, in this perspective, are always forms already full o f content, and thus powerful 
means for the production of meaning so that an “objective narrative” would be impossible. 
Thus according to this view, mythical and historical narratives would not be counterpoised
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as “fictitious” versus “real” stories, but they would tend, rather, to converge: history, as 
some have argued by pushing this argument to its extreme formulation, would then be 
nothing but the myth o f Western societies (Friedman 1992, Young 1990).
Thus, whereas Fernand Braudel for instance has attacked narrative history as 
intrinsically “dramatising” of reality, Roland Barthes has, from another point of view, 
challenged the very distinction between “historical” and “fictional” narratives, whereas, 
more recently, other authors of postmodern inspiration have dissolved the opposition 
“myth” versus “history” by sustaining that both are the products o f a politics of identity. In 
all these cases, thus, the idea of an intrinsic opposition between historical versus mythical 
narratives has been reversed into its opposite, i.e. the thesis of their essential coincidence.
Notwithstanding some common assumptions to these disparate theoretical positions, 
such as, for instance, the common emphasis on the language-mediated character o f the 
human experience o f the world, they all clearly bring very different issues to the fore. 
According to Braudel, what is wrong with the narrative history is that it pretends to 
describe things as they really happen, but it consists in fact of a heavily interpreted account 
of them, an authentic philosophy o f history. In particular, that which he criticises in this 
approach is the fact that, for the narrative historians, the life of human beings necessarily 
assumes the form of a drama, dominated by the actions o f often exceptional individuals 
who emerge as the very protagonists of history: i.e. the masters of their own as well as our 
fate (Braudel 1950:11).
Narratives, according to this view taken by all the historians following the Annales 
approach, are intrinsically novelising and even dramatising of reality: to this kind of 
historiography, they oppose the need for a “scientific” reconstruction of reality. This, they 
will argue, can only be accomplished by looking at deeper and long term historical 
processes, instead of personalised and dramatised events.
As has been noted, though, this position was bom more as a justification for the 
promotion of a historiography devoted to the analysis of “long-term” impersonal processes 
in demography, economics and ethnology, rather than as an incentive for analysing the 
nature of “narratives” : the rejection by this historiography of narrative history is due to a 
distaste for its conventional subject matter, i.e. past politics, as much as to their conviction 
that narratives are inherently “novelising” and therefore anti-scientific (White 1987: 32). 
The suspicion that is not so much the intrinsic dramatic nature of narrative that is at stake 176
176 For a reconstruction of the debate see for instance White 1987, Jenkins 1997, Strith 2000.
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here, but rather the distaste for a genre of literature focused on human agents as masters of 
their own destiny becomes legitimate.
To the view of narrative as an intrinsically dramatising form is opposed nothing less 
than the whole literary experience of the last century. As modernist literature clearly 
shows, it is in fact possible to narrativise without novelising and dramatizing. Indeed, at 
least from Pirandello onwards, it was even a common experience to view theatre that did 
not entail dramatisation. The point of the discussion then becomes to investigate what a 
narrative properly consists of and to what extent writing history without narrative is 
possible. In other words, do we have narrative only when we talk about “dramatised” and 
“novelised” political events, or are they much more pervasive than this view suggests?
According to Roland Barthes, for instance, narratives are much more pervasive than 
dramas, since they are almost ubiquitous. Barthes holds that narrative, with its 
pervasiveness and its ability to be expressed with the most widely differing materials and 
languages, is “international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself 
[...]. Under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in 
every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere 
is nor has been a people without narrative” (Barthes 1966: 78).
This does not mean though that, according to Barthes, every narrative is a myth.177In 
his The discourse o f  history, Barthes seems to hold that history can be represented in 
different ways, some of which are not mythological in as far as they do overtly call 
attention to their own process of production and indicate the constructed rather than found 
nature of their object. When, at the beginning of this essay, Barthes states his intention to 
show that historical discourse does not differ from imaginary narration, it is most probably 
the pretension of an objective account o f history that he is criticising. As he asks,
“the narration of past events, commonly subject in our culture, since the 
Greeks, to the sanction of historical “science”, placed under the imperious 
warrant of the “real” , justified by principles of “rational” exposition -  does 
this narration differ, in fact, by some specific feature, by an indubitable 
pertinence, from imaginary narration as we find in the epic, the novel, the 
drama? (Barthes 1967: 127).
The question is clearly rhetorical. Barthes is persuaded that by simply looking at its 
very structure, one can see that this kind of historical discourse is in its essence a form of
177 On Barthes's conception of narrative see also Chapter 5, whereas on his conception of myth see Chapter 
12.
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ideological elaboration: historical narratives are the result of an “imaginary elaboration”, 
i.e. of a performative speech-act through which the utterer of the discourse “fills out” the 
place of the subject o f the utterance. It is this performative speech-act that is responsible 
for what Barthes calls the “reality effect”, i.e. a new meaning that is extensive to all 
historical discourse and ultimately defines its pertinence and its reality itself. Thus, Barthes 
concludes, “historical discourse does not follow the real, it merely signifies it, constantly 
repeating "this happened \  without this assertion being anything but the signified wrong 
side of all historical narration” (Barthes 1967: 139).
According to Barthes then, it is quite understandable why at the privileged moment 
when history attempted to constitute itself as a genre, i.e. in the nineteenth century, 
historiography should have come to institute narration as a privileged signifier of the real: 
narrative history refuses to assume the real as a signified and thus, paradoxically, the 
narrative structure, which was elaborated in the crucible o f fictions and is the hallmark of 
myth, becomes for these historians the very sign and proof of reality (Barthes 1967: 140). 
Barthes thus contrasts this narrative history with what he considers a “veritable 
transformation” of contemporary historiography, which, by shifting the emphasis onto 
structures rather than events, has, in his view, liberated history from narrative (Barthes 
1967: 140).
Clearly, for Barthes narrative always implies a form of “distortion” (Barthes 1966). He 
made the point explicit in his “Introduction to the Structural analysis o f narrative”:
‘The function o f narrative is not to “represent”, it is to constitute a spectacle 
still very enigmatic for us, but in any case not of a mimetic order. The “reality” 
of a sequence lies not in the “natural” succession of actions composing it, but in 
the logic there exposed, risked and satisfied [...]Narrative does not show, does 
not imitate; the passion which may excite us in reading a novel is not that of a 
“vision” (in actual fact, we do not “see” anything). Rather it is that of a 
meaning, that o f a higher order of relation which also has its emotions, its 
hopes, its dangers, its triumphs” (Barthes 1966: 124).
In his Mythologies, Barthes sustained that myths are a form of ideological distortion of 
reality, and in particular one that presents that which is a product of contingency as natural, 
and therefore, eternal (Barthes 1957). Narrative history is also intrinsically distorting in 
this sense because it presents as “facts” that which is instead the constructed spectacle of a 
narrative. Even admitting Barthes’ definition o f myth and ideology as distortion, though, 
the problem within this perspective remains that, not only myth, but all kind of narratives, 
both mythical and historical, in as far as narrative is distorting per se are, as a consequence,
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to be characterised as “distorting” and thus “ideological” (in Barthes’s use of the term). 
How then can we distinguish between more or less mythological historical narratives? In 
other words, is there no historical narrative without distortion? What is the “reality” that 
they would distort?
As we have seen in his approach to narrative, Barthes moves from the assumption, 
drawn from the Russian formalists, according to which one can distinguish between two 
levels in a narrative: that o f the story or argument of the narrative and that the discourse or 
organisation of the argument, this latter only comprising tenses, aspects and modes o f the 
narrative (Barthes 1966: 87).178 But can these two levels really be distinguished? Is there 
any “natural” succession o f events that only later comes to be organised? If Nietzsche is 
right, as Barthes himself will recognise one year later, in saying that there are not facts as 
such but we must always begin by introducing a meaning in order to have a fact (Barthes 
1967: 138), then there is no basis for distinguishing between a “natural” succession of 
events from their “organisation” (Barthes 1966: 124). In other words, there is not, properly 
speaking, a “natural” sequence o f events since: as far as we perceive of a succession of 
events, they are always somehow already “organised” and thus invested with a meaning. 
To put it bluntly, whatever earlier stage of the perception of a sequence of events we take, 
the working of organisation has always already started.
Contemporary theorists have pushed this kind of argument further. Robert Young for 
instance seems to hold that if writing history always implies a process of selection and 
organisation of events in a narrative plot, i,e. in a totality within which only events are 
conferred a meaning, then the writing of history does not differ from the activity of 
creating a myth (Young 1990,1). In particular, in his view, the idea of “history” always 
reflects a totalising mode of organisation of events that is not only particularistic because, 
as Foucault sustained, each society has its own way of organising knowledge, but it is also 
mythological because it is based on the exclusion of the other’s perspective and thus, most 
often, results in the absolutisation of Western ethnocentrism (Young 1990).
History, so Young concludes, should then better be seen as simply a “white 
mythology”, i.e. “the “preposterous off-spring of a distorting egocentric illusion to which 
the children of a western Civilisation have succumbed like the children of all other 
Civilisations and known primitive societies” (Young 1990:19). The illusion consists here 
in the identification of the history of provincial Western societies with History writ large.
178 For a discussion of Barthes’ treatment of narrative see Chapter 5.
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With regards to this view, the emergence o f  postmodernism is thus the sign o f Western 
culture’s awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre o f the world 
(Young 1990,1).
Young is certainly right in his remark that postmodernism has brought about a new 
self-consciousness about a culture’s own historical relativity and thus a loss of the sense o f 
absoluteness of any Western account o f History. This new self-consciousness is perhaps its 
more permanent result. If one, however, were to further ask in what precisely the 
mythological aspect of the writing of history consists, two possible answers are available in 
Young’s account. In the first place, Young introduces the concept o f mythology by quoting 
a passage from Derrida’s critique of metaphysics as “white mythology”. The mythological 
aspect consists here in the illusion o f the universality o f metaphysics which calls itself 
“Reason” but is in fact an “Indo-European Mythology”, i.e. the mythos of a specific 
idiom” (Young 1990: 7). Myth, however, is here simply used in the polemical sense of 
illusion and, therefore, can be indifferently applied to both history and metaphysics as 
expressions of logocentrism. Young’s criticism seems to be directed toward a certain way 
of writing history, i.e. one that surreptitiously presents a specific history as history sans 
phrase (Young 1990:19); and, indeed, the white mythologies denounced in the title of his 
book are all those theories which, starting from Marxism, strive towards the idea o f a 
unique “world history” i.e. of history as totality.
A somewhat different argument is put forward, however, in the second chapter o f his 
book in which he criticises Sartre’s attempt to save the Marxist idea of history as a 
continuous totality. By reading Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist critique of Sartre as an example 
of deconstruction, Young suggests, with Lévi-Strauss, that history in general is the myth of 
modem man (Young 1990:45). Now it is the use of chronology itself, the code most often 
used by historians, which is said to create the illusory impression of a uniform, continuous 
progression; and it is in this sense that is said to be a myth. Dates, he observes, tell us 
something only in as far as they are members o f a class which, in turn, may or may not 
correspond to other classes such as periods, millennia, ages and therefore always reflect a 
specific organisation o f an event (Young 1990:46).
This is a crucial point. Even if one rejects Young’s polemical usage of the concept of 
myth as illusion, his remarks over chronology must be further discussed. Young seems 
here to suggest that the simple organisation of events according to a chronology implies a 
high degree of choice and interpretation. However, to this view one can object even the
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very perception of “one or more events” already implies a process o f selection and 
therefore organisation for what e-venit. Indeed, as we have suggested in Chapter 5, there 
are no events without them being already organized.
On the other hand though, while narrative always implies a certain organisation, 
“organisation” does not necessarily mean the superimposition o f a “dramatised” form, nor 
even a “distortion” through the imposition of a “fictitious coherence” that would otherwise 
lack reality. Indeed, events in as far as they mean something to us, always already exhibit 
some kind of organisation. The point, therefore, becomes rather to determine the degree of 
this organisation. Indeed, if in order to have a narrative we merely need a sequence of 
events, one must then recognise that not all sequences of events constitute a drama. And, as 
we shall see, in contrast to myth, historical narratives necessarily presuppose the former, 
but not the latter.
Narratives presuppose a plot that organises events: it is the plot that confers events a 
meaning as part of a whole. But the point is that this whole does not need to be a dramatic 
plot, nor even a “coherent” whole, as modernist literature shows. It just needs to be a 
whole. And, as we shall see, it is only when this whole that constitutes a narrative becomes 
“dramatic” that historical narratives can come to work as political myths. In other words, in 
order to have a historical narrative working as a myth, something else other than a mere 
narrative is needed. Let us dwell for a moment on the possible forms o f historical narrative. 
What kind of forms do they take?
Hayden White faces the problem in his The content o f  the form : narrative - this is his 
major argument - is not an empty form that can or cannot be added to a given content, but 
it is rather already a content in itself (White 1987: x). Thus, if narrative always brings 
content with it, the problem becomes to determine what kind o f content is entailed in each 
single form of historical writing. In the first o f the essays collected in The content o f  the 
form , White analyses three different examples o f historical genres - annals, the chronicle 
and narrative history -  and looks at the role played by narrative within them.
Annals, he observes, typically consist of a lacunose lists of events, where there 
apparently are none of the elements that we traditionally associate with narrative: there is 
no central subject, no central characters, no well marked beginning, middle and end, as 
well as no narrative voice whatsoever: apparently, thus, no narrative at all (White 1987: 
70). Subsequently, however, he takes a specific example: the Annals o f  Saint Gall. By 
looking more carefully at this lacunose list of events, it comes to light that there are criteria
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according to which “events” are ordered as well as on the basis o f which they are given the 
status of events at all (White 1987: 70).
Indeed, in all annals, and this is the sense o f their name, events are registered under the 
year in which they occurred; the years are then ordered chronologically and for each year 
only what it is held to be most important is actually ranked as an event. Thus, in the Annals 
o f Saint Gall, we find “Charles fought against the Saxons” next to the year 720, the 
registration of “great crops” next to “722” and nothing next to ‘7 2 3 ”, ‘724” etc. whereas 
the entry *732” registers that “Charles fought against the Saracens at Poiters on Saturday”, 
where the fact that the battle took place on Saturday seems to be given the same weight as 
the “great crops” of 722 or the fact that, in 725, “Saracens came for the first time”. Clearly 
thus, there is an organisation of events even in annals: “there is surely a plot, so writes 
White, if by plot we mean a structure o f relationships by which the events contained in the 
account are endowed with a meaning by being identified as parts o f an integrated whole” 
(White 1987: 9).
What then differentiates Annals from other types of historical genres such as chronicles 
or historical narratives? Chronicles, White observes, are held to be superior forms of 
historical representations because of their greater comprehensiveness, their organisation of 
material by topics and reigns and their greater narrative coherence. The chronicle, for 
instance, has a central subject such as the life o f an individual or a town or an institution or 
some great events such as war or crusades (White 1987: 16). Still, White observes, there is 
something that distinguishes the chronicle from other superior forms o f historical narrative: 
chronicles - like annals but unlike the history - do not so much conclude as simply 
terminate; typically they lack closure, that summing up of the “meaning” of a chain of 
events that we normally expect from well-made stories. Chronicles may promise a closure, 
but usually do not provide it, and this is the reason why the nineteenth century editors of 
the medieval chronicles denied them the status o f genuine history (White 1978: 16).
In contrast to both annals and chronicles, the story told by narrative history does not 
simply terminate, but actually concludes. All the narrative expectations of a reader are 
indeed satisfied: there is an identifiable subject, there is a well constructed plot with a 
beginning, middle and a proper end to the story: in a word, there is closure, a completeness 
that was absent in “inferior” forms of historiography. And according to White, the fullness 
and completeness of narrative that we experience in “superior” forms o f historical narrative 
signals to us that what was lacking in the annals* incomplete list o f events is indeed the
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notion of centre with respect to which to rank events: there is no single perspective that 
enables the annalist to make a complete story out of scattered events and these, as a 
consequence, appear to lack the ethical significance that is provided by a closed story 
(White 1987).
Going back to the Annals o f Saint Gall, White argues that there is a correspondence 
here between the absence of a closed narrative structure and the absence of a social centre 
providing a single perspective for ranking events. Without such a social centre, Charles’s 
campaigns against the Saxons remains simply a “fight”, the invasion of Saracens simply a 
“coming”, and the fact that the battle o f Poitiers was fought on Saturday as important as 
the fact that it was fought at all or the fact that the year 722 witnessed great crops (White 
1987: 11). Any well-made story, we can add, has a moral, and the reason why the annals 
seem to lack the structure of a real story is that they do not have any explicit moral to 
relate.
This analysis of the annals’ form, according to White, suggests that Hegel was right 
when he stated that a genuinely historical account has to display not only a certain form, 
namely the narrative, but also a certain content, and that this content coincides with a 
“political order”. The ranking of events always reflects criteria, and their ranking in the 
kind o f historical narrative that Hegel was referring to clearly reflects a political criterion. 
Thus, as White points out, for Hegel the content of the specifically historical discourse was 
not the story of “what happened”, but the peculiar relation between a public present and a 
past that a state endowed with a certain political constitution (White 1987: 29). As we read 
in Hegel’s passage from the Lectures on the Philosophy o f History, “in our language the 
term History unites the objective with the subjective side, and denotes quite as much the 
historia rerum gestarum, as the res gestae themselves; on the other hand, it comprehends 
not less what has happened, than the narration of what has happened. This union of the two 
meanings we must regard as of a higher order than mere outwards accident; we must 
suppose historical narrations to have appeared contemporaneously with historical deeds 
and events” (Vorlesungen fiber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Einleitung, C).
The historical narrative to which Hegel refers, according to White, unlike the Annals, 
reveals to us a world that is “finished”, “done with”, “over”. They exhibit a narrative 
closure that precisely because it is too embarrassing has to be presented as “found” in the 
events rather than placed there by narrative techniques. Indeed, it is precisely because
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narrative history provides us with a degree of coherence to which we ourselves aspire that 
the events presented by the narrative appear real; as White concludes:
‘The demand for closure in the historical story is a demand, I suggest, for a 
moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real events be assessed as to their 
significance as elements of a moral drama. Has any historical narrative ever been 
written that was not informed not only by moral awareness but specifically by the 
moral authority o f the narrator? It is difficult to think of any historical work 
produced during the nineteenth century, the classical age of historical narrative, that 
was not given the force of a moral judgement on the events that it related (White 
1987: 22; emphasis added).
According to this later suggestion, one could assume that historical narratives and 
political myths fundamentally coincide: in both cases their “narrative organisation” would 
indeed reflect a need for significance, and therefore the need for events to be assessed 
within the plot of a moral drama. In particular, if political myths are the working on a 
narrative that responds to a need for significance and historical narratives stem also from 
“a demand o f real events to be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral 
drama", then there seems to be no difference between the two. Furthermore, whereas 
White seems to hold that not all forms of historical writing directly address a need for 
significance, and seems therefore to limit his claim to narrative history, more recently there 
have been authors who seem to extend the same remark to all kinds o f history.
According to Jonathan Friedman for instance, history is a mythical construction 
because it is always a representation o f the past subordinated to the establishment of an 
identity in the present. In his article on “Myth, history, and political identity ”, he states that 
an objectivist history must necessarily be produced in the context of a certain kind of 
selfhood, namely one that is based on the radical separation o f the subject from any 
particular identity, and which objectifies and textualises reality (Friedman 1992: 194), In 
this sense, there would then be no difference between myth and history: the common 
understanding of history as a stream of events or as a temporal continuum whose empirical 
existence is unquestionable would, in turn, be a mythology - or better the peculiar myth of 
Western societies (Friedman 1992: 206).
We have seen that Young sustains a similar thesis, but he seems to limit it to those 
accounts presenting the history of western societies as the History sans phrase. Friedman is 
an anthropologist and justifies his claim that history is mythical through the analysis of two 
case studies. In this article “Myth, history, and political identity ” he analyses in the first
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place the shift in the perception of the eighteenth century Greeks of their previous history 
from that of “Romans” (Romoioi) to that of “Greeks”, or heirs o f the Hellenic civilisation. 
In a second step, he moves on to analyse the Hawaiians’ reconstruction of their history as 
opposed to Western “history”. However, this seems not to be sufficient to sustain the 
proposition that myth and history coincide because both the examples clearly deal with two 
peculiar historical narratives, i.e. narratives that are manifestly linked to two situations of 
struggle over a political identity.
Friedman moves from the observation that the 18th century construction of Greek 
national identity is largely due to the activity of a class of expatriate Greek merchants who, 
in contrast to a discontinuous Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman past, were led to rediscover 
Ancient Greece via Western European self-identity: in this latter, from the Renaissance 
onwards, Greece played a pivotal role as the birthplace of everything specifically 
“Western”. Thus, Greek national identity consisted in the importation and establishment of 
the European identification of Greece, just as Greek history became the European history 
of the Ancients (Friedman 1992: 195). The establishment of a particular history was the 
work of a process of political identity construction, both for Europe and for Greece as an 
emergent periphery in the European world system. Thus, Friedman shows how, whereas 
Greek history internalises the external gaze of its European other, making Greece, in its 
fashion, the ancestor of Europe instead of a mere political and economic periphery, 
Hawaiian history extricates itself from Western dominance by projecting a value system 
produced in the modem context onto an aboriginal past (Friedman 1992: 207). From the 
analysis of these two case studies it is patent that -  as the very title of the essay also 
indicates - Friedman’s focus is more on the way in which historical narratives are 
elaborated and re-elaborated according to a certain politics of identity rather than on what 
characterises historical narratives per se.
If Friedman can conclude that history is largely mythical, this is because he chooses 
these two case studies where historical and mythical narrative do indeed coincide. But can 
we conclude from these two examples that history is always mythical? Certainly history is 
always positional.179 As much as myth, history always reflects the point of view o f the 
present and is continuously retold from this point of view.
179 It should be clear from what precedes that when we speak of “history”, we speak in fact of the “writing of 
history”: history exists only in as much as it is accessible to us and therefore only as already interpreted 
events.
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In the first place, historical narratives select what constitutes an “event”. In this sense, 
they are constructed on oblivion as much as on memory (Strath 2000). The process of the 
selection of events can go from their deliberated occultation to their effectual perception 
according to non-intentional criteria. Secondly, as we have seen, events thus identified 
also go through a process of their further organisation and elaboration -  without though, in 
reality, it even being possible to distinguish between the two moments of selection and 
organisation.
Thus, Friedman is right when he points out that history is always the organisation o f 
the past in terms of a present situation: the selection-organisation o f events cannot but 
reflect our present condition and, therefore, also our future hopes and expectations. The 
past is always constructed according to the conditions and desires of those who produce 
historical texts in the present. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, identity in the 
present is also organised in terms of a past, as well as of a future, that is already organised 
by the present: this is indeed the circularity that is constitutive of the social-historical. 
Political myth - this is the major point - also operates from the point o f view of the present, 
but it does so in a somewhat different way.
Let me illustrate the point by going back to Friedman’s two case studies. In fact, both 
the Greek and the Hawaiian examples point to the fact that the mythical side of the 
historical narrative analysed consisted precisely in their being part of a politics of identity: 
in order to construct a common Greek or Hawaiian political identity the past needed to be 
anchored to a viable present. In other words, they show that, to put it bluntly, myth is the 
politics of history: it is precisely in order to spell out this potential political side of the 
historical narratives analysed that Friedman has recourse to the concept of myth.
Analogously one can argue that there is nothing mythical per se for instance in the 
identification of history with the history of W estern societies that Young criticises as 
“white mythologies”. On the other hand, he is right in saying that this narrative can come 
to play the role of a political myth. To put it in SOrel’s words, myth always contains a 
determination to act, and this determination become specifically political when it addresses 
specifically political conditions. Indeed, it is when it comes to political actions and 
conditions that historical narratives can work as political myths. If  myth and history - as we 
have seen - with some exceptions share a narrative form,180 what they differ in is that myth,
180 Not all historical writings are indeed narrative. Historical statistics are perhaps a good example: one could 
argue that they are a sequence of events, but they would still lack a plot in order to be classified as narratives. 
For a discussion of the concept of narrative, see also above Chapter 5.
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in order to nourish a determination to act, has to put a drama on the stage, or better, it has 
to be received as a drama. Political myths are stories that make their moral explicit in order 
to prompt political action. Political myths are thus “positional” in a different way respect to 
the way in which history is positional. In other words, political myths must directly 
respond a need for significance, whereas this is not necessarily the case with historical 
narratives.
Political myths, as we have seen, have a particularistic nature, because they must 
provide significance here and now, otherwise they cease to be political myths. ‘T o  be 
significant” always means “to be significant for someone and under certain conditions”. As 
a consequence, there are no universal political myths, but only particular ones -  and this at 
least partially explains why political philosophy has often neglected the topic. There can be 
attempts at a “universal history”, but not at a “universal political myth”. What is a political 
myth for certain subjects, here and now, may well no longer be a political myth even for 
the same people in another context or for different people in the same context.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that, as we have seen, political myths and historical 
narratives quite often are so intermingled as to coincide, analytically speaking we should 
keep the two categories separate. This can enable us to grasp the differences between 
certain phenomena that would otherwise be lost. Whereas not all historical narratives are 
necessarily political myths, not all political myths are historical narratives. The narrative of 
the general strike, that o f the society without class or the myth of the millennium, all of 
which have worked in the past as political myths, are, for instance, all constructed in the 
future dimension. Thus, even if one could argue that they presuppose certain historical 
narratives, they are not themselves genuine historical narratives.
This leads to a crucial point. The working on myth operates with a degree of freedom 
that is impossible in historical narratives. Certainly, as we have seen, the historian also 
looks at the past in light of the present and future but, to use Friedrich Schlegel’s 
expression, he is a “turned-back prophet.”181 Both historians and myth-makers are prophets 
since both look at the past and at the present in light of the future, but the fact that the 
historian is a “turned-back prophets” puts on him further constraints that are not pending 
on the activity o f the myth-maker. For instance, typically today, the mythmaker will be
181 The "prophet”, in F. Schlegel's use of the term, is a “poet-philosopher” (Schlegel 1798, Fragm. 249) and 
thus something close to an ideal-typical mythmaker. Nevertheless, as we have seen, a myth rather consists in 
the working on myth and there is no such thing, therefore, as a single mythmaker: at best we could speak of 
myth-makers/receivers.
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believed because he tells a variant of a story that addresses the need for significance, 
whereas the historian -  at least the modem historian - will have to rely on method.182
Tudor made a similar point when he wrote that the understanding provided by myth is 
a directly practical understanding, i.e. an understanding in which human beings consider 
the world that confronts them, not as an object of disinterested curiosity, but as the direct 
material for their activity (Tudor 1972: 123). One can certainly question the idea that the 
activity of the historian could ever be completely “disinterested”, but Tudor points in the 
right direction when he says that sometimes human beings engaged in practical affairs 
certainly do think, but think in a different way. For instance, he sustains, people confronted 
with the prospect o f death, disgrace or serious deprivation will not easily be persuaded to 
see other fellows’ points of view, nor are they likely to engage in disinterested reflections 
on human existence. What they require is the confidence to act, and this confidence is 
often to be induced by their holding the firm conviction that their cause is just and that they 
are certain to emerge victorious (Tudor 1972: 134).
Certainly this is an extreme case, but it points out that the types of interests at stake, 
both in the working on myth and in historical research, can coincide, but they may also 
diverge. This does not imply though that, as Tudor concludes, in the practical 
understanding provided by myth, in contrast to history, “no doubt, some distortion of facts 
does occur” (Tudor 1972: 123). As we have seen, historians, even without any 
manipulative intent, also distort facts; or rather, the very notion o f fact always implies a 
process of selection, choice and organisation so that it becomes difficult to determine 
where distortion starts and whether it could not have occurred.
The point therefore is not to counterpoise “practical” and thus “distorted” 
understanding versus “disinterested” and thus “faithful” reconstructions of events. Rather it 
is to contrast a discipline that was constituted around a method, with an activity, i.e. the 
working on myth that does not share the advantage and disadvantage of a method. Indeed, 
properly speaking, to talk of a “myth-maker” is an abuse of language: not only, as we have 
seen, is a myth made by its production-reception but it is an entire working on myth that is 
always at stake. This does not mean that a similar working on historical narrative does not 
occur: the professional historian does not operate in the social vacuum. Still, the very fact 
that there could be a professional historian is the sign of a difference: the activity of the
182 Ankersmit too, who sustains that no writing of history is possible without “representation”, recognised the 
centrality of the methodological aspects: it is here that the working of what he calls “transversal reason" can 
be seen (Ankersmit 2001).
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historian lends itself to a definition through a method. Notwithstanding the endless 
discussion that this point may open over the nature of this method, it still remains that the 
idea of a method implies that of an organon, i.e. of a series of more or less standardised 
rules and practises against which the correctness of the account will be assessed.
No “mythical method” exists or has ever existed. And this is probably because most 
often, as has been observed, political myths operate at the level of unquestioned beliefs 
held in common by social groups (Flood 1996). Thus, whereas narratives deriving from a 
method are somehow visible, political myths are difficult to even perceive and to be 
determined. As Lance Bennett observed, dealing with the North American case, political 
myths are difficult to analyse because they are such basic components of everyday 
perception: they cannot be seen as the things that the people see when they look at the 
world, because they are rather the things they see with. “Myths, he concludes, are truths 
about society that often remain unperceived because they are woven throughout everyday 
social discourse from dinner table conversation, to the morals of television programs, to 
the lofty policy debates of congress” (Bennett 1980:167)183.
Certainly historical narratives are also a part of the social imaginary constituted 
through different kinds o f social practices. And indeed, it is practically sometimes very 
difficult to distinguish between historical and mythical discourses, since in our everyday 
life they are often interwoven. Historical narratives do not live only in the libraries and 
archives where the modem historian is asked to produce them, but they also emerge out of 
social life. On the other hand, in as far as historical writings started to be defined in terms 
of a method, there has been the possibility to perceive them and thus criticise them on the 
basis of their formal correctness: the modem historian has to make footnotes; he is 
expected to refer to evidence, i.e. to other, in principle revisable, narratives. Typically 
today, he is asked to refer to documents, archives and all material that constitutes forms of 
“rationalised memory” i.e. the set o f information about and accounts of the past as it is 
contained in archives, processed in the form of written or visualised narratives that are 
accessible on demand (White 2000).184
183 On Bennett’s analysis see in particular Chapter 12.
184 White distinguishes between “rationalised memory and “traditionalised memory” as information about 
and accounts of the past latently stored in fables, tales, commonplaces, customs and prejudices. White argues 
that, whereas rationalised memory might comprehend traditionalised knowledge, the reverse is not the case. 
One could criticise this latter statement but the distinction between the two categories is certainly helpful in 
order to stress that the two may also enter into tension.
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Thus, whereas the work of the historian, at least in modem Western societies, is 
locatable, the working of myth is difficult even to perceive, and this is the reason why it 
could never be formalised through a method. Both, at the same time, are constitutive of 
those imaginary significations that contribute to providing a meaning to everyday 
experience and without which no society could ever survive. After the so-called “linguistic 
turn” and the emergence of constructivism, different approaches have been pointing to this 
crucial dimension of social life. The exponential number o f publications on “symbolic 
construction” and the “invention of societies and communities” has pointed out that no 
social life is possible outside of a symbolic network.185Political myths and historical 
narrative both contribute and often converge in the production of these social 
significations, but they do it in somewhat different ways. To put it bluntly, myths stem 
from a need for significance. Historical narratives can also, in principle, come from a 
simple need for meaning.
More than thirty years ago, Cornelius Castoriadis introduced the concept of social 
imaginary in order to stress what he still perceived to be a neglected side of social life. His 
reasoning was quite straightforward: all acts, both individual and collective, without which 
any society could survive - labour, consumption, love, war etc - are not only and not 
always directly symbols themselves, but are impossible outside of a symbolic network 
(Castoriadis 1975: 181). All functions performed within any society are, in fact, “functions 
o f something”, i.e. they are functions only in as far as their ends can be defined. These 
ends, which vary from society to society as well as from one epoch to the other, can only 
be defined at the level o f those social significations without which no social function or 
need could ever be defined: this is the level at which the “social imaginary” operates 
(Castoriadis 1975).
Castoriadis moves from the insight that a functionalist view, i.e. a view reducing the 
problem of social significations to the ambit o f the functional, is only partially correct: as 
far as it aspires to present the whole truth about the nature of the social-historical it is a 
mere projection. It pretends to identify a general rule, but in fact it projects over the whole 
course of history an idea derived not even from the everyday life o f Western capitalist 
societies -  that, notwithstanding the processes o f rationalisation are always only partially
185 On the symbolic dimension of community, see for instance Edelman 1964,1988, Cohen 1985. Cohen 
moves from Geertz’s definition of the human being as “an animal suspended in a web of significance”, but he 
does not distinguish between significance and meaning, both conflated under the heading of symbolism 
(Cohen 1985).
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functional -  but, rather, from what it would like these societies to be (Castoriadis 1975: 
197). Capitalist societies are no exception: rather, given the crucial role played by the 
social creation of needs, they ever more manifestly exhibit the working of the social 
imaginary (Castoriadis 1975). Any society continually defines and redefines its needs and 
none of them can therefore ever survive outside of the imaginary significations that 
constitute it and are constituted by it: the institution of a society presupposes the institution 
o f imaginary significations that must, in principle, be able to provide meaning for whatever 
presents itself.
Certainly, Castoriadis observes, there are limits to this symbolic order. To put it in 
Blumenberg’s terms, the world is always a work of art, but it can never be a total work of 
art (Blumenberg 1979). The working of the social imaginary must always start from the 
material that “it finds already there"’: there are limits posed by nature itself, (so that, for 
instance, all societies define the meaning of nourishment, but they all must take the need 
for it into account), by the rationality, i.e. the coherence of the symbolic edifice as well as 
the limits imposed by history itself: every symbolism is constructed on the ruins of 
precedent symbolic buildings and even in order to radically break with it it has to start with 
those very premises (Castoriadis 1975: 188). Notwithstanding all these limits, the social 
imaginary has a capacity of virtual universal covering so that any irruption of the raw 
world can immediately be treated as “a sign of something”, i.e. it can be interpreted away 
and thus exorcised. Even that which collides with this order can be subject to a symbolic 
processing: transgressions to social rule can become “illnesses”, completely alien societies 
that are fundamentally at odds with a given social imaginary can become “strangers”, 
“savages” or even “impious” (Castoriadis 1988).
At the same time though, Castoriadis observes, the major threat to the instituted society 
is its own creativity. The merit of Castoriadis’s concept of radical social imaginary is to 
point out that the instituted social imaginary is always at the same time instituting. No 
society could ever exist if the individuals created by the society itself would not create it. 
There seems to be circularity at the basis of the relationship between individuals and the 
social imaginary. This is the primitive circle o f the institution of society that Spinoza also 
emphasised: society exists only if it can exist in the imagination of individuals that, in turn, 
could not exist without the society they are part of.186
186 On this point, see also Chapter 8.
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The individual, thus, Castoriadis observes, is not contingent in relation to society. 
Society can exist concretely only through the fragmentary and complementary incarnation 
and incorporation of its institution and its imaginary significations in the living, talking and 
acting individuals o f that society. Athenian society is nothing but the Athenians, he 
observes: without them it is only remnants o f a  transformed landscape, the debris of marble 
and vases, indecipherable inscriptions, worn statues fished out o f the Mediterranean. But 
the Athenians are Athenians only by means o f  the nomos o f the polis. It is in this 
relationship between an instituted society on the one hand — which infinitely transcends the 
totality of the individuals that “compose” it, but which can actually exist only by being 
“realised” in the individuals it manufactures — and these individuals, on the other, that we 
experience an unprecedented type of relationship which cannot be thought of under the 
category of the whole and its parts, the set and its elements and, even less, the universal 
and the particular (Castoriadis 1988: 145)
Still, Castoriadis seems to open up this circle when he speaks o f an “absolute scission” 
between the two poles of the instituted/instituting social imaginary: the social-historical on 
the one hand187 and what he calls the “psyche” or “psychical monad” on the other (see in 
particular Castoriadis 1975: 470). The psyche is monadic since, in Castoriadis*s view, it is 
“pure representational/ affective/ intentional flux”, indeterminate and, in principle, un- 
masterable. Thus, according to this view, it is only through an always-incomplete violent 
and forceful process of socialisation that a social individual can be produced. According to 
Castoriadis, this happens through a process o f schooling that starts with the very first 
encounter with language, in the first place the language spoken by the mother: in this way, 
the psyche is forced to give up its initial objects and to invest in (cathecting) socially 
instituted objects, rules and the world. Thus, it is through the internalisation o f the worlds 
and the imaginary significations created by society that an “individual” properly speaking 
is created out of a “screaming monster” (Castoriadis 1988: 148)
As has been observed, Castoriadis*s thesis about the monadic isolation and the 
fundamental “hetereogeneity” between the psyche and society seems to lead to a highly 
problematic, and thus untenable, metaphysical opposition (Habermas 1985, XI, Excursus). 
Once we find ourselves within the monadic isolation o f the unconscious, it becomes 
difficult to even explain how communication is possible in the first place (Whitebook
187 With regards to the relationship between the terms "society’* and the “social- historical”, the latter is 
preferable since, in contrast to the term “society”, it does not suggest the idea of an entity endowed with 
clear-cut boundaries, which is contrary to Castoriadis’s own idea of magmatic logic.
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1989).188 However, Castoriadis’s insights into the role of the instituting and instituted 
social imaginary do not need to rely on such metaphysical assumptions. What appears at 
first sight to be a theory deeply dependent on psychoanalysis can in fact also be read from 
a different perspective.
Amason, for instance, points out that Castoriadis’s major contribution has been to link 
a radicalised idea of imagination with the problematic of meaning (Amason 1989a, 1989b). 
Castoriadis’s work has certainly contributed to the recent rediscovery of the importance of 
images and imagination in social life as well as to the development of a much more 
complex view of social imagination.189 190This is reflected in two aspects of his theory: first 
the idea of a “radical imagination”, and second the emphasis on the idea of “social 
imaginary".
As for the first, the term “radical” has here the function to stress that, as Aristotle 
sustained, together with an imitative and reproductive or combinatory “phanta$ia'\m  there 
is also what can be called a primary imagination, that is the faculty o f producing those 
“images in the largest possible sense (that of “forms”, “Bilder ”) without which there would 
not be any thought at all, and that therefore precede any thought (Castoriadis 1994).
The reason why imagination came to be associated with the idea of fictitiousness is that 
it is created ex nihilo - not in nihilo or cum nihilo -  and the Western ensemble logic, which 
starts with the identity assumption ex nihilo nihil, could not as a consequence but conceive 
of imagination as essentially non-existence. To this identitary and ensemblistic logic, 
which could never account for the fact that when “x = x” is it is always “x = non X”, 
Castoriadis counterpoises the logic of magmas: this sees significations not as “determinate 
beings” but as “faisceaux de renvois” that are certainly always determinable but never 
determinate (Castoriadis 1975: V, 1).
Thus, to sum up, the expression “radical imagination” has the function of conveying 
two ideas: the connection with the idea of imagination and creation, and with the “radical” 
side of it, i.e. with the fact that “this imagination is before the distinction between “real” 
and “fictitious” or, to put it bluntly, it is because radical imagination exists that “reality”
188 Whitebook argues that Habermas could not but sharply criticise Castoriadis’s theory of the psyche: 
whereas Castoriadis starts with the monadic isolation and the problem then become to establish how 
communication is possible, Habermas starts, on the contrary, with the fact of communication and the problem 
then becomes how this can be deformed in the unconscious (Whitebook 1989).
189 On the role of imagination in the study o f social and political sciences see recently Rundell 1994 and 
Friese 2001.
190 As Friese notices, it is again only in modem times that the term “fantasy” was definitely associated with 
the ambit of the fictitious and unreal (Friese 2001).
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exists for us -  and therefore, one can add, it exists tout court -  and thus it exists as it 
exists” (Castoriadis 1994).
Thus, as the concept of social imaginary points out, there is not a subject and a reality 
that stays facing it. Rather, the passage from the concept o f imagination to that of 
imaginary precisely reflects a change from a subject oriented approach to a context 
oriented one (Amason 1994). Castoriadis’s concept of social imaginary also has the 
function of underlining the notion that the definition o f “reality” itself depends on the 
working of the instituting and instituted social imaginary, and not vice versa (Castoriadis 
1975: 242; 1991:147).
The fact that, as we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the word “reality” comes into being 
only relatively late and that it has been conceived in very different ways, is the sign that the 
emergence of a new word, “reality”, was also the emergence o f a different conception of 
the “real”. All societies have somehow constituted their “reality” and it is for this reason 
that any distinction between myth and history as “unreal” and “real” accounts respectively 
cannot be but of limited efficacy.
On the other hand, it is precisely by moving from the idea o f  the “radical social 
imaginary” that we can try to restate the difference between political myths and historical 
narratives. Indeed, if both myths and historical narratives are constitutive of the social 
imaginary, i.e. of the imaginary significations through which any society institutes itself by 
being at the same time instituted by them, they are so in a different way. Generally 
speaking, we can explain the difference between the two by saying that political myths do 
not only answer the need for meaning, i.e. that for a symbolic mediation o f reality, but they 
must also coagulate and produce significance.
As a consequence, political myths can be seen as a site both for the construction of an 
instituting social imaginary and for the working o f a radical political imagination. Myths 
are not simply symbols, and political myths in particular are not only mapping devices: 
they also contain a determination to act, and this determination affects the specifically 
political conditions of a given society.
Therefore the work on political myths is radical in two senses. On the one hand, 
because it operates at the level of the coagulation and reproduction o f  significance as it has 
been defined in Chapter 6. Therefore, in contrast to historical narratives, political myths are 
often not even perceivable: there can be professional historians, but no professional 
mythmakers. Political myths are difficult to analyse because they are not only a part of the
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world that we experience, they are also, and foremost, the lenses through which we see this 
world.
If, in this sense, political myths contribute to the self-perpetuation of a given social 
imaginary, they can also, on the other hand, be one of the sites for the questioning of this 
same imaginary. Moreover, they can be the sites for the questioning of the specifically 
political conditions of an instituting and instituted society. Otherwise stated, the “not yet 
determined animal”(Chapter 6) is an animal that produces myth in order to satisfy her/his 
need for significance, but precisely because s/he is always not yet determined s/he can also 
always (potentially) question her/his own conditions of existence.
Put in Castoriadis’s terms, the idea of the radical character o f imagination is also linked 
to the project of autonomy. As Castoriadis points out, if autonomy must be conceived as 
the possibility to give oneself one’s own law, i.e. to institute a critical relationship with the 
discourses that are given, then imagination is also radical because, by its own creativity, it 
can also question not only what is given but also its own products (Castoriadis 1988, 
1994).
If  autonomy means interrogation, then political myths can be the site, not only for the 
instituting working of the social imaginary, but also for the opening up of the crucial 
question: “why these significations and not any other?”. Clearly this does not mean that 
political myths are always means for interrogation. The working on myth can also tends 
towards a closure of meaning.191 192As Castoriadis observes, it could even turn out to be the 
case that no autonomous society has ever existed, since all societies tend to conceal, by 
different means, the instituting dimension of the social imaginary. However, the concept 
of the radical imagination points to the fact that the working on political myth can also be 
the site for interrogation.
Castoriadis sees the creative dimension of imagination essentially as a capacity for 
interrogation, i.e. as a capacity for questioning the given. But there is another dimension of 
imagination stressed by Paul Ricoeur: for Ricoeur the creativity of imagination is linked to 
a capacity for fictionalising that we find in the logic of action. There is no action without 
imagination. People, as Sorel also has pointed out, need to represent their upcoming
191 Some suggestions on the conditions under which political myths produce a closure of meaning can be 
found in Chapter 12.
192 Since the instituting dimension of the social imaginary is the major threat to the stability of the instituted 
society itself, it is against this threat that the strongest defences are set up. These consist in the denial and 
covering up of the instituting dimension of society through the imputation of the origins of the institution and 
of its social significations to an extra-social source, such as Gods, heroes or ancestors (Castoriadis 1988).
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actions in terms of a narrative that makes significance of their conditions. This capacity to 
fictionalise through the combination o f unusual predicates, according to Ricoeur, is a 
capacity to “radically rethink” that he, employing Mannheim’s terminology, calls 
“utopian” (Ricoeur 1994).
To conclude, political myth can also be one o f the sites for the working of both these 
creative dimensions of imagination: as we have seen, for instance, the myth of the state of 
nature or that of the general strike can be both the direct means for questioning what is 
given as well as for utopian thinking and action. This does not mean that historical 
narratives are excluded from these dimensions: the concept o f political myth simply signals 
that, in as far as historical narratives come to  play this role, they are then no longer 
operating only as historical narratives but also as political myths.
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1L MYTH AND IDENTITY
In an early article on Die politische Theorie des My thus, (1923) Carl Schmitt sustains the 
existence of a strict relationship between the emergence of a political theory of myth and 
the crises of parliamentarism. The theory of myth, he contends, is the most powerful sign 
of the decline of the rationalism of parliamentary thought (Schmitt 1923: 17). His 
argument can be summarised as follows: if myth is the “symptom of an energy”, of an 
“enormous enthusiasm”, then the mechanism of what he calls “the discussing, bargaining 
and parliamentaring procedures” cannot but appear as a “betrayal of myth” and a 
fundamental infidelity to the vital enthusiasm from which myth derives (Schmitt 1923: 13).
Schmitt, in the first chapter of his Political Theology (1922), had been identifying in 
a “philosophy of concrete life” the basis for his intellectual enterprise. Sovereign, so states 
his decisionist thesis exposed at the beginning o f the book, is he who decides on the state 
of exception. According to Schmitt, and in contrast to common understanding, it is 
exception that creates the rule, and not vice versa: the exception precedes the rule both 
temporally and logically, since the rule, which in his view is only appropriate in the 
“prosaic conditions of normal life”, proves nothing whereas the exception proves 
everything. Indeed, Schmitt continues, “in the exception the power of real life breaks 
through the crust of a mechanism that has become torbid by repetition”; therefore, a 
philosophy of concrete life cannot withdraw from the exception and the extreme case, but 
must be interested in it to the highest degree (Schmitt 1922: 13-15).
It is moving from such vitalistic premises, not lacking in a Nietzschean echo, that 
Schmitt is led to privilege the moment of decision and exception to the following of a 
norm: it is in the former that the real life comes to light and breaks in a moment “the crust 
of a mechanism”. As is well known, Schmitt is here referring to the debate on the 
institutions of the Weimar republic and expressions such as “crust of mechanism” are a 
form of criticism towards the working o f  its parliamentary institutions. Parliamentarism is 
identified by Schmitt with a form o f “government by discussion”: the principle of 
discussion and of reasoning that he saw at work in the institutions of the Weimar republic 
is, according to his vitalistic decisionism, the “strongest opposite” to the real life of myth 
(Schmitt 1923: 11).
Therefore, it is not by chance that his article on “Die politische Théorie des Mythus” 
also appears as the final chapter of the text where Schmitt analyses The Crises o f  
Parliamentary Democracy. Here, significantly, the article appears with another title: 
“Irrationalist Theories o f Direct Use o f Force” . The major part of the article is indeed 
devoted to analysing Sorel’s view of myth, and, as we will see, it is by presenting his own 
interpretation of Sorel that Schmitt puts forward his view o f political myth as a symptom 
of a national energy.
Myths, according to Schmitt’s reading o f Sorel, are the direct expression of concrete 
life, of a Bergsonian élan vital that is alien and also hostile to discussion and rational 
mediation. For this reason, Schmitt takes the emergence of the theories of myth as the 
clearest sign of the crises o f parliamentarism. In Schmitt’s reading, Sorel’s myth stands to 
rationality as decision on the exception stands to parliamentarism; as a consequence, the 
rationalism of parliamentary discussion cannot but appear as a “betrayal” of the 
irrationality of myth.193Thus, according to Schmitt, Sorel’s theory o f the general strike is 
necessarily linked, not only to Sorel’s preference for violence over the institutional 
participation predicated by parliamentary socialists, but also to the intellectual choice for a 
sort of irrationalism that is substantially at odds with any form of discussion.
The only point where, according to Schmitt, Sorel was wrong was in his diagnosis of 
the contemporary forces for the production o f myth. If  myth, as Schmitt following Sorel 
argues, is the criterion for deciding whether one nation or a social group has a historical 
mission and has reached its historical momentum (Schmitt 1926:68), then we must
193 On Schmitt’s interpretation of myth as irrationality and particularly on the influence of Nietzsche for the 
development of this view see McCormick 1997: Ch2.
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conclude that the strongest myth of modernity is not that of class conflict, but that of the 
nation. The myth of class conflict, he observes, has been created by the diffusion of an 
image that was capable of intensifying all the emotions of hatred and contempt: this 
negative image of the bourgeois first fed by literati such as Stendhal or “the hatred socially 
déclassé genius of Baudelaire” was subsequently given a world-historical dimension by 
Marx and Engels, who made out of the bourgeois “the last representative of a pre-historical 
humanity divided into classes” (Schmitt 1926:74).
However, according to Schmitt’s diagnosis, at the beginning of the twentieth century 
this image of the bourgeois as the last odium generis humani could no longer live out of 
the sheer instinct for class conflict and had to recur to a superior mythology, i.e. the 
national myth.194The power of this latter was, in his view, proved by the experience of 
Italian fascism and by the fact that even the myth of class conflict had to assume the 
colours of nationalism (Schmitt 1926: 74). Also, other examples provided by Sorel in his 
Reflections prove, according to Schmitt, that the strongest myth of modernity is national: 
“the revolutionary wars o f the French nation and the Spanish, and German wars of 
liberation against Napoleon are symptoms of a national energy” (Schmitt 1926: 75).
If myth thus is the expression o f a great enthusiasm, of an energy that is already 
given, then Schmitt concludes that it is at the “myth of nation” rather than at that of class 
conflict that we have to look. What lies at the bottom of this “energy” is subsequently 
clearly stated:
‘The more naturalistic conceptions of race and descent, the apparently 
more typical terrisme of the Celtic and Romance peoples; and then the 
language, tradition, and consciousness of a shared culture and education, the 
awareness of a community of fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft), a sensibility for 
being different in itself (Eine Empfindlichkeit fu r  das Verschiedensein an sich): 
all o f that tends towards a national rather than a class consciousness today 
(Schmitt 1926: 75; translation mine).
All these elements explain why, thus, when it comes to a confrontation between the 
two mythologies, it is national myth that has always been victorious. “Italian fascism, for 
instance, depicted its communist enemy with a horrific face, the Mongolian face of 
Bolshevism; this has made a stronger impact and has evoked more powerful emotions than
194 One must not forget that, in 1930, seven years after Schmitt’s Die politische Theorie des Mythus, 
Rosenberg’s Der Mythus des 20.Jahrhunderts" appeared, whose subtitle is significantly “Eine Wertung der 
seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit". For a discussion of Rosenberg, see Chapter 8.
the socialist image of the bourgeois. [...] that w as an example of the irrational power of 
the national myth” (Schmitt 1926:75; emphasis mine).
Thus, according to Schmitt, myth is the symptom of an irrational force stemming 
from the consciousness o f  a common race and descent, traditions, language, the feeling of 
belonging to the same community of fate as well as a certain feeling o f being different in 
itself. In other words, national myth is the symptom of a common identity. Myths are in 
this view the mere epiphenomenon of a deeper reality, of an identity that is already given 
and that finds its source in an irrational power that is fundamentally hostile to rational 
discussion.
It is not difficult to recognise in this theory of myth as irrationality a familiar 
discourse. Schmitt’s treatment of myth reproduces the semantic apparatus and conceptual 
strategies of the Aufklärung by simply inverting its axiological connotation. In the 
Aufklärung, myth is the defeat of reason and, thus, the source of all evils, here it is the 
“great enthusiasm” that breaks through the crust o f mechanism of reason; in both cases 
myth and rationality are set on two different and opposite grounds so that the two 
approaches, far from being opposite, converge on a fundamental point: myth and reason 
are heterogeneous and mutually irreconcilable. The suspicion, though, seems to be 
legitimate that this view is more that o f Schmitt, who has in tum  been deeply influenced by 
Nietzsche (McCormick 1997),195 rather than the result o f an unbiased reading of Sorel.
As we have seen, Sorel does not in fact seem to conceive of myth in this way. Not 
only does he never explicitly associate myth with irrationality, but he explicitly engages 
himself in and calls for a rational discussion o f the myth of the general strike. His 
opposition to parliamentarism stems from a rational preference for the general strike over 
institutional participation as a political means for obtaining certain ends, rather than from 
an intellectual rejection of rationality and discussion per se. On the other hand, Schmitt, 
who associates parliamentarism with rationality, could not but see in Sorel’s preference for 
myth and direct action a form of irrationalism.
But there is more at stake. Schmitt conceives of myth as the product of a national 
energy, i.e. of a national consciousness that is based on elements - such as language, 
tradition and consciousness of a common fate - that pre-exist myth. On the contrary, Sorel 
presents the general strike as a means for creating a class consciousness that does not yet 
exist. The fourth chapter of the Reflections on Violence is devoted precisely to showing
195 On Nietzsche’s recovery of myth see Introduction to part H.
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that the general strike, by conveying in a sole image all the principles o f Marxism, is the 
best means for creating such a consciousness. To put it bluntly, for Schmitt the myth is a 
“symptom” because it reflects an identity that is given; for Sorel it is the means for creating 
an identity yet to come.
The contrast between those two views signals one of the antinomies of social 
identity: identity is by definition “that which is identical to itself" but is at the same time 
“that which is different from itself’ since it is necessarily the always changing product of 
history. Identity is a choice, if we look at it from Sorel’s perspective, but identity is a 
destiny, if we turn to Schmitt.196 Political myths also reflect the same antinomy: they can 
be seen as both a symptom of an already existing identity, but also as a means for creating 
an identity yet to come.
This antinomy explodes at the end of the Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy where 
Schmitt, after presenting national myths as the symptom of an already existing national 
identity, points to the dangers that myth represents: myth, Schmitt now suggests, is by its 
very nature polytheistic, both because o f “the pluralism of an unforeseeable number of 
myths” and because “every myth is in itself polytheistic” (Schmitt 1926: 76). Therefore, 
the feeling of belonging to a single community of fate, which he had before identified as 
the source and fundament of myth, is now seen as a unity that is crucially endangered by 
myth. Thus myth, conceived as the “symptom” of an already existing common identity, 
comes to be that which, with its intrinsically polytheistic nature, threatens the very deepest 
reality o f which it would be a mere symptom.
If we now go back to the previous chapters of the Crisis o f  Parliamentary 
Democracy, we see that the same antinomy pervaded Schmitt’s treatment of identity and 
democracy. Schmitt’s major point in this text is that parliamentarism, i.e. the “government 
by discussion”, is intrinsically linked to liberalism, but not to democracy. Schmitt defines 
democracy in terms of identity in contrast to liberalism. In particular, by returning to 
Rousseau’s Social Contract he defines democracy as identity between rulers and the ruled 
(Schmitt 1926: 26,27).
However, whereas Rousseau conceived of democracy as identity between rulers and 
the ruled in the sense that those who govern and those who are governed must be the same 
persons (i.e. as identity to themselves), Schmitt uses the expression “identity between
196 On the idea of the antinomies of identity, see Wagner 2002. He distinguishes between three of them: 
“identity as choice or as destiny”, “identity as construction or as reality”, and finally “identity as autonomy or 
as domination”.
rulers and the ruled” in such a way that it comes to  signify not simply identity between 
individuals among themselves, but also identity o f individuals with each other, identity 
between these individuals and a tertium that is the nation, and finally even identity of this 
tertium with itself. This is clear later on in the text where he explains what he means by 
democracy as identity between rulers and the ruled:
“[..] Democracy rests on a string o f identities: to  this series belong the 
identity of governed and governing, sovereign and subject, the identity of the 
subject and object of state authority, the identity o f the people with their 
representatives in parliament, the identity o f  the state and the current voting 
population, the identity of the state and the law, and finally the identity of the 
quantitative (the numerical majority or unanimity) with the qualitative (the justice 
of the laws) (Schmitt 1926: 26).
Thus, it is through such a holistic use o f  the term “identity between rulers and the 
ruled”, which indeed seems to go well beyond Rousseau,197 that Schmitt can conclude that 
“democracy requires first homogeneity and — second if the need arises -  elimination or 
eradication of heterogeneity” (Schmitt 1926:9).
If one then further asks how this homogeneity is to be understood, then two opposite 
answers emerge from the text and we are faced with another antinomy. On the one hand, 
Schmitt seems to be quite straightforward in asserting that “the question is not one of 
abstract, logical-arithmetical games, but it is about the substance o f equality, and as such it 
can be found in certain physical and moral qualities” (Schmitt 1926: 9; emphasis mine). 
As we have seen above, a more detailed list o f these qualities includes: race and descent, 
language, tradition, a consciousness of a shared culture and education, the awareness of a 
community of fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft) and a sensibility for being different in itself.
On the other hand though, later on in the text Schmitt equally strongly asserts that, in 
fact, such homogeneity never exists in concreto. Indeed, he openly states that “the various 
nations or social and economic groups which organised themselves democratically have 
the same people only in the abstract: in concreto the masses are sociologically and 
psychologically heterogeneous” (Schmitt 1926: 25).
Indeed even the passage quoted above, in which Schmitt spells out all the series of 
identities that constitute democracy (identity between the governed and the governing,
197 We cannot here enter a discussion of the difference between Rousseau and Schmitt’s treatment of 
democracy. Let me only point out that, as is well known, an expression such as “the identity between the 
people and their representatives in parliament” could not but have appeared suspicious for a critic of 
representative democracy such as Rousseau.
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between the subject and the object of state authority, the identity of the people with their 
representative in parliament, the identity of the state and the current voting population, the 
identity of the state and the law, and finally an identity of the quantitative with the 
qualitative), is followed by a further fundamental qualification: all these identities, Schmitt 
writes, are in fact not a “palpable reality” {handgreifliche Wirklichkeit).
In other words, identity appears here not as a matter of an “objective” legal, political 
or sociological equality, but rather of what he calls “identifications” or “recognitions of 
identity*’ {Anerkennungen der Identität) (Schmitt 1926: 27).198 Thus, it is thanks to the idea 
if “identification” holistically understood that Schmitt can, for instance, conclude that 
democracy is not antithetical to dictatorship: “the will of the people -  so he wrote - is 
always identical with the will of the people whether a decision comes from the “yes” or 
“no” o f millions of voting papers, or from a single individual who has the will o f the people 
even without a ballot, or from the people acclaiming in some way (Schmitt 1926: 27; 
emphasis added).
This is not the most appropriate space for entering into an accurate discussion of 
Schmitt’s complex view of democracy and identity/ identification. But clearly, even from 
such a brief reconstruction, it is evident that the holistic way in which Schmitt uses the 
concept of identity can result in very problematic normative outcomes. They become 
patent in that Schmitt, moving from his definition of democracy in terms of identity 
between rulers and the ruled, can come to conclude that, in as far as the people “identify” 
themselves with the Führer, he can be said “to have the will of the people” and his 
decision, whatever it will be, is, as a consequence, always by definition “democratic” 
(Schmitt 1926: emphasis mine).
It might not be irrelevant to remember here that Nazism attempted to present itself as 
the saviour of democracy and Schmitt’s theory, as reconstructed above, lends itself to such 
a political project.199 The assertion that a dictator can “have the will o f the people” is 
however very problematic -  not exclusively, but primarily due to its political 
consequences. In dictatorship, identity and the myth that of this identity should be the 
symptom, far from being a means for autonomy (as it was for Sorel), is turned into its
198 To my knowledge, Schmitt’s usage of the concept of recognition, and, in particular, in relation to identity, 
has not yet been focused on. We cannot enter here a full discussion of the issue, but it is certainly one that 
deserves being further investigated.
199 Carl Schmitt’s adhesion to Nazism is one of the most debated issues in the literature. Suffice is to note 
here that Schmitt’s treatment of democracy and its compatibility with dictatorship reminds us that, as many
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opposite: identity or identification is the means for domination and, we can add, for the 
most annihilating form o f domination. -
Schmitt’s treatment of identity and of the relationship between the latter and myth 
brings to light a series o f conceptual problems linked to this use of the concept of identity. 
First, as we have seen, Schmitt considers myth as the symptom of an identity that is 
already given but, at the same time, one cannot but point to the fact that, as Sorel shows, 
and Schmitt also seems at certain points to recognise,200 myth is also the producer of 
identity. This leads to the problem of the continuity o f identity, i.e. that which we can call 
the diachronic antinomy o f identity: identity must exhibit continuity in time, it must be 
identical to itself in order to be “identity”, but it is also the ever-changing product of the 
becoming.
Second, there is what we can call the synchronic dimension of this antinomy, which 
stems from the problem o f  the boundaries of identity. As we have seen in expressions such 
as “national identity” or “identity between rulers and the ruled”, Schmitt combined 
“identity of singular individual beings with themselves”, “their identity with each other”, 
as well as “their identity with a tertium (e.g. the general will, the state, the nation)” and 
even “the identity of this tertium with itself in time”. This brings forth the problem of the 
boundaries of identity and, in particular, the problem of the boundaries between personal 
and group identities.
Faced with the consequences of Schmitt’s holistic use o f the concept of identity one 
would be easily tempted to get rid of the concept altogether. Analogous problems emerge 
with some of the contemporary uses of the term “identity”. Expressions such as “modem 
identity” (Taylor 1989), “national identity” (Smith 1991), or also the widespread “politics 
o f identity” risk to lead to a holistic understanding of the concept of identity.
In the first place, it should be noted that even if we are now used to using the term 
“identity” without further qualifications, the concept always denotes a relation rather than a 
being: “identity” means that something “is identical” to something else. Therefore, beyond 
the widely debated “identity issue” and expressions such as “modem identity”, “gender 
identity”, “class identity” or “the Italian identity” there are possibly interrelated, but
authors have pointed out, Nazi-Fascism attempted to present itself as the saviour of democracy. For a 
discussion of Schmitt’s theory from this point of view, see Wolin 1990.
200 He seems to be aware of this when he analyses the way in which the creation through the work of literati 
and thinkers of an image of the bourgeois as an object of contempt has led to a class consciousness and the 
way in which this was supplanted by the working of national myth (Schmitt 1923: 17; 1926: 74-75). In
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fundamentally different, questions: the identity of the singular human being with 
herself/himself, the identity o f different singular human beings with each other, the identity 
between the same singular human beings with themselves in time as well as the identity 
between them and a tertium (nation, the gender or another social group) and even the 
identity of this tertium with itself.
It is the possible conflation of all these different problems that renders the expression 
“identity” without further qualification so ambiguous. By simply rejecting the notion, 
though, one would still be left with the problems that the notion addresses. Therefore, a 
more promising strategy seems to be taking note of the ambiguity generated by these 
usages o f the term and starting by distinguishing the different problems and issues that are 
here unified. In other words, we should move from the assumption that the term identity, as 
it comes out of these debates, fundamentally designates a “problématique” (Wagner 2002) 
rather than an “entity”.
According to one view, the emergence of this problématique is intrinsically linked to 
the conditions of modernity.201 Taylor’s influential “The Sources o f  the Self', whose 
subtitle is “The Making o f Modem Identity\ openly signals this relationship (Taylor 1989). 
Furthermore, while confronting the problem of personal identity, some authors have indeed 
noticed that it is under specifically modem conditions, i.e. in the moment when the 
singular human being is no longer assigned to a specific status by his birth and his position 
in the cosmos or the society, but is rather faced with an expanding myriad of possibilities, 
that the formation of his own identity becomes a problem (Melucci 2000).
This does not mean that personal and social identities did not exist before, or - better 
- that the issues to which the term refers did not exist. It only means that they were not 
problematic enough to be conceptualised, or that, at least, they did not appear as 
“problematic” as they appear to us now. In other words, we can say that the conditions of 
modernity rendered personal and social identity fundamentally problematic because they 
made it clear that our identities are always the instable result of “what we are”, “what we 
have been” and “what we want to be”.202 Modernity is by definition the “new epoch” 
(Neuzeit), the epoch that aspired to radically breaking with the past and thus it can
another crucial passage, after having asserted that a single individual can have the will of the people, he then 
adds “Everything depends on how the will of the people is formed” (Schmitt 1926: 27).
201 On this point, see Wagner 2002.
202 On this point, see Cerutti 1996. Cerutti insists on what he calls the normative and planning side 
(normativo e progettuale) of any group identity: in identifying ourselves with a group we cannot leave aside
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transform identity into a “project”: in an epoch when the “horizon of expectation” has 
supplanted the “space of experience”, identity has to become a problem because it can no 
longer be seen as the mere deposit o f the past.203
Hence, what we have called the diachronic antinomy o f the identity problématique: 
identity, in whatever way we want to use this term, fundamentally refers to the idea of 
sameness, to an idem that remains the same in time by necessarily being at the same time 
always different (Friese 2002). Thus, identity is fundamentally a problem: it is the problem 
of the possible continuity o f an idem in the becoming, i.e. of a possible idem in the 
difference between past, present and future.
Indeed, once one has signaled the dangers implicit in holistic uses of the concept of 
identity, one must also recognise that in all different cases - the identity of the self with 
itself, the identity of a self with others, or the identity of an abstract notion with itself in 
space and time - the problem of identity is always the problem of the idem. Otherwise 
stated, whatever qualification we add, the problem of identity is always the problem of the 
identity in difference, the antinomy o f an idem that must be identical to itself by being at 
the same time different.
Clearly it is a different “difference” that is at stake each time in expressions such as 
“logical identity”, “personal identity”, or “group identity”. All the same, it should be 
stressed that if the expression “identity” without father qualifications has come to be 
widely employed, it is because it has been suggested that there are no clear boundaries 
between the various forms o f identity: Schmitt’s usage of the expression “identity between 
rulers and the ruled”, or common expressions such as “national identity” or “politics of 
identity” all suggest more or less explicitly that the boundaries between different forms of 
identity have been challenged.
Therefore, whereas some authors, faced with the different forms of identity, simply 
liquidate the issue by saying that all these forms of identity have nothing to do with one 
another,204one should take note rather that the problématique stems precisely from the 
problematic relationship between them: an object or a concept is identical to itself or to
“what we actually are", but neither “what we would like to be" nor “what we think we ought to be or do" 
(Cerutti 1996: 7).
203 1 am here referring to the Koselleck’s thesis as it is exposed in Vergangene Zukunfi (Koselleck 1979).
204 Thus, Bilgrami for instance in his article on “Identity and identification: Philosophical aspects" (Bilgrami 
2001) liquidates the issue of the different forms of identity by saying that the problem of the identity of 
“objects and events” must by treated by metaphysics and is not related to the problem of “national, ethnic and 
sexual identity”. However, the problem although thrown out of the door comes back through the window, as 
it clearly emerges in his distinction between “objective” and “subjective” aspects of identity.
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something else in a different way from that in which a person can be said to be identical to 
itself or to another person, and the two, in turn, differ from the way in which a group can 
be said to be identical with itself in space and time. On the other hand, to distinguish 
between the two does not imply to deny possible overlap and convergences.
Let us begin from personal identity. What constitutes the idem in this case? In what 
sense and how can the self be said to be identical to itself in first place? Identity, it has 
been recently emphasised, is “a story of recognitions” (Pizzomo 2000). Ourselves, what 
“we are” is the result of our living in different circles of recognition and consists thus in a 
long series of recognitions by those who are part o f these circles.
Different traditions, ranging from the philosophical reflections of Rousseau and 
Hegel to the interaction psychology of Mead, have recently been turned to in order to point 
to the social dimension of the constitution of ourselves, i.e. to the fundamental fact that the 
ways in which we perceive o f ourselves depend on the ways in which we are and have 
been perceived by relevant others (Taylor 1992, Honneth I992).205 The concept of 
recognition points, thus, to the fact that our personal identity is inseparable from our social 
identity because it is the result of interaction with others.
The recourse to the concept of recognition does not imply though that personal 
identity coincides tout court with family-, gender-, national-, class- or any other form of 
group identity. The simplest reason why this is not true is that whereas in the case of 
personal identity the first vehicle of recognition is our body, in case of group identity, there 
is not a single visible body that is the object of recognition by both relevant others and by 
ourselves. 206 The idea of a “social body” is clearly only a metaphor, and moreover, a much 
contested one.207
Thus, our identity is a story of recognition by others, but we interact with many 
others. Indeed, many theorists have, from different perspectives, underlined the 
multiplicity of identity: our identity, it has been claimed, is the result of the many different
205 Notwithstanding the common reference to the concept of recognition, there are many differences between 
all of these approaches. In the first place, whereas Pizzomo has recourse to this concept from a sociological 
perspective, in order to explain how society and conflicts emerge (Pizzomo 2000), Honneth and Taylor have 
a clear normative intent. Honneth by following Hegel’s Jena writings before the Phenomenology on the one 
hand and Mead’s social psychology, explicitly aims at building up an ethics of conflict whose ultimate 
normative reference point remains however the singular human beings (Honneth 1992), whereas Taylor, who 
refers on the one hand to Rousseau and Hegel’s dialectic of serf and master and to the Herderian ethic of 
authenticity on the other, applies the concept of recognition both to individuals as well as to social groups 
(Taylor 1992).
206 For a critique of Pizzomo’s neglect of the role of the body in the formation of identity, for instance, see 
Sparti 2000, as well as Pizzomo’s answer in Pizzomo 2000.
202 For a critique of the metaphors state-individuals, see for instace Bottici 2004.
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and sometimes contrasting roles and actions we perform in our life as well as of the way in 
which these generate dynamics of recognition. Still, if the word “identity” is to have a 
meaning whatsoever, if the concept o f the “s e lf ’ is to preserve its semantic core of 
“sameness” then there must be a unifying moment. The continuity o f the body, perceived 
and recognised by others and by the self, is the first answer.
As A. Pizzomo points out, the fact that our identity is a story of multiple 
recognitions also implies that there is only one self that knows the whole story and can 
reconstruct it (Pizzomo 2000: 209). Our identity is not the chaotic juxtaposition of 
recognitions, because intertwined with these latter there is also self-recognition, a sort of 
self-attribution o f identity. The self, thus, appears as a story of recognitions by others and 
by ourselves, because it is only the self that can reconstruct the whole story by narrating 
the recognitions that have been accumulating in space and time.
“Narrating in order to exist” (Melucci 2000) is the slogan that has be proposed for 
pointing out that the alternative is not between the Cartesian punctual “ego” and the 
dissolution of the idem in an eccentric identity. W hat creates an idem out of a more or less 
scattered set of recognitions is the possibility o f  a narrative. A self implies the possibility 
of telling a more or less coherent story and the unity o f the self is the unity of a possible 
story. This, on the other hand, must be a story that encompasses an endless number of 
stories: that of a moving, living, interacting body; that of a mother, a daughter, a sister, a 
worker, a member of a polity, to mention only a few. And the concept of narrative has the 
advantage of pointing at the same time to “sameness” and the unavoidable “multiplicity” 
of identity.
Thus, if identity is the story of recognitions, then the loss of identity is the loss of the 
possibility of telling a story. According to one view, the pathologies of the self can be 
considered in terms o f an interruption in a narrative or the loss of a coherent story (Ricoeur 
1965). The therapeutic impact of psychoanalysis has consequently been identified, not in 
the removal of the cause of the “trauma”, but rather in the possibility to rediscover a story. 
Disputes may arise, and have arisen, over the degree to which this rediscovery can be 
considered as a collective enterprise rather than an imposition by the therapist of a 
narrative upon the experience of the patient, but it seems as if there can be no definitive 
answer to this question.
On the other hand, what can be said is that the therapist does play a crucial role in 
the construction of the plot. The therapist is he who can help to rebuild a story by
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providing a narrative plot. In a letter to Einstein, Freud suggests that his theory is nothing 
but a great mythology (Freud 1932). In what sense can Freud’s conception be considered a 
mythology? The therapeutic impact of Oedipus’ complex lies in its power to generate 
story-plots: Oedipus’s and Electra’s stories are mytkologems that can potentially provide a 
plot to an interrupted life experience. Therefore, a psychoanalytical therapy is successful 
not when the cause o f the trauma is removed, which is impossible since an event has 
simply happened, but when it is inserted into a coherent narrative.
Notwithstanding the recent exponential interest in narrative, which has led to 
speaking o f a crucial “narrative turn” in the human and social sciences (Aronsson 2001), 
the narrative core of the self is not a recent discovery. According to Foucault’s discussion 
of the various technologies of the self, this discovery goes back at least as far as Greek- 
Roman philosophy and Christianity: in one, in the form of confession, in the other, as 
philosophical dialogues and letters to friends. In both cases, the self is constructed through 
narrative practices (Foucault 1988). In modem societies, confessions have been integrated 
into more or less institutionalized practices such as interviewing, teaching, counselling and 
therapy, all of which covey what Foucault calls disciplining, i.e. normative patterns for 
what should be told and the ways in which it should be done (Foucault 1988).
Foucault’s analysis of the technologies o f the self brings us back to a crucial 
antinomy o f identity: if identity is a story of recognition, then not only those who gave us 
past recognitions but also those who can influence our own construction of the plot 
dominate us. In other words, if our public and private selves are intimately linked to 
conversational practices and cannot be separated from them because it is through these 
practices that recognition, and thus the constitution of the self, takes place, what margin 
remains for autonomy? Identity as autonomy and identity as domination: this is perhaps the 
antinomy of identity that summarises all other possible antinomies: “identity as unity” 
versus “identity as plurality”, “identity as choice” versus “identity as destiny” (Wagner 
2002).
Two considerations, concerning respectively the diachronic and the synchronic 
dimensions of the antinomies of identity, can however be added. On the one hand, our 
identity is not just the story of past and present recognitions (both by others and by 
ourselves), but it is also the story of future and expected recognitions. These may or may 
not come, and our struggle for recognition may be more or less successful; but still the 
project and expectations of future recognitions is also constitutive of our own identity. At
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the same time, projects and expectations o f future recognitions are also dependent on our 
present and past identities.
This, in turn, brings in the issue o f  the relationship between personal and group 
identities. In what sense can a social group, nation or class be said to be an idem0. Either 
there can be an answer to this question o r expressions such as “group identity”, “social 
identity”, etc. are, properly speaking, nonsense. Here the problem is not only that of the 
narrative synthesis among a more or less scattered set of recognitions. The problem is that 
there is not a “self’ which can tell the whole story. There is not a body that is the object 
continuous in space and time o f a set o f recognitions and there is thus not a self that knows 
the whole story. Whereas the continuity o f the self, and thus of the story that only s/he 
knows, can be guaranteed by the continuity of the body, in the case o f the social group the 
idea of the body can at best be a contestable metaphor. The body with its precise contours 
is, in fact, the first vehicle o f recognition by the other as well as for self-recognition, but in 
the case of group identities we do not have just one, but many living bodies with many 
different stories of recognitions to tell.
A social group, indeed, is a being o f  imagination in a different sense in which “this 
table’ or “my self’ are.208 Properly speaking, they are not beings of imagination, because 
there is not a single subject who has this faculty o f  imagination, but rather a being of the 
imaginary (Amason 1994). In the case o f social entities such as the nation, the class or the 
state, we are not dealing simply with abstract notions, but with socially constructed beings: 
it is because there are narrating bodies that behave as i f  such beings existed, that they 
actually exist. They are not, to use Schmitt’s expression, a palpable reality. The recent 
explosion of literature on various aspects of “the construction of social realities” stems 
from a new emphasis on this fundamental insight.
If there is an idem that can unify the multiplicity of living, acting moving, narrating 
bodies, this, again, is a narrative, but it must be a narrative of a different sort: it must be a 
narrative that recognises that nobody can tell the whole story, and that maybe there is no 
story at all to tell. Any form of group identity adds a further dimension to the 
problématique of identity: the possibility to recompose, not just different stories, but also 
different narrating voices. The failure to do so results not simply in a “disturbance of
208 Following the publication of Anderson’s influential “Imagined Communities” and the growing interest in 
social constructivism there has been an exponential number of publications on the “construction” or 
“imagination” of social and political communities (Anderson 1983). Spinoza’s theory of political myth, as we
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identity”, but in the absence of a possible story, i.e. in the dissolution of a common 
identity.
How does myth relate to all this? The concept of the working of myth also implies 
the idea of plurality as well as that of its problematic nature. On the one hand, myth, as 
Schmitt points out, is intrinsically polytheistic: it is implicit in the concept of myth not only 
that there can be different variants of it, but also that there are many different and possible 
mythologems. Polytheism is what characterises myth but it also points, at the same time, to 
its danger: the plurality of stories may turn into the recognition that there is no common 
story to be told.
On the other hand, myth also implies the possibility of encompassing different stories 
in a common mythologem: different stories, stemming from different narrative voices, can 
be re-comprised in a single mythologem. Myth can, therefore, contribute to delineating the 
always problematic idem o f any form of group identity. Group identities are in fact often 
defined in terms of a set of elements, such as principles, values, memories, symbols etc. 
that we recognise as common and sufficient for feeling as a “we”.209 But what makes “a” 
single “set” out of a multiplicity of principles, values, memories, symbols? A common 
narrative seems to be the means of keeping together the variegated elements of any form of 
group identity. Myth, as narrative that provides significance, can also fundamentally 
contribute to this end.
Myth can, indeed, be one of the means through which a single narrative unifying all 
the variegated elements that constitute common identity come to be recognised and 
accepted by an intrinsic plurality of living, acting, narrating bodies. Myth is indeed a 
narrative that can coagulate and provide significance and significance, as we have seen, is 
always particularistic in the sense that what is significant for some people in given 
conditions might not be significant for other people in other conditions, as well as for the 
same people in different conditions.
Some authors have sustained that a group identity does not require a founding myth, 
which is seen as fundamentally deforming and thus as not criticisable, but only a 
founding narrative, i.e. “the memory, discussed and processed in public, of the processes, 
values and obligations thus maturated from which a political community or its new phase
have seen, contained some fundamental insights in this direction. What we need, though, is a transition, 
following Castoriadis, from “imagination” to “imaginary”.
209 See for instance Cerutti 1996: 6.
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derives” (Cerutti 1996: 22). While not all identities are mythical in the sense that I can, for 
example, recognise my “italian idenity” without this being a source of significance to me, 
this does not means that all founding narratives cab be constitutive o f identity. Indeed, 
there are many different stories that can be told about the “origins” o f an idem without 
them necessarily being constitutive of identity. For a narrative to become constitutive of 
identity it has to be able to make sense for the subjects of that identity - and not all 
founding narratives can help in this direction. Furthermore, a narrative that makes sense 
does not need to be cast in the form of “memory”, i.e. as narrative of the past, but it can 
well be a narrative o f its future.
Political myths, on the other hand, are not necessarily deforming and hostile to 
critical discussion and they can therefore also be the non-pathological means for the 
shaping of common identities. In particular, as narratives that provide significance, they do 
not only make sense of experience, they also provide orientation and stimulation for action 
in the here and now. In this sense, they can be the producers of the common identities 
derived from this action. The general strike described by Sorel is not a simple narrative that 
provides meaning to the experience of the proletariat, but it is the narrative of its future 
action because it contains a determination to act: and it is from such an image of future 
common action that, according to Sorel, the proletariat can derive its identity.
This brings us back to  the diachronic/synchronic dimensions o f the antinomy of 
identity as well as to the problem of the relationship between political and other forms of 
identity. Myth has alternatively been seen as the result and the producer of identity. And 
identity, in turn, has been seen at the same time as a destiny and a choice. Still, as we have 
seen, if there is an idem, this must exhibit continuity. The working on myth can be 
considered as the working on a common narrative that provides significance and can thus 
link the present with the past and with the future. The working on myth, thus, does not 
solve nor promise a definitive solution to the fundamental tensions o f identity, but rather 
fully addresses them.
A similar argument can be made for the synchronic dimension o f the antinomies of 
identity: the working of myth, with its intrinsic plurality, can be seen as a means for 
sustaining the formation o f group identities. The polytheism of myth, which, from the point 
o f view of Schmitt’s political theology, was a threat, can thus be seen as nothing but the 210
210 On the relationship between myth and critique see Chapter 3, whereas on myth and the critique of political 
reason see Chapter 7.
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reflex o f the heterogeneity of group identity. Conversely, to assume that identity 
necessarily implies homogeneity means to assume the point of view of political theology, 
which is certainly empirically misleading as well as normatively problematic. All forms of 
group identity are the result of different stories and different narrative voices whose 
possible re-composition in a common mythology is never assured.
On the other hand, Sorel’s example of the general strike shows that, from the point of 
view o f a theory of political myth, there cannot be any sharp separation between cultural 
and political identity. The myth of the general strike is a specifically political myth because 
it addresses the need for a common action that affects the specifically political conditions 
in which this action takes place. The identity that the myth of the general strike contributes 
to shaping is indeed both cultural and political. What renders a myth specifically political, 
and therefore the identity that it can contribute to shape, is the way in which it interacts 
with the context and, thus, the specifically political conditions that are given each time.
These brief considerations do not pretend to be exhaustive. Manifestly, they open 
more questions than provide answers. They simply suggest that a theory of political myth 
can be very helpful in facing the problem of common political identities. In particular, a 
philosophy of political myth must adress the antinomies of identity because the identity 
that results from the working on political myth is and must remain a problématique.
A philosophy of political myth, indeed, does not entail a homogenising view of group 
identity.211 Rather, the view of group identity that the concept of working on myth 
presupposes clashes with the idea that group identities are self-like wholes. There are many 
variants of this idea today, but the idea of the “clash of civilisations” is perhaps the most 
striking. Civilisations and culturescan be said “to clash” with each other only if they can be 
said to “interact” with each other, to “hate” each other, to “perceive” each other in a certain 
way or in another.212 Expressions such as “nations today raise questions as to Who we 
are? \ or even “in the world of global politics cultures interact with each other” 
(Huntington 1996: 21,43) imply attributing to cultural identities all the features of a self: 
raising questions, providing answers, interacting, and even hating and perceiving. Certainly
211 For instance Smith’s ethno-nationalism, which considers myth as a fundamental component of national 
identities, also seems to endorse a homogenising view of national identities (Smith 1986,1991,1999). 
However, it is only by conflating meaning and significance, on the one hand, and personal and group 
idenitity, on the other, that Smith can argue that since human beings need meaning, they also need to trace 
out their roots and genealogies and as they do it with their family origins so they do with communities and 
nation ( Smith 1999:60-61)
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these expressions are only metaphors, but the problem is that they are misleading ones. In 
particular, they can surreptitiously come to suggest that group identities could come close 
to exhibiting the same kind o f coherence as self-identity. But in group identities there is not 
a single narrating body that can tell the whole story, and it can therefore always be the case 
that there is no common story at all.
Thus, the problem with Huntington’s paradigm of the “clash of civilisations” is not 
only that he reduces social action to a unique category of determinations and motivations, 
i.e. culture (Terrier 2002: 141). Huntington explicitly claims that he merely aims to build a 
map of reality, which, like all kinds of maps, is necessarily reductive (Huntington 1996: 
29). The problem is rather that the map that he wants to draw is empirically misleading, 
because it suggests the existence of clear-cut “boundaries”, and normatively problematic, 
because it is based on the attribution to civilisations of the attributes of a self.213
The antinomies of identity, and in particular the attempt to solve them in a definitive 
way, has certainly helped in creating such a hypostatised view of identity. A certain degree 
of scepticism is thus necessary and we must never forget that beyond expressions such as 
“civilisations! identities” (Huntington 1996) or also “national identity” (Smith 1991, 1999) 
there might be a conflation between the identity o f individuals among each other, their 
identity with a tertium such as culture or nation, but also the identity o f this tertium with 
itself in space and time. But the subjects of social identity are always singular human 
beings: they are human beings raising questions, providing answers, being the object and 
subject of the process of recognition. In other words, only singular human narrating bodies 
can tell the stories of common group identities and there is never the guarantee that all 
these stories can be reconciled in a single plot.
Thus, the paradigm o f  “multi-culturalism” should also raise suspicion. Social groups 
and nations can be the object of “recognition” only in a completely different way to which 
individuals are. They are not selves that can recognise each other on the basis of a body 
and of a single narrating voice. In his Politics o f  Recognition, Charles Taylor, following 
Herder, deals in a parallel way with identity and recognition of individuals and identity and 
recognitions of social groups (Taylor 1992). But to say with Hegel that it is only through a 
process of recognition by the others that the self can emerge does not mean to assume that 21
212 Huntington, going against the German usage which distinguishes between “civilisation” (Zivilisation), as 
based on material factors, and “culture” (Kultur) as based on values, ideals, and other higher intellectual, 
artistic and moral qualities of a society, defines civilisations as cultural wholes (Huntington 1996:41 and ff)*
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social groups should be the object of a politics of recognition in as much as individuals 
should be. Axel Honneth and Alessandro Pizzomo, for instance, moving from the same 
insight do not arrive at the same conclusion.213 14 To hold this conclusion means to consider 
cultures as self-like beings and overlook the fact that, for singular human beings, a politics 
of the recognition o f single cultures thus understood may turn into into another form of 
universalism disguised as particularism.
In this way, the paradigm of multiculturalism, which theoretically derives from a 
critique of a solipsistic philosophy of the subject as pure abstract reason, risks turning into 
a form of solipsism on a larger scale, which is even more problematic than the solipsism of 
the subject it was meant to criticise. For instance, it has been suggested that this view of 
cultures as self-enclosed wholes could come to substitute that place once occupied by 
“race” in practices of discrimination: a multicultural politics of identity can result in a form 
of essentially flawed antiracism that, by endorsing a form of a cultural determinism of 
individual identity, tends to privilege cultures over individuals and can therefore lend itself 
to a politics of discrimination (Lentin 2004).
213 In particular, on the fundamentally problematic character of any form of analogy between states and 
individuals, see Bottici 2004.
2,4 In both these authors, the ultimate subject of recognition is the singular human being. Whereas Pizzomo 
has a more sociological approach, Honneth moves from the individual in order to construct an ethics that 
mediates between modem conceptions of freedom and morality and the ancient view of ethics (Honneth 
1992,1:1).
12. POLITICAL MYTHS TODAY: THE EXTRAODINARY AND 
THE BANAL
Political myth has often been associated with the extraordinary. Political myths, 
both when rejected by enlightened thinkers as regression into primitiveness or when 
acclaimed as symptoms o f a great enthusiasm by their sympathisers, were most often 
seen as manifestations o f the extraordinary. Thus, according to this view, political myths 
should have disappeared from modern politics, ruled as it is by an increasing 
rationalisation and bureaucratisation. In fact, this does not seem to be the case. Even in 
the world of organised modernity (Wagner 1994), it seems as if - to paraphrase Clifford 
Geertz - the mythical has not gone out of politics, however much the banal may have 
entered them (Geertz 1983: 143).
The suspicion emerges that it is precisely through the interplay o f the 
extraordinary and the banal that the working o f political myth can at best take place 
today. If this proves to be the case, then looking for the mythical only in the sites of the 
extraordinary, in the grand parades and blood rituals, one risks overlooking the actual 
sites for the working o f political myth. Precisely by rendering banal the extraordinary 
and vice versa, political myth may come to operate within the ambit of that which is out 
o f question, because it is either apparently irrelevant or too important to be questioned.
It should be remembered here that “banal” literally means “commonplace” in 
the sense of that which is used by the whole community. According to The Oxford 
English Dictionary, the term “banal” in the first place denoted something belonging to a 
compulsory feudal service, whereby for instace the tenants o f a certain district were 
obliged to carry their com  to be ground at a certain mill and to be baked at a certain oven 
for the benefit o f the lord; it is only from the intermediate sense of “open to the use of all
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the community” that the term comes to mean “commonplace, common, trite, trivial and 
petty” (Simpson, Weiner 1989, V ol.1:147).
If banal means this, then the hypothesis seems legitimate that political myth 
operates by rendering banal, i.e. commonplace within a community, that which is prima 
facie extraordinary. On the other hand, it might also be the case that, particularly under 
contemporary conditions, political myth can also operate the other way round, i.e. by 
rendering extraordinary what is prima facie banal.
If the interplay of the extraordinary and the banal proves to be the privileged 
site for the working of political myth, then this latter assumes a much more sinister light 
than it ever has in the past. Whereas grand parades of fascist regimes in a sense rendered 
the role of political myths conspicuous, in the composed discourses of our politicians, 
there seems to be little place for the great enthusiasm that according to a romantic view 
should characterise political myth. This may in turn be the result of the fact that, under 
contemporary conditions, political myths have become more difficult to perceive.
The postmodern attacks on grand narratives, together with the prophecies o f a 
world ruled by specialists without spirit, have from different sides contributed to 
obscuring the possible banality of political myth. By pointing at times towards the 
dangers of grand political narratives and at others towards their inevitable decline, both 
these approaches may have contributed to rendering us myopic in the face of the myths 
we live by (Midgley 2003). However, there is chance that the grand political narratives 
thrown out the door by post-metaphysical thought have re-entered through the window.
We have seen that, when analysing the technique of modem political myths, 
Ernest Cassirer observed that modem politicians fulfil the functions that, in traditional 
societies, were performed by the homo magus and homo divinans (Cassirer 1946: 288, 
289). Our modem politicians, he observed, not only promise to cure all social evils, they 
also continually foretell the future: prophecy has become an essential element in the new 
technique of rulership, the most improbable and even impossible promises are made, the 
millennium is predicted over and over again -  this, as we have seen, was his conclusion 
(Cassirer 1946: 289).
Now, if these remarks cannot fully explain why people need such prophecies, 
they can nevertheless provide some insights as to the forms that political myth can 
assume under the conditions of modernity. In particular, it seems as if the contemporary 
conditions of médiatisation and spectacularisation of politics (Edelman 1988) have
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indeed increased the potentiality of “prophecy’ as a technique o f government. In other 
words, precisely under such new conditions, politicians are given unprecedented chances 
to “make the most improbable, even impossible promises”. Our homines magi and 
divinantes might have refined their techniques o f divination up to a point where they 
have lost any magical aspect, but while the techniques have changed deeply, the things 
themselves -  to paraphrase Cassirer - have by no means vanished.
It is not only in the discourses of professional politicians that the working of 
political myth can be perceived. Again Cassirer’s remarks contain helpful insights in this 
regard. Let us go back to the passage where he analyses the role played by prophecies:
“Curiously enough, - thus the passage continues - this new 
technique of divination first made its appearance not in German politics, but 
in German philosophy. In 1918 there appeared Oswald Spengler’s Decline 
o f  the West. Perhaps never before had a philosophical book had such a 
sensational success. It was translated into almost every language and read 
by all sort or readers -  philosophers and scientist, historians and politicians, 
students and scholars, tradesman and man in the street. What was the reason 
for this unprecedented success, what was the magic spell that this book 
exerted over its readers? It seems to be a paradox; but to my mind the cause 
o f Spengler’s success is to be sought rather in the title of his book than in its 
content. The title Der Untergang des Abendlandes was an electric spark that 
set the imagination of Spengler’s readers aflame” (Cassirer 1946: 289).
The passage cannot but call the attention to the “sensational successes” of our 
epoch. Books such as Huntington’s “The Clash o f  Civilisations” or Francis Fukuyama’s 
“The End o f History” also seem to owe their extraordinary success to their titles much 
more than to their content. Huntington’s book is a mélange of the methods of political 
science, history and international relations, and nevertheless there are reasons to suspect 
that the power of “The Clash o f Civilisations” rests more on its appeal to the imagination 
that on the rigour of his scientific arguments. The title of the book sets the imagination of 
its readers aflame no less than Spengler’s did. The difference between the two is perhaps 
that, in the space of only a few years, the Clash o f Civilisations turned into a self- 
realising prophecy: while the “West” has not declined, “civilisations” appear indeed to 
have clashed.
Political myths, as we have seen, are not only the result of identity: they also 
create identity. They are not just the model o f  society, but also always the model fo r  
society (Lincoln 1989: 24). Flood has observed that political myths work both as
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cognitive schemata through which a present, past and future experience is organised and 
as practical schemata which orient and organise political action (Flood 1996). As Sorel 
also strongly emphasises, what is characteristic of political myths is that they do not 
exhaust themselves in contemplative images of the world; they also contain a 
determination to act (Sorel 1908). And this, as we have seen, is what, at the conceptual 
level, distinguishes them from purely historical narratives.
On the other hand, one does not have to look for titles that set the imagination 
o f their readers aflame for seeing the working of political myth. According to one view, 
myth and theory regularly coexist and reinforce each other (Flood 1996: 105). Political 
myths are simply the working on a common narrative that provides significance to 
present, past and future experience: as such they are not opposed to rational theorising, as 
an enlightened view would pretend, but rather, they are quite often intermingled with it. 
“Political myth -  Henry Tudor observed thirty years ago - supplies the theoretical 
argument with a concrete reference and a temporal perspective it would otherwise lack; 
on the other hand, the theoretical argument endows the myth with academic 
respectability and a certain timeless significance” (Tudor 1972: 126). Thus, for instance, 
M arx’s theory of society is not in itself a myth. Nevertheless, when inserted into a 
context in which it can come to provide significance for the subjects operating in that 
context, it can work also as a political myth.
Far from constituting a dichotomy, myth and reason often reinforce each other. 
A political myth, though, in contrast to a theory, is rarely learned once and for all: rather 
it is more often apprehended through cumulative exposure (Chapter 9). If political myths, 
thus, have always been “the working on” a common narrative, it is perhaps the privilege 
o f our time to have pushed the pervasiveness of this working to the extreme. Suspicious 
as we have become of any grand narratives, and thus of manifest political myths, we 
have developed political myths that, in comparison with those o f the past, tend to 
exasperate their form of archipelago. Whereas the grand political myths of the past were 
as conspicuous as continents, today it is only by travelling from one island to the other 
that, most of the time, we apprehend them. The risk, thus, is that we might perceive only 
single islands, but no longer the whole archipelago.
On a basic level, this network is typical of any meaning that, to put it in 
Umberto Eco’s terms, in always an unlimited network of references (Eco 1974). Each 
junction of the network is linked to the others by an unlimited series o f references, so that
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its meanings cannot be separated from the position it occupies in the network. But 
political myths do not simply provide meanings: the archipelago constructed by the 
working of a political myth is held together by a particular type of connection - the being 
part o f a narrative that has coagulated and thus makes significance for certain subjects at 
certain moments.
It is from the working o f  and on political myth that is also derived the peculiar 
relationship between political myths and those objects and images that convey them, and 
that Flood calls “icons” (Flood 1996). In modem societies, he observed, a photograph, a 
painting, a piece of sculpture, a carving, a cartoon, a poster, a mosaic, a collage among 
other things, can all represent an established political myth or a set of myths. The way in 
which this happens is in the form of a synecdoche: an icon is the “part” that stays for the 
“whole” of a political myth (Flood 1996: 167).
Hence is derived also the peculiar condensational capacity o f political myth, i.e. 
its capacity to be conveyed through fragmentary references, images, watchwords, 
slogans, echoes, as stressed by Barthes in his Mythologies more that half a century ago 
(Barthes 1957). According to Barthes, today myths are second-order semiotic systems, 
i.e. the products of a form of meta-language in which pre-existing signs are appropriated 
and stripped of their original content, so that the contingent product of history is infused 
with a natural appearance (Barthes 1957). Myth, thus, has the task of giving a natural 
justification to a historical intention and rendering natural and therefore eternal the 
contingent. ‘This process, so Barthes wrote, is exactly that of bourgeois ideology. If our 
society is objectively the privileged field of mythical significations, it is because formally 
myth is the most appropriate instrument for the ideological inversion which defines this 
society’ (Barthes 1957).215
Whereas Barthes rightly points to the increased condensational capacity of 
political myth in contemporary conditions, by defining myth as a second-order semiotic 
system which infuses historical products with a natural and thus apparently eternal 
appearance, he characterises myth as a form of false consciousness. As we have seen 
though, a more promising strategy is to make no assumption over the more or less 
mystifying contents of myth (Tudor 1972, Flood 1996, Lincoln 1989). Political myths are
215 For a discussion of the concept of ideology see Chapter 9. It should be clear at this stage that such a 
polemical use of the concept of ideology is not very helpful towards an understanding of political myth.
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narratives that must make significance within always changing historical conditions that 
therefore take the form of a continual Arbeit am Mythos (Blumenberg 1979).
A rejection o f grand narratives, on the one hand, and the emergence of new 
powerful technologies, on the other: both seem indeed to have rendered the working of 
political myth less and less perceivable, and therefore more subtle. The working of 
political myth has always been the working on significance and, as a consequence, 
political myths have always been difficult to analyse, precisely because the working of 
and on significance can take place at a more or less conscious level. Political myths are 
part of our basic components of everyday perception of politics and for this reason they 
remain unquestioned. They are not only that which we perceive about the world of 
politics, but rather the lens through which we perceive it (Bennett 1980). They are the 
basic assumptions of a society that are woven throughout everyday social discourses and 
practices: from dinner conversations to the lofty debates of political conventions (Bennett 
1980).
However, if, to paraphrase Spinoza, all societies are and have in a sense been 
“mythical”, what they differ in is the degree to which this mythical dimension can 
generate and is therefore compatible with further discussion. In other words, political 
myths can be the vectors of the project for autonomy, but in order to be so they must 
work as means for interrogation. The problem emerges, however, that under the 
contemporary conditions o f a globalised spectacle (Edelman 1988) this becomes more 
and more difficult.
According to Bennett, it is because o f the absence of formalised political 
ideologies in American politics that political myths tend to surreptitiously guide the 
whole process in which policies are made and public opinion formed (Bennett 1980: 
167). Its systematic effect on public thinking, communication and action explains, 
according to Bennett, a number of the characteristics of American politics, including the 
narrow range of public debates, the restricted scope of political conflict, the tendency of 
political institutions to produce and implement policies that embody stabilising images of 
political order whether or not they have any impact on underlying social problems 
(Bennett 1980: 167).
In the process of growing up in contemporary mediatic societies, Bennett 
observes, most people encounter an overwhelming number of myths that gradually slip 
into their subconscious thinking (Bennett 1980). Young children are exposed to a battery
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of them through schools, parents, cartoons, films, advertisements, icons etc. These myths 
may recount the extraordinary vicissitudes o f groups such as the Puritans, the Founding 
Fathers, the Slaves, the Western Pioneers, the European Immigrants. But whether these 
groups and their heroes are black or white, rich o r poor, great leaders or humble citizens, 
their dramatised experiences, according to Bennett, illustrate a remarkably similar set of 
virtues: in other words, their extraordinary adventures serve to transmit those models of 
conduct that are destined to uphold their future everyday banality. It is through these 
models of virtues - that which Spinoza called “exemplars o f human nature” - that people 
first encounter models of life centred on free enterprise, industry, tolerance, perseverance 
and individualism (Bennett 1980).
Some of these myths, Bennett observes, point for instance to the causes of 
poverty and other social adversities and show how people overcome them; others teach 
the principles of politics, the standards of civility and the nature o f society. The range of 
different myths available to make essentially similar points makes it possible for cultural 
perspectives to be transmitted in forms that are suited to the experiences of different 
social groups so that it is legitimate to assert that there is a clear body of myth at the basis 
of American society (Bennett 1980).
Neither could one object that these are cultural but not truly political myths: the 
concept of political myth precisely shows how problematic any sharp distinction between 
political versus cultural myths and identities can be. One cannot counterpoise “political” 
versus “cultural” identity as a “unity of political values and principles versus cultural 
diversity influencing their interpretation” (Cerutti 2003: 28) because what renders 
specifically “political” a set of values and principles is precisely the context in which 
they are set in the first place, and thus the way in which they are received and interpreted 
in everyday life.
There is, for instance, a whole range of literature showing how the working of 
apparently cultural myths alone can come to influence the specific political settings and 
conditions o f a society, and thus also the commonsense of belonging to a community no 
less than the distribution of power and other limited resources (Bennett 1980, Yanarella 
and Sigelman 1988, Edelmann 1988). This literature has shown how, for instance in 
mass-oriented American ‘Westerns’, the myth of the Frontier addressed political issues 
such as the nature of society or the persisting problem o f balancing the social need for 
law and the human desire for justice (Moeller 1980). Similarly, the problematic and
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undecided relationship between politics and sports fiction has been explored: according 
to one view, both when dealing with overtly political material and when not, works in the 
genre of sports fiction can be the site for the working of political myths. Among the 
narratives that have been able to coagulate significance, Shevory mentions the heroism of 
individual aspiration; the participation in community or rather the heroism of individuals 
equipped with extraordinary qualities, or the team as a utopian ideal (Shevory 1980).
Bennett also provides an illuminating example of the way in which political 
myths succeed in structuring political processes: their working is not only evident in the 
production of equally acceptable policy alternatives, but also in the generation of 
intolerance for political options that fall outside the range of the myth-sanctioned 
choices. The working of political myth is locatable in “what is not said” as much as in 
“what is overtly said”. For instance, in the 1972 election, George McGovern elicited 
strong public rejection and confusion by proposing a guaranteed minimum income for 
every American. The total failure of the proposal is even more striking if compared with 
the success of Nixon’s 1968 proposal for a guaranteed annual income.
The difference between the two, as Bennett observes, was not the amount of the 
stipend, which was the same, but the different terms in which the proposals were 
presented. Nixon put it in the mythically acceptable terms of a “Family Assistance Plan” 
and never mentioned the concept of a “minimum guaranteed income”. McGovern’s 
proposal, explicitly cast in the terms of a “guaranteed income”, was, in contrast, 
unacceptable to a diffused mythical understanding of poverty that attributed it to 
individual failings on the part of the poor.
As Bennett further points out, the diffused belief in the individual causes of 
poverty is the result o f the working of a political myth. Even if there is nothing 
“political” per se in the claim that the poor is poor because of its individual failures, and 
thus in the films, icons, and other fragmentary islands of this archipelago, it is clear that 
the context in which the working of myth operates and the way in which this myth is 
received and relaborated can come to render it crucially political. Furthermore, precisely 
because its working is not so easily locatable, dispersed and pervasive, it tends to remain 
out of question and, thus, to reinforce itself. According to Bennett, there is no policy 
success or failure that could contradict this myth today: if policies against poverty -  most 
of them generally aimed at correcting “individual attitudes” - are seen to fail once, they 
are easily interpreted as proof of the incorrigibility of individuals (Bennett 1980:172).
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Thus, from his analysis, Bennett concludes that the logic of mass 
communication tends to enhance the circularity of reasoning on social problems and 
political solutions: this circularity can also take the extreme form in which the failure o f  a 
political policy is regarded as a vindication o f the assumptions and understandings on 
which it is based (Bennett 1980:166). As Bennett concludes, the result of this is that “the 
popular significance o f political outcomes may have less to do with their measurable 
social impact than with embodiment of enduring images o f polity and society” (Bennett 
1980: 166).
Among the factors that promote this circularity, two deserve further comment. 
In the first place, there is what has been called “the primacy effect” (Flood 1996: 87). 
This term has been coined in order to stress the power o f a person’s earliest perceptions 
of a phenomenon to function as the basis for generalisations, categorisations and 
expectations that are not easily or adequately revised in light of subsequent observation. 
Through a process of continual exposure that starts from childhood itself, the working o f 
political myth assumes particularly insidious forms since it drastically reduces the 
possibility to perceive and thus dismiss it in favour of alternative cognitive and practical 
schemata.
The primacy effect is exacerbated under the contemporary conditions o f a 
globalised spectacle. In a spectacular society, the possibilities of rendering extraordinary 
the banal, and vice versa, are enormously increased. Thus, for instance, one does not 
need certainly to read Huntington to begin to perceive the The Clash o f Civilisations. 
This latter is continually put on the stage of our screens, and thus banalised, i.e. rendered 
commonplace through continual usage. One just needs to watch the news, children’s 
cartoons or Hollywood films, or merely walk in the street: everywhere there are 
innumerable examples of the mediatic constructions o f such a clash and o f icons 
variously recalling it. People no longer see single individuals acting in one way or 
another, they actually see civilisations clashing with each other. In particular, the 
working of the political myth of “clash of civilisations”, by providing the theory of the 
dangerousness of Islam with a concrete reference, as well as with an association with the 
emotional shock of September the 11*’ is becoming one o f more conspicuous political 
myths of our epoch (Geisser 2003).216
216 Geisser analyses the ways in which the working of this myth in the French media, academic and political 
debates has contributed to the rise of a “new Islamophobia” (Geisser 2003)
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However, we do not need to look among bloody clashes for seeing the working 
of political myth. According to Bennett, one can see the working of political myth even 
in political routines such as elections (Bennett 1980). In his view, political elections and 
the spectacle that usually accompanies them in the USA, rather than being a moment for 
questioning a certain model of society, are the means through which a basic model of 
liberal democracy is reproduced: elections are its visible, acted and re-acted continuity 
(Bennett 1980).
And this brings us to our second consideration. If  political myths are the 
models that a society or social group constructs o f  itself and fo r  itself (Lincoln 1989: 24), 
rituals such as elections can be seen as one of the social routines through which these 
models are reproduced within society. Indeed, in virtue of their mere repetition, rituals 
powerfully contribute to reinforcing the circularity of political processes.
As we have seen, though, political myth and rituals are not coextensive 
concepts.217 Whereas myths have to change with the changing of the political conditions 
for which they must provide significance in order to be effective, rituals must remain 
unchanged for the same purpose. Rituals indeed represent the stability acted out and re­
enacted: by virtue of repetition they tend to deny the passage of time, the nature of 
change and the implicit extent of indeterminacy in social relations (Moore 1975).
Rituals, together with other icons, and various fragments of the archipelago, are 
the means through which the working of political myth can take place. As Spinoza 
pointed out when analysing the political myths o f the nation o f Israel, it is through social 
rituals recalling in everyday life the pact with God that this political myth works. The 
working of myth is rarely learned once and for all, but has to be internalised through 
cumulative exposure. For instance, the obsessive character of Jewish rituals, according to 
Spinoza, by virtue of the obsessive repetition of gestures - when eating, ploughing, 
sowing - had the precise function of implicitly annihilating the sense of individual 
autonomy: in their everyday gestures, the Hebrews had to confess that they were not their 
own masters, but entirely under the control o f others (Spinoza 1670, V, 76). In 
particular, Spinoza observed, the strongest of all these rituals was circumcision: the 
inscription in the body itself o f the alliance with God was such a strong means for the *
2,7 On the difference between myth and ritual in general see Chapter 6 , whereas on the difference between 
political myth and ritual in particular see Chapter 9.
*18 As we have seen, a similar point was made by Cassirer on the Nazi rituals: with their obsessive recurrence 
in everyday life they annihilated the sense of individual freedom (Cassirer 1946). On this point see Chapter 8.
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cohesion of the people that, Spinoza affirms, it was simply thanks to this ritual that the 
nation of Israel could survive for centuries without danger of dispersion (Spinoza 1670).
As we have seen, though, according to Spinoza, this does not mean that 
political myths, since they are often transmitted through rituals, are destined to inhibit 
social change. If  political myths are models o f  a society and for a society and if these 
models are transmitted through social routines so that they are apprehended through 
cumulative exposure to them, how is it possible to account for social change? How can 
this circularity be opened? Under contemporary conditions, the problem seems destined 
to be even more insidious.
The enormous potentialities o f the new mediatic technologies, their possible 
global range, the increasing role that they play in our everyday life, not to speak of the 
alarming possibilities opened by biopolitics, all of them could potentially render the 
working of myth incomparably more sinister than it has ever been in the past. The 
working of myth is no longer restricted to a few disparate, fragmentary appearances 
recalling each other, neither is it limited to a few political rituals: we live in a world 
made of icons, i.e. of potential conveyers of the working of myth. Moreover, the working 
of myth is rendered less and less accessible in the form of the “great narratives” of the 
past: the attacks against them, far from being liberating, have rendered the working o f 
political myth more insidious whilst apparently “banal”.
In facing the issue of how social change is possible, Maurice Bloch pointed out 
the difference between ritualised and non-ritualised discourses. For Bloch, writing thirty 
years ago, the problem was still how to account for social change moving from 
Durkheim’s assumption that cognition is socially determined. His answer consisted in 
showing that, in fact, it is only “ritual” discourse that is moulded to the social structure. 
This, in his view, means that there are always terms available to social actors by which 
social order can be criticised: not all the terms are determined, in his view, by the social 
order (Bloch 1977).
Does this view still hold in the contemporary conditions of a globalised 
spectacle? On the one hand, we have seen that the working of what Bloch called 
ritualised discourses can be much more intrusive that in the past. We have also seen that 
the logic of mass communication tends to render the working of political myth much 
more insidious because, in a way, it neglects its own political character. There may be 
nothing overtly “political” per se in a Western, a sports fiction or any other sort of
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Hollywood film that does not openly deal with political material; but when it comes to 
the justification of certain policies over others, or even to the a priori denial of certain 
political options, then they do reveal their overtly political character.
Yet, as has been suggested, even in a sports fiction there can be germs o f 
political criticism (Shevory 1980). Even in the contemporary condition of mass 
communication there can thus be a chance for the working of what Castoriadis called the 
“radical imagination” (Castoriadis 1975). However sinister the new conditions might 
render the working of political myth, there may still be space for the working of the 
critique. The slogan “another world is possible” , which is the icon of a new possible 
political myth, is a symptom of the working of the radical imagination. The working of 
imagination is radical not only because it radically shapes our social imaginary, but also 
because it can create ex nihilo (not in nihilo or cum nihilo), and it can thus always 
potentially question its own products: imagination becomes radical when it becomes the 
means for interrogation.
To the question how is this possible, there is no general and definitive answer. 
Political myths, as well as political imagination in general, are destined to remain prey to 
the antinomies that we have seen in the working of identity: the working of political 
myth can mean unity and plurality, choice and destiny, the spaces for autonomy as well 
as for the most totalitarian of dominations. We do not need grand parades or blood rituals 
though to witness the working of political myths: they are a part of our banal political 
life.
The question of how questioning is possible is rendered even more complicated 
by the fact that the working of political myth is never “pure”, but is always interwoven 
with other kinds of discourses. It is not only difficult to locate the working of political 
myth: it must also be distinguished from the other kinds of discourses in which it is most 
often wrapped up. Thus, for example, religious political myths are typically myths that 
aspire to providing an ultimate meaning and unique truth: this is true, for example, of the 
Jewish theocracy analysed by Spinoza (Spinoza 1670), as well as for the contemporary 
myth o f martyrdom, against which Palestinian suicide attacks can be read (Larzilliere 
2003).
Scientific political myths, on the other hand, are those that present a narrative of 
events intermingled with chains of relationship causes and effects. Thus for example, the 
myth o f the Aryan race that Cassirer analyses is based on a melange o f narrative and
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scientific “findings”, such as the biological superiority o f the Aryan race (Rosenberg 
1930, Cassirer 1946). Clearly, the two discourses bring different issues to the fore.
Finally, there are historical political myths. In this case, political myths are 
fused with historical narratives. Historical political myths are narratives that produce 
significance and that can come to affect political conditions. For instance, most national 
myths, such as the Italian Resistenza or the French Revolution, are derived from 
historical narratives (Smith 1986, 1991). In the case of historical narratives, the great 
advantage in respect to other forms o f political myth is that there is a moment in which 
these narratives are given “visibility” since they can be put in the form of a “rationalised 
memory” (White 2000). In these cases, the working of myth can thus be more easily 
located, formalised and discussed.
Each of the types of political myth described above brings further 
considerations to the fore and, therefore, also calls for different tools of evaluation: the 
very possibility of an “ultimate meaning” in the face of a plurality of sacred stories, the 
correctness of scientific theory in respect to current paradigms, or the accuracy of the 
historical reconstruction in respect to current methods. Their possible fusion with 
political myths, on the other hand, points to their intrinsic plurality: the plurality of the 
“sacred stories”, the probability of scientific findings as well as the never ending 
character o f historical interpretation.
When the plurality of political myth is denied this is the sign that the instituted 
dimension of the social imaginary is denied. Political myths live out o f history: they have 
to remain open to change because they must provide significance to changing 
circumstances. On the contrary, when political myths attempt at a closure of meaning, 
then no more working is possible and the myths in question cannot be revised, but only 
dismissed together with the political regimes that have produced them. Well known 
examples are the myth of Jewish theocracy, the myth of the Aryan race or the fascist 
myth of the Italian “Romanita These are myths that, by attributing the origins of the
social significations o f a society to an extra-social source (Gods, heroes, ancestors), have 
covered up the instituted dimension o f society, and thus subtracted it to the possibility of 
interrogation (Castoriadis 1988: 153).
This is the main reason why we should be sceptical in the face of all myths 
whose working can come to cover up the instituted dimension o f society. Thus, for 
example, it is not in the story of the eponymous heroine Europa, recently revived from
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Greek mythology, that we should look for the mythical underpinnings o f the construction 
of Europe (Passerini 2003). The risk is not only, as it has been observed, to close the 
meaning of the European construction into its problematic “Greek origins”. As has been 
pointed out, the myth o f Europa raped by the bull, however reinterpreted, remains a 
Greek myth that, under contemporary conditions, cannot but recall the exclusivist myth 
of a European inheritor of Greek civilisation: the working of this myth cannot but leave 
out all those who are “in but not of Europe” (Hall 2003). The myth of Europe raped by 
the Bull can be not only misleading - since there is no more reason to link the European 
Union to Ancient Greece than, let us say, to its Latin or even its Arab origins - but also 
normatively dangerous, because it can occult the instituted dimension of society.
Furthermore, as is always the case, by looking for the mythical among 
extraordinary stories of heroines and Gods, the risk is to become myopic towards the 
much more powerful and apparently banal myths that we live by. In the case of the 
European Union, at least two other political myths seem to be at work. One is the 
political myth of Europe as the land of freedom and welfare: the clearest sign of the 
working of this myth can perhaps be caught in the number of immigrants that are 
prepared to die at its borders. Secondly, there is the political myth that derives from the 
banal history of the European construction itself, first bom as an institution aimed to 
solve the historical conflicts between Germany and France over coal and steel, then 
developed into the European common market and later into the European Union. These, 
however, are still, to a great extent, myths to come.
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